Alexander Shubin. Mode in search of character

Mode in search of character
Alexander Shubin

Date of publication: October 16, 2000

At one time, it was customary to begin a conversation about a particular regime by defining its character. You have decided what kind of regime you are facing - bourgeois or people's democratic - and much is already clear. With the fall of the monopoly rights of Marxism-Leninism on humanitarian knowledge in our country, this activity “lost its relevance.” But in vain. The nature of the regime is its quality, generic affiliation, and defining features. If you understand the character, you will understand the logic of behavior. It is especially important for its leaders to understand the nature of the regime. Otherwise, it will turn out like Putin’s predecessor Andropov, who suddenly realized that he did not know what kind of society he had inherited. Putin behaves as if he faces a similar problem. He doesn't know what he controls. All he knows is that the whole thing is in crisis.

In relation to the regime existing in Russia since 1993, it is easy to apply three definitions: bourgeois-oligarchic (socio-economic content of reforms), authoritarian-bureaucratic (content of socio-political practice), virtual-manipulative (methods of control over society and information form). All these aspects of the regime entered a period of crisis in mid-2000, from which no way out was found.

Crisis of the oligarchic regime

Already in the first half of the year, a split emerged in the group of winners in the 1999-2000 elections. V. Putin, who largely owed his victory to B. Berezovsky and his “chain friend” S. Dorenko, began to act in the interests of another group, which even after the death of the “founding father” A. Sobchak can be called St. Petersburg. The administration, which was formed not without the influence of Berezovsky, now does not want to follow the “advice” of its “godfather”. The cunning BAB hasn’t been “thrown around like this” for a long time.

The social meaning of this process is clear. In many ways, it repeats the situation of 1997-1998, when “young reformers”, closely associated with oligarchic groups in the process of coming to power, suddenly switched to anti-oligarchic positions. Of course, some financial bigwigs remained on their team (ONEXIM, for example), but rather in supporting roles. The technocratic bureaucracy decided to escape the control of monopoly capital and act in accordance with its understanding of the state's benefit. Our reformers, with Yeltsin's approval, were seized by the utopia of a clean, transparent, honest and efficient state. But there is no such thing as bureaucracy. And after several years of intensive merging of bureaucracy and business - even more so. As a result, the oligarchs turned out to be stronger than state regulation and used a wide arsenal of means of pressure, including television, financial flows, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and the Independent Trade Union of Miners. Result - August 1998.

Despite the fact that the events of 1998 brought a lot of trouble to the oligarchs themselves, Berezovsky and others like him decided that now the young reformers would become humble and would not dare to challenge the oligarchic lobbying. And even more so - Putin, who stood very close to Sobchak, Borodin and Chubais, who were involved in scandalous stories. But such is the social role of the young reformer. He is more of an official than a market man. He needs a rationally organized, not a lobbyist market, an ideal scheme, which may not be feasible in reality, but which needs to be moved towards. And Putin began to implement it, “tighten the screws,” and level the conditions in the vastness of Russia.

On May 14, a new level of management was created - representatives of the president - which assumed part of the power. The emergence of this lever of reform and the transformation of the upper house of parliament caused a confrontation between the governors, which resulted in month-long bickering over the law on the formation of the Federation Council - from June 28 to July 26. Before this conflict had time to enter the open phase, on May 31 Berezovsky decided that the right moment had come to go over to the opposition - someone had to lead the governor’s resistance! But this was the first mistake of the “great schemer” - socially, the governors are much closer not to Berezovsky’s arguments about democracy and federalism, but to Putin’s new order. After all, governors are officials who are accustomed to pushing around business in their territories.

Putin is building the same model on a Russian scale. Officials do not like those who give them a bribe and then try to give instructions and command departments from their offices on this basis. And after Putin signed the Decree on the State Council on September 1, that is, he promised to meet personally and “resolve issues,” only a few donor regions had grounds for dissatisfaction. But there are “seasoned men” on the farm who know that there is no need to quarrel with the bosses if there is no real opportunity to get rid of him.

Of course, the reforms “according to Gref” remain liberal, and in this regard, the ruling technocrats continue to play in a field that is obviously unfavorable for themselves. In the era of transnational corporations and global financial flows, the state is strategically weaker than business. But global business is not only about Russian monopolistic oligarchs, and their removal from power is not yet a reason to bring down the ruling regime in Russia. For now you can practice in Yugoslavia.

Under these conditions, the bourgeois-oligarchic regime was able to get rid of direct tutelage from some of the oligarchs and, to a greater extent, acquired the features of an authoritarian-bureaucratic regime. Today, the position of the ruling young reform group is stronger than in 1997-1998. Firstly, now the heavy hand of the old president does not hang over the young reformers. You can consult with him, but he will not resign at the most inopportune moment, as happened with Kiriyenko. Secondly, the refusal to rely on some of the financial oligarchs slightly narrowed the socio-economic base of the regime, since production (especially raw materials) capital is still generally satisfied with the economic course. In addition, the young reformers in 1997-1999 did a lot to bring natural monopolies under state control. But the removal of oligarchs from commanding political heights has caused a number of problems associated with the virtual nature of the modern political environment. Media moguls began to wait for the moment of crisis, and they arrived quickly.

Crisis of the virtual regime

The August events (primarily the story of the sinking of the Kursk) dealt a crushing blow to the virtual basis of the current government. It was in August that even Putin’s supporters saw that the hero was virtual. Why does a real, functional leader “tour his property”? Why does he climb onto submarines and sit at the helm? To find out what the difficulties are, how reliable and safe something is. But the virtual president lives according to the script and does not ask unnecessary questions. “How will you save yourself, guys, if this hatch fails? Do you, Comrade Admiral, have divers at your disposal to open this thing if it jams?” How does a real head of state act if sudden troubles occur in the country? He immediately arrives at the workplace and sits down at the controls. But if the president is virtual - a television puppet designed to distribute medals and deliver speeches written by speechwriters, then his actions in a crisis situation are ensured by the logic of PR. In the event of an emergency, presidential PR people begin to wonder whether it would be good for Putin to arrive at the scene of the incident. It was good to go to Pushkin Square after the explosion. The consequences have been eliminated. Anyway, we plan to interrupt our vacation due to a visit from a foreign colleague. But the Barents Sea is bad. What if you can't cope with the situation? Miracles, like in Chechnya, must be planned in advance. But there won’t be a miracle here. Is this good for PR?

Putin can be understood as a human being. The man worked for a year in the field of the state show. For once I was going to relax in Sochi. And then drag across the whole country to cold latitudes. If only she had drowned in the Black Sea! But the military says everything is under control.

A few days later it became clear that everything was wrong, and the laws of PR demanded an immediate arrival on the Peter the Great, a thoughtful look, and sympathetic speeches to relatives who had not yet despaired. In this case, the virtual essence of the regime would not be so noticeable.

Putin’s problem is not that something is sinking and burning all the time. All over the world, things constantly break down and people die. And, horror of horrors, the victims’ relatives are not even paid ten years’ salary in advance. Chirac recently personally witnessed the fall of the Concorde at the airport. But this did not lead to a political crisis. Chirac did not quarrel with the owners of leading non-state television channels.

What brought Putin to power - the manipulation of mass information - now threatens the sustainability of power both within the country and abroad. The president's unsuccessful phrases and steps are repeated many times on air. The president is noticeably nervous in the new situation and breaks down: “They stole money, bought the media, manipulated public opinion. That’s all. It’s a difficult issue, unfortunately, with the media.” This is true. They stole and manipulated. And only thanks to this Putin became president.

The president’s problem is that he behaves like a virtual president (as he’s used to), and in the virtual environment he acts like an authoritarian politician. This duality of behavior produces the worst results.

Understanding the problem of the media precisely as a problem of power, Putin immediately began to prepare for a fight with ORT, trying to bring Media-MOST under state control. This war, planned as a blitzkrieg in Chechnya, was a complete failure from the point of view of media laws. May 11 - an energetic raid on the premises of "MOST". On television it looked like a gangster action. Even the frightening masks of the security forces, designed for bandits, on TV turned the operas themselves into bandits, characterizing the entire regime as criminal. This, coupled with what follows, fits well with the stereotypes of not only liberal, but also state-communist consciousness as a continuation of the “great criminal revolution.” And this is a serious blow to the electoral base of Putin, who was previously portrayed as a fighter against “lawlessness.”

Having lost time, the regime got involved in a war on two fronts - with growing opposition from ORT. But before the August disgrace, he still managed to make Gusinsky a political prisoner on June 13, under the threat of criminal prosecution, to obtain from him a willingness to profitably renounce his shares in favor of Gazprom (almost the state). Now that this whole story has turned into a big scandal, the question remains - who came up with Protocol #6 signed by Lesin on July 20? After all, all the problems of the regime were solved by the previous five papers. But Gusinsky’s problems were not solved. Having convinced the winners who pressed him politically (Voloshin, Lesin) and financially (Vyakhirev, Kokh) that he needed security guarantees, Gusinsky killed three birds with one stone: he got rid of the criminal case for a while in order to go abroad, also temporarily solved the problem of debts and received a trump card to refuse a bad deal if better offers are found. And in the conditions of “gangster persecution of the opposition,” such proposals could be found (and, apparently, were found) precisely in the West, for which “MOST” is the last channel of effective information influence on public opinion in Russia.

Back in July, Putin could well have strangled the opposition on ORT. Fortunately, the state has a controlling stake in the hands, and such ORT leaders will not take risks for the sake of friendship with Berezovsky. But this takes time. Long negotiations were held with creative workers...

Meanwhile, a maritime tragedy broke out, and Putin found himself under attack from two television channels (NTV and ORT), which managed to take over the intellectually unwieldy RTR. The picture of the complete incapacity of the authorities took hold of minds. The crisis of the oligarchic regime led to a catastrophic collapse of the virtual lining under the regime.

This is already a matter of political survival. The power decided to use itself. Having experience in taking away shares from Gusinsky (and not knowing that they had fallen for a bluff), the administration suggested that Berezovsky also give back the shares. Unless, of course, he wants to get Gusinsky into trouble. The media reaped what they sowed by fighting for Yeltsin and then trying to privatize the battle-built regime.

After Dorenko refused to obey the administration not through BAB, he was taken off the air on September 9. The Moor did his job, but at the same time made good money. So let's not feel sorry for the Moor. Moreover, Berezovsky does not abandon his team, but uses it to cover his own capital. When the administration tried to get a stake in Berezovsky's ORT as profitable as the shares in MOST, Berezovsky promised to transfer this 49% to the management of the creative intelligentsia. Since dozens of intellectuals cannot manage anything, we are talking about transferring the package to the director, with whom the intellectuals will sometimes meet and even possibly pay him a salary (according to Berezovsky’s original plan, from their own pockets). First of all, those creative intellectuals who previously received the lion's share of their salaries from Berezovsky's pocket bought into this idea.

And then, just on September 18, the NTV-Gazprom scandal broke out. Apparently, Gusinsky has already found the money. The bomb of an international scandal exploded. Madeleine Albright publicly stood up for Media-MOST, and the inspired NTV in the program “Dolls” promised to put Putin in an American prison for tax evasion. Like, don’t take from others, and they won’t ask from you. Putin had to urgently accept his predecessor Gorbachev, whom NTV turned into its “human face,” and dissociate himself from Lesin. But it was impossible to fire the Minister of Press, because then the former (and possibly future) owner of Video International would also turn into an enemy, and even publish memories of who and how gave him instructions to take away the shares. In general, on September 28, Lesin, hiding a grin, was publicly flogged by the government and released in peace - to discuss the plan for belated revenge on Gusinsky in the prosecutor's office. Meanwhile, the media tycoon himself turned into a “defector”, inviting the prosecutor’s office to continue the dialogue on Israeli territory.

The “fighters” remaining in Russia against the regime are no longer as brave as during the previous information wars. The leaders of NTV, playing the role of going underground, recall the Aesopian language native to the “sixties”. It is no longer possible to scold Putin in the same terms. But it’s impossible to resist - the “intelligent” soul is eager to defame someone. And so E. Kiselev ends the “Results” on October 1 with a vociferous swearing at the pillar of the regime - “Azef” Pavlovsky, simultaneously “educating” the audience, reminding us, the “siryms”, who Azef is. But the bewildered viewer needs to be quickly reminded who Pavlovsky is. Gleb Pavlovsky is a right-wing analyst, head of the Effective Policy Foundation, who supports the current administration. Since criticism of the administration poses a danger, we can focus our fire on a representative of “our own shop” who has sided with the regime. Kiselyov has forgotten the times when he himself stood guard over the administration through faith and falsehood. The regime stamped its foot, and the media became quiet. It's hard not to notice that this is just a lull.

Authoritarian regime crisis

Having lost his monopoly on the media, Putin feels out of place, increasingly resorting to “administrative resources.” But in the modern world, this resource in itself does not provide a chance to win. Global financial and information flows are not regulated in Moscow. And administrative barriers that are too strong can cause quite destructive pressure on oneself. Perhaps the West took up arms against the essentially harmless Milosevic precisely because it was so that the Russian leadership would understand the limits of its sovereignty.

Meanwhile, the administrative resource itself has become quite worn out. The symbol of this was the same "Kursk". If the boat was sunk by admirals, then they cannot be removed from office. If you punish the admirals, then Putin will also lose the support of the military, and the media will begin to defend them with the same fervor with which they previously denounced them for “disinformation” and “ineffectiveness.” Discontent among the high command is like death. Because now there is someone to pay for the coup. It's much better to keep them on a short leash of investigation. But the army is shaky both in the middle and in the lower echelons. The military is already learning to use force in economic conflicts. On September 12, in Ivanovo, missilemen famously occupied a substation in response to a power outage in part of the military camp. The military can be understood - they are not to blame for the fact that the government did not pay off RAO UES. But if the army gets a taste for it, then we should soon expect to occupy the Ministry of Finance building in response to the delay in salaries for officers. And there it’s not far from the Kremlin. Meanwhile, contract soldiers, “thrown in” with some of the “fighting” money, are already blocking the approaches to the district headquarters in Rostov-on-Don. This is a strong blow to attracting those willing to serve under contract and at the same time an example for officers to follow.

As for other security officials, the government’s behavior regarding the traffic police requirements for the administrative code is symptomatic. When discussing the automobile chapter of the code in the Duma, the government symbolically insisted on a couple of articles stimulating police corruption and removed them so as not to jeopardize the passage of the budget. And here the administrative resource has its own interests, and the government has its own.

So, administrative resource is an unreliable thing. No one is going to strain themselves in the name of Putin’s policy of strengthening statehood. Strengthening the state can have different consequences. And the growth of corruption with the strengthening of the positions of bureaucrats will come faster than the restoration of order.

Historical experience shows that administrative resources only work together with an idea that reinforces the “revolution from above” with mass active support from below. There is simply not enough power to mobilize the masses. Today everyone loves their homeland - from Zyuganov to Berezovsky. Virtual levers for arousing enthusiasm are paralyzed by the information and financial war.

If Putin finds an idea that can captivate an impressive mass of fellow citizens, he will be able to compensate for the resistance of the “power” and pro-Western oligarchs, rely on the movement of society and make the state mechanism work. If not, he will be demonstratively flogged and forced to fulfill unspoken election promises. Or they will replace him with someone more presentable and calm. Like Kasyanov. In these conditions, you won’t envy Putin. But he is still too recently on the throne for his opponents to conceive the idea of ​​organizing a palace coup.

In the remaining time, the president needs to find a fresh idea around which a popular ideology of change can be formed. In this regard, the meeting with A. Solzhenitsyn on September 20 seems no coincidence. An authoritarian regime needs an understanding of its perspective, its character; it needs a non-virtual information resource. The official media used the visit to quote the writer's positive assessments of the president. But the substantive side of the conversation also slipped through: Solzhenitsyn advised the president to pay attention to self-government. Did the president hear what the interlocutor said? Self-government, a society organized from below, is an alternative to the current bureaucratic-capitalist swamp on the periphery of the world. Moreover, the alternative is constructive. Self-government, grassroots democracy and organization can become the basis for turning the population into a people, for revival. But in this case, the regime will have to radically change its character and take a real step towards democracy.