Evgeny Kuznetsov. Chronicle of a declared disaster

Chronicle of a declared disaster
Evgeny Kuznetsov

Date of publication: October 16, 2000

Lately it has become unfashionable to fight communism - in the form of ghosts, hydras, the terrible Zyugano-Makashov monster. The knight's march from the inn to the windmill was stopped by harsh weather conditions and led to some increase in practicality and realistic perception. Those words suddenly entered the lexicon, the utterance of which turned a person into a “marginalist” who did not understand the “epoch-making essence of transformations.” Suddenly it became “decent” to talk about the deterioration of fixed assets, the destruction of science and culture, and the need to increase the role of the state in the economy. And, of course, about the “demographic catastrophe.”

It’s not that these suddenly awakened signs of adequacy are insincere - after all, the new government seriously intends to be re-elected not only through “technology”, but also on the wave of a real improvement in life. It’s not that these problems are far-fetched or exaggerated - unfortunately, the numbers and facts scream about large-scale and negative changes. But so far, in the borrowing of vocabulary and “circle of concerns,” there is no sense of some understanding of what, in fact, is happening in the country and the world and what are the principles of domestic and foreign policy that could lead us to a period of sustainable existence and development.

Society is looking for a way out, but is it ready to find it? Is it possible to “solve” the problem by leaving in the taboo area those system presets that are its root cause? Making “ugly” symptoms the subject of much publicized fuss, forgetting to inform about the diagnosis of the disease itself? Is it possible to find a way out in which the number of sheep is preserved not by shooting wolves, which just yesterday were the standard-bearers of social Darwinism, which, by a strange coincidence, is now called “liberalism” in our country? So, are we trying to correct critical developmental deviations or are we implementing the PR concept of “caring power”?

Difficult questions. Before trying to answer them, we should use the example of the extremely complicated problem of large-scale demographic changes caused by a complex set of reasons to analyze what, in fact, are the real pillars of understanding the situation and determining the path forward.

Russian cross

People first started talking about a “demographic catastrophe” in the middle of the decade, when a rather sharp surge in mortality was noted. Since the beginning of the 90s, constant steady natural population growth (about a million per year) was replaced first by a stop (1990-1991), and then by a rapid decrease in population (over 700 thousand people per year). Increased migration somewhat “damped” the decrease in numbers, but it did not change the main thing - the population of Russia began to steadily decrease. It immediately became noticeable that there was not only a surge in mortality among all categories and ages of the population, but also a sharp decline in the birth rate in most regions of Russia, and this double trend received the somewhat ominous name “Russian cross”. The unacceptably low reproduction rate (about 1.4 with the required 2.3-2.4) and the steady trend of decreasing life expectancy, which consists of the not entirely favorable legacy of Soviet times (generations weakened by war and other social cataclysms and their children) also look critical ) and the drastic consequences of the deteriorating social situation.

Several trends immediately emerged in assessing the changes that had occurred. Critics argued that the changes were "catastrophic" and indicated the country's imminent extinction; defenders of government policy defended themselves by saying that “for Europe” (more precisely, for all developed nations in which certain structural changes have occurred), negative population dynamics are very typical and there, too, natural decline is covered only by migration. Both of these statements are equally unfair and dogmatic. Crisis processes in the demographic situation have been growing before, and the negative consequences of the “dark” or war periods of history have been talked about for a long time - for example, the Great Patriotic War affected the population not only directly, through significant losses, and not only in the form of a reduction in the birth rate, but and through the weakening and, as a consequence, higher mortality of “children of war,” as well as the lower vitality of their children, “grandchildren of war.” Negative trends have been growing for several decades, and the state has constantly been faced with the question of overcoming them.

Equally unsuitable are statements about the “modernity” of negative growth. Let’s compare: in Russia since 1993 it ranges from -5.1 to -6.1 people per 1000, while in Germany over the same period from -1.0 to -1.5, in Italy from 0. 0 to -0.5, and in “cold” Sweden a negative increase (about -0.2) appeared only in 1996, and before that it was positive - about 1-2 people per 1000. So, what kind of “Europe” are we talking about? are we talking? About Belarus (approximately -4), Bulgaria (approximately -5), Hungary (approximately -3) or about “developed countries”, in which a weak negative drift is not only compensated by migration, but may well be reversed (we are talking about a return to relatively stable situation no more than ten years ago). Something else is evident: social reforms have an equally negative effect on the population, regardless of the specifics of the course being pursued - and this is a natural consequence. However, the scale of the negative consequences varies and likely reflects substantive differences in the policies being pursued.

Unpleasant facts became generally known, first after their active use by the left opposition (the “genocide” clause was the core point for many in the attempt to impeach Yeltsin), and now - from the policy statements of the new Russian leaders. It would seem that if the state “finally” pays attention to the problem and tries to develop ways to solve it, then the negative trends can be reversed. However, not all so simple. The extremely complex picture of the root causes of the described phenomena does not give reason to assume that any social engineering technology will be able to rectify the situation. Moreover, in this matter there is a fairly clear example of a “social experiment” that was initially successful, which, however, did not change the situation. We are talking about the “anti-alcohol campaign” and its direct and indirect consequences.

Death delayed

Relatively recently, after the stamp about the “extinction of the nation” had already become firmly entrenched in society, voices began to be heard in the scientific community about the incorrectness of statements about “a sharp surge in mortality in 92-94.” The following works became pioneering: Alexandre Avdeev, Alain Blum, Serge Zakharov, Evgenij Andreev, "Reaction d'une population heterogene and une perturbation. Un modele d'interpretation des evolutions de mortalite en Russie" ("Population", 1, 1997: 7 -44) and S.V. Zakharov, “Cohort analysis of mortality in the Russian population (long-term and short-term effects of generational inequality in the face of death)” (“Problems of Forecasting”, 1999, #2). Also, the annual report of the Center for Demography and Human Ecology on the demographic situation in the country “Population of Russia 1999” states that “there was either practically no real increase in mortality in the first half of the 90s, or it was very small. There were only shifts in compensatory character..." .

Briefly, the essence of the problem is reflected in the following statement by S.V. Zakharov: “The same people who were saved during the anti-alcohol campaign turned out to be largely victims of the subsequent events . ” Indeed, if you look at the dynamics of first a fall (in the period 85-88), and then a sharp increase in mortality due to external causes (alcohol poisoning, road accidents, suicides, etc.), then against the backdrop of a general increase in these indicators since the early 60s years, these fluctuations do not go significantly beyond some unfavorable strategic trend. So, should we follow the authors of this extremely interesting discovery in asserting that “these changes were partly even positive; for a number of generations they did not shorten, but lengthened the time of real life lived on average by each deceased” ?

Generally speaking, if you do not compete with professional demographers in the field of assessing a particular situation, but consider it somewhat more broadly, within the framework of a general analysis of the effectiveness of a particular state social policy, then accepting the conclusion that a sharp change in the demographic situation as a result of reforms will not have “no impact” It's not so simple anymore. The unexpected success of the “anti-alcohol campaign” (mortality due to external causes decreased overall by 1.5 times, and due to alcohol poisoning - by more than half) can be considered an “accident,” but in fact it is an example of a very successful implementation of some social policy. Indeed, while “extending” the lives of some categories of citizens, this situation did not lead to the consolidation of generally positive trends, and therefore the subsequent death of random lucky ones is quite objective. However, is it fair to say that the change from an obviously successful (at least in a certain direction) social policy to an obviously ineffective one (also on this issue) is “justified”?

It is appropriate to quote the famous French demographer Nicolas Brouard from a discussion of the described situation at the French National Institute for Demographic Research (INED): “... we are talking, as I believe, about a hypothesis. Is it possible to postpone deaths in the population? In other words, if political measures, banning alcohol save the population aged 35 to 45 for several years, do they save them forever? To substantiate this hypothesis, it is necessary to prove that the population saved at the moment is still more vulnerable and that it is enough to again open access to alcohol less legal means (...) so that this more vulnerable part of the population begins to die.Thus, in each cohort, and therefore at different ages, the deaths prevented in 1985 and subsequent years were not avoided in 1992-1994 By 1995, the more vulnerable population had died out and only "normal" deaths remained. However, it is difficult to believe that this happened so suddenly in 1992-1994 and then faded away. Some serious event must have happened during these years. Hence the argument for market reforms" . As you can see, in the absence of political engagement, the “justification” for the death of those “saved” during the anti-alcohol campaign does not look so convincing.

As a result of a sharp change in the social climate, sharp changes occurred in the structure of the distribution of generations in society. The mortality rate of forty-year-old men in the period 92-94 almost doubled compared to the beginning of the decade, and yet these are the most socially active and effective people. Yes, as shown above, their death was due to the “gift” of the social policy of the 80s, however, even in the context of the mentioned scientific discussion, we should not forget that the sharpest surge in mortality was caused not only by alcohol poisoning, but also by intentional murder (almost three times ( !), and their decrease in the late 80s was very insignificant) and suicide. You can blame everything on “vodka,” but they also drink it “not because of a good life.”

According to domestic demographers, in recent years, “the standardized mortality rate from all external causes exceeded the average for the countries of the European Union by about 6 times, from murders - by 30 (!) times, from suicides - by 4 times, from road traffic accidents - 2 times. The corresponding differences for the worse from the countries of Eastern Europe were also impressive: an increase of 3 times for all external causes, 10 times for murders, 2 times for suicides, 50% for road accidents" ( here and further quoted from the materials of the annual reports on the demographic situation of Russia of the Center for Demography and Human Ecology of the Institute of Economic Forecasting of the Russian Academy of Sciences).

Moreover, fluctuations in mortality from external causes are not the only reason for the steady decline in life expectancy, since mortality statistics from natural causes are also very negative. The increase in mortality occurred due to refusals of vaccinations (a consequence of both economic reasons and the growing distrust of citizens in the state), and an increase in the number of diseases of the respiratory system (which, in particular, is the result of the collapse of the system of labor protection standards in hazardous industries). Stress has increased sharply, and as a result, the number of cardiovascular diseases and mortality due to them. Long-forgotten epidemics of cholera, smallpox and other diseases have emerged, which are a direct consequence of the degradation of the healthcare system. If the need for reforms was caused by the slow growth of a number of unfavorable trends since the 60s, then do the sharp destructive processes of recent years deserve only discussions about the “inevitable price”?

And in addition: for the first time in many years, a trend towards a decrease in the urban population arose, and at a certain period, migration to the countryside even began to compensate for the natural decline in the rural population. Russia was rolling back before our eyes, and all this happened under the banner of building a “modern economy.” Now the situation has stabilized somewhat, but it is still problematic to discuss the possibility of compensating for the rollback.

Life deferred

While arguments for and against the assertion that a sharp surge in mortality was due to social deformations were being born, an equally significant unfavorable factor - the decline in the birth rate - was being reassessed from slightly different, largely similar positions. It is necessary to analyze the content of the thesis that “in modern societies, in general, few people give birth,” which is not at all so flawless. The well-studied process of a decrease in the number of children and an increase in the average age of a mother at the birth of her first child during urbanization and other social changes is beyond doubt, and the development of the demographic situation in the USSR developed completely in line with this trend. However, this does not at all explain such a complex development of the situation that we have the misfortune to observe in post-reform Russia.

In studying the issue, we will again encounter a contrast between the constructive social policy of the 80s and the spontaneous development of the situation subsequently. “In the first half of the 80s, pronatalist social policy measures caused the emergence of two waves of increase in births due to the additional number of second and third children. The short-term effect of these measures was enhanced by an increase in the number of mothers over 28 years of age, who, as a rule, give birth to third and subsequent children. But already at the end of the 80s, this effect dried up, the number of births began to decline rapidly. Since 1994, this decline has slowed down significantly, although - despite the improvement in the age structure and the gradual increase in the number of young women - it has not stopped . "

The everyday content of this data is obvious. In 1980, the total number of pregnancies among women was 6515.1 thousand, and in 1994 the total number of pregnancies decreased by more than two million and amounted to 4401.6 thousand. Moreover, over the same period, the number of unforced abortions changed proportionally, and we can even talk about a slight decrease in their relative number. And the number of pregnancies in relation to the total number of women of childbearing age decreased from approximately 18% to 11% (that is, they became a third less common). In addition to the trend of decreasing motivation to get pregnant that emerged in Soviet times, there was a sharp increase in reasons not to give birth in the first half of the 90s.

However, here too there is an interweaving of many trends. The decrease in the contribution of mothers over 30 years of age to the final (total) birth rate that occurred in late Soviet times fully reflects the fact of changes in social stereotypes and preferences characteristic of nations with growing levels of prosperity. However, in the 70-80s, there was a counter process of “rejuvenation” of mothers and, accordingly, an increase in the influence of this group on the overall birth rate. “The decline in the number of births in the second half of the 90s, in contrast to the previous five years, occurs solely due to the fall in the birth rate among women under the age of 25 (especially rapidly before the age of 20) . ” In other words, in a society of “new rules,” young people no longer put “having a child” before social adaptation, which has recently become especially difficult for them. “Family policy measures introduced in the 80s (primarily, parental leave) sharply accelerated the pace of family formation. Mothers began to give birth to children not only at an even younger age than before, but also with less delay after marriage, with shorter intervals between the birth of the first and second child, the second and subsequent children. The trend towards accelerating the rate of formation of the final size of the offspring continued until the early 90s. Thus, the birth rate for people under 20 years of age increased from the middle 60s to early 80s more than 2 times" .

The following changes are also noteworthy. If in the period 1965-1985 the average number of girls a woman will give birth to before the end of her reproductive period (net reproduction rate) was almost constant at 0.935, then after 1992 this important indicator dropped to an average level of 0.625. In other words, the actual basis for the reproduction of the nation is currently beginning to dissolve, and the combination of trends towards the refusal of young people to have a child and the inevitable further aging of mothers can create additional grounds for a decrease in the birth rate.

A more subtle analysis shows that if the reproduction models of the 60s were maintained, society would have shrunk by 16% by now. However, as follows from the CDECH materials, “if this did not happen, it was only due to the potential for demographic growth accumulated in the age structure of the population under the influence of past reproduction regimes. The younger population structure gave a greater number of births, fewer deaths and, accordingly, a more significant natural increase . " That is, socio-demographic changes in Soviet times compensated for some negative natural ones, which made it possible to “postpone” the development of unfavorable trends. How long their blocking could have taken place is a separate question, but a spontaneous collapse in the field of social policy destroyed almost all stabilizing mechanisms (and it should be noted that the “rollback” began not in 1992, but a year or two earlier, even with the growth of alarming expectations and the development of commodity crises of the late 80s).

So, the Soviet methods of correcting social policy were effective in their own way, if we consider the fact of changing trends in the birth rate as a criterion of effectiveness, since their “economic” or social effect is indirect and dependent on many other factors. The breakdown of the state machine and the formation of an atmosphere of social chaos quickly negated some of the “successes”, and this happened not so much as a result of some plan, but as a reaction of society to a change in the system of social motivations. On the one hand, we are approaching, in a number of characteristics, modern European societies (in which, in particular, the trend of “aging” in the age of birth of the first child has long been noted). However, not being compensated by a complex of factors for the reproduction of the nation, this trend does not look positive, only recording a situation of reduction of the nation, in which over the next 30 years the population may be reduced by almost half.

Only cats will be born quickly

So, the analysis of crisis processes in the Russian demographic situation allows us to move from a dry statement of negative trends to understanding the actual nature and causes of both social changes and the role and place of the state in correcting the development of society. Most of the politicized polemics on this issue boil down, firstly, to statements about the unambiguous destructiveness of the socio-economic processes of recent years, and secondly, to statements about the “pattern” of a rollback from the positive changes of the 80s and the conditionality of the changes by some global trend . And since the scientific side of the issue is not yet so clear and is the prerogative of specialists, it is the political consequences of such controversy and the decisions that follow from it that should be analyzed.

If we ask the question whether effective changes and corrections of the situation in this area are possible with the implementation of targeted government policy, then the tactical success of social policy in the 80s allows us to answer it positively. However, it should also be noted that most of the changes were situational and only slightly changed important system settings, and therefore “rollbacks” (“delayed deaths” and “excess births”) were inevitable. It is incredibly difficult to assess their scale if a different policy had been pursued, but it would not be a stretch to say that they would not have been such a catastrophic collapse. Yes, the effects of the transition to a new model of social reproduction are inevitable. However, the example of the United States, in which the almost linear growth of the population by one and a half times since the 60s is due to 34% natural growth and only 16% to migration, shows that it is not at all necessary to attribute everything to “world standards.” The situation in Europe is less close to the Russian one in terms of the nature of general historical processes than the American one, and therefore one should not say at all that negative growth is natural and inevitable.

Moreover, the main negative reasons for the situation lie entirely within the realm of the possibility of pursuing a constructive social policy, which, however, requires adequacy and correlation of all directions with the issues and priorities under consideration. The partial and sharp fluctuations of the early 90s are already in the past, and their conditioning by both the “correction” effect and the extreme unsystematic nature of transformations already plays a secondary role in relation to the generally unfavorable strategic trends that have been going on for many decades. Just as the problems of industrial and economic potential are based on the development of old “diseases,” so the socio-demographic problem requires the formulation of a consistent modernization policy, rather than a narrow compensatory policy. The self-reform of the socialist system in the 80s in the area under consideration was more effective than in the economy, however, it was the failures of industrial “intensification” that became the basis for the destruction of fragile successes. If the new government, inspired by the idea of ​​the expediency of implementing centralized programs, begins to change the private situation, then there is every reason to expect only temporary changes, and political and financial costs will be scattered and wasted. This is perhaps the most important conclusion from considering this situation.

Undoubtedly, there are many absolutely necessary expenses that must be carried out not so much in order to fight the “extinction of the nation”, but in order to have the full right to sit at the same table with developed countries, leaving shameful and large-scale regression in the past. It is also necessary to solve the problem of the high proportion of violent deaths, suicides and other unnatural deaths, and to normalize the situation in the field of labor protection and the environment. We must also take care of increasing motivation to have children and provide real social support for motherhood and childhood, reduce unacceptably high maternal mortality and take care of reproductive health. All these are “particulars”, but the state is obliged to correct its mistakes simply because it cannot parasitize on its own nation. And although this will not cause rapid growth, at least we will not age and die out at an accelerated rate. There will be at least some basis for the emergence of a broad and comprehensive social policy and, perhaps, a return to the circle of “growing” rather than “aging” nations (to which, quite possibly, Europe will join in the future). After all, fears caused by expectations of global conflict and the work of the Club of Rome about overpopulation have already been rethought, and it is quite possible to expect pronatalist social policies in rich urbanized countries.

Is it really that important? Or maybe “less is more”? Perhaps it would be easier to open the doors of migration and allow young, healthy nations to compensate for our aging? The answer to these questions cannot be given without a comprehensive study of the demographic factor in the development and formation of nations, in the creation of effective political and economic systems. In order to stop the attempts of supporters of the conservation of the dangerous mistakes of quasi-liberalization to hide behind naive justifications, it is quite enough to refer to “world experience” in their usual spirit. It is decent for cultural and developed nations to take care of the health of mothers and children, it is decent to rejoice at healthy and long-lived old people, it is decent to root for more and more “Americans”, “French”, “Italians” and other “Swedes” to know, love and promote their culture. It is decent and quite European to demand from the state care for the weak and young in exchange for honesty in paying taxes and performing other duties. It is reasonable to count on an increase in personal well-being not only due to the fact that “freeloaders will die.” Who knows who is actually more valuable than mother history - a “loving mother” or an “effective manager”. Although both are equally needed.

It remains to wish our state success in realizing its promises, and to all of us that these actions turn out to be more promising than the “good intentions” of the modernizers at the beginning of the decade.