Translated material
Robert Dahl. The Shifting Boundaries of Democratic Governments
Globalization
Globalization has many aspects: cultural, economic, political, military. Its manifestations are manifold: travel, migration, language, communications, clothing, architecture, popular music and many other forms. It seems to me impossible to fully predict what impact globalization will have on democracy in the coming century. But, of course, its consequences will be profound - perhaps even, from the point of view of future generations, revolutionary.
Two closely related aspects of globalization are particularly relevant to the prospects for democracy. One of them is the worldwide spread of markets, market economies and market-oriented enterprises; the other is the growth of international public organizations, both global and regional, which have significant ability to influence the decisions of individual governments on important issues or to exclude them from these decisions 1 .
Some observers argue that in the coming years many of the important functions currently performed within individual countries by market economies and democratic governments will be appropriated by international organizations or their implementation by individual governments will be significantly hampered by economic processes on an international scale. In this sense, the recent role of the International Monetary Fund in shaping the policies of Asian countries - from South Korea to Indonesia - during the economic crisis is a bode for the future of all countries, including the democracies that exist today. The IMF is not only outside the direct control of the countries it provides assistance to. In its objectives and in many respects in its practice, this organization is also outside the direct control of any democratic leaders. In short, the IMF is a semi-sovereign, extremely powerful and completely undemocratic organization. Whatever it is said that the power of such institutions is limited only by their influence on developing countries - in today's jargon, "emerging markets" - let us recall the new European Central Bank, to which members of the European Union have transferred their control over monetary policy. And not just over it: essentially, they also gave up their ability to use fiscal policy. However, since the 1930s, fiscal policy has been seen as a vital tool to enable a democratic government to adequately provide for the welfare of its citizens, especially in the face of economic downturns and high unemployment rates. Like the IMF, the European Central Bank is deliberately designed to remain free from the influence of democratically elected leaders in its member countries.
Although the ECB and the IMF are extreme examples, they demonstrate some of the possible consequences of globalization of both economic processes and bureaucratic organizations. On the one hand, globalization makes a country significantly more vulnerable to international economic forces such as capital markets, near-instant capital movements, and sudden changes in the value of certain countries' currencies. On the other hand, this vulnerability, in turn, reduces the country’s negotiating capabilities when it is opposed by, say, the IMF. In essence, the IMF is saying: either accept our terms or lose our help. To lose this assistance means for a given country to suffer, perhaps significantly, and perhaps even be on the verge of the collapse of democracy. Accepting the conditions means that the country must obey the IMF and implement the program approved by it.
What follows from this situation? Some authors argue that individual governments are destined to become subordinate entities within international systems, much like local or provincial government structures within a country. Some observers predict "the end of the nation-state" 2 . The shift they predict is reminiscent of the earlier transformation I mentioned above, in which independent city-states or other small political entities were absorbed into nation-states.
Governments and global markets. An alternative view, which seems more plausible to me, is that for at least the next half century and beyond, local, regional and national governments in most countries, especially democracies, will continue to retain significant control over many important functions: education , social security, transfer payments, medical care, roads, the condition of streets and highways, transport, housing, urban planning and a number of others 3 .
Moreover, before the First World War, the United States and most European countries were even more integrated into the international economy than they are today, 4 and yet the functions of national and local governments were far from trivial. simply to counter the hostile influence of international markets . Indeed, people in democracies today can demand that their governments do more, not less , Thus, the quality and functioning of democratic governments in these national and subnational entities will remain a matter of primary concern. Indeed, the importance of subnational structures may increase as some of the functions carried out by national governments are devolved to smaller units, so to speak, with democratically elected governments, as has happened recently in Scotland and Wales and as may apparently happen in France.
International organizations. However, all this leaves us with a nagging question: what about the leadership of international organizations? Will they be democratic? Could they be like that?
Some observers insist that democracy can and will, in due course, be extended to international organizations. To put this point of view into historical perspective, let me return again to the earlier history of the subordination of local entities to national governments. The ancient and long-held conviction that democracy could only exist in small entities such as the city-state was, as I have mentioned, completely replaced by a new conviction: through the system of representation, democracy could be extended to much larger entities, namely the "state-state". nation" or country. As a result of this change, democratic government flourished on a scale far beyond what was ever thought possible according to the traditional view. Thus, as some authors argue, democratic theory and practice, having expanded to the scale of international governments, will shift to a completely new level, which is essentially global.
Skeptics argue that the conditions necessary for democratic institutions to function simply do not exist internationally and are unlikely to arise here in the foreseeable future. I am one of these skeptics 6 .
What if the skeptics are right? If the governance of international organizations is not currently democratic and is unlikely to become so in the future, what are they now and what could they be? government, we appear to have no generally accepted typology into which to fit international governments . Despite countless attempts over several millennia to classify systems of I have no intention of adding another typology. And I cannot suggest a name for the type of government that dominates international organizations. However, I believe that we view international governments as systems of decision-making by political and bureaucratic elites operating with a very high degree of autonomy within the framework established by charters, treaties and other international agreements.
Some might argue here that international organizations are no different from government bureaucracies in democracies. I think that such an opinion would be wrong. It is true, of course, that government bureaucracies within individual countries pose a similar problem; it must be admitted that the task of balancing democratic control with the need for independent expert judgment is a perennial problem. However, the means of holding domestic bureaucracies accountable to democratically elected leaders are much more robust and varied than the means of holding international ruling elites accountable. And the ability of the interested forces that internal bureaucracies influence with their decisions to react and change their decisions is, in my opinion, much greater. Ignoring these differences and treating them merely as a matter of "degree of influence" is like saying that the difference between plunging into a warm bath and jumping into boiling water is just the level of temperature. In political life the most important differences are "a matter of degree." Even the question of the difference between democratic and non-democratic governments is a "matter of degree." But for most of us, these differences make a huge difference.
If this view is more or less true, then international governments represent, in my opinion, a problem that we need a solution to. If international organizations and processes were undesirable, the solution would be obvious and feasible. We'd just have to get rid of them. But getting rid of international organizations is undesirable and, obviously, impossible. As is the case with democratic governments in individual countries, despite all the shortcomings of international organizations, their contribution to public welfare is great and can become even greater. As an example, let us point out their contributions, real or potential, to resolving international conflicts, improving health care, increasing economic growth, controlling the environment, solving the problem of global warming, ensuring civil rights, and even, in some cases, democratization and ensuring democratic stability.
However, if we believe that their governance is and will likely remain undemocratic, how can we ensure that political and bureaucratic elites are held accountable for the decisions they make? Or ask the age-old question: What is the best way to ensure that rulers use their power to achieve good ends? So that they strive to achieve the common good, and not just satisfy their narrow interests? So that their policies benefit society, and not just themselves? For governments of international organizations to be accountable to the public or publics beyond national boundaries? Can they somehow be held accountable even in the absence of democratic institutions to ensure that accountability?
Or should we conclude that democratic standards do not apply to the governance of international organizations?
After the extraordinary triumphs of democracy in the 20th century, should we not return at the end of the century to the anti-democratic views of Plato and Confucius in the hope that we can entrust the management of international organizations to rulers possessing the appropriate virtues, wisdom and integrity? This would require rulers virtuous enough to strive for good ends, wise enough to know the best ways to achieve them, and incorruptible enough to preserve their virtues and wisdom despite the tests of power, ideology and dogma.
Historical experience is not, in my opinion, encouraging. And I admit that I am as skeptical about the desirability of trusteeship in ruling international organizations as I am about its desirability in ruling countries. However, solutions remain unclear. Consequently, I hope that in the coming century some of our best social scientists will address the question of how international organizations can be governed in accordance with democratic goals.
Notes:
1 The University of Michigan website lists 82 international organizations, ranging from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to the World Bank, World Health Organization, World Trade Organization, and more.
2 Vaclav Havel makes a compelling case for these claims (I agree with many of his thoughts) in “Kosovo and the End of the Nation-State” (The New York Review, June 10, 1999, pp. 4-6).
3 A similar, empirically based critique of views advocating the primacy of global markets over national economic policies, including distribution policies, can be found in Geoffrey Garrett, “Global Markets and National Policies: Collision Course or Virtuous Circle?” (International Organization, Vol.52, #4, Autumn 1998, pp.787-824); "Capital Mobility, Trade, and the Domestic Politics of Economic Policy" (International Organization, Vol.49, #4, Autumn 1995, pp.657-687) and Garrett and Peter Lange, "Internalization, Institutions, and Political Change" ( ibid., pp.627-655).
4 By some accounts, labor and capital were more mobile before 1914 than subsequently, and foreign capital financed a much larger share of domestic investment in the "developing countries" of the time, such as the United States, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia, than today. (Nicholas B. Kristoff, "At This Rate We'll Be Global in Another Hundred Years" / The New York Times, May 23, 1999).
5 Geoffrey Garrett challenges the conventional wisdom that “economic internationalization has disrupted the traditional redistributive agenda of the left...Rather than being constrained by increased mobility of goods and capital, the relationship between the power of left-wing Labor governments and fiscal expansion has been strengthened by greater internationalization. Without further analysis, it is impossible say whether this was the result of increased political incentives to normalize market dislocations, or whether it was the result of certain types of government spending that increase competitiveness (as proponents of the new growth theory argue). In any case, these results contrast sharply with the traditional view. " Mobility, Trade, and Domestic Politics of Economic Policy" / Op.cit., 1995, p.682).
6 Since I have already substantiated this point of view, I will not repeat myself. See my work "Can International Organizations be Democratic? A Skeptic's View" (in Jan Shapiro and Casiano Hacker-Cordon. Democracy's Edges. - 1999: 19-36).
7 Starting, perhaps, with Aristotle's famous classification of three basic forms of government (by one man, by a few men and by many), each of them can in turn be divided into "good" and "bad" forms. Thus, he allowed for the existence of six forms of government: monarchy versus tyranny, aristocracy versus oligarchy, and “mixed” government versus democracy.
Originally published in Social Research , Vol.66, #3, Fall 1999, pp.915-931
Abridged translation by Grigory Weinstein