Theodore Schick Jr. Morality

The idea that reality is a socially constructed construct seems decidedly strange to many; and yet, such a view is unlikely to surprise anyone. Many vehemently deny that something becomes true only because we believe in it, but at the same time readily agree that something becomes true only because we believe that it is right. The view that belief can determine the rightness or wrongness of any action is known as "subjectivism" or "relativism." Despite the popularity of this approach to ethics, there are probably fewer supporters of it among professional moralists than there are creationists among professional biologists. Why? Because subjectivism is incompatible with ethical theories. To understand this, we need to understand a little about theory and the nature of theorizing about ethics and morality.

One of the central questions of ethics is the question of what exactly makes an action right. Ethical theories attempt to answer this question by identifying the features that distinguish right from wrong action. Thus, their task is to determine what all right actions have in common. In other words, they try to identify the logically necessary and sufficient conditions that make an action right.

Ethical theories deal with our thoughtful moral judgments, as well as with our moral experiences - this is the factual material that these theories are intended to explain. Everyone makes moral judgments, we all engage in moral debates, and we all act immorally from time to time. Any adequate theory of morality must be based on these facts. If a theory sanctions demonstrably immoral actions, if it denies that there are significant differences between people on moral issues, and if it claims that we never act immorally, then there is good reason to think that the theory is wrong.

In addition, ethical theory must be applicable in practice - it must help us resolve the moral dilemmas that arise before us. We need adequate ethical theory because we want to do the right thing. If an ethical theory does not give us specific instructions about how to behave in specific situations, it fails to meet one of the basic requirements for an ethical theory.

Subjectivism

Subjectivism states that what makes an action right is a person’s conviction that this action is right. Despite the fact that subjectivism seems to perfectly support equality (after all, according to this theory, all moral judgments are equal in rights), it still has some strange consequences. First, subjectivism assumes that every person is morally infallible. If we believe that all our actions are right, or approve of them, this means that we cannot do anything wrong. But such a statement cannot be correct. Let's say Hitler believed that the Jews should be exterminated. According to the subjectivist point of view, it follows that the extermination of the Jews was right. Suppose Stalin believed that political opponents should be killed. Subjectivism sanctions any action if the person performing the action approves of it or believes that it is right. However, what Hitler and Stalin did was wrong, even if they themselves were convinced of the opposite. So, believing that an action is right does not mean that the action is right.

Subjectivism not only asserts the moral infallibility of any person, but in fact recognizes the practically impossible existence of disagreements between people regarding moral issues. Suppose Jack argues that homosexuality is good, but Jill holds the opposite view. At first glance, you might think that Jack and Jill disagree with each other. But, from the standpoint of subjective relativism, such a conclusion will be erroneous. After all, Jack claims to be convinced that homosexuality is good, while Jill claims to be convinced that homosexuality is bad. The positions taken by Jack and Jill cannot be considered to be in conflict with each other, since neither statement contradicts the other. For Jill to disagree with Jack, she would have to argue that Jack is not convinced that homosexuality is good. Meanwhile, it is difficult to imagine a situation in which Jill could make such a statement, since, most likely, no one knows Jack's beliefs as well as Jack himself.

Thus, subjectivism does not meet the requirements we require for an adequate ethical theory: it sanctions apparently immoral actions, assumes that people are morally infallible, and denies the possibility of significant differences between people on moral issues. Since subjectivism is incompatible with our moral judgments and with the moral experiences we have, it cannot be considered an acceptable ethical theory.

Cultural relativism

When we say about any action that it is correct, this means not only our conviction in the correctness of this action. What does this mean then? Many believe that in this way we convey the beliefs that dominate our culture.

Our moral beliefs tend to reflect the culture in which we are raised. For example, if we grew up in India, we might consider it morally justifiable to burn a widow alive on the funeral pyre of her deceased husband. If we were raised in Syria, we may believe that polygamy is morally justifiable. If we happen to grow up in Sudan, we may believe it is morally permissible to surgically remove the clitoris in young women. If we were raised in America, on the contrary, we will consider all of the above practices morally unacceptable. Since people raised in different cultures have different moral attitudes, the conclusion that morality is culturally bound seems inevitable.

Unlike subjectivism, cultural relativism does not presuppose human moral infallibility. However, this theory assumes the moral infallibility of culture. Since moral codes are shaped by culture, culture cannot make mistakes.

However, recognizing the moral infallibility of a culture means that moral views that do not coincide with the attitudes of any culture cannot be correct. Social reformers cannot oppose practices approved by society, because if these practices are supported by society, then they are correct. If society, for example, accepts slavery, then slavery is morally justified. Anyone who thinks otherwise is simply mistaken. Following the logic of cultural relativism, it should be recognized, for example, that William Lloyd Garrison took an immoral position when advocating the abolition of slavery. We, however, do not think so. We believe that the institution of slavery is immoral, even if our culture supported it. Since cultures cannot be considered morally infallible because they may sanction immoral actions, cultural relativism cannot be accepted as a valid ethical theory.

Unlike subjectivism, cultural relativism does not deny the possibility of any disagreement on moral issues. Since individuals can be mistaken about what society approves and disapproves of, there is a legitimate basis for moral debate. However, since all actions that are approved by society are right, any such dispute must come down to what is approved and what is not approved by society. For example, people arguing about the moral justification of abortion must, in essence, arguing about whether abortion is approved by society. Is this situation plausible? Are people arguing about the morality of abortion really arguing about what society accepts and does not accept? Can the abortion issue be resolved through public opinion polling? Of course no. From this it is clear that cultural relativism, like subjectivism, is incompatible either with our moral judgments or with the moral experience we have.

Even if it is accepted that cultural relativism can provide compelling reasons for the existence of ethical disagreements, it cannot be considered an adequate ethical theory because it cannot serve to practically resolve these disagreements. Cultural relativism will not help us solve many moral dilemmas, because determining whether an individual belongs to a particular culture is usually quite difficult. Imagine that you are a Negro, a Jew by religion, and on top of everything else, you happened to live in Bavaria during the Hitler regime. What culture do you belong to then? To the black one? To the Jewish? To the Bavarian? Or maybe to the Nazi? Each of us absorbs many different cultures bit by bit, and it is often very difficult to determine which of these cultures is the main one. If we cannot accurately indicate our belonging to any one culture, cultural relativism cannot serve as a means of solving our moral problems.

If cultural relativism has so many flaws, why is it so popular? This is partly because, in the opinion of many people, he preaches tolerance. Anthropologist Ruth Benedict, for example, believes that, guided by the principles of cultural relativism, "we will arrive at a more realistic social faith, accepting as a new basis for tolerance the coexistence and equal value of the different models of life which humanity has created for itself from the raw material of its own existence. " . However, the explicit recognition of the correctness of cultural relativism on the grounds that it preaches tolerance implies at the same time an implicit recognition of the fact that tolerance is an absolute value. But if there are absolute values, then cultural relativism is wrong.

The most that a cultural relativist can confidently say is that his culture values ​​tolerance. But for other cultures, tolerance may not be so valuable. In fact, fundamentalists of all stripes are extremely intolerant of anyone who does not share their point of view. From the standpoint of cultural relativism, their intolerance receives moral justification. Thus, any attempt to justify cultural relativism by appealing to its tolerance is doomed to failure.

Another reason for the popularity of cultural relativism is that it appears to be about the only ethical theory that is consistent with anthropological evidence. However, the inadequacy of cultural relativism suggests that this conclusion is also mistaken. To understand why this is so, we need to take a closer look at the evidence offered by anthropologists.

Evidence from anthropologists

In accordance with anthropological arguments in favor of cultural relativism, the existence of differences in the moral assessment of the same actions by representatives of different cultures allows us to conclude that there are no universal moral norms. However, the fact that there are disagreements on moral issues cannot in itself serve as evidence of the absence of absolute moral values. Such a conclusion can only be made if a number of other assumptions are made. By making these assumptions explicit, we can test the strength of the anthropological defense of cultural relativism. Here is one possible way to argue anthropologically.

1. Representatives of different cultures give different moral assessments to the same actions.

2. If representatives of different cultures give different moral assessments to the same actions, it means that they are guided by different moral standards.

3. If representatives of different cultures are guided by different moral standards, this means that uniform moral standards do not exist.

4. Consequently, there are no uniform moral standards.

Such a proof looks convincing, since the conclusions follow from the premises. The question is whether the premises themselves are correct. Premise 1 is certainly true, since it has been repeatedly confirmed by anthropological research. What about premise 3? According to it, if people have different opinions about what makes an action right, then the answer to the question “What makes an action right?” doesn't exist at all. However, in this case, the second part of the statement does not follow from the first. The mere fact that people disagree on an issue does not mean that none of the disputing parties can be right.

Meanwhile, premise 3 is not the only weak link in the above argument. Premise 2 states that people who have different opinions about the moral value of an action inevitably preach different moral standards. In other words, premise 2 states that differences in moral evaluations are an inevitable consequence of differences in moral standards. However, moral evaluation may depend not only on moral standards.

In order to form a moral assessment in a certain situation based on moral norms, we also need to have an idea of ​​the facts that make up this situation. Without this information we cannot make any moral assessment. Therefore, the formula for the moral assessment of a certain phenomenon can be presented in the following form:

moral standards + ideas about facts = moral assessment.

Since the formation of a moral assessment of a phenomenon is influenced not only by adherence to any moral standards, it cannot be argued that the difference in moral assessments is a consequence of differences in moral standards. Any differences in the moral assessment of a situation may also be a consequence of differences in ideas about the facts that make up the situation being assessed.

Some anthropologists believe that quite often this is the case. Here is what Solomon Ash writes about this:

“It is generally accepted that different assessments of the same action are automatically evidence of the existence of different principles on the basis of which the assessment is made. The above examples show the fallacy of such an interpretation. ... Anthropological evidence cannot serve as proof of the legitimacy of relativism. We know nothing about societies that despise courage and extol cowardice, as well as about cultures in which generosity would be recognized as a vice and ingratitude as a virtue. It can be assumed that the relationship between evaluation and meaning is rather invariant in nature . "

According to Ash, representatives of different cultures come to different moral judgments not because they have different views on the nature of morality, but because they see the nature of reality differently.

Take the controversy surrounding abortion. "Pro-life" believe that abortion is wrong, and "pro-choice" believe that abortion is right. Does this mean that the two named groups of people have different ideas about the nature of morality? No. After all, both of them certainly condemn murder. They just have different understandings of what a fruit is. Some believe that he can be killed, while others believe that he cannot. Thus, in this case we are talking about different understandings of the nature of the fetus, and not the moral justification of murder. Since the moral assessment of an action is formed both by the moral standards that the evaluator adheres to and by his ideas about reality, differences in moral assessments do not necessarily imply the presence of differences in moral standards.

Despite the fact that moral debate is still widespread, it still seems clear that humanity is moving along the path of moral progress. Slavery was banned, women received voting rights, and dolphins were protected. However, all these achievements can be considered progress only if we assume the existence of certain universal moral norms, common standards according to which we can judge our actions and behavioral manifestations. If such standards do not exist, we have no reason to think that the situation is any better than it was before. Thus, the best explanation for the fact that we have made some moral progress is the existence of universal moral standards.

Where did these common norms come from? No one, not even the Lord God, can give this or that action the status of right, simply by believing that it is so. Many people, including the founders of our state, believed that moral standards were self-evident and did not need proof!

“We accept these truths as self-evident,” declares the Declaration of Independence. A truth is self-evident, the understanding of which becomes its proof for a person. Take, for example, the statement that something that has shape also has size. If you understand this statement - if you know what shape is and what size is - you will believe it to be true. And to support this belief you do not need any additional evidence. What makes a truth self-evident is the needlessness of further proof of its truth. Such truths constitute proof of themselves.

It is widely believed that self-evident truths are found in logic. For example, the statement that any thing is identical to itself. But are there self-evident truths in morality? Consider this statement: “Unnecessary suffering is wrong.” This statement does not say that suffering is wrong or that no one suffers more than they need to. It only says that if someone suffers more than necessary, it is wrong. For anyone who understands what suffering is and what is wrong, this truth will be self-evident.

If you don't believe this statement is true, you have to prove otherwise by providing a counterexample. If you can't do this - if you can't point to a situation in which unnecessary suffering is justified - then your belief that the claim is wrong is irrational because you don't have good enough evidence for it.

Among ethical truths, there are several that are self-evident. These include, for example, claims that equals should be treated equally or that unnecessary destruction of values ​​is wrong. These principles do not form a general theory of morality, since they do not define certain general properties inherent exclusively in right actions alone. But they can be considered as certain limiting conditions that any ethical theory must accept. If an ethical theory allows a violation of one or more of these principles, as subjectivism or cultural relativism does, it cannot be considered acceptable.

Notes:

1 Ruth Benedict. Patterns of Culture. - New York: Pelican, 1934. - P.257.

2 Solomon Asch. Social Psychology. - Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1952. - P.378-379.

Free Inquiry
Translated by Ilya Kun