Boris YELTSIN: “I gave all my strength, all my soul to my presidential marathon. I honestly gave my all during the race. If I need to justify myself in something, then here is my excuse: you can do better - try. Run those forty thousand again. Faster. Better. More graceful. Easier. And I did it.”

THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING EARNEST

The third book of Yeltsin’s memoirs evoked an unexpectedly lively reaction. For modern society, where fewer and fewer books are read and former rulers are quickly forgotten, this is an unusual effect. It is curious that the main advertisement for Yeltsin’s memories is done by opponents, such as E.A., who has finally found like-minded people. Kiseleva and A.V. Korzhakova. Their main thesis is that the memoirs are false, Yeltsin as the author is a fictitious figure (a kind of former chairman Pound) and all this is just another machination of the “family”, i.e. lithographer of Yeltsin's conversations V.B. Yumasheva.

First, it would probably be worth explaining about the falsification of the memoirs. It does not occur to Kiselev-Korzhakov that this thesis is equivalent to the statement: “Yumashev is a genius.” If we assume that Yumashev himself composed most of the “Presidential Marathon,” this forces us to assume that most of the “Confession on a Given Topic” and “Notes of the President” are the same fruit of Yumashev’s falsification - for there are no fundamental stylistic and compositional differences between the third volume and the first two are not observed. The unity of the author's image is fully maintained. If the real author of the third volume is Yumashev, and Yeltsin has no idea what was written there on his behalf, then the same can be said about the previous two volumes. But then it turns out to be quite interesting... The themes, plots, interpretations of events contained in the first two volumes are not subject to any particular doubt and are confirmed by a very large amount of independent evidence. People who participated in the events described, who were close to Yeltsin, admit that this was exactly what happened. “Here is my riddle, cunning Korzhak, solve it.”

The thesis about the machinations of the “family” is also not very clear. Who, in fact, is the object and victim of these machinations: Primakov? Luzhkov? Gusinsky and Berezovsky? But the listed persons, even without these intrigues, are not in the best condition, because besides the “family” there is someone who does not love them and wants to put them in their place. A PR campaign to overthrow the already defeated is strange, and doubly strange when such a campaign is launched by a genius (see above), who suddenly lost all his genius for some unknown reason.

If you look at the problem from a different angle - without geniuses, intrigues and highly insidious intrigues, in the analysis of which the cunning analysts themselves become entangled - everything looks much simpler. Any memoirs - especially the memoirs of a major politician who ruled the country at critical moments of its existence - represent an important and valuable source that supplements our historical knowledge. But the fact is that for the heroes and organizers of information wars (to which wars, until recently, all Russian politics boiled down and - who knows - maybe it will boil down again) all historical knowledge is a deadly poison. For an information war to be absolutely successful, the targets, i.e. ordinary citizens must have a minimum amount of RAM (so that only the last portion of agitprop can fit into it - and not a byte more), and not have long-term memory at all. In order for freedom of speech, as our special propagandists understand it, to flourish, it is necessary to come close to the ideal described by Orwell: everyone knew that Oceania had always been at war with Eurasia, and when Oceania began to fight with East Asia, everyone immediately began to know that Oceania had always fought with East Asia. In the complete absence of historical memory, it is more convenient to know that Gusinsky was always friends with Berezovsky (var.: always fought with Berezovsky), with Korzhakov, with the Kremlin, with Chubais, etc. Moreover, the emotional intensity of the fighters and propagandists is due to the fact that they have successfully deprived themselves of this long-term memory, and reduced the operational memory to the minimum limits. This allows them to sincerely believe that Oceania has always been at war with East Asia, and to captivate listeners with a similar memory capacity with their sincerity. Memoirs, no matter how subjective, but published, published and therefore no longer subject to constant rewriting for the sake of the current moment - “every piss, piss” - for a certain type of political culture called totalitarian, is a murderous thing, because it makes the past objective.

In addition to this main reason for vilifying memoirs, there are also secondary ones. The work of any political analyst is an investigation carried out on the basis of circumstantial evidence. The analyst does not sit under the table or stand behind the curtain in the government offices and therefore does not have direct evidence of how everything really happened, how and why certain decisions were made. If he still stands behind the curtain, i.e. believes himself to be a witness, or even a direct participant in the events, then, most likely, he is simply sold the desired version. Analytical work is something like calculating the coordinates of an invisible celestial body from the gravitational disturbances produced by this body, the discovery of the planet Uranus at the tip of a pen, glorified by Engels in Anti-Dühring. But all such calculations are just plausible. They are made more or less true when Uranus can be seen at the predicted point and when conclusions drawn from circumstantial evidence agree with direct evidence. Memoirs that reveal the details of the political kitchen are the sought-after direct evidence that confirms the conclusions made by representatives of one analytical school and refute the calculations made on the basis of another concept. Naturally, those whose conclusions were refuted and whose analytical abilities were thereby strongly doubted do not like all this and are not at all eager to recognize the evidence as genuine. In response to the offer to look through a telescope and discover the planet Uranus in the predicted place, they reasonably object that this is not a planet at all, but a complete PR campaign for the “family”, this planet Yumashev supposedly drew in the telescope.

The fervor of the refutations is primarily due to the fact that the memoirs are for the most part imbued with everyday common sense. There is no senile dementia, no special traces of diabolical intrigues are visible, but one can see approximately what some analysts already saw and wrote about: the need to prevent communists from coming to power, an attempt to give a second wind to reforms, the “book business” as successful revenge for an adventurous , an attack on the oligarchs carried out without proper preparation, a divorce from the ambitious Luzhkov and Primakov, the search for an heir who could ensure a smooth succession of power. The intrigue is that there is no special intrigue. Instead of the soul-shaking “top secret” there is an imperious routine. It is enough to read any memoirs of any major historical figure or any serious work on political history to exclaim: “I recognize Brother Vasya!” The answer of kings in all eras is approximately the same. This is such a position.

What is really new and interesting in the “Presidential Marathon” is not so much additional evidence confirming previous common-sense considerations, and not even cute and hitherto unknown details from the life of the leaders (Luzhkov’s cow, which suddenly stopped milking in the summer of 1998, which is why the previous supplies of mayor’s milk in the Kremlin have ceased forever; Primakov’s leather daddy with denunciations of nobles, choral chants of young reformers, etc.). The most interesting are Yeltsin’s occasional frank confessions, which allow us to understand the two main psychological mysteries of the personality of the first president of Russia. Firstly, where did the strength come from to be a politician for ten years, standing two heads above the rest of the political crowd? Secondly, what is “family”, was there something there or wasn’t it, and if there was, then what?

The answer to the first question is unexpectedly contained in the confession about offensive weaknesses regarding the war with Ivashka Khmelnitsky (conducting the Berlin orchestra, etc.). Yeltsin says frankly that after the shooting of the White House in 1993, he was in a state of constant shock, for which he was treated in the traditional Russian way - an admission supported by off-the-record testimony from other credible people. The paradox here is that for the most courageous and progressive apple-communist denouncers of the shooting of the White House, all their curses were nothing more than rote rhetoric. It is, of course, necessary to expose a political enemy if he has set himself up like this, but to say that Klaas’s ashes were knocking in Zyuganov’s heart would be impermissibly simple-minded. But the fact is that he knocked on Yeltsin’s heart and got through to a heart attack and bypass surgery. In fact, in all of Russia there were only a few people for whom the events of 1993 left a terrible scar on their hearts - Yeltsin himself and a couple of Anpilov’s grannies who were most firm in their convictions. Our other politicians did not have any ashes in their hearts, but they were simply engaged in ordinary postmodern verbal exercises based on the deep belief that the word is worthless.

But this is precisely what explains to us why Yeltsin is in the world history textbook, and other brave politicians suck. Yeltsin is in the textbook, because his nature was characterized by animal seriousness. A word is a word, a deed is a deed, an answer is an answer. Having taken on the overwhelming task of transforming Russia, he was the only one who took this matter with the greatest seriousness, which is why he managed to lead the country through the first, most difficult decade of revolution and disruption with minimal losses. Whoever considers them to be maximum should re-read the dystopias of the late 80s. The constant awareness of the sovereign’s duty “to answer for Russia before the Almighty,” which means to be terribly serious in both word and deed, because every idle word (not to mention deed) will be severely punished - this is what made the hefty man disabled, but, with on the other hand, this is what made him a true sovereign. While the Russian elite was choking on the postmodern destruction of meanings - even the most important ones - Yeltsin honored the principle “How important it is to be serious” (i.e. “You must treat your word honestly”, as well as “You will answer for the market”). Therefore, he is in history, and Russia is relatively prosperous.

Another clue is the favorite and most important topic of “family”, with which something completely anecdotal has been happening lately. The latest ranking of the influence of Russian politicians, published by Nezavisimaya Gazeta based on expert surveys, is given by T.B. Dyachenko in 31st place (next to Tatar President Shaimiev), V.B. Yumashev - on the 35th, Yeltsin himself - on the 67th. Until now, it was believed that the “family” was a “family” because it managed to privatize Yeltsin’s powers in a family way. Now it turns out that you can be a “family” without even privatizing anything, because what powers does a retiree who occupies the rear 67th place next to the most influential B.E. Nemtsov? The question of whose powers the “family” is privatizing today remains deeply unclear, and, in fact, few people demand clarity. It is not the real situation with the “family” that is important—the myth about the “family” is important.

But the true and main creator of the myth is Yeltsin himself. The success of propaganda about the “family” is not connected with the influence of certain individuals included in it, and not with the volume of abuses committed by these individuals, especially since everything we know about this influence and these abuses comes from one single source - UGG agency (“one citizen spoke”), and the source may be wrong. Let us remember how much she said, well, at least citizen Carla del Ponte. Maybe there was a lot of things there, maybe there was nothing - the problem is that if there had been nothing at all not only reprehensible, but even minimally dubious, it would not have changed anything, because any accusations are all the same would lie on fertile soil cultivated by Yeltsin himself.

He cultivated it, in every word, in every gesture, in all his behavior, demonstrating the tribal principle that was practically lost in our everyday life, so textbook glorified by gr. L.N. Tolstoy (the Rostov family in War and Peace). Peasant Yeltsin naturally and organically felt like a patriarch, an imperious but loving father of his subjects - and his co-workers. His attitude towards the same “young reformers” was a purely paternal one - I refer to the corresponding passages in the memoirs, which are strikingly reminiscent of family holidays in the Rostov house. With such an undisguised atmosphere of family warmth, you can steal, or you can not steal - they will still be accused of theft. It’s too atypical, informal and patriarchal.

In essence, one of the main themes of the memoirs, never expressed in open text, is Yeltsin’s constant, underlying melancholy that God did not give him a direct male heir. For a monarch by nature, this melancholy is natural, for the monarch (unlike a democratic hired worker, ideally guided by the principle “accepted power according to the inventory, handed over power according to the inventory”) is deeply, painfully indifferent to the one into whose hands his country will pass, into which he put his whole soul into it. This is the eternal question and the eternal torment of the kings - from the hope that “the son will take the easy power from my hands”, from the thoughts “but who will answer for Russia before the Almighty?” to the bitter dying confession of Nikolai Pavlovich addressed to the heir: “I’m handing over to you the command is not in order.” Yeltsin’s search for an heir did not begin because in the late 90s he felt an urgent need to retire with impunity. They began immediately after the actual accession to the throne, because reign is unthinkable without succession to the throne - hence all these unsuccessful attempts to politically adopt either Shumeiko or Nemtsov. Sometimes I think: what would have happened if Yeltsin had such an heir? On the one hand, there would be no adoption attempts, from which, in truth, there was not much benefit. On the other hand, it happens that nature rests on the heir, and from childhood the founder of the dynasty does not have the opportunity to prepare his son for the future royal service - in the 50s, when the Yeltsin couple gave birth to children, this issue was not relevant enough. But the strangest thing would happen if such an heir were truly a worthy successor to his father’s service. The establishment of a dynasty would be perceived as a scandal; the removal of a worthy son from government affairs would be unbearable for the president. So the current version of scandals with the “family” is still a very weak option compared to what could in other circumstances arise from the tribal feeling inherent in Yeltsin.

The last volume of a logical trilogy (“Rise” - “Their Most Glorious Hour” - “Departure”) is the farewell of a ruler who has disappeared forever into world history. There are smaller people left, like us sinners. But this is also a testament to us - the great old man is gone, his testament “How important it is to be serious” now must be fulfilled by us. There is no one else.

Maxim SOKOLOV , columnist for the newspaper Izvestia,
especially for Ogonyok