Evgeny Kuznetsov. Reforms and reformers

Reforms and reformers - 1
About kings without cabbage

Evgeny Kuznetsov

Publication date: November 10, 2000

On one of the most authoritative “home pages” on the RuNet, the site of Grigory Sapov, a most interesting discussion is posted between two famous authors and experts - Simon Kordonsky and Boris Levin. The battle of the “titans” is devoted to the question of the possibility and meaningfulness of reforms in Russia - an eternal, epic and, at times, epochal topic. The author recommends that everyone who wishes to familiarize themselves with this work of the epistolary genre, and he himself offers below some “suggested” reflections on what has been forgotten - about the actual mechanics of reforms .

First of all, it must be said that carrying out reforms is by no means a scientific or theoretical task. task This is a managerial , and therefore the preparation and implementation of reforms does not lie in the realm of scientific debate. And since our respected interlocutors ignored the very important issue of the mechanics of the management decision-making process (including in the very specific Russian government), it is worth dwelling on this.

The success of reforms, like any purposeful action, is a consequence of its necessity. If real imbalances and inconsistencies with optimality can really be a) correctly identified and b) correctly corrected, then the reforms will be successful. As a matter of fact, there is a temptation to exclaim - this is it, how can one identify the conflict and eliminate it without the presence of a True Theory (thus repeating the mistakes of many convinced reformers)? But, alas, a real and sober assessment of the adequacy and completeness of the current state of knowledge in the field of social, political sciences and economics still does not allow these issues to be transferred to the plane of a purely scientific discussion. How can there be no “scientific justification”? How often does the reader make a decision based on “scientific knowledge”, for example, when choosing a profession, a place of work, a life partner - in practically all the key issues of life? Does he often turn to statistics or advice from specialized scientific luminaries? Agree, no. Why? Because decision-making tools imply expert scientific opinion as an important, but far from the only component.

Generally speaking, the manufacturability of decision-making is precisely measured by the degree of its expert elaboration, measured not by the thickness of the corresponding research work, but by the degree of adequacy and feasibility (!) of the developed solutions. In this sense, it is desirable that decisions on key issues in the life of the country are made with the maximum degree of expert study, but for this it is necessary to have effective theories tested on a wide range of conditions and circumstances. This, alas, is not the case. We can talk about this long and hard, and here I will again refer the reader to the dispute between Lvin and Kordonsky, which contains a lot of useful and revealing things. But in this material I want to talk about something else.

So, in the decision-making process, there is not and cannot be absolute sufficiency of knowledge and ideas about the results of actions taken. Consequently, what comes to the fore when carrying out reforms (as well as any other organizational measures) is:

- the ability to monitor and manage the process;

- ability to mobilize the required resources;

- willingness to take responsibility for the final result.

The last point is especially important - since it is precisely the repeated “moan of the reformers” with their numerous searches for those responsible for failures that is the first sign of their professional unsuitability . Unsuitability not as expert advisors from numerous “problem institutes...”, but as direct managers carrying out reforms.

As the attentive reader has probably noticed, all three conditions are a consequence of applying the principle of consistency to all constructive actions. If there is no ability to control the process, it may require too many resources or generate an excessive number of undesirable consequences (and simply lead to the opposite result). If the required resources are not available, the process may dry out long before positive trends are consolidated, or the ability to control will weaken. If there is no willingness to take responsibility, then the key “feedback” in the form of moral and legal restrictions will not work, which will remove from the levers charlatans, amateurs, adventurers and those who deliberately disguise themselves with reforms to obtain certain benefits. These three conditions are necessary and possibly sufficient.

Now let's look at the progress of Russian reforms at the end of the twentieth century.

Was there "the ability to control the process"? In a political and managerial sense, this is the ability to make all the decisions necessary and justified by the program without critical expenditure of resources or losses that render reforms meaningless. At the end of the 80s, we actually found ourselves in a situation of progressive paralysis of power, which the top officials of the state actively contributed to! They themselves destroyed the mechanisms that were capable of controlling economic and social processes. And although there are very reasonable objections that these mechanisms have already exhausted themselves and were ineffective, this does not negate the fact that in this case it is impossible to carry out reforms . The classic “revolution from above” in Russia (in Eidelman’s definition) is impossible without a strong and controlled power machine - because otherwise all the social and economic components of the decaying state and society will begin to live on their own outside of unified control. That's what happened.

Was there "the ability to mobilize the required resources"? The key resources for reforms should be understood as financial (necessary for modernizing the economy), human (to ensure trust and consolidation of society) and technological (to reorganize the management and interaction of subjects of political and economic spaces). Moreover, “mobilize” does not mean “receive” - it means “reach the recipient who needs stimulation and support.” If we subtract dissipation (losses) in the form of corruption, ineffective application, and errors in determining priorities, then we must admit that in the process of past reforms the authorities were unable to “mobilize” a tenth of the required resources - moreover, they used them “to heat the environment” (as they say techies), "in a spray", a gigantic amount of material resources and people's trust. This is a reflection of a monstrously ineffective management mechanism - one, incompetence of reformers - two - and a lack of understanding of the essence of the task - three.

Was there a “willingness to take responsibility for the final result”? Unfortunately no. There was a substitution of faith in a bright future and the ideological pressure of real management tools. Instead of creating primary motivation for every Russian to carry out actions that are appropriate within the framework of reforms, he was pressed with mythical “revenges” and other “epochal” things. At the beginning of the reforms, a conscious bet was made on the minority , which would come forward and receive advantages and grounds for protecting what had been acquired, while the rest were considered - and are considered!!! - backward retrogrades and culprits (!) of failures. These are precisely them, those who could not leave the North and the Siberian factory towns, who did not dare to sell everything and go to the capitals to catch blue birds, professionals in the rapidly depreciated social sphere, clinging to the value and necessity of their own knowledge and experience - namely They, the workers of the military-industrial complex, social services, science, are the ones who are responsible for the failure of reforms. That's how it works. Because they are responsible for its failure - with their poverty and loss of rights. It is them, the “Soviet” people, who are accused of undemocratic preferences and shifting from charismatic to charismatic.

But what about those who took upon themselves the right to decide, without having any opportunity to defend the decision made, to pass the required package of laws, to insist on the necessary steps? And they, it turns out, are victims. This is an example of colossal deception on the part of conscious liars, those who do not understand the very essence of social obligations, the essence of power and management. Power is the right to decide, given in response to responsibility for mistakes. The only way.

If we step back a little from the assessment of what happened - after all, in society this has long been a matter of faith, and not a discussion of methods and goals, then it is worth talking about the possibility and feasibility of reform as such in the present and future.

Firstly, there is nothing to reform . Only a stable conglomerate of relationships, a society with developed values ​​and goals, can be reformed. Currently (unlike the late 80s - early 90s) there is no trace of this. That is, we should not talk about reform, but about creating a system of goals and priorities, mechanisms and ways of existence of the country.

Secondly, almost all possible resources for pursuing a constructive policy (the policy of introducing new forms of activity and optimizing existing ones) have been exhausted. External assistance has been squandered along with confidence in the country, internal reserves are beyond exhaustion - exports provide money that the state needs for short-term needs, but is not even able to save the producers themselves from the progressive aging of fixed assets, equipment that brings in that very money. Actually, this is a path “to nowhere,” and that’s probably why it’s not customary to talk about it - it’s easier to finally move into the world of myths. Educational and technological potential has been undermined by “brain drain”, the aging and disappearance of scientific and industrial schools, and the growing technological and scientific lag.

Are the tasks of reforming and creating something new fundamentally different? Without a doubt. The first faces, first of all, the inertia of elites striving to preserve their position. Accordingly, in this case, the priority is a strong centralized government that can effectively block any counteraction. The second has its enemy, first of all, the insufficient degree of motivation of society (you can also get used to living poorly, alas) and the lack of tools for action - there is nothing and nowhere to implement and apply. Accordingly, in the first case, the main actor, naturally, is the government, fulfilling the social order to change the situation in exchange for submission, and in the second - society itself, which with each of its representatives is obliged to perform a socially significant act, take actions, introduce ideas and take upon itself personal responsibility. Because in the absence of effective power, with any attempt to “press”, the corresponding “lever” will simply be broken and there will be nothing to press on. You cannot pull yourself out of the swamp by your braid.

Thus, the government did not apply the management technology of “reforms” when it had (even minimal) prerequisites for it, and now it seeks to manage when it needs to be stimulated and facilitated. This is a hopeless and obviously failed idea, and the only question is to what extent the crisis will chill the ambitions of the helmsmen.

However, this does not mean that the authorities need to withdraw themselves. Its task is to create all the necessary prerequisites for initiative and conscious cooperation of society , promote the development of self-government and self-organization, eliminate all attempts to violate the general rules of the game and privatize advantages and resources. On the one hand, it seems that the new leadership is talking about this, but for some reason - under the name “reforms”. Well, let’s say, out of habit, it confuses the term and the advertising image, which, by the way, is not at all attractive, but, unfortunately, everything is not so simple. The fact is that the authorities, firstly, are fundamentally not going to introduce a regime of equal playing fields (which will inevitably require the withdrawal of hyper-powers and funds from those who received them due to the deliberately erroneous policies of the past decade), and secondly, they are in no way In this way, it is not going to contribute to the creation of minimal prerequisites for people’s activities - material, technical, financial. What to work on (check out the state of affairs in rural mechanization)? Who should work (check out the state of affairs on the skilled labor market)? The authorities still do not want to take on obligations, but for some reason they demand consciousness from citizens.

It is now fashionable to consider the role and place of the state in terms of various kinds of theories and models, completely in isolation from a number of objective characteristics of social relations. For example - time. What kind of time scale does a person think on? What is the near future for him, for which he must work now, and what is distant - for which he must save up his strength, resources, qualifications? Or such a parameter as costs. How many resources can one person mobilize, what credit will he be given for his private initiative? It is quite obvious that issues that are significant for the existence of modern large social systems do not fit into the scope of personal planning. And accordingly, the delegation of powers to more technological and knowledge-intensive social strata, to those who know how and are ready to make decisions, is a natural consequence of the very self-organization that supporters of free development advocate. The question is not whether the state is needed, the question is what is in whose competence and who is responsible for what.

The newly adopted “reform” program contains many correct principles. Within the framework of this material, the task is not to discuss in detail its pros and cons - the question was raised about “the degree of compliance of reform actions with the basic principles of management technologies.” Let's ignore the fallacy of the term "reforms" - what else is wrong with Putin with his Gref, Illarionov and other "reform barons"?

Firstly, since there is nothing to reform, building up power muscles is an irrelevant task and harmful due to its resource intensity and conflict potential. To eliminate restrictions and barriers, it is not so much the humiliation of opponents that is needed, but rather political will, which in our “troubled waters” has enough ways to be realized. There is no perfect legislation and distribution of powers even in prosperous countries - and everywhere these most important components are a consequence of long evolution, and not the implementation of programs developed by "brain trusts".

Secondly, since resources are almost exhausted, the state must find and mobilize them. These are, first of all, foreign policy resources - the sympathy of the world community and willingness to cooperate, cleansing of ulcers and other “national vices” so dear to us, active defense of interests and promotion of one’s goods to foreign markets. This inevitably requires a smart and consistent foreign policy, as well as strengthening those attributes of statehood, without which it is not customary to pay attention - first of all, the army and technological challenges (including in the form of space, so disliked by many reformers). This is an indicator of the degree of one’s own self-respect and readiness to fight - which forces neighbors to cooperate, and not to rob or settle on reservations.

Thirdly, since society and the authorities finally need to conclude an agreement other than “rob the loot” or “live as you can,” then it is the authorities, as a more organized and controlled force, that have the responsibility to take and openly declare strict obligations. In no way - not in the form of promises or good wishes - has everyone heard this, and no one will believe it. They will believe exclusively in deeds - and, although this is not fashionable, first of all, in the form of personifying responsibility for past mistakes. This is very “inhumane”, very “medieval” - “spears”, “barbarism”, etc., but for now every official is sure that he will either be released with a promotion, or sent on a “golden parachute” to some institute, a rich company or party (for feeding), the people will not trust the authorities. “Every man for himself” - this is what the current social contract says, and, alas, half a step has not been taken to replace it with something more decent.

So, three components of conducting a managed improvement of the situation must be in place. Let the reader determine for himself what is there and what can be replaced with something “softer” or more effective. Everyone will have to do this anyway - since the Russian authorities, as many years of experience have shown, do not intend to remember responsibility until the thunder strikes.

It's a pity.