Eternal question

Almost a year ago, Vladimir Putin won his biggest political victory so far - in the Duma elections, almost a quarter of Russian voters cast their votes for the Unity bloc, which he supported as a citizen. With this success, Prime Minister Putin's claims to become Boris Yeltsin's successor were confirmed de facto. And it was then that the question of who you are, Mr. Putin, became extremely relevant. This is how he remains to this day. Especially after the president insisted on making a synthetic decision on state symbols. The scandal did not arise at all because of the notes of Glinka and Aleksandrov. It’s just that the coalition members, who to one degree or another support Vladimir Putin, for the first time asked the question: with whom exactly are we in the same boat, which the president asks us not to rock.

At the end of 1999, Mr. Putin's support base was a bizarre mixture of inveterate statists and equally inveterate liberals, supporters of stability and preservation of Yeltsin's rules of the game and those who were waiting for change. During his year as president, he managed not only to retain most of his supporters, but also to acquire new ones. The secret of the president's success is that everyone can find something pleasant for themselves in his words and deeds.

A hardliner will probably like the operation in Chechnya, the regular appearance of masked men with machine guns in the offices of oligarchs, and Mr. Putin’s regular statements about the revival of the state. The liberal should be pleased with the tax reform and German Gref's program. Those who were in favor of preserving the rules of the game are warmed by the presence in the top leadership of the country of people brought in by Boris Yeltsin, and the absence of sharp movements by the new government in relation to business. At the same time, the declared “equidistance of the oligarchs from power” and the appearance in the power structures of politicians with a military bearing or a soulful KGB look appeals to those who consider it necessary to “throw Yeltsinism off the ship of modernity.”

For the time being, Putin’s supporters, who hold diametrically opposed positions, may “not notice” the existence of competitors or reassure themselves that the “alliance with the enemies” is temporary and short-lived. This was the case with Boris Yeltsin, who in the early 90s was supported by both democrats and supporters of “Great Russia”. However, this cannot go on forever. Russia faces serious problems that will have to be solved sooner or later. These state symbols of the times of the Tsar, the Provisional Government and the USSR can be packaged in one package and ensure that it is adopted by the Duma. It is impossible to do the same with military or administrative reform. Sooner or later, Vladimir Putin will have to sacrifice part of his support base for unpopular actions.

The solution for the president may be to timely convert mass support into strengthening personal power, building a vertical that will help take those very unpopular steps that threaten to lose some of his supporters. In fact, federal reform is the most striking example of a movement in the direction of increasing personal power. The appearance of seven governors in the federal districts made the situation on the ground more controllable for the president. However, sooner or later, Vladimir Putin's plenipotentiaries will have to solve more important problems, and they will need more significant powers. Otherwise they simply won't manage. This is what happened, by the way, with Konstantin Pulikovsky - to solve the energy crisis in Primorye, they had to send first Deputy Prime Minister Ilya Klebanov, and then the head of the Ministry of Emergency Situations, Sergei Shoigu, to the region.

The reform of the party system and the establishment of new rules of the game are also a step aimed at strengthening federal and, above all, presidential power. However, it is not enough to create conditions so that the “party in power” can take serious positions in the Duma over and over again; people must be taken from somewhere who could use this resource. But the project of the Unity party cannot yet be called successful. For example, in a number of regions, local branches of the “party in power” play against presidential governors.

By and large, the personnel problem still remains the main one. Mr. Putin will be able to partially solve it only if the priority tasks of presidential power are determined. It will be possible to recruit people for these tasks. And here the question of who you are, Mr. President, will become not just relevant, but simply topical.

Gleb CHERKASOV