Evgeny Kuznetsov. Evolution from above. Interests versus ideologies

Evolution from above. Interests versus ideologies
Evgeny Kuznetsov

Publication date: December 28, 2000

The large-scale reorganization of the system of political and economic relations taking place in the country has already been called a “revolution,” but although the real changes are quite significant, it is still not a traditional “revolution from above.” It is also important that the changes began not in April 2000, but earlier, only having received an impetus and a new framework during this period, and that they are not entirely determined by the authorities; many things happen spontaneously and independently, as a consequence of the systemic shifts of recent years .

The authorities are not so much “reforming” the situation as seeking to regain control over key management functions and levers. This is undoubtedly useful as a way out of large-scale and spontaneous disintegration , which has become the basis for the degradation of the country’s social and technical infrastructure. However, strengthening the role of the center is not the only option, although it is the most common. Will the usual solution become adequate and promising in this situation, which can be “thrown out” along with the muddy water of the confusion of economic and political interactions of the Yeltsin era?

Order out of chaos

The leading process of the last decade has been the restructuring of financial and commodity flows between economic entities. The single economic machine, which collapsed almost overnight, turned into a mass of unorganized units, degenerating at first from a complex multi-level system of resource distribution into an almost single-level layer. A huge number of industries found themselves without the opportunity to obtain credit, organize supplies and sales, although it was initially thought that bringing a system of inter-production interactions into a transparent market environment was a purely technical process. But it turned out that most of the “supplier-consumer” connections have lost both their meaning and the possibility of preservation. The collapse of such an organizing infrastructure as commodity exchanges showed that the post-Soviet economy does not want or cannot exist in the space of open and regulated communications, and the firms that survived the chaos of the general intermediary boom took the lead and became centers for organizing inter-industrial relations. Lending to production did not work either, remaining only within closed groups. Happened privatization of connections - systems of interaction between economic entities, and this conversion of information into money and power became the only achieved result of the reforms.

The first stage of recovery from degradation and destruction of ties led to the emergence of financial and industrial groups and trade and intermediary empires. By re-establishing themselves around financial centers, enterprises acquired what was lost - communication space, which meant the possibility of obtaining loans, organizing supplies and sales, as well as resolving legal and other conflicts.

At the grassroots level, this was embodied in the creation of a system of “roofs” - when the center of the organization became a criminal group, which often performed the functions of an “investor” (giving “easy loans” at crazy interest rates) and made it possible to resolve conflict situations with an almost completely paralyzed legal system. The general mood of distrust in the state at that time weakened the influence of both the center and local authorities to a critical level.

The second stage of restructuring of the social and economic space consisted in the emergence of large groups from under criminal control and in return they received status and weight in power. At this moment, large financial and industrial groups became objective allies of the center, as they began to jointly recreate the state as a kind of “roof”. This happened at other levels and, in particular, led to a general desire of criminal groups to become legalized and, by entering into active cooperation with local authorities, to acquire “systematicity.” The process was successfully implemented in 1996 at the federal level, and later at the local level. The authorities managed to supplant outright criminality by legalizing the activities of some groups already in the new system of distribution of resources and statuses.

At this moment, there was a direct entry of prominent figures of the FIG into the structures of the federal government, and, conversely, the active recruitment of high-status government officials into the management structures of the FIG. arose A symbiosis of official and unofficial power , in which the first controlled the central systems of government and security, and the second had real control over a significant part of the “privatized” power functions. It is well known that many federal structures, even at the highest level, often carried out the “order” of a friendly financial structure, taking care of the state interest in the second place. Representatives of financial clans who entered government bodies received two salaries, which fully reflects their actual “dual citizenship” - in Russia “official” and “real”.

The third stage is associated with important changes after the crash of 1998, although it started earlier. FIGs as centers of influence began to lose strength, which happened both as a result of the struggle between them for the most “tasty” property, and because the “new elite” knew how to make a profit only from “hard” profitable industries and through shadow machinations. When producing anything more complex than "aluminum ingots", they lost profits, and almost all of the "complex" property hung on them like a weight. A strong social deformation also intervened in the process: entire cities with standing factories began to join the ranks of the left opposition, which created almost insurmountable obstacles for the activities of the symbionts (central government + financial industrial groups).

The essence of the third stage was that local authorities took the leading roles in organizing and controlling economic and political relations. What prevented them from playing second roles in the “Moscow finances” was that the big players were only interested in “tasty” things, and the governors were left “alone” with standing factories and pensioners. There was a massive “export of problems” from top to bottom. The role of “local representatives of the true owners” became relatively stable only in single-commodity resource regions (oil), while the rest were forced to “spin.”

Actually, the nature of the “third wave” was determined precisely by the fact that, from the point of view of the governors, a working and idle plant are quite close in “cost” - the first will feed its “treasury”, the second can be “sold” when bargaining for transfers, for preferential loans and tax breaks. The social capital of unemployment was almost not relevant for financial industrial groups (with the exception of hiring the unemployed for strikes - as was the case with miners in May 1998), but was very relevant for local authorities. In addition, after the collapse of the communication system within the country, it was easier for enterprises to recreate it at the regional level . In this system, some complex industries got a chance, including those producing consumer goods.

In 1998, a shift occurred that temporarily strengthened the position of governors. The crisis brought down many schemes of interaction between the raw materials sector and importers, who formed and are forming a unified system of penumbral financial circulation. Chaos and the collapse of demand made it possible for local producers to crowd out imports, which local authorities had previously “bought” as “social” capital. Now it has become “productive” - and began to bring not only political, but also economic profit. Success began to develop in the form of further transfer into the ownership of the region or a large “local” clan and other important objects.

The basis for intense competition between the leaders of the “second” and “third” waves of creators of unified economic systems was formed. The first insisted on maintaining the pre-crisis situation, the “continuity of power,” which allowed them to compete for status and control over federal authorities. The latter hoped to oust their weakened opponents and enter into bargaining with the center as the only influential force. However, by preserving the central instruments of influence, the federal government repelled the attack of the governors.

So, in 2000, a situation arose in which the weakening of financial industrial groups coincided with the suppression of regional elites. The central government temporarily found itself outside of the symbioses (existing or planned). And this is where it became clear that she lacked real tools and habits for recreating that space of economic and political communications that, each in their own way, were recreated by the “financiers” and “regionals.”

Contours of the new policy

The current central government, represented by President Putin, has the following set of options. The first is compensation for the lack of one’s own tools through an alliance with one of the opposing forces (already obedient “industrialists” or governors). The second is the development of our own tools for coordinating and managing financial and resource flows and social communications by creating “state oligarchies” in the form of offices of presidential representatives in the districts . The third is promoting the establishment of self-organization mechanisms such as the market and civil society .

The first option is familiar and quite acceptable if there is equidistance from both opponents and the creation of a full-fledged system of their party representation. In fact, parties of “financiers” and “regionals” exist, and it is only important to position them correctly and emphasize the difference in interests. The center will rely on them in areas of maximum competence, benefiting both economically and politically.

The second option may have already been chosen by the authorities as a basis. The creation of a system of federal districts in this regard seems like an obvious solution. The reorientation of regional law enforcement agencies to district structures, the emergence of “new systemic” banks, industrialists and traders will create new schemes for obtaining loans and investments, new ways of resolving conflicts . A significant part of the shadow and “gray” financial and political communications will come under the eye of the governors and return to the space of state control. This is a good option, but it has many pitfalls - including traditional corruption and localism.

Is it possible to implement a third, somewhat ideal, model? When the market and the rule of law are strengthened, real economic interests become integrators, and conflicts and disputes are resolved in a civilized way? Is there time for a progressive policy of “promoting self-organization,” or is only a mobilization strategy relevant, which is required by a large part of society? The answer to this will most likely be given not by a political discussion, but by the real state of the Russian economy in the next year, which promises to be a very turbulent year.

So it is much more realistic to discuss who will be the first to recover from the blow - large trans-regional financial and industrial groups or governors, “oligarchs” or “regional barons”. Who will offer the authorities the most economically or socially beneficial solution. The most desirable option in this situation would be an option in which reliance would be placed on these forces not in the form of a close personnel-ideological compromise, but in the form of an honest and open victory of the political party from the corresponding force - with the admission of its representatives to the government to share responsibility and, again, the legalization of dual interests . If in modern Russia it is so difficult to formulate party ideologies , then maybe they should at least clearly indicate their interests ?

In the event that the government decisively assumes the function of an arbiter, strictly deprivatizes the courts and other federal bodies, actively promotes the development of self-government and public life, and if the district authorities do not take the dangerous path of “subordinating everyone under themselves,” then there will be grounds for open and fair competition of development models both at the federal level and at the level of specific production, which will be able to choose with whom it is more profitable for it to cooperate.