“The law is good, but what is the line?”

The foundations of state-church relations are established by the Constitution of the Russian Federation and law. I took part in the development of the Federal Law “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations” of 1997 and am related to the practice that is developing in this area. The path to this law was not easy. Let me remind you that in 1990, two laws were adopted almost simultaneously - the Union one, which was developed under my leadership, and the Russian one, the development of which was led by V. Polosin, Chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Freedom of Conscience, Religion, Mercy and Charity. The fundamental difference between the laws is already visible from the names - the union one was called the law “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations”, and the Russian one was called the Law “On Freedom of Religion”. In the early 90s, new religious phenomena were among the first gifts of freedom. Not all of them met with sympathy and understanding in Russian society, and a huge diversity of opinions arose. The search for a compromise resulted in the development of a new law, which was completed only 4 years after the adoption of the new Russian Constitution. The storm of passions was “international in nature” and contributed to the displacement of the compromise from the equilibrium point. The last stage of development of the law took place in the presidential administration with the active participation of the high representative of the Russian Orthodox Church.

Compromise has affected some formulations; different understandings of their content still lead to conflicts, the resolution of which even rises to the Constitutional Court. The law complies with the norms of the Constitution and Russia's international obligations. But the living interests of some interested parties force them to look for interpretations that would allow them to do as they want, and if this fails, simply circumvent the law.

As for the Russian Orthodox Church, it is natural that it wants to further elevate its role in society; the Church cannot be reproached for this. However, it is not appropriate when state or municipal officials allow themselves, out of respect for it or because of their religious affiliation, to restrict the religious freedom of numerous other faiths. They are not allowed to translate their religious likes and dislikes into actions that infringe on the rights of other believers. For example, if Archimandrite Roman does not approve of holding a meeting of believers of the Korean Methodist Church, then this is not a reason for the administration of the city of Dmitrov to prohibit the rental of club premises for holding a meeting of Methodists. If an Orthodox priest calls on Radio Radonezh for pogroms of sex shops and dispersal of “sects,” then the Orthodox sympathies of the prosecutor should not prevent him from taking measures in accordance with the law.

The state and its officials must take into account that the country is multi-religious and that religious organizations are equal under the law. We must not, for example, forget that in our country there is not only the Russian Orthodox Church - the Moscow Patriarchate, but also other religious organizations. For example, Old Believers were repeatedly offended when Orthodox icons, bells, and even churches that previously belonged to them were transferred not to the Russian Orthodox Church, but to the Russian Orthodox Church.

To realize human rights to freedom of conscience and religion, it is not enough to have written norms. When the union law was adopted, the wise Metropolitan Juvenaly, who was a member of the working group, expressed a deep thought: “The law is good, but what will the line be?” The problem today is that there is no line. The state does not have a developed, conscious, understandable, expressed position on which to rely when making current decisions. The state addresses problems of relations with religious organizations as these problems arise, decisions are made within the framework of a specific situation. This naturally takes into account the fact that the Church has significant political influence.

In my opinion, the influence of the Church is based not on the fact that there are a lot of true believing Orthodox Christians in Russia, but on favorable circumstances. There are still few believers who regularly pray in churches, give their donations to the needs of the church and church charity, although their number is growing, more young people are being added. But even a non-believer admits that Russian culture is based on Orthodoxy and is implicated in it. A totalitarian society aimed to create a “new man”, sought to break traditional ties and impose its ideals. With the advent of freedom, people themselves began to look for their place in the world, to remember who their ancestors were, if they were Orthodox - and they, therefore, are also Orthodox. Although not everyone was even baptized. It is not because Orthodox Christians follow the norms established by religion that they pray. Many do not know either the “Creed” or the “Our Father” and are not able to distinguish an Orthodox cross from a Catholic one. But they support the Orthodox Church, and the priests count them among their own, although this flock is not very reliable. In fact, such people are quite easily influenced by charismatic personalities and the efforts of preachers and missionaries of other faiths. To keep them, to truly “church” them, is work, you need personnel, you need skill, which is in short supply. There is a temptation to use other measures. Including those that in other cases are called “unfair competition” and are suppressed by the state. In relation to the Orthodox Church, on the contrary, a high degree of understanding of its interests is sometimes manifested, going beyond legal limits.

Sometimes steps towards the aspirations of the Church, as it seems to me, are connected with the hope of popular support in elections, sometimes with the need to fill the vacuum created after the departure of the ideology that filled all organized life. These phenomena are objective, but are not fully compatible with the law, and therefore proposals to supplement it, to introduce a division of religions into traditional and tolerant, do not subside, bearing in mind that the “intolerant” will be outside the law.

Today, according to the Constitution, Russia is a secular state, all religions are granted freedom, restrictions on which can be imposed only by law and only to the extent necessary in order to protect the foundations of the constitutional system, morality, health, rights and legitimate interests of other persons, and ensure the defense of the country and state security. Do we need to move away from this? It seems to me that it is better to consistently implement the provisions of the current Constitution.

What is the traditionality of religions in the field of law? Traditions existing in human relations do not always need to be enshrined in law, and some traditions do not fit into the law. Let's say, autocracy was traditional for Russia, and the Orthodox Church was part of the state machine and was not headed by the Patriarch. The Synod was a state institution. How many people today consider it necessary to restore this situation? And at what cost can this be achieved?

There is no doubt that Orthodoxy is traditional for Russia, Islam too. After all, at one time paganism was quite “traditional.” But Orthodox missionary activity among pagans was also traditional. Conversion to Orthodoxy from any other religion was welcomed, but conversion from Orthodoxy to another faith was punishable by deprivation of civil rights and exile to Siberia. Here is an example of the difference between traditionalism and tolerance towards religion being enshrined in law. And what consequences of such a division could be consolidated today? Law is rigid and concrete, has its own logic and does not accept empty declarations. When you say “a”, keep in mind that you will have to go to “z”.

If we are talking not about religions, but about religious organizations, then it is proposed that some organizations be given more rights than others. I can't support this idea. Firstly, it is generally unreasonable to talk about the “traditionality” of organizations. The “organization,” that is, the structure, of the same Russian Orthodox Church is radically different from the pre-revolutionary one. In “organizations,” much depends on the historical moment and even the personality of the leader—let’s take the Communist Party under Stalin, Brezhnev, Gorbachev. Secondly, the surest way to lead an “organization,” especially a spiritual-ideological one, to destruction is to give it advantages over others. To me, these proposals seem to be the underside of uneradicated Bolshevism, if you like - a childhood disease, because there are only 10 years of religious freedom... And before that - strict state control, who was “traditional” and who to tolerate, was established by the state, and in fact it was decided by the ideological organization. This is a tradition that I don’t want to return to!

In essence, the social influence of the Russian Orthodox Church today is great, recognized, and based on the consciousness of tradition, but I cannot say how it will develop further and what will be required from the state in these conditions. Judgments require a basis that does not exist.

In my opinion, the harmonization of relations between society and religious organizations cannot be done without the participation of the state, and a professionally working state body is needed. What is needed is not authority over religious organizations (the courts have them), but an understanding of the situation. It is necessary to collect information, analyze, summarize, correct the practice of state and municipal authorities, bringing it to the law, develop a conceptual understanding of the current state and prospects, and propose solutions. It is necessary to ensure the implementation of laws and improve legislation. If we talk about the sphere of state-church relations, today the executive authorities do not deal with this professionally.

Evidence that state-church relations are of increasing interest in society is the public sound of the social concept of the Russian Orthodox Church or, for example, the publication in NG-Religion of two projects “Concept of Church-State Relations” (one created at the Russian Academy of Civil Service , and the other by a team of authors led by Alexander Shchipkov, head of the guild of religious journalists). In this regard, I note: I cannot agree with the panicky statements of some evangelical churches, which see a terrible threat to themselves in freedom of speech. But the demand for the formulation of public policy in this area is felt.

According to the Constitution, the basis of state policy is determined by the President of the Russian Federation. Vladimir Putin’s position is not yet entirely clear to me personally. By his behavior, he demonstrates respect for the law: he modestly speaks about his Orthodox worldview, the prayer service after the inauguration was held outside the framework of the official ceremony, he meets with representatives of both the Russian Orthodox Church and other faiths. However, the logic of these meetings is not obvious. Probably, an understanding of the fundamental issues of further development of relations has not yet developed. It would be a pity if such an understanding would develop without the support of professionally prepared materials.