Sacred "capital" and its "oligarchs"

"Church of Millions"

Answering the question - what is the modern Russian Orthodox Church - is very, very difficult. From a theological and canonical point of view, the Russian Orthodox Church itself defines itself as the “One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church ,” founded by Jesus Christ Himself, and within the Ecumenical Orthodox Church, the Russian Orthodox Church has the status of one of the autocephalous Churches. The Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia ranks fifth in the hierarchical list ( diptych ) of Orthodox patriarchs.

However, if we adhere to strictly canonical logic, then serious objections can be made to each of the points of self-determination of the Russian Orthodox Church, calling into question the compliance of the modern Moscow Patriarchate with textbook definitions. Since we are not faced with the task of participating in theological discussions, we will focus on analyzing the position of the Russian Orthodox Church as a social institution that almost exclusively represents the Orthodox tradition in modern Russia .

On what sociological, political or historical realities is the position of the Russian Orthodox Church based as the monopoly custodian of “Russian Orthodoxy”? Usually the Russian Orthodox Church refers to the fact that this Church unites as its members from 80 to 100 million Russian citizens. The requirement for “proportional” participation of the Russian Orthodox Church in the activities of the main social and political institutions of the Russian Federation is based on this “statistical” statement. This astronomical figure can be questioned. Even a mechanical multiplication of the number of Russian Orthodox Church churches in Russia (8,500) by a thousand (although not every church can accommodate such a number of parishioners) gives a more than modest figure of 8.5 million people. That is, in Russia there are no more than 10 million people who could regularly attend church services (without which, according to canonical definitions, a person can hardly be considered a member of the Church). The majority of the 100 million “flock” of the Russian Orthodox Church does not go to churches, does not participate in church life, and does not even “really” believe in God (that is, in accordance with Orthodox dogmas).

This contradiction in the Russian Orthodox Church is overcome with the help of the concept “Orthodox by birth,” which denotes people who grew up in the Russian cultural tradition and experienced the influence of the Russian (=Orthodox) national cultural environment. The enormous destruction caused in the 20th century to the traditional cultural environment is not completely ignored, but is perceived as unimportant, easily restored with the help of the Russian Orthodox Church, which, for this purpose, seeks to strengthen its influence. A paradoxical situation arises: church structures demand help from the state in restoring their influence over tens of millions of people, justifying the legality of the request by their influence on these people.

This paradox is difficult not to notice, and it is ignored not because they are not noticed, but because for the state and society, what is decisive is not the actual influence of the Russian Orthodox Church on each individual person, but its ability to influence the field of social relations as a whole with the help of its “ symbolic capital" . The influence of the hierarchical and administrative structures of the Russian Orthodox Church on society is explained by the fact that these structures in the currently existing social and political field take the place of the historical Russian Orthodox Church, one of the leading agents of all Russian history.

Symbolic capital and its practical application

The “symbolic capital” that the Russian Orthodox Church uses in its socio-political and economic activities can be defined as a set of cultural symbols and archetypes, principles of public morality and norms of behavior, basic elements of the historical memory of the people and forms of state and social structure, one way or another rooted in the Russian Orthodox tradition.

The actual religious component of the “symbolic capital” of the Russian Orthodox Church is in demand mainly by the “churched” part of its flock, i.e., approximately 2–4% of the Russian population. It is they, according to various sociological surveys, who participate in church sacraments, strive to lead a constant and intense spiritual life, profess Orthodox dogmas and study the Holy Tradition of the Orthodox Church. From time to time, this religious component is also in demand by the “unchurched” part of the ROC flock (those “Orthodox by birth” who were already mentioned above). Thus, the majority of Russian citizens baptize their children, get married or have funeral services for relatives in church. Recently, the practice of consecration by clergy of the Russian Orthodox Church of various buildings, offices, vehicles, etc., state-owned or privately owned, has become widespread. The magical perception of church rituals and the superstitious fear associated with their non-fulfillment bring representatives of the political elite and business to churches. The religiosity of the “churched” and “unchurched” flocks of the Russian Orthodox Church is strikingly different - while the former is characterized by a conscious perception of Orthodox dogma and conscious participation in church sacraments and rituals, the latter does not have definite religious beliefs, but is guided only by vague ideological ideas and fetishistic superstitions.

A characteristic feature of modern pastoral practice in the Russian Orthodox Church is that the majority of clergy do not seek to combat superstitions and magical attitudes towards church rituals, which are characteristic of the “unchurched” flock. On the contrary, overly active and inquisitive parishioners (especially young ones) often cause fear and suspicion - they are often warned about the danger of falling into pride and “prelest” (spiritual deception), recalling the words of the Holy Scripture: “In much knowledge there is much sorrow . ” In turn, the exploitation of superstitions, mistakenly perceived by secular people as integral elements of church tradition, has become widespread - the clergy often supports the opinion that they are some kind of closed caste of bearers of secret sacred knowledge, which is inaccessible to the “laymen”, therefore the latter must unconditionally trust priests and follow their advice (this tendency has reached its maximum embodiment in modern “young age” - in the practice of forming closed communities around the most “spiritual” and “insightful” priests, who regulate all the nuances of the private and public life of their “children” , who, in turn, surround their confessors-“elders” with an aura of holiness ). The actual religious component of the “symbolic capital” of the Russian Orthodox Church should include Orthodox dogma, Tradition and traditions of the Orthodox Church, sacraments, services and rituals, principles and norms of spiritual life (“spiritual practice”), as well as superstitions and magical ideas that are associated with the Church among the “unchurched” part of her flock.

The “practical” use of the religious component of the “symbolic capital” of the Russian Orthodox Church is not limited to the performance of “magical” rites for the “unchurched” and the teaching of sacraments for the sanctification of soul and body for the “churched”. Based on its religious tradition, the Russian Orthodox Church offers society certain principles of social and personal morality , assessing certain phenomena of social life from the point of view of these principles. of the Church adopted at the Anniversary Council of Bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church in 2000 The most complete set of these principles, norms and rules are the “Fundamentals of the Social Concept” . In recent years, the Russian Orthodox Church has been striving to more actively introduce the norms of Orthodox morality not only into the private life of its flock, but also into public policy. Often, in controversial issues that arise between certain institutions of the state and society, the “word of the Church,” usually voiced by the Patriarch, turns out to be decisive. One of the most recent examples of this kind of interference is the dispute that flared up at the end of August 2001 about holding a bullfight in Moscow. It was decided to cancel the bullfight after Patriarch Alexy II stated that it incites base animal instincts and is an “untraditional” way of entertainment for our country and Russian culture.

The Russian Orthodox Church also includes in its “symbolic capital” the role that the Church played in the formation of Russian statehood . In recent church publications, the concept of “state-forming” is increasingly encountered when it comes to the advantages of the Russian Orthodox Church over other “traditional confessions” in Russia. Despite the fact that Kievan Rus arose even before the baptism of Rus', it was Orthodoxy that made the power of the Grand Duke legitimate, and later a church blessing (expressed in different periods of Russian history in different ways) became an indispensable condition for ascending to the grand-ducal, royal or imperial throne. Even Soviet historians recognized the exceptional role of the Church in the unification of Russian lands around Moscow. Finally, Russian legislation until 1917 (but especially before Peter) was based on church law. The centuries-old tradition of perceiving the Russian Orthodox Church as an institution that gives the highest sanction to power, serving as the highest source of legitimacy for power, is still reflected today. In 1996, the Patriarch's blessing to the newly incoming President was included in the official inauguration ceremony of Boris Yeltsin. In 2000, immediately after the official inauguration ceremony of Vladimir Putin, the new President proceeded to the Archangel Cathedral - the home church of the Moscow tsars - where Patriarch Alexy II served him a farewell prayer service and blessed him “for the presidency” with an icon.

To the fourth category of “symbolic capital” of the Russian Orthodox Church we will include the cultural and aesthetic heritage of 1000 years of Russian Orthodoxy - icon painting, church architecture, sacred music, liturgical texts and some other literary works of Ancient Russia, objects of decorative and applied art used in church life (liturgical vessels, crosses, frames, vestments, etc.). It is this heritage that has shaped the authentic image of Russian culture and continues to have a significant influence on its development.

The “symbolic capital” of the Russian Orthodox Church is embodied in a large number of Orthodox mythologies , the assessment of which we will leave behind brackets. Some of these mythologies are embodied in succinct slogans inscribed on the banners of participants in various Orthodox patriotic processions and religious processions: “We are Russians! God is with us!”; “Holy Rus', keep the Orthodox faith!”; " "Without Orthodoxy there is no Russia . But there are also deeper mythologies that influence the political life of the country and the everyday behavior of many Russians, “rooted in Orthodoxy” (a common expression of Patriarch Alexy II). Since Russian national self-identification is almost inseparable from religious self-identification as Orthodox, it almost always implies a certain hostility towards Muslims and especially Jews who “crucified Christ.”

The church is revolutionary. Ideological renewal

During the Soviet period of Russian history, the “symbolic capital” of the Russian Orthodox Church underwent serious deformation . In the first years of their rule, the Bolsheviks tried to pursue an uncompromising policy on the “religious front” - any religious ideas were declared “prejudice”, the words “religion” and “church” were made synonymous with “counter-revolution”, and the clergy was viewed as an exploitative class subject to complete destruction. The painful clash between Orthodoxy and Bolshevism reveals the quasi-religious nature of the latter, its desire to implant the only “true faith” with fire and sword, destroying all “heresies” and “prejudices” of other faiths.

As the romantic ideal of the “world revolution” was gradually replaced by pragmatic considerations of strengthening its own power and building socialism, the Soviet leadership partially revised its policy towards religious organizations. Already in the early 1920s, a special “religious” department was created within the structure of the OGPU, which began, in modern language, to develop the concept of using the “symbolic capital” of the Russian Orthodox Church in the interests of “workers’ and peasants’ power.” Of course, the pragmatization of the approach to religion did not mean that the ideologists of the Soviet regime abandoned their communist ideal, inseparable from atheism, but it took into account the objective sociological fact - even the “Stalinist” population census, carried out in conditions of general fear in 1937, showed that 1/3 The urban and 2/3 of the rural population of the USSR (i.e., the majority of the entire population of the country) profess themselves to be believers.

The new tactics of church-state relations were first tested in 1922, when the OGPU initiated the renovationist schism of the Russian Orthodox Church. The group of liberal clergy, who came up with their program of radical reforms of church life back at the Local Council of 1917–1918, was asked to take over the management of the Church, creating new bodies of supreme church authority, while ensuring the complete “ loyalty” of the Russian Orthodox Church to the Soviet authorities under the guise of one of elements of the “ideological renewal” of the Church. Renovationism declared the similarity of the ideals of Christianity and communism, calling for their synthesis. The success of the renovationists, according to the authorities, was to be ensured by undermining trust in Patriarch Tikhon, who was arrested and placed in prison in May 1922. However, the repressions of the Soviet government only led to an increase in the authority of the Patriarch among the people, and renovationism did not receive any noticeable support from the church people. This is not least explained by the fact that the renovationists decided to abandon a significant part of the “symbolic capital” of the Russian Orthodox Church - including traditional church rituals (they translated services into modern language, changed church rites, etc.). But it was precisely this part of the “symbolic capital” that was closest and most familiar to the simple church people, who, seeing it “damage” , refused to recognize the Renovationists as Orthodox.

Soviet church. Propagandist and diplomat

The failure of the attempt at a renovationist “synthesis” of Orthodoxy and communism quickly became obvious to its main inspirers and developers. During the interrogation of one of the new martyr hierarchs at the OGPU in the mid-1920s, a characteristic phrase was heard: “If you do not accept the renovationists, then we will give you one of our own. Then hold on . ” After the death of Patriarch Tikhon in 1925, the Soviet government prevented the convening of a new Local Council necessary for the election of the Patriarch, and the highest church authority gradually passed to Metropolitan Sergius (Stragorodsky). It was the latter that the OGPU managed to make the conductor of its plan, which turned out to be more successful than the renovationist one. In July 1927, Metropolitan Sergius issued his famous “declaration ,” proclaiming the “new course” of the Russian Orthodox Church for cooperation with the state, the “joys and sorrows” of which the followers of Metropolitan Sergius recognized ” as “their own . by the opponents of Metropolitan Sergius This course, called “Sergianism” , became a condition for the legal existence of the Russian Orthodox Church under the conditions of the Soviet state. However, this existence from the very beginning turned out to be quite flawed - the part of the Church that followed Metropolitan Sergius voluntarily took on the role of political decoration, behind which the iniquities of the Soviet regime were hidden. Already, Metropolitan Sergius was forced to repeatedly officially declare that there was no persecution of believers in the Soviet Union, and his successors actively participated in the Soviet “struggle for peace”, under the cover of which the export of communism and a new redistribution of the world after the Second World War was carried out.

“Sergianism” was a more subtle way of using the “symbolic capital” of the Russian Orthodox Church by an atheistic state than “renovationism.” In his “declaration,” Metropolitan Sergius especially emphasized that the church structure he created leaves intact all Orthodox dogmas, traditions and pious customs, without outwardly changing in any way the traditional way of church life. But many of Metropolitan Sergius’s contemporaries, brought up in the pre-revolutionary church tradition, felt a significant internal change that turned the Church into an earthly (and, moreover, very politicized) organization. The majority of the hierarchs of the Russian Orthodox Church at the end of the 1920s rejected Metropolitan Sergius’s course of subordinating church administration to “godless authorities ,” which he considered “power from God . ” These hierarchs were repressed in the 1930s, and their small surviving flock went underground, forming the Catacomb Church.

The canonical structure of the Russian Orthodox Church, legalized in 1927, survived until 1941 with difficulty: there were only about a hundred open churches throughout the USSR. Wartime events put a new demand on the “symbolic capital” that the Church had preserved. in 1943 Usually they point to two circumstances that pushed Stalin to “church revival” . The first is the patriotic rhetoric characteristic of wartime, the need to actualize the “connection of times” (and the only social institution that actually preserved this connection in the country of the Soviets was the Church). The second is the religious policy of the enemy, who opened churches en masse in the occupied territories, thereby securing the support of the local population. Finally, we can point out the strengthening of religious and mystical sentiments characteristic of participants in any military action, which, as they say, did not bypass Stalin himself, who allegedly came to pray at night in a Moscow temple. In addition, the death of many millions of fathers, husbands and sons at the front led to the awakening of religious feelings among the female part of the population, which filled the Orthodox churches that were reopened on the initiative of the authorities, without particularly asking questions about “Sergianism” and the legitimacy of the power of Metropolitan Sergius.

In the years after the war, the authorities turned to that part of the “symbolic capital” of the Russian Orthodox Church, which helped it solve specific political and, so to speak, socio-psychological problems. The Church began to be used primarily as a means of propaganda (especially in foreign policy, through its connections with other local Orthodox churches and through “peacemaking ministry”). Within the country, the Russian Orthodox Church was allowed to perform only ritual functions (the liturgical part of its “symbolic capital” was in demand) in order, on the one hand, to create the appearance of religious freedom for “outsiders”, and on the other, to satisfy the most basic spiritual needs of widows who had lost their husbands in years of war and those in need of psychological assistance, which the state could hardly provide them with its own funds. It is characteristic that Soviet leaders (especially Khrushchev) sincerely believed that with the departure of this generation of believers, the Church would lose its flock, since it would no longer have “patients” in need of psychological support through rituals associated mainly with the remembrance of the dead. However, this did not happen. With the passing of one generation “grandmothers” were replaced by something else - a stable stereotype has developed in the public consciousness: an elderly woman must go to church, even if she is not too religious. Visiting a temple became an attribute of a certain social status.

The “internal” religious policy of the state allowed the use only of the “external” part of the “symbolic capital” of the Russian Orthodox Church - its rituals, and then only for a certain, marginal part of society. That is why the youth and intelligentsia, whose representatives often turned to the Russian Orthodox Church in search of another, main part of its “symbolic capital,” experienced disappointment and became dissidents both in relation to the authorities and the Church.

The leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church in Soviet times was aware that the priority for the state was the “external” direction of the Church’s activities. The main task set by the Stalinist regime for the Russian Orthodox Church was “peacekeeping,” that is, carrying out particularly delicate diplomatic tasks under the guise of “external church relations . ” By 1961—the time of the beginning of the so-called “Khrushchev persecution” of the Russian Orthodox Church—the church leadership was already quite clearly aware that the only guarantor of the preservation of the Church within the USSR could be its international activity. It is the desire to find support in the Western Christian world that explains the fact that the Russian Orthodox Church joined the World Council of Churches (WCC), the largest ecumenical organization that proclaims as its goal “the restoration of the unity of the Christian world,” and as its fundamental doctrine the “theory of branches ,” according to which all Christian denominations are only branches from a single tree, but none of them contains the fullness of the truth and cannot claim the title of “one True Church.” Joining the WCC, on the one hand, was fraught for the Russian Orthodox Church with a partial loss of religious identity - after all, the Orthodox Church from time immemorial has professed itself to be the “one True Church,” considering other confessions to have separated from it. On the other hand, in the conditions of anti-religious persecution and the extreme narrowing of the scope of religious life within the country, interfaith differences were somewhat obscured, and the task of "save at least something . " Until 1990, there was very little criticism of ecumenism in the Russian Orthodox Church - even radical dissidents reproached the church leadership for collaboration and cooperation with the authorities, but not for friendship with Western Christians. Only when, with the cessation of persecution, it became possible to calmly think about one’s religious identity, a powerful wave of conservative criticism of ecumenism arose in the Russian Orthodox Church. Be that as it may, ecumenism, following “Sergianism,” became another serious blow to the “symbolic capital” of the Russian Orthodox Church, further emasculating its doctrinal component.

The many-year period of close cooperation with the authorities and the solution of the foreign policy tasks set by them did not pass without a trace not only for church doctrine, but also for the church organization itself, the structure of which was formed in such a way as to make it most convenient to carry out the propaganda tasks set by the authorities. The composition of the church hierarchy was completely controlled by a specially created government body - the Council for Religious Affairs, whose authorized representatives had the right to dismiss from the parish or not allow the priest of even the most remote rural church to serve. The leaders of the Council for Religious Affairs, in most cases career KGB officers, often spoke about the need to create a “new type” of priest , which they partially succeeded in doing. By the end of the Soviet period, the administrative system of the Russian Orthodox Church worked quite clearly and in an independent mode, weeding out everyone who could pose the slightest danger to “normal church-state relations . ” None of the church dissidents convicted of “anti-Soviet activities” in the 1970s–1980s received support from the clergy; on the contrary, all of them were subjected to strict church punishments (ban from ministry and even excommunication from church communion).

The church is modern. Orthodox oligarch

The socio-political conditions that arose as a result of the collapse of the Soviet system, it would seem, provided the Russian Orthodox Church with every opportunity for the gradual restoration of its “symbolic capital” to its original, intact state and its further increase. But the inertia of the “symphony” with the state turned out to be so strong that the path of restoration was essentially rejected. Fearing the collapse of the church-administrative structure, similar to the one that occurred in Ukraine, where the fusion of the Russian Orthodox Church with the state weakened for a short period, the church leadership in Moscow chose to move passively in the usual wake of serving “state interests.” In exchange for loyalty to this proven course, it received in the form of the state an external force that restrained the centrifugal forces within the Church. Although in the early 1990s Orthodox canonical structures alternative to the Russian Orthodox Church were legalized in Russia (in Soviet times they existed underground), and even the process of transition of communities to the Russian Church Abroad began, the scale of this phenomenon remained quite modest - most of the “fallen away” churches were returned to the Russian Orthodox Church by force, with the help of riot police.&#;

The “symbolic capital” of the Russian Orthodox Church, even if it has reached our time in a form fairly distorted by history, remains in demand by modern authorities. But if during the Soviet period the church leadership disposed of this “capital” only to the extent that the authorities determined for it, now it has become the absolute owner of this heritage. Our time is characterized by two features of the exploitation of “symbolic capital” in the Russian Orthodox Church - the monopolization of it by the church hierarchy (the church “lower classes” are allowed access to this “capital” to a very small extent and even the clergy can use it in strictly limited quantities) and its transformation into an object of commercial activity (the value of one or another component of the “symbolic capital” of the Russian Orthodox Church in our time, in most cases, has a very definite monetary equivalent).

The commercialization of “symbolic capital”, firstly, turns the Russian Orthodox Church into one of the largest economic entities in Russia, and secondly, makes the demand for “symbolic capital” dependent on its commercial success. Mainly this transformation occurs due to the fact that those cultural archetypes, forms of self-identification and, finally, magical ideas that are associated with the performance of religious rituals live in the public consciousness. As mentioned above, it is the “unchurched” or “low-churched” part of the flock that brings the greatest income to the church treasury. It is noteworthy that in its “market” the Russian Orthodox Church is an almost complete monopolist . Possible competitors are eliminated by administrative methods, with the help of the state (in the early 1990s, alternative Orthodox Churches were eliminated, and currently “sects” and Roman Catholics are being eliminated, which pose less of a threat because they do not have “symbolic capital” similar in form with capital of the Russian Orthodox Church).

Being the owner of such substantial capital, both “symbolic” and transformed into material values, embodied, the leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church has significant influence on the state and society. In this regard, the church leadership should be perceived as a collective oligarch who has sufficient opportunities to play “his own game” on the political and economic stage of Russia. The technique of influence of this collective oligarch on the state and society has its own characteristics. In addition to financial leverage, the Russian Orthodox Church has a powerful resource of spiritual and psychological influence, the origins of which lie in the “otherworldly,” transcendental origin of its “symbolic capital.”

This resource is used in a wide variety of forms - from primitive (a priest threatens a businessman that he will sing him alive if he does not “donate to the temple”) to very sophisticated (a clergyman becomes the confessor of a high-level politician and, through his pastoral advice and blessings, influences him political activity). Recently, to enhance spiritual and psychological influence, the authority of “elders”—experienced confessors who, as a rule, live in monasteries or remote rural parishes and enjoy a reputation as “visionary,” living saints—has been increasingly used. Many political figures visit the “elders” to receive important advice from them, without even suspecting that their “consultants” of a lower rank, usually from among the capital’s clergy, are acting through the “elders.” The so-called “doctrine of triarchy” has become widespread in the Russian Orthodox Church , according to which power is represented in the form of a triangle, the two bases of which symbolize secular and church-hierarchical power - royal (conditionally) and priestly ministries. The apex of this triangle is the power of the “elders,” which, being an expression of prophetic ministry, is the unconditional authority and standard for the two “lower” types of power.

The desire to obtain the maximum and fastest commercial effect from the exploitation of the “symbolic capital” of the Russian Orthodox Church leads to its squandering and gradual loss. The most obvious symptom of this process is the decline in the flock of the Russian Orthodox Church and the decline in the authority of the Church in society, which, as analysts predict, may gradually reach a level capable of causing a new atheistic surge. Elementary concern for self-preservation, in theory, should prompt the hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church to shift the center of gravity in its activities from commerce and fulfillment of demands to education, missionary work and social assistance. However, so far religious education is a very deplorable spectacle, and there is no real missionary work ("missionary work" in the modern Russian Orthodox Church refers to, for example, trips of church-carriages and church-ships to remote areas, where the local population needs services - mainly baptism and funeral services , - which are carried out by “missionaries” for a certain fee). A potential atheistic surge threatens not only the well-being of the Russian Orthodox Church, but also the cultural and national identity of the Orthodox peoples of Russia and even the socio-political stability of the entire Russian society. The state is perhaps more interested than the Russian Orthodox Church itself in minimizing such a danger, without creating the preconditions for it.

The Russian Orthodox Church, as one of the most numerous institutions of modern Russian society, interacts with the state in a variety of areas. In many cases, the procedure for this interaction is determined by special treaties and agreements signed by the Russian Orthodox Church with leading ministries and departments (including all law enforcement agencies). The presence of such legal acts puts the Russian Orthodox Church in a special legal position , which no other religion has in Russia. The Constitution of the Russian Federation and the Federal Law “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations” declare the equality of all religious organizations and the secular nature of the state, but only the Russian Orthodox Church has the opportunity to be actively present, say, in the army and penitentiary institutions, since only with it is the leadership of the Armed Forces and The penitentiary departments signed special agreements. The Russian Orthodox Church has certain privileges in the law enforcement system, in educational and medical institutions, in tax authorities, and in intelligence services, with which it has also signed cooperation agreements.

The Russian Orthodox Church cooperates with the federal legislative and executive authorities through the Department for External Church Relations (DECR) . Three hierarchs of the Russian Orthodox Church are members of the Council for Cooperation with Religious Associations under the President of the Russian Federation; The DECR holds constant consultations with State Duma committees, participating in discussions of laws affecting the interests of the Church, as well as with the government and the Presidential Administration, where the voice of the Russian Orthodox Church is of considerable importance in the development of by-laws that in one way or another relate to the activities of the Church. Recently, parliamentary hearings were held in the State Duma, entirely devoted to an internal church document - the Fundamentals of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church - an unprecedented event in the history of Russian parliamentarism.

The DECR also plays a key role in the process of gradual transformation of the Russian Orthodox Church into a “subject of international law . ” This status is probably needed by the leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church, firstly, in order to gain greater weight in the domestic political sphere, and secondly, in order to secure international guarantees of its immunity in the event that the political climate within Russia begins to change sharply in an unfavorable way for ROC side. In recent years, the DECR has taken several concrete steps to integrate the Russian Orthodox Church into the system of international relations - first of all, the opening of a representative office of the Moscow Patriarchate in the European Union and the conclusion of a cooperation agreement with the World Bank. By participating in international politics, the Russian Orthodox Church also uses the experience that it accumulated during the Soviet period, when, as we noted above, it often solved diplomatic problems in the interests of the Soviet state. The Russian Orthodox Church continues to strive to coordinate its foreign policy actions with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, the vector of interaction between the Russian Orthodox Church and this department has changed significantly: if in the Soviet period church diplomats served state interests, now in most cases secular diplomats help the Church solve its problems, mainly related to the “return” of extensive church property abroad (the most striking examples of this interaction - the seizure of two monasteries of the Russian Church Abroad in Palestine and the change in the status of the Church of St. Nicholas in Bari (Italy), which also belonged to the Russian Church Abroad. In both cases, the Russian Foreign Ministry provided active diplomatic support to the Russian Orthodox Church).

Peaceful coexistence or fruitful dialogue?

In our opinion, church-state relations in modern Russia are experiencing a crisis because neither side clearly defines the goals of these relations. On the one hand, the Russian Orthodox Church inherited from the Soviet era an emasculated thesis about the “separation of the Church from the state ,” ultimately aimed at turning the Church into a social ghetto, satisfying the private spiritual needs of individuals. On the other hand, the modern state inherited from the Soviet era the hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church, brought up in servility and collaborationism, a church structure created by the Soviet state specifically to solve those internal and external tasks that this state posed to the Church (but not vice versa). Therefore, any attempts at dialogue between the Church and the state as equal subjects are futile in modern Russia. Following the inertia of past years, the hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church is ready to carry out almost any tasks of the authorities, if they do not “look into their pockets” The Church (Stalin forbade his first “chief prosecutor” - Chairman of the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church G. Karpov) to do this, i.e., he gives it almost unlimited freedom of financial and economic activity. It is the socio-political passivity of the Church, its isolation in its internal spiritual or economic life that prevents the state from establishing an equal dialogue with it.

But such passivity of the Russian Orthodox Church is largely explained by the fact that its administrative structure is a creation of the state itself; it was created in 1943 practically “from scratch” to carry out certain state tasks. Therefore, the initiative to form a new type of church-state relations in Russia can only come from the state, which should set new “rules of the game” for the Russian Orthodox Church.

Currently, among civil servants who in one way or another decide issues of interaction with the Church, two points of view prevail on the principles of church-state relations. The first of them, especially popular in the first years after the collapse of the USSR, comes down to the liberal doctrine of “a free church in a secular state . ” According to this point of view, the Church and the state should come into contact as little as possible, and the role of religious organizations in society should be equal to the role of, say, charitable or cultural-educational organizations. Recently, a somewhat protectionist point of view has become more popular, embodied in the draft Concept of Church-State Relations , developed this year by order of the Presidential Administration (which, however, was rejected by it). should be given special rights From this point of view, “traditional confessions” , to which the state assigns certain tasks in maintaining “public morality,” resolving interethnic conflicts, and in general in all “problematic” social spheres where the state “cannot cope” on its own. With this approach, the Church is called to some public service , which imposes on her a certain responsibility to society and the state .

The modern socio-political image of the Russian Orthodox Church was formed by the Soviet and post-Soviet eras, the “continuity” with which the current Russian government is not yet ready to completely break. And if so, then the authorities need to recognize that effective interaction with the Russian Orthodox Church is primarily its prerogative. The modern Russian Orthodox Church as a social institution, as a structure, is a fragment of the almost completely destroyed Soviet state machine that has survived to this day. If the state is interested in a responsible social partnership with the Church, then it must help it free itself from the legacy of the past that drives the Russian Orthodox Church into a cozy ghetto, sitting in which the church leadership can calmly and uncontrollably engage in trading in the “symbolic capital” of Russian Orthodoxy.

Who rules the Russian Orthodox Church?

The modern system of managing the “symbolic capital” of the Russian Orthodox Church developed during the Soviet period; the last decade has made only minor adjustments to it. To some extent, this administrative system is based on the canonical principles of church government and on the thousand-year church tradition developed by the Russian Orthodox Church. However, in many ways this external, ceremonial structure is adapted to modern political and economic conditions, therefore some of its traditional institutions do not work at all, and some are replaced by “shadow” structures, the existence of which is not mentioned in the Charter of the Russian Orthodox Church .

According to this document, which serves as a church constitution, the highest governing body of the Russian Orthodox Church is the Local Council , consisting not only of bishops, but also of representatives of ordinary clergy and laity. The modern idea of ​​the Local Council was formed in the Russian Orthodox Church relatively recently - at the beginning of the twentieth century. The only historical standard of such a Council is the Council of 1917–1918, which restored the patriarchate in the Russian Orthodox Church and created a unique structure of church government, in which the hierarchical and democratic principles in the Church were equalized and a harmonious proportion was established between them. However, historical conditions prevented most of the decisions of that Council from being translated into real church life. Thus, already 25 years after the Council, in 1943, one of its most important rules was violated, which prescribed the election of the Patriarch at the Local Council. By the decision of Stalin, who revived the administrative structure of the Russian Orthodox Church anew and on a new basis, Patriarch Sergius was elected in September 1943 by a backstage meeting of 19 bishops. After 1943, Local Councils in the Russian Orthodox Church were convened four times - in 1945, 1971, 1988 and 1990, but they performed a symbolic, ritual function and lasted only two or three days, and the 1988 Council was entirely dedicated to the pompous celebration of the 1000th anniversary of the Baptism of Rus'.

A weak attempt to restore the power of the Local Council was made in the “perestroika” year of 1990, when the wave of general democratization somewhat affected the Russian Orthodox Church. Then it was decided to hold Local Councils not only for the election of the patriarch, but regularly, once every five years. This decision of the 1990 council was never implemented, despite the active demands of the church community to “revive genuine Orthodox conciliarity” - to convene a real Local Council for repentance in cooperation with the godless authorities and to solve the many problems that have accumulated over 80 years of paralysis of cathedral life. At first it was planned to hold such a “historic” Council in 2000, timed to coincide with the anniversary of Christianity. But literally a few months before the scheduled date, the leadership of the Moscow Patriarchate decided to abandon the “triumph of church democracy”, limiting itself to only the Council of Bishops, consisting only of bishops. It adopted a new Charter of the Russian Orthodox Church, which effectively abolished the Local Council and established the final triumph of the hierarchical principle in the management of the Russian Orthodox Church.

Thus, the only bearer of real power in the Church becomes its hierarchy, the episcopate, and the body of the highest church authority is the meeting of the episcopate, the Council of Bishops . In general, this situation has a number of bases in church history and canon law of the Orthodox Church. The ancient Ecumenical and Local Councils consisted of only bishops. However, the mentioned Councils took place under the conditions of a Christian state - the Roman or Byzantine Empire. They were convened on the initiative of the emperor, who himself often presided over the Councils, representing the “civil population” of the empire, and approved the decisions of the Council. In Rus', not only the highest state dignitaries and boyars, but also the abbots of monasteries, and even, in some cases, representatives of the estates participated in the Councils. Some Councils, called “Zemsky” , were the highest body of not only church, but also secular state power, although, however, both “branches” of power were very closely intertwined in Russia and did not always know where the border between their jurisdictions was. The unprecedentedly wide representation of ordinary clergy and laity at the Local Council of 1917–1918 can be explained both by an attempt to restore this Russian tradition, and (to a greater extent) by the abolition of tsarist power - by the fact that the people appropriated supreme power to themselves and wanted to become "collective emperor "

Thus, today the highest church-administrative power of the Russian Orthodox Church (about 150 bishops) has such complete power that this hierarchical corporation did not have either in ancient Russia, where each bishop depended on his prince and his boyars, or in the Muscovite kingdom, where Councils were held " command of the sovereign" and with broad representation of the political elite, neither in the Russian Empire, where the head of the Church was the emperor, who ruled the Russian Orthodox Church through the Synod headed by the Chief Prosecutor, nor in the Soviet Union, where the most important decisions concerning the Russian Orthodox Church were made or approved by the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council for Religious Affairs. It is obvious that 10 years of religious freedom in Russia have led to an unprecedented strengthening of the position of the church hierarchy, which may not share its power in the Church with anyone.

Within a narrow hierarchical circle, power is also far from evenly distributed. More precisely, the central government, because local bishops are practically unlimited in managing their dioceses. In practice, the Council of Bishops is deprived of the opportunity to make those decisions that were not submitted for its consideration by the Holy Synod , which resolves current issues of church life in the period between Councils. This was especially clearly demonstrated by the last Council of Bishops in 2000, which lasted only four days, but adopted a number of important documents (100-page Fundamentals of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church, the Concept of Relations with Heterodox, a new edition of the Charter of the Russian Orthodox Church, messages, definitions, acts on the canonization of saints etc.). According to the bishops who participated in the Council, they received the documents submitted for its consideration either before the start of the meetings, or even during the discussion. Therefore, they practically did not have the opportunity to make any amendments to these documents, which is what the organizers of the Council were counting on. However, the majority of bishops did not pretend to actively participate in the discussion of the documents of the Council, as evidenced by the almost unanimous adoption of all its decisions (six abstentions and one who voted against one of the most important council documents found themselves in the center of press attention for a long time). This phenomenon is easily explained by the peculiarities of the psychology of the diocesan bishop, for whom the main thing is not to be touched, allowing him to freely dispose of “symbolic capital” within his diocese. And the approval of all decisions of the Moscow hierarchy is one of the indispensable conditions for such freedom of the bishop in intradiocesan affairs.

If church-administrative power in the Russian Orthodox Church as a whole belongs to a closed corporation of bishops, then the highest church-administrative power belongs to the Holy Synod, or more precisely, to its permanent members . The Synod, which is considered only an advisory body under the Patriarch, consists of twelve people, seven of whom are permanent members, and the rest are called to each session. Which of the diocesan bishops to call to the next session is decided by the Synod itself; a call to the session is rather an honorary reward for the diocesan bishop who has established the warmest relations with the Moscow leadership. The meetings of the Synod are presided over by the Patriarch, and the permanent members are the Metropolitans of Krutitsky and Kolomna (manages the parishes of the Moscow region), St. Petersburg and Ladoga, Kiev and all Ukraine, Minsk and Slutsk, Chisinau and all Moldova, as well as the manager of the affairs of the Moscow Patriarchate and the chairman of the Department external church relations. Draft decisions of the Synod are usually prepared by those of its members who are permanently in Moscow - in addition to the patriarch, these are the manager of affairs (now Metropolitan of Solnechnogorsk Sergius (Fomin)), the chairman of the DECR (Metropolitan of Smolensk and Kaliningrad Kirill (Gundyaev)) and Metropolitan of Krutitsky and Kolomna (Juvenaliy (Poyarkov)). They make up the same thing "Metropolitburo" , which is at the very top of power in the Russian Orthodox Church.

Since during the formation of the modern administrative structure of the Russian Orthodox Church the key direction of its activity was foreign policy, the DECR became the most numerous and professional division of the church apparatus . After the collapse of the USSR and the Russian Orthodox Church gained autonomy from the state, it was this Department that took over the functions of the central church apparatus, broadly interpreting the concept of “external relations” (in the Soviet period it meant only relations “with foreign countries”). “External relations” meant contacts with federal and local authorities, with political parties and public organizations, with the media, with the business world, etc. It was in the depths of the DECR that the most important church documents were created - resolutions of the Councils and Synod, messages of the Patriarch, press - releases and statements. In the mid-1990s, the DECR and its chairman, Metropolitan Kirill, found themselves at the center of the “tobacco” and “vodka” scandals, as a result of which it turned out that the DECR had become a “roof” for a multimillion-dollar business in the trade of excisable goods, which the Russian Orthodox Church imported duty-free into the Russian Orthodox Church. Russia under the guise of "humanitarian aid". Seeing that enormous power and financial resources were concentrated in the hands of the DECR, Patriarch Alexy II restored Management of the affairs of the Moscow Patriarchate, which was designed to balance the DECR and prevent the final concentration of all church-administrative power in this department. However, today public relations, information policy and, in many ways, contacts with the business elite still remain the prerogative of the DECR.

Physical capital Of course, significant power in the Russian Orthodox Church is wielded by Patriarch Alexy II , who for 25 years served as manager of the affairs of the Moscow Patriarchate and has quite well mastered the technique of retaining and using church power. It can be argued that it is the Patriarch who controls such an important sphere of intra-church life as the appointment and transfer of diocesan bishops. Several commercial projects operate under the auspices of the Patriarch (in particular, the Foundation for Reconciliation and Harmony, the president of which is a businessman with a controversial reputation, Gulnaz Sotnikova). The Patriarch and the Mayor of Moscow oversee the capital's Orthodox Entrepreneurs' Club, whose members are required to make certain "contributions" for church and city needs, which provides their businesses with preferential conditions. The presence of such projects allows the Patriarch to have financial independence, which also guarantees a certain degree of his administrative independence.

Back in the Soviet period, a harmonious vertical was formed in the Russian Orthodox Church, through which shadow funds were channeled from the parish through the diocese to the patriarchate. This “feeding” system is still the main instrument of church personnel policy. Since such a system contradicts church canons (it is called “simony”, “trading in grace” ), information about the “cost” of certain church positions rarely ends up in print. It is known exclusively from the stories of the Patriarchate employees that not only the appointment of a bishop to a “prestigious” see, but also the “retention” of this see has a certain price. This is a kind of tax that the hierarch must pay to the patriarchy that appointed him to the diocese for the right to manage diocesan finances practically without control. In dioceses , the system of financial relations looks somewhat more “transparent”: back in Soviet times, it was customary that with every trip to the diocesan administration, and even more so with every visit of the bishop to the parish, the rector or headman must transfer to the head of the diocese "envelope" with a certain amount of money, the size of which depends on the welfare of the parish. The current era, however, has made its own adjustments to this well-functioning system. During the Soviet period, there were almost no “poor” parishes, since there were few parishes of the Russian Orthodox Church in general. At the present time, the bishop has to support some unprofitable parishes and monasteries that have a certain “symbolic” significance (for example, historical monuments). As a rule, this is done either in the hope of government support, or out of a desire to make this or that monastery an object of pilgrimage, which will attract funds for the diocese in the future and will cover the current costs of restoration. Based on this, each monastery strives to acquire some kind of shrine (a miraculous icon or the relics of a saint), even if in the past there were no such shrines in this monastery.

Commercial activity itself at the diocesan or parish level is no less developed than at the general church level, and parishes try to be as financially independent from the diocese as the diocese is from the patriarchy. Most commercial projects come down to providing tax benefits to companies cooperating with the Church, since Russian legislation provides such benefits for commercial organizations that donate part of their profits to charity. Less often, commercial projects operate directly under the church brand. At the parish level, commercial activity is on a more modest scale. This is, as a rule, trade in church utensils and literature, ritual services, organization of pilgrimages or small production (in particular, candles).

Purely administrative methods of strengthening financial ties between the patriarchate and dioceses and between dioceses and parishes now, as a rule, do not work. Thus, Patriarch Alexy II, in his report at the last Council of Bishops, complained that dioceses are increasingly purchasing church utensils from the Sofrino Art and Production Enterprise of the Russian Orthodox Church , thereby reducing the amount of revenue from this enterprise to the church budget. In turn, diocesan bishops are trying to oblige diocesan clergy to purchase candles and utensils from the diocesan administration, but most parishes still choose cheaper options.

Of course, the system of managing the “symbolic capital” of the Russian Orthodox Church is not limited to the distribution of administrative power or control over financial flows. However, it is precisely this power and control that somehow opens up access to the use of “symbolic capital.” An ordinary clergyman will not be able to serve in a parish if he does not establish “correct” financial relations with the diocesan bishop. Just like the ability to make statements on behalf of the Church and determine church policy, which the head of the DECR has, is based on the position that this Department occupies in the administrative structure of the Church and on its financial independence.

The state will not be able to effectively interact with the Russian Orthodox Church if its financial and economic life and the principles of administrative management do not become more “transparent” not only for special government bodies, but also for society. The Russian leadership, having set itself the task of bringing Russian business out of the “shadow,” should not forget about the Church. If the prospect of cessation of any commercial activity by religious organizations seems unrealistic and unnecessary, then it is necessary, at least, not to create conditions for the “shadow” commercial activities of the Russian Orthodox Church, to get rid of false reverence for the church treasury. In the end, the sphere of financial relations lies outside the competence of church institutions; it entirely belongs to the area of ​​secular life, and to that part of it that is in one way or another regulated by the state. After all, it was by taking money in his hands - the Roman denarius - that Christ said: ” “Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s .

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The scope of this article does not allow us to consider many specific examples of the exploitation of the “symbolic capital” of the Russian Orthodox Church, its consequences, as well as intra-church conflicts associated with the struggle for control over this property of Russian Orthodoxy. We tried to give only the most general answer to the questions: what is the Russian Orthodox Church, what does it have, why the state and society might be interested in its “symbolic capital?” We hope that what has been said is enough to recognize: the Russian Orthodox Church is one of the structure-forming institutions of the Russian state and society due to the possession of a unique "symbolic capital" formed over centuries. This "symbolic capital" is the property of the entire society, therefore it must be used responsibly and reverently, and such use cannot be in the hands of a narrow and not always responsible oligarchic corporation .