Yaroslav Shimov. Four Europe

Four Europe
Yaroslav Shimov

Publication date: February 27, 2001

Europe was buried more than once. From the time of the French Revolution until the beginning of the twentieth century, when O. Spengler's famous work "The Decline of Europe" was published, there was no shortage of forecasts that painted the future of the Old World in gloomy colors. Later, the need for such prophecies disappeared: the reality of the 30s and 40s exceeded the most pessimistic expectations. The post-war era divided Europe with an “iron curtain”, and only the last decade can be called a time of Euro-optimism , when the peoples of the continent seemed to see a clear prospect of integration based on mutually beneficial economic cooperation and liberal democratic principles.

The latter, however, is nothing more than a myth, just like the beautiful and scary fairy tale about the “decline of Europe.” The replication of myths in general was a distinctive feature of the 90s, which led to the emergence of stereotypical ideas that had little to do with reality. There is no United Europe , and its emergence is still in question. Let's say more: at the moment, Europe is nothing more than a geographical concept, denoting the space between the Atlantic Ocean and the Ural Range. This space is occupied by several dozen peoples and states, which quite clearly fall into four groups of different sizes (let’s call them “mini-Europes”). Each of them is not only the bearer of a certain historical experience and the political and economic mechanisms, cultural traditions, etc. that have developed on its basis, but also faces a number of problems on the solution of which, on the one hand, the future of this group itself depends, and on the other, the prospects for its relations with other “mini-Europes” and the rest of the world.

1. Western Europe

The European Union , which includes the vast majority of countries in this region, is probably the only supranational entity in the modern world, the degree of integration within which can be called quite high. Neither the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), nor ASEAN, nor the Arab League, nor the CIS, nor any other regional economic and/or political union can compare with the EU in this regard. However, the states united under the blue flag with golden stars have not yet answered a number of important questions.

Internal unity. The European Union is heterogeneous, and within it there is a struggle for economic and political dominance. The backbone of Western Europe is the Berlin-Paris axis, but Franco-German relations , despite their current stability , are rather a reluctant alliance in which the strengths and weaknesses of the partners complement each other and give their cooperation a relatively harmonious character. Germany significantly exceeds its neighbor in economic potential, without (for historical reasons) having the political weight corresponding to this potential. On the contrary, France, although not one of the world's economic leaders, is a member of the UN Security Council and therefore enjoys the status of a great power. Since the UN model, which was created in completely different geopolitical conditions, is increasingly criticized as outdated, Paris and Berlin in the future may find themselves on opposite sides of the barricade: France is objectively interested in preserving the current system, Germany in revising it.

The third important player within the EU is Great Britain, known, on the one hand, for the strong positions of “Eurosceptics” (although under Labor they are being systematically and successfully attacked), and on the other hand, for its special relations with the United States, which make London the main conductor of American policy in the West Europe. The nature of this relationship does not appear to be changing in the coming years - as recent negotiations between George W. Bush and Tony Blair have confirmed - so the UK's position in the EU will largely depend on the overall nature of Western European-North American ties (see below).

In each of the countries of this “mini-Europe” there is a rather sharp struggle between conservative and liberal forces. The triumph of pragmatism in economics has led to the fact that the policies of right-wing and left-wing governments in the economic sphere often coincide, but on issues of foreign policy, immigration, minority rights, and the social role of the state, their positions differ markedly.

The conservative part of the Western European political spectrum is betting on what is familiar and has already proven itself - freedom of enterprise, a compact but strong state, moderate nationalism and a cautious foreign policy. Liberals (in the broad sense of the word, including left-wing parties and their supporters) insist on greater openness of Europe to the rest of the world, respect for the rights of minorities up to the so-called positive discrimination, “generous” social policies and the fight against the negative consequences of economic globalization. The former, as a rule, consider the European and Western experience in general to be unique, the latter - universal. The former are cautious and distrustful even of their closest eastern neighbors, candidates for EU membership, while the latter dream of spreading democratic values ​​in their Western interpretation throughout the world. From a philosophical point of view, we are talking about the struggle between pessimists and optimists, realists and idealists - despite the relativity of these concepts in relation to the world of politics.

Add to this the unequal level of economic development and political influence of different EU members, the serious concerns about some aspects of integration that exist in small Western European countries (as recalled last year in the referendum on the introduction of the euro in Denmark ), it is difficult to seriously say that the European Union has already become one. Yes, Western Europe has no internal borders, but they still exist in the minds of its people.

Relations with the USA. The close military-political alliance between the United States and Western Europe is perhaps the only element of the world order of the Cold War era that has survived to the present day. But even in this monolith, small cracks are noticeable. The positions of Washington and its allies on many world issues are increasingly diverging. An example is the cautious attitude of European politicians towards US plans to create a new missile defense system or the indignation with which official Paris reacted to the February bombing of Baghdad. On the other hand, the American political establishment and military leaders have mixed feelings about the EU's intention to create its own rapid reaction force. There are significant differences in the foreign policy strategies of the United States and Western Europe in relation to many countries and regions of the world: for example, Washington is quite actively involved in geopolitical games around Ukraine, while the European Union and its individual members occupy the position of interested observers here.

It is too early to say that the US and Western Europe are diverging. But it is difficult not to notice the differences in their historical experiences and political philosophies, which may become even more pronounced over time. America is the only major power in the modern world that has not known serious defeats. It is unaware of military defeat, foreign occupation, long-term economic decline (with the exception of the Great Depression), the collapse of an empire built over centuries, and other troubles experienced by all the peoples of Europe, except perhaps Switzerland. This probably explains those features of American policy that often cause irritation in Europe: unshakable confidence in its own rightness and the universality of its values, the willingness to assert them in various parts of the world, the habit of negotiating from a position of strength, etc. The position of the only superpower in which the United States found itself at the end of the Cold War only contributes to the development of these features and trends. There is something to make your head spin.

Western Europe has no reason to be so dizzy. Defeats suffered in the past not only leave scars on the soul - they often make an individual and entire nations wiser (the experience of Germany is the best proof of this). In addition, the EU countries are not separated by an ocean from the ever-turbulent Balkans, or from the burning Middle East, or from the unstable post-Soviet space. All these factors determine the tendency of the European political elite (at least a significant part of it) towards a more balanced and moderate foreign policy. This creates the basis for serious contradictions with the United States. Will they appear in the future? This depends not only on the position of the Europeans, but also on Washington’s course under the new administration.

Eastern neighbors. The expansion of the EU to the east is a matter that would seem to have been decided long ago. Meanwhile, the admission of new members to the Union is postponed. So, in relation to Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovenia we were talking about 2003, now it is called 2005, but further adjustments are not excluded. Integration with Central-Eastern Europe threatens the EU with a number of unfavorable consequences. German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder has already stated that it is necessary to limit the right of free employment in Western European countries for citizens of Central and Eastern European countries for quite a long time - after the latter join the EU. Concerns about a possible influx of cheap labor from the east are also being expressed in Austria and Italy. And the conflict between Austria and the Czech Republic over the Temelin nuclear power plant once again confirms that on different sides of the former “Iron Curtain” they still look at many things differently.

The problem of immigration from Third World countries is even more painful in Western Europe. EU countries, with their extremely low birth rates and steadily aging and shrinking populations, may find themselves in a very difficult demographic situation in a couple of decades. But improving it by facilitating access to Western Europe for millions of immigrants who want to get there is also scary: crime, drug addiction and other social vices have already become an integral feature of immigrant neighborhoods in many European cities. The fears of Western Europeans lead to an increase in xenophobia and a rise in the popularity of far-right parties and their leaders. The left-wing press even writes about a possible “brown wave” in Europe in the future.

It seems that having made the decision to integrate with their eastern neighbors during the years of euphoria that accompanied the fall of the Iron Curtain, the leaders of Western Europe did not really understand how difficult this process would be. In addition, Brussels strategists for a long time did not think about when and where it should end. The “European House” is being built without a clear plan, which calls into question the strength of the future structure.

2. Balkans

The “powder keg of Europe” remains such today. The conflicts in Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo have been transferred from a “hot” to a “cold” form, which does not at all exclude the possibility of a reverse process. Only the presence of international troops prevents the warring Balkan ethnic groups from again grabbing each other's throats. At the same time, NATO , which has taken the lead in peacekeeping operations (or what was called by this beautiful term), apparently does not have the slightest idea of ​​​​in which direction it is necessary, as they say, to “resolve the situation.” Western troops may remain in the Balkans for a very long time, but this will hardly make today’s Bosnia and Herzegovina cease to be an artificial, torn in three and clumsily stitched state formation, and Kosovo Albanians will not be inflamed with love for their Serbian neighbors (and vice versa).

The Balkans are lost in time. The national-state demarcation that occurred in the center of Europe immediately after the First World War, when the Austro-Hungarian monarchy collapsed, was “frozen” in this region thanks to the creation of the Balkan mini-empire - Yugoslavia, first under the scepter of the Serbian Karadjordjevic dynasty, then under the iron fist Marshal Tito. The causes of the conflicts of 1912-1913, when the Balkan countries enthusiastically fought each other, easily changing enemies and allies, did not disappear, but the conflicts themselves were postponed for eight decades. The current situation is dangerous because it again “mothballs” hotbeds of possible fires - without any guarantees that Kosovo or Bosnia will not flare up again in the near future.

The coming to power of more liberal regimes in Serbia and Croatia in 2000, of course, changed the situation for the better, but by no means radically. In addition to reconciliation, the Balkan peoples need economic restoration, and for this they have neither the strength nor the means. The West does not seem to object to providing large loans and other assistance to the countries of the region, but surrounds this agreement with conditions that are not always acceptable to the Serbs, Croats and their neighbors. We are talking, in particular, about the extradition to the Hague International Tribunal of a number of persons, many of whom are considered not war criminals in their homeland, but national heroes (a recent example is the Croatian General Norac, in whose support hundreds of thousands of people gathered in Zagreb in mid-February).

The de facto separation of Montenegro from Serbia, which lacks only official recognition, cuts off Belgrade from the sea and reduces the Serbian state to the borders of the early twentieth century. The Serbs today are undoubtedly the most humiliated nation in Europe . Without going into the reasons for this situation, one cannot fail to note that this situation in itself is dangerous, because another explosion of Serbian nationalism could lead to a new Balkan war. Another potential source of conflict in the region are the Albanians , who, in addition to Albania and de facto independent Kosovo , make up a significant portion of Macedonia's population. Considering that Albanians are the people with the highest birth rate in Europe, it is not difficult to imagine what an attempt to implement a “Greater Albanian” project could lead to in the future.

So, the prospects for a second “mini-Europe” remain, to put it mildly, unclear. The conservation of conflicts instead of their gradual and methodical elimination is the result of the Balkan tragedy of the 90s. It is difficult to talk seriously about the prospects for integration of the Balkans into Western Europe, although the United States and the EU welcome statements made in a similar spirit by local politicians. But the West, of course, is not going to leave the region, especially since it has no real rivals there (Russia’s influence in the Balkans, if not completely lost, is at least small). It can be assumed that even with a favorable development of events (that is, if the war does not resume), the Balkans, with the exception of the most prosperous countries like Croatia, for many years will become something of a protectorate of the West - with international troops on its territory, quite a frail economy fueled by foreign loans, with corrupt local elites and a poor population that regularly joins the army of immigrants in EU countries.

3. Central-Eastern Europe (CEE)

Compared to the Balkans, the life of this region (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia; the Baltic states are often included here) in the 90s represents a real success story. However, there are not so many absolute, rather than relative, successes among the listed countries. As I have already written in RJ , the main strategic goal proclaimed by the leaders of CEE in the early 90s - accelerated integration with Western Europe - has not been achieved. At the same time, the countries of this region are the only ones from the former socialist camp that have managed over the past 10 years to create a political system that is generally reminiscent of Western Europe (its parliamentary, “British-German” version), and also the only ones that have developed in relative accordance with the liberal a theory about the prominent role of civil society in the transition from totalitarianism to democracy. Indeed, civil society institutions in CEE exist and operate, but their relationships with political and government institutions are still of a conflictual nature (for example, the crisis situation around public television in the Czech Republic).

The external and internal problems facing this “mini-Europe” force its political and intellectual elite to make adjustments to their usual strategy. Currently, three possible options for relations between CEE and its neighbors are being discussed in the scientific, political environment and media of the countries of the region. The first is a continuation of the previous “Westernizing” course. At the same time, each candidate country builds relations with the EU and NATO independently, which feeds a certain spirit of competition between them. The second way is to intensify regional cooperation. In this regard, the recent speech of Austrian Foreign Minister Benita Ferrero-Waldner, who put forward the idea of ​​a “Central European Benelux” consisting of Austria, Hungary, Slovenia and the Czech Republic with the possible inclusion of Slovakia and Poland, is symptomatic.

Finally, the third, unexpected and for many local political forces is still unacceptable, the option is the development of ties with Russia, which would allow the countries of Bol to become a kind of bridge between the West and Moscow, thereby significantly increasing the geopolitical significance of the region. A certain activation of the Russian direction in the foreign policy of Poland and the Czech Republic, noticeable recently, allows us to say that such a plot is not an idle game of mind.

Thus, the third “mini-Europe” is still in search of its own identity, and there are no clear answers to questions about the role and place of this region in the hypothetical “European house”-although, of course, the orientation on the EU remains the cornerstone of the Central European politicians.

4. Post -Soviet Europe

It is this name that seems to us suitable for a huge array lying between Bsu in the West and Central Asia in the east (the latter, although it includes a number of former Soviet republics, clearly belongs to another, Muslim, civilization, and therefore its problems cannot be considered in European context).

For many analysts of liberals, both Western and Russian, post -Soviet Europe is the “wrong” region, since the features of its development clearly do not correspond to the liberal -universalist canons, according to which the post -communist world is a single whole where the same laws act ” transition from totalitarianism to democracy and market economy. " You can recall, for example, a series of publications in scientific and periodicals of the mid-90s, in which a comparative analysis of Eastern European (most often Polish) and Russian economic reforms was carried out. The former were presented as luck, the latter as a failure. At the same time, the fundamentally different historical and social foundation of these reforms and, accordingly, the unequal logic of the development of Tsaria and post -Soviet Europe, was not taken into account.

In Russia, Belarus, in Ukraine, in Moldova, unlike their Western neighbors, the collapse of communism did not entail a complete rotation of the ruling elite. The basis of the new political class here was three groups: part of the former bureaucracy, adapting to the new political and economic conditions ("strong business executives"), the top of the new bourgeoisie ("oligarchs"), which, on the one hand, has fused with the state apparatus, and on the other - on the other. with a criminal environment, and power structures, especially special services. The latter have kept in the shade for almost the entire last decade, but at present their political role has grown significantly. In Russia today, they act as almost the main “system player”, which defines the rules of the game on the political field, without going out or almost without going beyond formal legislative restrictions, which the security forces, closely related to the highest state leadership, are managing to change while using Legitimate state-legal mechanisms (first of all, we are talking, of course, about building the all-Russian “vertical of power”).

None of the countries of the region had and there are no full -fledged structures of civil society. This is not a “irregularity” and not a sign of a certain inferiority of the peoples of post -Soviet Europe, but only a feature of their social structure, due to the previous development within the tsarist and Soviet empires. The authoritarian trends inherent in these countries is also by no means a sign of the "Asian", but one of the manifestations of the post -Impersian syndrome that took place at different times in Western, Central Europe and in other regions of the world. The state and power structures, as the most organized and often the least corrupt component, become under these conditions a natural frame that does not allow a society that is not yet capable of self -organization, to go into a state of chaos.

At the same time, of course, there is a danger of developing an authoritarian-paternalistic state into a full-scale dictatorship. In the second half of the twentieth century, most Latin American states took place in the second half of the twentieth century, with which post -Soviet Europe, by the way, is also related to other trends - in particular, “leaching” of social groups with stable average income and lumpenization of a significant part of the population. However, the experience of Latin America is also ambiguous: in some countries of this region, in the conditions of military dictatorships that ensured political stability (what methods are another question), economic growth took place and the formation of the middle class, which later, in the 80s, became the main driving driving the power of democratic changes that committed the military. The society "dare" to democracy - however, having paid for this a price that seems too high to many.

It is still unclear whether post -Soviet Europe will go in the footsteps of Latin America. The current regimes in Belarus, Georgia, Armenia as a whole fit into the framework of the Latin American model. Current events in Ukraine are more likely to talk about the premises of the "Latin Americanization" and the possible appearance there in the near future of the authoritarian regime. However, the further development of the situation in post -Soviet Europe will primarily depend on Russia with which the rest of the region of the region is connected not only by the general past, but also by the similarity of political mechanisms and social structure, not to mention the closest economic relations.

Russia is the natural center of the fourth "mini -Europe". This, of course, does not mean that soon the “whole Soviet land” will again begin from the Kremlin, but it means that Moscow has enough tools for influencing the situation in almost all countries of this region. How skillfully she uses these instruments, it will become clear, for example, at the end of the current political crisis in Ukraine, which can lead to essential progress in the policy of official Kyiv. By the end of the year , the situation in Belarus may also change: although Alexander Lukashenko will almost certainly win the presidential election, and in his course - not without influence of Russia - significant changes are not excluded.

The situation, however, is complicated by the fact that Russia itself has not yet decided on its external and internal political priorities. The phrase "Great Russia" (which often denotes the strategic goal of President Putin and its regime) is as much deprived of a specific content as, say, the concept of "democratic society": in the modern world there are a great many options for the answer to the question of which state is considered great and which society - democratic; In its own way, Switzerland is also great, in its own way democratic and Nigeria. If Russia does not understand what it wants from itself, it is unlikely to be able to defend her position as the leader of the post -Soviet Europe, not to mention larger geopolitical tasks.

* * *

Let's summarize. None of the "mini-Europe" today has internal unity. None of them has any clear development strategy. The state of chaos (of course, relative, and not absolute), in which the old light is from the end of the Cold War, is very slowly replaced by the signs of a new order. One of these signs is the collapse of the European space into four parts. Within the framework of each of them, there are many problems and contradictions, often complicated by the influence of external forces. But all the peoples of four Europe, by and large, remain children of several great empires of the past, the legacy of which they continue to share, often without realizing it. The first stage of the cessation of this deed is regional integration, on the basis of which over time, a certain real, rather than a utopian pan -European project, will probably arise. The EU is only his draft sketch. After all, European civilization still exists, since a single historical and cultural foundation has not disappeared anywhere, uniting the peoples of the four "mini-Europe". And therefore - to bury "old Europe" is really early.