Georgy Kuznetsov. A war of nations is better than a war of religions

A war of nations is better than a war of religions
Georgy Kuznetsov

Date of publication: October 16, 2001

The Third World War, unlike the first two, threatens to become a war of two civilizations - Christian and Islamic. Since it was not possible to avoid its beginning, then perhaps it will be possible to turn it into something similar to the first wars - a battle between nations?

European and Asian states

In 1914 and 1939, it was primarily Christians who clashed with each other, and the difference between Catholics and Protestants or Orthodox did not play any role then (except in some local conflicts). Nations, that is, nation states, fought among themselves, and ethnic minorities were sometimes forced to fight with their fellow tribesmen (as, for example, Austrian Poles and Ukrainians fought with Russians).

But then Europe - despite the global nature of the two wars, it was their main theater. In Europe, by the beginning of the twentieth century, a system of nation states had developed, and by the end of the 30s it took shape even more clearly. This is not at all the case in Asia, where there are still very few such countries, but many more multi-ethnic ones. True, in the Middle East there are many states inhabited mainly only by Arabs, but here is another side of the same phenomenon - a single people is divided into many fatherlands, very different from each other and showing unity only in hostility towards Israel.

Where the borders between states and ethnic groups practically never coincide, religious affiliation takes on the role of a unifying factor instead of nationality. Europe lived in a period of awareness of itself as a Christian world, and during this period it undertook the Crusades. But for several centuries now this continent has been divided primarily along national (usually linguistic) lines. And even those countries where the percentage of minorities is quite large are distinguished by a general national identity, which is only complemented by local ethnic identity.

Despite all the differences between faiths, Europe also recognizes itself as a single Christian continent. Even if political correctness forces Europeans to talk about the equality of all religions, they cannot help but worry about the segregation of Muslim immigrants in their communities, just as they once worried about the segregation of Jews in ghettos.

What about Asia? Asia is several times larger, and at least three civilizational regions can be distinguished - Islamic, Hindu and Buddhist-Confucian. The latter two now demonstrate either neutrality or muted approval of Western actions, but the former has difficulty containing hostility. Even if the Americans manage to defeat the Taliban and catch the main terrorist, they may receive in return a smoldering front of hatred in a number of Islamic countries.

The United States hopes both for its strength and for the slower “education” of Islamic peoples, introducing them to the Western system of values. This is worth counting on, but while the educational process is taking place, more than one conflict may break out. Very different peoples, united only by a common faith, can direct their accumulated anger against the “infidels,” that is, first of all, the Yankees and Jews.

First - Muslims, then - Pashtuns

One of the factors integrating radical Islamist tendencies is the multi-ethnicity of the largest Muslim countries - Pakistan, Indonesia, Afghanistan, Iran. Being very different in language and culture, and sometimes in race, the inhabitants of these countries are united precisely by religion, which they therefore place above all else. Since none of these countries currently have a strong and charismatic secular government, even military regimes are afraid of Islamic radicalism and are forced only to keep it within certain limits (as in Pakistan).

If now the Islamists finish off Pervez Musharraf and turn the country into something between Iran and Taliban Afghanistan, then it will be much more difficult to fight this state of more than 100 million people, which (in all likelihood) also has nuclear weapons. And fundamentalists around the world will receive a clearly defined leader on whom they will place all their hopes...

The Americans hope that without their military and financial assistance, radical Pakistan will not last long. But countries that plunge their citizens into the Middle Ages also instill in them medieval needs. And, as we know, it is much more difficult to fight with people who are accustomed to living without the benefits of civilization.

Let it be the other way around

Fortunately for the West, a factor has already clearly emerged in Afghanistan today that can and should be used against Islamic integration. True, so far it is working rather into the hands of the Islamists, but this is only because it has not yet been turned against them.

We are talking about the multi-ethnic composition of the population of this country. The Northern Alliance relies mainly on Tajiks and Uzbeks, while the Pashtuns easily submitted to the Taliban and now clearly do not want to come under the rule of foreigners. The ethnic, tribal factor plays no less a role in this society than the religious one, but it is precisely state interests that are now relegating it to the background.

Will Afghanistan, which has expelled the Taliban, become freer of radicalism if rivalry between ethnic groups persists? Hardly. Partly, different tribes and nationalities can be reconciled, firstly, by a traditional monarchy, and secondly, by a strict authoritarian regime - secular or theocratic. Neither one nor the other is acceptable for Afghanistan now - from the point of view of those who want to see it as a safe state. The monarchy is unlikely to be accepted by a solid majority of residents; the authoritarian dictator must be supported by the main forces inside and outside the country - and this is more than doubtful. There is no need to talk about theocracy. What remains?

There is only one thing left - either to transfer ethnic tensions into a civilized channel, or to divide ethnic groups by state borders. The first option could be similar to the Lebanese system, which was reviled many times, but still kept this country from complete collapse and chaos. Only instead of confessions, ethnic groups should share power among themselves in all branches and levels. Another thing is whether the Afghans, who are not accustomed to constitutions, will want to engage in such a division, will they prefer division by the right of force to it?

Therefore, it would be better to create two or more ethnically relatively homogeneous states on the territory of present-day Afghanistan. At first these may not be sovereign states, but rather federal or even autonomous entities, but pretty soon centrifugal tendencies will take over. Busy with squabbles among themselves, these small states willy-nilly forget about their Islamic unity. First for a short time, and then for a longer period.

Will the Afghans themselves want this? It seems they will have no other choice. If the Taliban are removed, then clashes between Pashtuns and Tajiks, which helped the Taliban to establish itself in the mid-90s, will resume. The West could unobtrusively encourage the tendency of ethnic groups to isolate themselves, without showing preference for any of them.

Each ethnic group - a state?

But Afghanistan is not the only country giving rise to radicalism. By and large, Pakistan, inhabited by very different peoples, also needs the same “disintegration.” This state itself was formed artificially during the partition of India, which was accompanied by mass relocations, massacres and purges along religious lines. The main ethnic groups inhabiting Pakistan are forced to use Urdu as the state language, which is not native to any of them (Urdu is a separate version of Hindi).

For many years, Pakistan's integrator was animosity with India, but now anti-Western sentiments are coming to the fore. If the unrest of Pakistani Taliban supporters develops into a civil war, it will inevitably acquire ethnic overtones. The Pashtuns of the northwestern province and the Baluchis will side with the Taliban, but the largest ethnic group - the Punjabis - are unlikely to support them so unequivocally. Like Sindhi, who also have many fellow languages ​​in India.

The formation of several ethnically homogeneous states on the territory of Pakistan will make it, like Afghanistan, safer. Discord between ethnic groups is now preferable to their unity under the green banner. At the same time, interfaith problems will not arise in the new states, since they are all populated by Sunni Muslims. Co-religionists from India who speak the same languages ​​can move to them - about one hundred million adherents of Islam live in this country, which cannot but worry the authorities. It is one thing if they go to strengthen the greater Pakistan, and another thing to strengthen its ruins.

On the other hand, Pakistani Pashtuns will probably want to join their brethren in what is left of Afghanistan, Pashtunistan. Would the Afghan Tajiks want to unite with the Tajiks of the CIS, and the Uzbeks want to enlarge Uzbekistan? This is already an area of ​​such shaky hypotheses that they can only be tested in practice...

It is important to be convinced of a fundamental point: unless Asia, like Europe, takes the path of becoming a continent of nation-states, the threat of Islamic radicalism will remain, at best, as strong as it is now, and at worst, it will be much more serious. Another thing is that redrawing borders in our time is almost impossible by any other means than military means. And since we are faced with this challenge, we need to take advantage of the chance.

By the way, Bangladesh, which separated from Pakistan, is distinguished by ethnic homogeneity that is rare for Asia and is not at all seen indulging in fundamentalism. Plus, the memory of the tragedy of 1971, when Punjabis from West Pakistan massacred several million Bengalis, will not allow this country to stand on a par with the defenders of the Taliban.

What about the problem of the Kurds? The stateless people of 30 million would be very grateful to the West if it supported its aspirations and contributed to the separation of part of their territories from Iran and Iraq. Turkey, a NATO member, will be much more difficult to convince, but if they have their own national home, it will be easier for Turkish Kurds to move there.

Of course, the redrawing of borders and ethnic divisions are all from the arsenal of the last century, if not the year before. But it is better to use the methods of the nineteenth century than to return to the fifteenth.