
The main foreign policy event of the past week was the meeting of OSCE foreign ministers in Bucharest, where Russia demonstrated its new post-September international face, the face of “not a boy, but a husband.” Although, with the exception of RJ, the Russian media actually ignored the Bucharest summit. Why? Probably because, firstly, the Kremlin itself for the time being does not want to “reveal” itself as a new strong international player, and secondly, commentators and analysts are accustomed to considering the OSCE a kind of humanitarian septic tank and have not noticed the changes emerging in the organization initiated by , by the way, precisely by Russia.
Even on the eve of Igor Ivanov’s trip to Bucharest, it was clear that Russia seriously intended to make, at a minimum, amendments to the constitutio of European organizations, and in the future, Europe as a whole. At the end of October, after a meeting with the current OSCE Chairman, Romanian Foreign Minister Mircea Dan Geoana, Igor Ivanov said that, firstly, Moscow was “seriously preparing” for the OSCE Ministerial Council meeting, and secondly, that Russia was going to “breathe new life” into the activities of this organization." And Mircea Geoana, it seems, was not at all embarrassed by Ivanov’s decisive attitude. The Romanian minister, on the contrary, admitted that Russia’s contribution to the organization’s activities “is decisive.”
It should be noted that Russia is going to make “amendments” to constitutional acts, in particular the OSCE, in both meanings of this magical Latin term: 1) constitutio as a set of the most important laws (meaning the state), establishing the principles of organization and activity and 2) constitutio as a structure or structure (meaning a person), a complex of morphological and functional individual characteristics , formed on the basis of hereditary properties acquired under the influence of social and natural conditions and manifested in its reaction to various (including pathogenic) influences .
With the first one everything seems clear. Russia, first of all, is not satisfied with the “ principles of activity ” of the OSCE, namely, the fundamental passivity of the organization in the European political clearing. It is this passivity that seems to have become the cause of the protracted OSCE crisis, which was discussed by almost all participants in the meeting in Bucharest, but most of all by Russia. It is worth noting that the passivity of the organization was already laid down in the Final Act of the CSCE, signed on August 1, 1975, with its 10 principles: sovereign equality; respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty; non-use of force or threat of force; inviolability of borders; territorial integrity; peaceful settlement of disputes; non-interference in internal affairs; respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; equality and the right of peoples to control their own destinies; cooperation between states; fulfillment of international legal obligations . Frankly speaking, all these “respect”, “non-use”, “inviolability” and other “non-interference” were good in the conditions of the unstable equilibrium of the Cold War, which was quite adequately outlined back in 1958 by Raymond Aron: “The current situation in Europe is abnormal , and even absurd. But it has a clear appearance, and everyone knows where the demarcation line is, and no one is particularly afraid of what might happen.” Today, in the presence of completely new threats and challenges, the indecisiveness (to put it mildly) of the OSCE is completely unacceptable. Today we need offensiveness and direct decisions, that is, political will.
And this already relates to the second meaning of the term constitutio, in the context of which Russia is trying to revive such a “ morphological and functional individual feature ” of the OSCE as, in fact, ensuring security. The OSCE's response to such a " pathogenic influence " as international terrorism showed, firstly, a clear lack of immunity in the said "organism", and secondly, an inability to even identify the "virus". It was these two shortcomings of the OSCE that the Russian delegation focused its efforts on.
To strengthen the immune system of Europe, an Action Plan against Terrorism was adopted (note that this is a plan not only “against”, but also “actions”!), and to define the virus of terrorism, the Russian delegation firmly raised the issue of preventing double standards , when extremists and separatists in one country are called terrorists, and in another - fighters for their rights. Thus, some forum participants, as Russian representatives did not fail to point out, are ready to discuss the topic of human rights in Chechnya in detail, but immediately lose their voice when discussing the situation in Latvia or Kosovo (by the way, Latvian politicians are already rubbing their hands in view of the expected closure of the Human Rights Bureau in Riga, which Russia resolutely opposed in Bucharest). Differences in views on the issue of double standards remain, but it is now clear that, in the end, attitudes towards such basic concepts as “human rights” and “terrorism” will become universal. This will eliminate the “geographical imbalance” in the work of the OSCE, which Igor Ivanov spoke about at the meeting.
One of the most characteristic moments of the meeting of foreign ministers of the OSCE member states was the tone in which Russia began to speak with its partners. “Russia is not satisfied and will no longer be satisfied...”, “Russia insists...” and even “...demands.” It’s been a long time since we heard such words from representatives of the Russian Federation, moreover, spoken on an essentially foreign platform. It is interesting to note that on the eve of the Bucharest summit, OSCE Chairman-in-Office Mircea Geoana kindly stated that “the world that has changed since September 11 provides an opportunity for Russia to find its place in the Euro-Atlantic security architecture .” Russia decided to take full advantage of this opportunity and, in turn, promised to make every effort to, firstly, update the entire activities of the organization and, secondly, help the OSCE itself find its place in the international security architecture . And it helped!
The main achievement of the meeting was the signing of the Final Declaration and Action Plan against Terrorism. The Action Plan states that “no circumstances or reasons should justify terrorist acts.” The document emphasizes that terrorist actions can be caused by “a number of factors of a social, economic and political nature, including separatism and extremism .” In connection with these circumstances, the OSCE countries undertake to “take all necessary measures to suppress on their territory the illegal activities of people, groups and organizations that incite, finance, organize terrorist attacks or take direct part in terrorist or any other criminal activity aimed at overthrowing the existing political system of any member state of the organization." How can one not admit that behind each more or less abstract formulation of the Action Plan there are quite concrete events that are familiar to everyone who even watches the television news. Now, very specific complaints, for example, against the British authorities regarding the activities of Islamic fundamentalist organizations on its territory recruiting mercenaries for Chechnya, can be supported by reference to OSCE documents. Moreover, referring to these same documents, one can make claims against NATO, which, having once armed Albanian extremists in the Balkans, has still not done anything to calm down the rampant militants and drug dealers. And official Tbilisi will have something to think about.
By the way, as for NATO, in the conditions of reform and intensification of activities, the OSCE can not only complement, as was diplomatically said at the summit, but replace the Alliance in European affairs. Is Russia interested in this? Without any doubt. Firstly, “squeezing out” NATO from general European affairs, that is, affairs related to the security of “greater Europe” from the Atlantic to the Bering Strait, will make Western Europe a powerful and truly independent center of world politics, without constant regard to the overseas “big brother” ", and this development of events is a major step towards the multipolar world so desired by many world powers. And secondly, Russia in this case acquires the real status of a “meeting place” between the West, represented by Europe, and the East, represented by China and India. In this sense, it is strategically important that the Action Plan against Terrorism emphasizes the need to coordinate actions, among others, with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. If, as Moscow proposes, the SCO is focused on security issues in the same way as the OSCE, then Russia turns out to be a real link in the system of not Euro-Atlantic, but Eurasian security. This would be a very concrete step in the construction of that Eurasian “northern umbrella”, which I already wrote about .
And with the definition of Russia’s Eurasian interests, a funny incident arose last week. ORT journalists, in a report on Putin’s interview with Greek journalists, approached the president’s answer with a question that Greek journalists, in general, did not ask. That is, the question was simply different: “QUESTION (from Greek journalists): BB, do you, for Russia, still have strategic interests in the Balkans? And what do you think could be Russia’s specific role in resolving conflicts that are still not are dying down on our peninsula ? According to ORT, Putin was answering the question: “How do Russia’s strategic interests in Europe and Asia compare? What direction of foreign policy is a priority for Russia?” Agree that the questions, to put it mildly, are different, but the coolest thing is that the GDP seemed to answer precisely the unasked question of the Oertesh people: “Russia is gradually regaining the quality of a country that cares about what is happening in certain regions of the world. Yes and it is impossible to imagine a Russia that would not be interested in and would not influence these processes. Just look at its territory: Russia is located in Europe, and in Asia, and in the South, and in the North. Simply by the fact of its presence in these. regions of the world, it is a European and Asian, southern and northern power, and all this has practical significance in solving specific problems.”
Such statements fully respond to the condescending smiles of Brzezinski (Mikhail Leontiev in the program “At Another Time”): “First you repair the roads, and then you will think about geopolitics.” Specific political and economic steps aimed at closer interaction between Russia and Europe and Asia - without any metaphysics of the Eurasians - lead to the latent construction of a new geopolitical landscape of Eurasia and the world as a whole. Even Henry Kissinger, who has always been smarter and more careful in his statements, and therefore more influential in determining the course of US foreign policy than Brzezinski, admits: “Putin has saved his other opportunities with China and Europe, especially with Germany, in case if something doesn’t work out with the United States,” which was confirmed by the results of the Sunday meeting between Putin and Schröder.
And finally: why the “meeting under the bridge”? Because all participants in the Bucharest summit were aware of the fact that after building a new “bridge of trust” between the United States and Russia, the latter received the status of a political heavyweight in European affairs. The fact that the OSCE Ministerial Council meeting is taking place under the shadow of new Russian-American relations was stated already at the opening of the summit by Mircea Geoana. That’s why the Bucharest summit was like a “meeting under a bridge.” As for the attitude towards Russian initiatives, I recall the words of Charles de Gaulle from his book “Memoirs of Hopes”, in which France of 1958 can easily be replaced by Russia of 2001: “In general, abroad, despite in response to the discontent experienced, to the sour-sweet speeches, to the negative statements of the press and evil caricatures, they began to get used to this new France, behaving like a great power, and from now on began to follow its deeds, gestures and words with such attention as it had long since "were not provided."