| 2001 passed without shocks, which is what I wish for 2002 The outgoing year 2001 was the calmest for Russia over the past 10, or even 15 years. It was even a little boring in a European way - no battle between parliament and the executive branch, no turbulent conflict between the government and the oligarchs using all available media, no mass social unrest. Public silence and social peace, diligent work on important laws, the systematic development of the oil money that has poured into the country, the gradual renewal of personnel - in a word, routine.
However, the calm of the past year was deceptive. In full accordance with the proverb about the still waters and its inhabitants.
In 2001, the formation of the regime of Vladimir Putin was almost completely completed. Even during the time of the late Boris Yeltsin, the elite often wondered: what would a young and healthy president be like? The answer has been received. Mr. Putin is active and energetic, and he considers it his presidential duty to intervene and delve into almost everything. The president holds several meetings a day - interlocutors note his meticulousness, and people who follow the presidential schedule complain that each of the meetings lasts longer than planned. Which is a natural explanation for Mr. Putin's perpetual tardiness.
Boris Yeltsin was the creator of careers and the author of great turning points - Vladimir Putin, it seems, is trying to become the author of all Russian politics. Some economic issues are left to Mikhail Kasyanov and his cabinet, but the Kremlin has become the real center of strategic developments. This, in fact, was always wanted there, but it only happened in 2001.
The Russian elite readily and joyfully gave the president and his administration the right to be the only demiurges of Russian politics. But along with the right to create, part of the elite also parted with responsibility for what is happening in the country. If something happens, plenipotentiary representatives in the federal districts, deputy prime ministers, and ministers can easily say: we acted on the orders of the president. Deputies, senators and governors can say this with even greater right. In fact, Vladimir Putin is now responsible for everything. And this is one of the “mines” that the calm year 2001 leaves as a legacy for the new year.
The system of power that Vladimir Putin built and is building looks like a vertical, but it is not, since there are catastrophically few people who would take responsibility in a moment of crisis. The scandal in Udmurtia is indicative when the head of the republic, Alexander Volkov, did not allow the new head of the state television company sent from Moscow to work, ordered the premises of the federal inspection to be sealed, and began negotiations only after a whole landing party from Moscow arrived in the republic. Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoy Sergei Kiriyenko, whose area of responsibility includes Udmurtia, was very lucky that the scandal coincided with the start of the military operation in Afghanistan, and no one cared about him.
The concentration of powers, initiatives and responsibility in one center is so far ensured by the high rating of the president. But Vladimir Putin cannot always be so popular. If only because it owes its high rating largely to the stable economic situation in the country, and this stability looks even more precarious than the political one, since it depends on world oil prices and the country’s debt obligations.
The personnel policy also began to look rather unstable due to its “frontal” nature. A series of anecdotes about the mass conscription of natives of St. Petersburg into federal government bodies became the decoration of any official table conversation. Fear has big eyes - in fact, there are much fewer St. Petersburg residents than they say. However, personnel selection based on the principle of fraternity does take place, and service in the mayor's office of St. Petersburg during the time of Anatoly Sobchak is now considered a ticket to high society. This also hinders the formation of a system of power, if only because not all recruits to Putin’s conscription are ready to solve the tasks assigned to them. In addition, non-Petersburg residents increasingly feel offended and left out.
For the time being, personnel clashes were a purely “internal elite” matter, but the events of the last months before the New Year (the hyperactivity of the security forces who undertook to harass the government) proved that administrative conflicts that influence the adoption of quite fundamental decisions did not at all go down in history with Boris Yeltsin.
The year 2001 was also calm because the authorities tried (and had the opportunity) to solve their problems, as they say, within their own circle, without involving the “public” and actively using available media and PR tools. It is no longer possible to guarantee that this will be the case next year. And it is quite possible that 2001 will go down in history as the most serene year in Russia. Gleb CHERKASOV |
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