Alexander Kazakov. Persian patterns

Persian patterns
Foreign policy of the last week of last year

Alexander Kazakov

Publication date: January 8, 2002

The New Year's week was marked by relative calm in Russian foreign policy. The exception was telephone conversations with leaders of different countries dedicated to the Pakistani-Indian confrontation. In this case, a characteristic detail can be noted. Despite the fact that all the world's leading players have appealed to the leadership of Pakistan and India, it is mainly the United States and Russia that are acting as the "spoilers". Washington is trying to influence Islamabad, which is traditionally its ally, and Moscow is trying to influence Delhi, which is traditionally friendly. On the one hand, such a situation can be described as “treading on the old trail” and, therefore, as a kind of echo of the Cold War, and on the other hand, as an attempt at joint action within the framework of a new model of relations between the United States and Russia - partners in the anti-terrorist coalition. The failure of the Middle East settlement can to some extent be compensated by resolving the pre-war situation in the disputed state of Kashmir. This situation turns Kashmir into a convenient testing ground for testing new mechanisms of interaction in the “post-September world.”

In addition, there is a moment in the interaction between Russia and the United States to resolve the Pakistan-India conflict that is specific to the current situation in the world. Both Moscow and Washington demand that General Musharraf stop the activities of radical Islamic organizations in the territory controlled by Islamabad. So, in essence, despite the echoes of the Cold War in the diplomatic situation, Russia and the United States are acting precisely as allies in the anti-terrorist coalition.

Among the “television news” events of the week, one could only notice the visit to Moscow of the Emir of the State of Qatar, Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifa Attani. The visit took place according to the scenario “for official use” - no press conference, no statements. However, despite the more than meager reports about the progress and substance of the negotiations, the general direction of the dialogue can be judged, firstly, by some statements of the GDP and the Qatari emir, and secondly, based on the interests of Russia and Qatar in international affairs and, in in particular, in matters of cooperation between Moscow and the Arab world.

The main words were spoken to the GDP already at the beginning of the negotiations, when the President stated that he viewed this meeting “as a continuation of Russia’s policy aimed at strengthening ties with the Arab region.” It would be more accurate to say - to restore connections lost over the past ten years.

It should be noted that Qatar is a completely suitable counterparty for restoring ties with the Arab region. Firstly, it is Doha that currently holds the presidency of the Organization of the Islamic Conference; secondly, Qatar is a member of OPEC, and not just an active member, but even an aggressively active one (it is worth remembering that it was Qatari Oil Minister Abdullah al-Attiyah who openly threatened Moscow with a price war last fall if it did not agree to reduce exports) , which means that the position that Doha will take in the near future in the internal OPEC showdowns is very significant for Russia, both for economic and political reasons; thirdly, it is on the territory of Qatar that the “Arab CNN”, the satellite news channel Al-Jazeera, is based, and therefore Doha plays a significant role in the information policy of not only the Persian Gulf region, but also the entire Islamic world. So Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Attani could well be called the Arab “special envoy” in Moscow, as they did in Gazeta.ru.

The Emir of Qatar did not remain in debt and assured GDP that Qatar has always strived to strengthen ties with Russia, a state “that has traditionally been a supporter of the Arab world.” It remains to be seen what the Arab “special envoy” was counting on. The fact that Moscow is intensifying its activities in the region? Is the Kremlin interested in this? What interests can Moscow defend in the Arab world, other than the desire of some leaders to rinse their footcloths in the Indian Ocean or, I would add, in the waters of the Persian Gulf?

First of all, Moscow is vitally interested in the stability of this region. “Participation in the affairs of the Near (and Middle - A.K.) East,” according to Igor Ivanov, “is natural for Russia due to its geopolitical position. In the era of globalization, the tension that persists in the Near (and Middle - A.K.) East ", more than ever, affects the interests of security and stability in the vast region immediately adjacent to the southern borders of our country. And Russia is interested in this region becoming a zone of peace and stability." But it seems that Moscow has another task in the region, no less important than achieving peace and stability (hardly possible in the current circumstances). This task is to prevent the political and strategic unification of the “Islamic world.” We need to remember the good old method of “divide and conquer,” although today the conversation should be less about domination, and more about preventing the expansion of the world of Islam, which is clearly at the stage of passionarity.

In the well-known geopolitical alignments of world forces, South and Southeast Asia, the Near and Middle East, and North Africa appear under the general name “Islamic world” or, without reference to territorial and national entities, as “Islamic civilization” ( S. Huntington ). Today, two main characteristics of the “Islamic world” attract attention: 1) brutal activity and expansionism and 2) political, ethnic and economic disunity. Considering the danger of the first, Russia, as an active (forced) player in the region, must take full advantage of the second.

That is why one of the main tasks of Russian diplomacy in the region is to prevent “Islamic solidarity” from taking final shape. To do this, it is necessary, first of all, to develop separate ties with different ethnic entities in the region - Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and in the Arab world, which gravitates toward unity more than others, economic differences between the leading states should be stimulated. If it is not possible to resist their unification under the green banner of Islam, we must rely on “state” international organizations (eg, the Organization of the Islamic Conference), which themselves are ready to fight the “terrorist international” and religious extremism (one should carefully consider what has been developed within the framework of The OIC to the Treaty on the Fight against International Terrorism, drawn up in accordance with Sharia law, which Saudi Arabia was the first to sign in 2000), and therefore, at least officially, can assist Russia in curbing radical Islamists.

Moreover, it is necessary to interact more closely with “government” unions such as the OIC in their opposition to anti-system organizations such as the NIK (People's Islamic Conference, in which, by the way, representatives of Chechnya take part), and to in every possible way support regimes associated with traditional Islam and striving to preserve status quo.

According to A. Ignatenko , in the Islamic world there is now an internal struggle between three projects - liberal (modernization), jihadist (fundamentalist) and traditionalist . The first project involves instilling in Islamic society “universal” (really Western) values ​​and forms of social life, the second - oppositional to the first - involves expansion , political and territorial, and the third - basic - is a justification of the status quo and does not imply drastic transformations. If Russia has to - and it still has to! - to make a choice between these three projects in terms of support, then the most preferable, of course, is the third project. The first - liberal - seems unrealistic due to the fact that its leaders will have to seek a compromise with the leaders of the second - jihadist. As for the fundamentalist project, its leaders, raised during the Cold War by the USSR and the USA with the active support of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, are precisely the main opponents in the anti-terrorist war.

It is in this situation that Moscow is more than interested in establishing direct relations filled with real economic projects with the ruling regimes of those Arab states that are either already opposing the destructive activities of terrorist and generally anti-system organizations, or are ready to join this confrontation.

In this sense, it was not for nothing that the GDP emphasized that “multilateral Russian-Qatari interaction is important for Russia both in itself and taking into account its priority in relations with the member countries of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Persian Gulf.” Indeed, taking into account the political situation in the “post-September world,” interaction with the GCC is acquiring special significance for Russia, both economically and, especially, politically. After all, the Persian Gulf region is a “zone of vital interests” not only for the United States, but also for Russia.