Officials of the Ministry of Natural Resources assure that they intend to seize a thousand

Officials of the Ministry of Natural Resources assure that they intend to confiscate a thousand licenses from subsoil users. But in practice this is not so easy to do, as evidenced by the ministry’s unsuccessful attempts to revoke the licenses for Gamburtsev Shaft from the Severnaya Neft company (Kommersant has written more than once about the disputes surrounding this group of fields). General Director of Severnaya Neft ALEXANDER SAMUSEV spoke about how he sees the interaction between the state and oil workers. The interview was recorded specially for Kommersant by RusEnergy.com correspondent SERGEY CHERNYSHOV.
— Why is the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment so persistent in seeking a review of the results of the competition for Gamburtsev Val? “It is absolutely obvious to me that the minister is acting in the interests of several large corporations.” I am convinced that this has nothing to do with state interests.
— Then why does the Ministry of Natural Resources carry out an inventory of licenses? After all, as a result of this, many large oil companies may lose part of their reserves?
— The question is what purpose is set during the inventory. Now the Ministry of Natural Resources has collected dirt on subsoil users in order to use it later. In the context of a contradictory and incomplete legislative framework, this is not difficult. It is much more difficult to force large companies, provided with reserves for many decades to come, to invest money in developing production and creating jobs.
— How does the use of deposits differ between large and medium-sized companies?
— For us, deposits are, first of all, production assets that must constantly produce returns. Large producers with excess production assets can selectively develop subsoil resources, ensuring the efficiency that is beneficial for them, and consider the remaining reserves as an allocation of financial resources. The level of investment in core production in such companies is actually extremely low and does not depend on market conditions or taxation. Now this figure averages about $10-12 per ton of production, although for the normal development of the Russian oil industry in its current state, $30-40 is needed.
— Is it possible to compare the strategy of large Russian and foreign companies in the accumulation and development of reserves?
— Western companies have a completely different inventory structure than in Russia. With rare exceptions, they are enough to work for ten years versus 40-50 years for large Russian companies. Western companies themselves monitor this parameter in terms of business efficiency and company capitalization. If a company incurs costs to obtain reserves that will be developed over a ten-year horizon, then, from the point of view of shareholders, this is an inefficient investment.
But in Russia, a deposit is often not a production asset, but a financial instrument that will obviously bring a higher interest rate than is paid when placing money in conventional financial instruments. Legislation and established law enforcement practice make it possible to actually gain control over reserves for very little money, while they may remain unclaimed for quite a long time. And monitoring licensing agreements does not help much in this matter.
— But it is in the licensing agreements that the terms and volumes of mineral extraction are specified.
— The subsoil use process is a project that will be implemented for at least 20-25 years, and for now all relations within its framework are regulated by a standard form of licensing agreements on several pieces of paper. This document does not answer any of the questions that arise during the implementation of projects, not to mention the fact that it is still not clear whether a license agreement is an administrative or civil document.
In the West, the requirements for subsoil users are much more stringent. If a subsoil user violates something there, then he bears responsibility regardless of the shape and size of the company. All the rules are spelled out there, and the one who violates them knows about it already at the time of the violation, and not after some official has come to such a conclusion.
— In other words, do you assume that even after the current inventory, large companies will remain sitting on excess reserves, and licenses will be canceled only for worthless deposits?
— To solve problems on a large scale, we need state policy in the field of subsoil use. But we haven’t formulated it. It is still unclear what the state wants to receive from the exploitation of subsoil: one-time financial injections or long-term investments, production development, job creation, etc. There are no regulatory documents regulating in detail the process of subsoil use; such a document could be the Mining Code, which , like the Tax Code, will determine the specifics of the activities of various groups of subsoil users, regulate the process of inspections by government agencies, etc. This, by the way, is what the Ministry of Natural Resources should be doing - formulating general rules of the game for all participants in the subsoil use process. Then, perhaps, the result of total checks would have been different.

Newspaper "Kommersant" No. 51 dated March 26, 2002, p. 8

"The Ministry of Natural Resources has collected incriminating evidence on oil workers"