From the editor: we do not have materials confirming or refuting the author’s opinion, therefore in no case do we subscribe to the stated position. The editorial position is that the Chechen issue needs to be studied in detail at the expert level. If any of the living persons mentioned below deem it necessary to come forward with their version of events, we will certainly publish this speech.
In 1997, employees of the State Security Department of Chechnya recorded the transfer of money by the Berezovskys to Udugov, Basayev, Barayev. Thus, Berezovsky financed gangs involved in murder, kidnapping and selling people. In 1998, the prosecutor's office of Ingushetia opened a criminal case (#99600052) on the facts of strange abductions from Russian territory - and the same strange releases of Russian soldiers. During the investigation, it turned out that the organizers of this slave trade, when dozens of soldiers go “AWOL” and are ransomed a day or two later as kidnapped by Chechen militants, are a certain “humanitarian foundation and mission” of Berezovsky. The “humanitarian mission”, in fact, consisted of direct financing of criminal and political formations in Chechnya by staging the kidnapping of soldiers and ransoming them as hostages. For example, there was a short-term disappearance of soldiers in collusion with their command for a period of 1-2 weeks, their subsequent “ransom” from the militants and noisy coverage of this in the media.
Other high-profile hostage releases involving Berezovsky:
December 1996. The Penza riot police led by Major Zotov were bought off.
February 1997 Ransom for very large sums of ORT correspondents Roman Perevezentsev and Vyacheslav Tibelius (one and a half months in captivity).
Spring 1997 Berezovsky's participation in the release of four journalists from Radio Russia and ITAR-TASS.
August 1997. Correspondents of the television program “Vzglyad” Ilya Bogatyrev and Vladislav Chernyaev were released for approximately $1.5 million.
March 1998. With the financial support of Berezovsky, the heads of the FSB of Ingushetia, Gribov and Lebedinsky, were released.
Autumn 1998 Boris Berezovsky bought the Englishmen Camilla Carr and Joe James.
At first, money for hostages was transferred through employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Later, Balaudi Tekilova and Adam, nicknamed Pirate, became intermediaries in the ransom of hostages. Huge amounts of money were invested in this business. Thus, more than $1 million was transferred only for FSB officers Gribov and Lebedinsky, who were kidnapped in 1997. No less was paid to Baraev for the representative of the President of the Russian Federation Vlasov and the son of the former Prime Minister of Dagestan.
Why did Berezovsky need all this? Hardly just for self-promotion. The hostage business brings good profits not only to Chechens. It allows this channel to be used to finance criminal groups and stimulate new takeovers. The issue of financing militants by Berezovsky has been the subject of discussion at the level of representative and judicial authorities more than once. Thus, at the end of 1996, at the Sharia court, the commanders of the North-Western Front accused Basayev of being financed by Russian structures (meaning Berezovsky). Basayev refused to refute this fact with an oath on the Koran. In 1997, the parliament of the Chechen Republic accused the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Maskhadov government, Movladi Udugov, of criminal connections with Berezovsky. This episode was also shown on local television. Udugov did not deny his connection and the financing of his activities by Berezovsky and explained this with a sacramental phrase: “Berezovsky and I made friends between Islam and Judaism.” As a result, at the insistence of Parliament, he was relieved of his post.
Thanks to an audio recording made by employees of the Department of State Security of Chechnya, Berezovsky’s meeting with Basayev, Udugov and Maskhadov during the fighting in Chechnya in 1996 became widely known. This refers to the telephone conversation between Raduev, who was undergoing treatment in Germany, and Moscow. Here are some of the most interesting excerpts from this conversation:
Question (to Raduev): What did you mean when you said that Maskhadov, Udugov, Basayev betrayed Dudayev?
S. Raduev : They conspired with Moscow to get the president out of the way. They went to Istanbul in March, and from there to Europe. And Udugov went, and your Bereza... Who keeps television, keeps newspapers... He keeps money for them in Moscow and keeps it... she also came from Moscow for a day or two. They were dating. There were also Tsar agents, Turks from MIT. There they decided everything. And your Grachev was also decided. He's no longer there...
In 1997 Maskhadov invited Arbi Barayev to his government and transferred all power structures to his subordination. Apparently, during this period some incriminating materials fell into his hands. It was people from Barayev’s entourage who demonstrated audio and video materials about Berezovsky’s close contacts with Udugov, Basayev and others. In the same year, Barayev voluntarily left Maskhadov’s government and headed a separate armed formation. At this time, in Chechnya there were disputes between military-political groups over spheres of influence (we are talking mainly about the oil production and oil refining complexes, the communications sector, cement and sugar factories). During one of the showdowns in Grozny over the sugar and cement factories, Basayev, in the presence of two dozen witnesses, stated that he was purchasing these factories with Berezovsky’s money for a joint business.
Udugov kept himself apart from everyone. As it turned out later, according to his own and his relatives’ confession, Berezovsky provided him with a business in the field of mobile communications in Moscow. Udugov's representative in Moscow in these cases was his cousin Akhmed Khalidov. Foreign capital also tried to infiltrate Chechnya - specifically into the telephone business. Representatives of this very foreign capital appeared in Grozny... Who were immediately kidnapped by Barayev.
Due to circumstances, having been involved in their release, the author of these lines was informed by people close to Barayev that Berezovsky paid Barayev $2 million for the execution of these specialists (remember? severed heads laid out in a row). They say that Chechnya is his sphere of influence, and he will not allow anyone to interfere in his business with impunity. Actually, Barayev himself did not hide this during a personal conversation with me.
In 1999, during the military operations in Dagestan, after my publications in the newspaper Die Welt and Berliner Post-Morgen, a stranger asked me to meet, promising to present documents on the events in Dagestan. Having identified himself as a commander from Baraev’s detachment, he offered me to sell abroad documentary evidence of the financing and organization of the armed conflict in Dagestan by Berezovsky through Udugov and Basayev. To be convincing, he showed me a video recording of Berezovsky’s meetings with Udugov and Basayev. He promised to give me the rest of the documents for $1 million in Sleptsovsk.
In 1999, the public of Moscow and Chechnya was shocked by the high-profile murder of the President of the Confederation of Peoples of the Caucasus, a famous public and political figure, Yusup Solambekov. This murder occurred after his loud speeches exposing Berezovsky’s criminal activities in Chechnya. Everyone knows the facts of contacts between Berezovsky and Basayev and Udugov a month before the provocation with the invasion of Basayev into Dagestan. And Basayev himself did not deny that he received $20 million from Berezovsky for this.
Today Berezovsky accuses Russian special services of terrorist acts - bombings of houses in Moscow and Volgodonsk. But why doesn’t Berezovsky talk about his meeting with Basayev and Udugov at a villa in Nice and explain his telephone revelations with the direct perpetrators of the bloody massacre in Chechnya, although audio recordings of these conversations have become available to the press?
It is also not a special secret that Berezovsky introduced people he liked into the special services. Then the question arises: who could organize bombings of houses in Moscow and Volgodonsk more easily than others, even through the special services (more precisely, through their own people in the special services)? And Berezovsky's interest in the second bloodbath is obvious.