Today, Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi arrives in Moscow for a two-day visit. The visit was planned back on the 20th of February, but then it was suddenly canceled to “refine” the program. The Iranian minister hoped for a meeting with President Putin, but it was not included in the latter’s plan, and then, by mutual agreement, the trip was postponed. In those days, they also hinted at one more circumstance - the stay in Moscow of high-ranking American diplomat John Bolton, who tried to explain to his Russian colleagues why Washington had “strung” Tehran on the “axis of evil.”
Today there are no VIP guests from the United States in the Russian capital; Vladimir Putin has returned from vacation and even, contrary to custom (the Russian president, as a rule, does not receive foreign ministers), according to the Russian Foreign Ministry, is ready to meet with the Persian visitor tomorrow. First, his Russian counterpart Igor Ivanov will meet with the head of the Iranian Foreign Ministry. But America will now become an invisible participant in the Russian-Iranian dialogue. Just the other day, Washington and Tehran exchanged sharp attacks, and Moscow may partly find itself in the role of a mischief maker. US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld accused Iran of al-Qaeda militants using its territory while fleeing Afghanistan, although he noted that Iranian authorities may not have complete information about this. The Pentagon chief added that Iran supports Palestinian suicide bombers by paying their families $25,000. In response, Kamal Kharrazi supported Iraq's call for Arab countries to stop exporting oil to the United States.
It is safe to assume that tomorrow in Moscow statements will be made about Iran’s non-involvement in supporting terrorism and about joint Iranian-Russian efforts to combat this evil. Moreover, the positions of Moscow and Tehran regarding Afghanistan largely coincide. In this regard, Mr. Kharrazi will also be interested in how the Russian leadership views the strengthening of the American military presence in Central Asia and the Caspian Sea.
The Caspian issue itself will dominate the negotiations. On April 23-24, a summit of five Caspian states is scheduled to take place in Ashgabat. Almost all Caspian players (with the exception of the summit hosts) would like to bring an agreed document from Ashgabat in order to move further towards concluding a final agreement on the status of the reservoir. Paradoxically, it seems that precisely because this is impossible, all presidents will go to Turkmenistan without fear. After all, Iran, which does not intend to “give up the principle” of dividing the Caspian Sea into five equal parts (which is absolutely unacceptable for its partners), by withdrawing from participation in the Ashgabat summit, may be left alone in front of the Caspian “four” CIS countries.