START-SPREE PROBLEMS NO.

Very little time has passed since May 2002, when the presidents of Bush and Putin signed a framework agreement on the long -term perspective of a reduction in strategic nuclear weapons of the two countries. Suddenly, a calm official reaction of Moscow to the US exit from the software agreement in 1972 caused ambiguous assessments both in Russia itself and abroad. Along with the support and reasonable justifications of this decision of President Putin, criticism continues-from simply doubts to direct or veiled accusations of a political and military-strategic error, infringing on the national interests of Russia.

An analysis of publications on this topic shows that often assessments and conclusions are built only in the political plane. And in cases where military-strategic arguments are used to justify political conclusions, these arguments are supposedly in nature. Which is not surprising, because to the present on both sides of the Atlantic, the content of global war plans and the calculations of the sufficiency of nuclear potentials are contained in deep secret. Military strategists try to keep the right monopoline to answer the question: “What does the country need to reliable protection of its interests?” Of course, in these conditions, it is difficult to completely trust the conclusions and proposals expressed in open publications, and build on their basis their attitude to the policy of the highest leadership on such an important issue as the danger of nuclear war. And I would like to have such an opportunity.

It makes no sense to hope for a coup in relation to the secrecy of the plans of the nuclear war and to the sudden decision of the authorities to fully open the calculations of nuclear potentials available in the Pentagon and the General Staff. But, I think, this is not necessary. It is possible by simple logical constructions to establish whether Bush and Putin are right in their agreed decision, or one of them (or both at once) made a serious mistake. Generally speaking, many ordinary people intuitively feel their innocence and are quite calm about the development of events in this area. But here we are not talking about this main mass of reasonable people, but more about those who are not tired of screaming "guard!" And prevents further movement in the right direction.

For this is, indeed, the correct joint political decision in these conditions, in no way contradicts both the interests of the national security of the United States and Russia, and someone else's interests. Let's try to prove it. At the same time, we will leave aside the current, conjunctural political considerations, as well as such an economic “justification” of Russia's decision: they say, she would like to threaten a giant nuclear arsenal, but no longer can. Take only the military-strategic side of the security problem, which should be the main measure of fidelity to political decisions.

Russia

President Putin went against the standard official calculations of the military and ignored their fears regarding the future American missile defense system and its influence on the effectiveness of the Russian nuclear impact of retaliation. It is reliably unknown whether this was his personal decision based on common sense, or whether the president listened to the arguments of those experts who managed to get out of the usual framework of the Cold War.

In open Russian and foreign sources, a scheme of such traditional calculations is sometimes given. It is simple to genius: for example, let Russia have 5,000 nuclear charges (blocks) on combat duty. After a powerful first US blow (not necessarily nuclear), Russia will have only 200 (also for example). Let the United States have a about 90 percent. Then the “calculations show” that in the Russian strike of retaliation to the goals in the United States, 20 blocks will reach. And if this result is obviously considered insufficient to restrain the United States, then Russia's security is not ensured. Amazing!

The numbers given in this example are conditional, and it is not at all the matter. The thing is that this method is incorrect in principle: it is impossible to use fixed (averaged) assessments of the size of the impacts - both the first strike of the aggressor and the impact of retaliation. And, of course, - the result of the operation of the missile defense system. All these processes are random, and with repeated modeling of each specific scenario of the war, a large set of different results of retaliation is obtained. The correct method is to explore all the results obtained, and not use only the most likely (i.e. more often than other) outcomes of the conflict to assess the reliability of deterrence.

With the right approach to the study of modeling results, such a picture can be obtained. In 1,000 cases of the war (the same scenario) there were 970 “weak” strokes of retaliation-in each no more than 5-6 blocks. But in 30 modeling, retaliation turned out to be at least 200 blocks. Is such a set of possible retribution results to contain Americans from the first blow? It would be best, of course, to ask the Americans themselves about it. Maybe we will live to such cooperation. In the meantime, even a one -way assessment of these results should be reasonable, and it should be assumed that 200 blocks with a probability of 0.03 are a sufficiently restraining factor for a “potential aggressor”. Although 5-6 blocks with a probability of 0.97 are also not a gift.

It must be understood that with a single “real test” there can be any retribution. Including - and unacceptable in every sense. Understanding this is a true restraining factor. Even with very small values ​​of the probability of such an outcome.

Of course, it cannot be said that military analysts have not used before and do not use a probabilistic approach now in assessing nuclear deterrence. They did and do it, and statistical modeling is not at all news for them. But for some reason, “the most unlikely, but terrible” cases of retaliation are excluded from consideration. They are discarded as extra, uncharacteristic, as is always done with ordinary multiple modeling. But here we are dealing with such a unique phenomenon as a nuclear war, albeit hypothetical. And the approach to the analysis of possible results should be special.

Perhaps the specified correct approach is already used for official assessments. Then why not say this openly, because in the method itself there is nothing secret. The benefits of such mutual information are undeniable. If the Russians know that the Americans are using the same approach, they think the same way, then they should stop being afraid of the future about the United States, no matter how effective it becomes. And at the same time, we would have the opportunity to calmly reduce the level of our nuclear arsenal in the framework defined by the Gentlemen Agreement in May 2002.

Apparently, Vladimir Putin understood this when he signed the specified agreement of Russia with the United States. It is likely that before that he and George Bush exchanged opinions about such an elementary truth in the ranch in Texas.

USA

Perhaps the above arguments are already used by official American experts when it comes to the fact that Russia has nothing to fear the future about the United States.

The question arises: how can the case be guaranteed to protect the territory of the United States from single launches of rockets of the storm countries? Today, most media outlets are widely used by this formula: about the United States will not be able to resist a fairly massive nuclear shock (read - Russia); But it will be able to protect the country from single launches of missiles. Neither statements are true.

From the above, it is clear that the correct forecast for any level is this: "anything can be." In other words, it may even happen that not a single Russian nuclear block will reach the US territory in the blow of retaliation, that is, it will work with one hundred percent efficiency. However, most likely, “some” will reach. But even everything is so unambiguous with protection from the rockets of the Rogue countries. It is impossible to guarantee that one or two blocks with nuclear (or bacteriological, chemical) filling will not fall into any American city. Of course, the more powerful the pro, the more likely this is less, up to the insignificant. But it remains, and this circumstance can give international terrorists an occasion for blackmail. The only way to get rid of this is to completely remove the subject of blackmail, that is, rockets.

But, let me: why then will it be about? The question seems funny, and it seems that the circle is closed.

It seems, however, there is an explanation. You cannot forbid the people to try to protect themselves. It is impossible to deprive each person of hope that at a critical moment about his house will save his house from an insidious blow or from a racket accidentally breaking off from the start. And if the Americans find money to create this hope, well, this is their business. And at the same time, the United States will make another technological break -in forward.

Any speculations on the topic of START-Pro can be refuted by a simple argument. An attempt to protect yourself from an attack from outside cannot be condemned; After all, no one is arguing regarding the System about around Moscow. But never, no reasonable leader of a great country will even think about delivering the first blow to another nuclear country, hiding behind a boat. Because no such system can guarantee absolute impunity.

The conclusion from the foregoing is obvious and simple: it is time to sit on one computer to American and Russian experts and jointly prove the lack of the problem of START-PP.