Naked reception

The loneliness of this book is far from a trivial fact. There were many genres of military literature in ancient times; these are “tactics” - manuals on the organization, armament and maneuver of troops; “polyorcetics”, dedicated to the art of siege and defense of fortresses; "hippics" or "hipparchics", addressed to cavalrymen; “strategicons” - instructions on the duties of strategists. In this variety of military genres, there was also a modest place for “stratagems” - treatises on military tricks that were used by strategists to achieve victory (examples of these tricks were copied from historical works). A classic of “strategems” is the work of the Roman Sextus Julius Frontinus, who organized the stratagems thematically, according to military situations: the first book of his work spoke about the preparation of a battle, the second - about the battle, the third - about the siege, the fourth - about the moral state of soldiers.

If you believe Polybius, a noble man who wanted to become a strategist had to read historical literature in order to comprehend military wisdom from the experience of great men. Actually, almost all historical literature of antiquity is military-historical literature: Herodotus writes about the war between the Greeks and the Persians, Thucydides - about the war between the Lacedaemonians and the Athenians, Xenophon about the same and about the wars between the Greeks. And so on - it seems that only in Sallust, in the Conspiracy of Catiline, for the first time the basis of a historical plot becomes a non-military theme. But there were no works at the intersection of the genres of military history and military theory - ancient historical-narrative science, to the extent that it was a science, had no taste for “sectoral” generalizations.

The ancient history of ancient philosophy was possible only in the form of the famous anecdotes of Diogenes Laertius about the antics, tricks and funny traits of the famous eccentrics and originals of antiquity - philosophers: “Once Dionysius, over a cup of wine, ordered everyone to put on red clothes and start dancing. Plato refused, saying: “No, I am not able to dress as a woman!” But Aristippus accepted the dress and, starting to dance, aptly objected: “A pure soul will not be corrupted by dancing in Bacchus.” Likewise, a general history of the art of war turned out to be possible only in the form of similar anecdotes, reading which in itself will give the non-specialist reader considerable pleasure: “Dionysius, the tyrant of Sicily, the assembled mercenaries wanted to kill, they rushed along the conventional sign, standing near his house. He came out, putting on miserable clothes and sprinkling ashes on his hair, showing himself handed over, so that they could decide his fate. The mercenaries, because of the disastrous change in him, left without harming him. Dionysius, a little later, in Leontini, surrounded them with his army, and killed everyone with spears.” Since Polyaenus’s work has been preserved almost completely, we have 833 similar anecdotes.

However, this anecdotal collection actually has all the signs, firstly, of universal history, secondly, of history and, thirdly, of military art. Judge for yourself - the geography of the work is from Persia to Rome, the chronological framework is from the legendary times of Dionysus (Polyenus begins the story with the conquest of India by Dionysus) and Hercules to Caesar and Augustus. In eight books, the author organizes the stratagems on a chronological and geographical basis: first come the legendary and ancient heroes of Hellas, the second book talks about the exploits of the Spartans in the 4th century, and the third talks about the exploits of the Athenians at the same time. The fourth deals with the generals of the Hellenistic era, the fifth deals with the famous Greek tyrants, the sixth deals with various Hellenic tribes and barbarian peoples, and the seventh deals mainly with the Persians. Finally, the eighth book is divided between the exploits of the Romans and the exploits of famous women.

In the preface to the first book, addressed to the Augustans Lucius Verus and Marcus Aurelius, who, at the time of writing the book, were waging a war with the Parthians, Polyaenus develops a whole apology for the stratagem, military cunning as the highest form of military art, which would have been the envy of the Chinese military sage Sun Tzu , and the famous theorist of the “strategy of indirect action” Liddell-Hart. “After all, the one who wins, using in battle with enemies not military force, but prudence, has courage - to gain the upper hand without a fight through skill and cunning, so the main science of skilled strategists is to achieve victory without being exposed to danger. And the best thing is to plot tricks in the battle formation itself, so that the thought of victory predetermines the end of the battle. At least, it seems to me that Homer also advises this, because every time he says: “by deceit or force,” he does not prescribe anything other than tricks or stratagems to be used against enemies; if you are weaker in this, then it’s worth risking military force . ”

The maxim “then it’s worth risking military force” first makes you shudder, and then gets stuck in your memory for a long time. This is not the abstract wish of Sun Tzu: “the best of the best is to win without fighting.” Everything is very specific: the battle, which is a fetish for the new European “German” military theory, brilliantly presented by Clausewitz, is recognized by the Greeks (and Polianus does not say any ad-lib, he diligently sets out exactly the generally accepted and most sensible opinions for his era) as the worst scenario for the development of military events, the extreme a risk taken out of foolishness or weakness. The destiny of the weak is strength, the destiny of the strong is cunning - the distribution of roles is completely opposite to that to which a person of modern European culture is accustomed, who firmly knows that evasions and shifting eyes are the lot of the weak, and the strong are always open and honestly ready to swing their fists.

The European is trying to show his power, to reveal what was hidden - and combat, in general any head-on collision, any single combat, is the ideal way to demonstrate hidden power. The Greek is trying to add to what he has what he does not have, trying to strengthen his power, hidden or obvious - and for this the most suitable thing is not wasting power in single combat, but a maneuver that allows him to accumulate it further. When the Spartans, having started the Peloponnesian War, forced the Athenian naval alliance to openly display their power, they doomed the enemy to a painful and long defeat. The pinnacle of the European mind is technology , that is, the rational concentration of power that can be demonstrated at one time or another. Military clashes of Europeans are clashes of more or less perfect technologies (whether we are talking about material technology or the technology of the “art of war”, military organization and other technology related not to matter, but to structure). The pinnacle of ancient reason is “sophrosyune”: art, which is also wisdom, which is also cunning. This cunning makes it possible to turn black into white, the weak into strong, the mirrors created by Archimedes into setting fire to Roman ships, and the “ravens” invented by the Romans on the bows of ships allows turning a ramming battle at sea into a boarding battle on deck (and in it the descendants of Romulus are stronger than the opponents of the Carthaginians). All ancient technology is in this cunning, but in the Stealth bomber, stuffed with electronics, computer guidance systems, high-precision weapons and well-trained pilots, there is no specific “cunning”.

If we look for a non-military parallel to the military art of strategems, we will find it in ancient rhetoric, and in sophistic rhetoric, for which making the weak strong and the wrong right was the highest manifestation of wisdom. Rhetorical devices, especially sophisms, are the same stratagems, but only applied to civil life. In the famous sophistry with horns ( "You haven't lost your horns? - No. - So you have horns" ), a sophistical trick is a way of giving an opponent horns without actually pinning them to him. A strategem in its ideal form is a way to defeat an opponent without defeating him. The sophists promised to teach rich young men exactly this kind of wisdom (even if it seemed imaginary to Socrates) - to win in courts, to lead the people in public assemblies, to seduce their interlocutors with their words, without resorting to what in modern military language is called the “strategy of means”, i.e. that is, without having any real trump cards in his bosom that can be laid out on the table. A well and competently conducted war is a skillfully composed speech by an experienced sophist.

Sophistic technology, however, and with it the culture of stratagems, did not, on the whole, survive antiquity. And in antiquity they were gradually suppressed by the Socratic-Platonic-Aristotelian understanding of wisdom, that understanding that would lay the foundations of the new European technological approach to wisdom and power. Plato's ideas are high-altitude strategic bombers that threaten his opponents with such demonstrative power that no trick can be done. The Socratic and then Aristotelian system of constructing logical reasoning is a technology for controlling and concentrating power; it allows not to make white black, but gray - white and dazzling, or gray - black and disgusting (as was done with the same sophists). If we continue our somewhat free rhetorical military analogies, then the Socratic-European tradition is the creation of more and more perfect and mathematized fire control systems , while the sophistic-antique tradition is the development of more and more perfect and ingenious forms maneuver. In this capacity, a huge future awaits military sophistry, because the current level of development of military technology can be contrasted with only one thing - the exceptional development of military ingenuity.

Therefore, it is not accidental that the translators made a reservation that “most readers will become acquainted with Polyaenus from a military-historical point of view, and not for aesthetic purposes.” Polyaenus is relevant not as a monument to immortal and beautiful antiquity, but as another “book of future commanders.” And for this task, the edition presented to us is brilliantly adapted - a good, clear translation, a detailed commentary (“this edition is one of the first attempts to create a commented translation of Polyaenus”). Lovers of aesthetics will undoubtedly be pleased with the printing quality of the publication and the accompanying illustrations - antique images of the heroes of the story. The publication opens with two magnificent introductory articles: one, by A. K. Nefedkin, is devoted to the place of Polyaenus’ work in the military literature of antiquity, the other, by A. B. Ksenofontov, is devoted to the place of “Strategems” in the literary process and the personal “stratagem” of Polyaenus himself, who tried to do With the help of this book, his career, but not successful, was interrupted by death. The last circumstance is perhaps the main limitation of any stratagems.