Discussion about the transformation of the US Armed Forces

* Bureaucracy is characterized by addiction to a common cliche. This is especially true for government bureaucracy. The Ministry of Defense is now the most popular term “transformation”. Loren Thompson from the Lexington Institute recently outlined the difficulties associated with this concept, as follows: “The very popularity of the word in the corridors of the Pentagon suggests that everyone understands it differently. For some, “transformation” is a way to keep the shaken ideas and institutions, for others it is a way to finally shift them. And for many, this is a magical formula called, as usual, to sanctify the next undertaking. ”In the Ministry of Defense,“ Transformation ”came to replace the recently used term“ revolution in military affairs ”(RVD). This former designation, like the current one, was ambiguous and, therefore, gave rise to similar problems. In fact, the discussion around the planned RVD proceeded from the prerequisite that the “achievable and predictable” technological progress in areas of accurate guidance, high -precision weapons, tracking and observation systems and computer systems will change the warfare methods as radically as the two world wars due to the development of strategic bombing means, and the use Armored equipment and deck aircraft or after the Second World War with the advent of nuclear ballistic missiles. According to this point of view, the most consistently defended Andrew Marshall, director of the US Department of Defense for Analysis and Evaluation of Programs, and Andrew Krepinevich, executive director of the Washington Center for Strategic and Budget Objects, the transformation process in the RVD should be a response to the changed security conditions. Krepinevich prefers the term "military revolution." In his very constructive article (in the journal “National Interest”, 1994), he defined the military revolution as a sharp increase in combat power, which is fundamentally changing the nature and development of military conflict. Although the technology often provides the possibility of a military revolution, the question is still posed by more widely. The military revolution, Rubypinevich wrote, suggests not only the technological aspect, but also systemic development, tactical innovations and organizational changes. So, the real basis of the German blitzkrig was not technology (tanks, aircraft and radio communications existed earlier), but a new tactical concept (swiftness of movements based on the efficiency of actions) in conjunction with structural-organizational changes (the use of motorized infantry divisions). Actually, some of the largest military revolutions were in no way connected with the technological process. The revolution in the field of finance, which occurred in the UK at the end of the 17th century, made the construction of the Royal Fleet, which for three centuries was turned by a small island state, moreover, poor resources, into a leading world power. Having removed the restrictions on the mobilization of all the resources of the country, in particular for the military draft of citizens, the French revolution brought at the disposal of Napoleon a large and well -armed army, which allowed him to conquer not only Europe, but almost the whole world. The other, a radicalist approach to the RVD problem, in which not a process was put forward, but the result. Supporters of this view argued that new technologies would “transform the nature of the war”, providing the command with the opportunity to “see and realize everything that is happening on the battlefield” and thanks to this “win the war”. The dividing this position believed that the “information dominance” achieved using the latest technologies would make it possible to get rid of “diverse in actions”, dispel the “fog of war” and thereby ensure the highest command echelons to almost complete “owning the situation”, which will lead to “reduce risks” when using military formations.

Thus, the former vice-chairman of the United Committee of the Chiefs of Staff Admiral William Owens made a very strong statement that "the technology is able to help the US Army to dispel the" fog of war "... the dominant possession of information-that is, the ability to see and understand everything that is happening on the battlefield is achievable."

According to those who understood the RVD as an end result, and not as a process, the United States should have been radical reconstruction of their armed forces, starting with immediate investment in management, control and communications, in computer systems, in the technology for collecting information, tracking and intelligence, as well as the development of high -precision weapons of a large radius of use. The integration of the listed technologies should, in their thoughts, lead to the creation of a “system system” and give the United States the ability to “use military force with incomparably more efficiency than the enemy, while not at risk of their own armed forces.” Those who are inclined to reduce the RVD to its final result believe that as soon as this desired result will be achieved, the United States will forever disappear for anxiety for its safety.

Clarification of terminology

Now that in the offices of the Ministry of Defense “Revolution in Military Affairs” it gave way to the key term “transformation”, it is necessary to figure out what, in fact, this latter means. Krepinevich defines the transformation as "large -scale innovation ... undertaken by the military, who believe that the main changes occur in the nature of the combat conflict." In fact, this is an attempt to use the RVD to achieve a “sharp jump in the effectiveness of military operations”. “Transformation” is not another designation of the RVD, it is “a process initiated by the defense department at the moment when, in general conviction, the implementation of the RVD has almost begun.” Taking into account the direct connection between the RVD and the transformation, one should not be surprised that the second concept inherited the internal contradictions of the first.

Why, then, the best army in the world, over the past and a half decades without much difficulty dealing with any enemy, now needs transformation? Answering briefly - because the world has changed, if not completely, then in many important relationships. The United States de facto are an imperial power. The independence and prosperity that we are accustomed to largely became the result of our “imperial policy”. However, performing the indicated role, the United States is faced with certain obstacles. The list of these “tactical challenges” includes factors such as “tyranny of distances” and the rapid spread of military permissible technologies that potentially expand the “dead zone”, which may need to act American military forces. And as a result - the possible assimilation of the strategies of “access to access” for the United States to well -known points, as well as the methods of “reduction of space”.

Supporters of the transformation believe that in order to overcome these tactical challenges it is necessary to give certain characteristics to the US armed forces. The US troops must have high mobility, undeveloped, high dispersal, as well as be secured by network electronic communications, which makes it possible to carry out compact tactical actions, the application of long -term high -precision strokes and the rapid delivery of widely distributed military formations to the theater of war. According to their thoughts, such forces will provide the United States with the preservation of dominance in the “aggregate”, that is, the sea, land and airspace, ensure their safety and create a threat to the security of the enemy.

Of course, it is much easier to describe the desired characteristics of the future armed forces than to determine the ways of achieving the goal. In fact, this last is the main content of the discussion, which has unfolded around the transformation problem.

So, questions arise: how quickly should the US armed forces be transformed? What are the “costs”, that is, what will we have to refuse today to get the desired result in the future? Who will transform? Should she be centralized in the apparatus of the Minister of Defense or the General Staff or remain decentralized and rely on innovative initiatives of individual services with their own strategic and tactical concepts? And finally, what risks are associated with the transformation process?

One of the transformational strategies, which received the support of many experts on defense issues, is to “jump over the generation” of weapons. In September 1999, during the election campaign, the Bush candidate voiced this principle, saying that the United States should “modernize some of the existing types of weapons and equipment, according to current tasks. But relatively the peaceful position in which we are, allows the United States to do this selectively. The true goal is to skip the stage of surface improvements and replace existing programs with new technologies and strategies, jumping through a whole technological generation. ... I call for new thinking, to a difficult choice. "

Supporters of this point of view call the three conditions under which such “jumping” can be considered appropriate: firstly, if in the near future the threat of US security is relatively low, which reduces the need to maintain a large number of repeatedly modernized systems; Secondly, if some improved system obtained as a result of such multiple modernization is ineffective due to unexpected changes in the configuration of external threats; Thirdly, if quick technological progress opens the way to create fundamentally different forces, focused on fulfilling the most important tactical targets that can arise at an unexpected beginning of the war.

The recent decision of the Minister of Ramsfeld on the closure of the Cruisider artillery program was dictated by just similar considerations. All arguments in favor of continuing financing this program collapse against the backdrop of their own transformation tasks facing the US Army; In addition, this weapon in itself does not satisfy the requirements of "track formativity."

Yes, many believe that the Cruisider program is trifles. In a recent report under the heading “empty promises”, which was prepared at the Kato Institute, known for its libertarian views, it is stated that after the terrorist attacks of September 11, all attempts to transform the US military system are buried by the “iron triangle”, i.e. bureaucracy of the congress, defense industry and Pentagon. The 2003 budget, raising the costs of defense, "literally ozolled the Pentagon, instead of push it to radical redistribution of financial costs in order to ensure the transformation of the armed forces." The authors of the report believe that the F-22 fighter-bomber should be discontinued, and the released financial resources are aimed at creating a new bombarder. That the number of aircraft carriers should be reduced, and the F/A-18 E/F fighter-bomber was removed and replaced by the F-117 version modified for the needs of the Navy. That the divisions of the Ground Forces should be reduced, and the tank - introduced into the National Guard. That the production of a vertical take-off and landing aircraft MV-22 OSPREY should be stopped, and amphibious forces should come to the forefront in the naval.

For those who are skeptical in relation to the transformation, the Kato Institute's report is a sample of dangerous extreme in the discussion on defense issues. Poophrazing, perhaps, the largest military analyst of our days of the former colonel Richard Sinnreich), we can ask: should we send the current weapons systems or extend their existence, in the meantime, in the meantime, for the so -called “leading” technologies that have not yet migrated from drawing boards to military factories and, in fact For all, they will not be migrated soon?

Determination of the position

The Texas Populist Political Political Policy Jim Hightower once said: if you can find something in the middle of the road, then only a dead skunk or a yellow dividing strip. In the case of military transformation, it seems that the middle of the road is perhaps the most profitable place. Two influential supporters of the transformation approach converge. Crepinevich writes that the transformation "does not mean replacing the entire complex of the armed forces with new systems and military structures." The task of this moment is to “using our huge advantage in military force, to determine what the optimal ratio between existing and new systems for the best conformity of configuration of external threats provided for our defense strategy is.”

Philip Gold from the Discovery Institute in Seattle writes that transformed military forces "will still use traditional systems, it is possible to even go back and modify some of their species, which seemed outdated for a long time: the process sometimes called" retrote technology "." An example of what Gold and Creepinevich have in mind is a combination of the B-52 aircraft fifty years ago and high-tech equipment Joint Direct Attack Munion, which provides extremely high accuracy and efficiency of high-altitude bombing. It is also clearly manifested when establishing the network interaction of the existing types of armed forces, which allows to significantly increase the speed of the commands and reduce operational planning time, that is, to make and make decisions with a large enemy’s care.

The transformation of the US defense complex is absolutely inevitable, but on this path we are in wait for some dangers. One of them is that, just as it happened with the military reform of the 1980s, the transformation can be interpreted as an occasion to reduce the armed forces to a level below what is necessary to perform current tasks. Someone will offer to cut out defense costs-the syndrome of the “cheap hawk” (Newt Gingrich, Newt Gingrich). An adjacent problem may arise if someone tries, referring to the preparation of new systems, to close the existing programs-as some members of the Congress proposed due to the upcoming appearance of the B-2 bomber to stop release B-1.

As Lauren Thompson pointed out, the real transformation will cost a lot. Iona will require an increase in funds for the purchase of new types of weapons: “It is nice to stay up late in its offices, discussing future methods of warfare. However, all proposals for cutting the defense budget, already insufficient for the purposes of modernization, only bring the day when even the uninitiated will see the true nature of our transformation: empty speeches against the background of rapidly obsolete technology. In France, the lag in defense from political rhetoric led to the fact that this country, which was the leading military power in 1919, was twenty years later not ready for Hitler's invasion. ”

In the context of war

Any transformation, in order to become real, should be carried out with an understanding of what , in fact, is a war as such. One of the reasons that encourage us to study the works of Karl von Clausewitz, a Prussian general who died more than a century and a half ago, is that he developed a harmonious theory of war. The most important position of this theory is that the war is inexhaustible by nature. The war is a fierce clash of two will, each of which achieves dominance of its rival. According to the wording of the clause, our will is aimed at an animated object, causing a response in it, often unpredictable. The cyclic relationship between the warring will unfolds in the kingdom of probability and chaos. The theoretical constructions and historical studies of Clausevitsa allow us to withdraw three characteristic elements of any war that are not dependent on the time. This is its nonlinear character, uncertainty and the presence of inconsistency in actions.

Since the war is purely human, the human dimension is central and necessary for understanding. Accordingly, the war contains an element of irrational, which is not succumbing to any calculation. The war reflects human nature, the whole complexity of human behavior, the limitation of the intellectual and physical capabilities of man. Any understanding of the war, ignoring what Clausewitz called “moral factors” - fear, threat of threat, physical fatigue - contains danger. Как заметил великий немецкий мыслитель, «военные действия никогда не бывают направлены только против материальной силы; они всегда нацелены также и на моральную силу, которая их одушевляет и не может быть отделена от материальной». И далее: «Искусство войны имеет дело с живыми силами морального порядка. Следовательно, оно не может достичь абсолюта или полной ясности и всегда должно оставлять место для неопределенности — как в величайшем, так и в мелочах».

Трансформация военных сил — достойная задача. Но трансформационная стратегия, основанная на линейной, механистической, целиком техноцентричной концепции войны, без учета моментов несогласованности, случайности и неопределенности, свойственных каждой войне, без попытки вникнуть в мысли противника — такая стратегия ведет к поражению.

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* Перевод с английского Александра Ярина.