Alexander Kazakov. Two Chechnyas: a picture for the West

Two Chechnyas: a picture for the West
Alexander Kazakov

Publication date: November 18, 2002

Instead of constantly complaining about how we are misperceived with our problems in the outside world - be it Europe or America - it is worth looking back at ourselves and asking the question: what do we ourselves do to ensure that we are perceived adequately? And the first thing that comes to mind is that we are not doing anything at all. Only occasionally do we appeal to our Western “partners” to open their eyes and take an impartial look at what is going on here. But you can’t demand that everyone calmly look at our ulcers, and at the same time make the correct diagnosis. I'm not even talking about the fact that behind the colorful demonstration of our problems by the Western media there may be their specific (and quite selfish) interests, and not general ideas about “human rights”. And in general, what we, upon discovery, with satisfaction designate as “double standards” is not a disease of vision for a Western observer. He just knows what he wants and uses all non-criminal ways to achieve his goals.

How can we help our Western “partners” understand what is happening in Chechnya? First, you need to understand this yourself, formulate it (it is fundamentally important to find the words ) and offer your “picture” to the West. This “picture”, drawn by us, and not borrowed from the same Western media, must be made a kind of “screen” between their observer and our reality. And then let them correct, refute or confirm what is drawn on the screen. This is still better than excursions to Chechnya by Lord Judd and his communication with hysterical ladies, who often receive fees for their hysterics. Offering a Western observer his “picture” instead of lamenting the one he draws himself will be precisely a manifestation of that “targeted” and at the same time offensive foreign policy. Building such a “picture” for export and introducing it into the Western market of public consciousness will at least somewhat resemble foreign policy work (which, by the way, Mr. Lesin somehow promised to do).

In order not to be unfounded, I will risk adding to others my version of the “export model” of the situation in Chechnya. For simplicity, it can be called “Two Chechnyas”.

One Chechnya. The Chechen Republic, which exists within the Russian constitutional field (it does not necessarily follow from this that it is within the framework of the Criminal Code). In general, this definition is more suitable for people than for a territorial-administrative unit, that is, we should rather be talking about Chechens who perceive themselves in the constitutional field of Russia or, more simply, as Russians. These are the people with whom you can negotiate on certain issues, and not negotiate as with an opposing party. These are people who want to build a new Chechen Republic with a new constitution and legitimate government, with the degree of autonomy that will be determined in the agreement between the new republican government and the center.

Another Chechnya. This “Chechnya” has nothing to do with Russia at all and is included as an integral part of the Terrorist International (at the same time, the presence of structural ties, for example, in Al-Qaeda, is important, but not fundamental). The initial political motive for this Chechnya is the separatist idea, which serves as a cover for religious (caliphate) and criminal ("black hole", transshipment base for drugs and weapons, production base for counterfeiters, etc.). Conversations with this “Chechnya” are meaningless, and negotiations are shameful and immoral. There are only two options here - judgment or destruction.

The first Chechnya is in the department of politics, and the second is in the police (military) department. The establishment of the first is an internal matter of the Russian Federation , and the destruction and ultimate destruction of the second is the task not only of Russia, but also of its partners in the international anti-terrorist coalition .

Chechen-Chechen border

The dividing line between the first Chechnya and the second is Putin’s ultimatum, delivered to the Chechen gangs, if I’m not mistaken, last fall. Negotiations can only take place on the terms of the surrender of weapons and the transition to a peaceful life for those who have no blood on their hands. And this is not the capitulation of the Chechen people, but the disarmament of those Chechens who fought with Russia for other people’s ideas, other people’s glory and other people’s money. This is an agreement on a ceasefire and armed confrontation in general and a transition to peaceful life. It is worth adding, in order to avoid misinterpretation, that when I speak of a ceasefire, I do not mean a truce, be it for the duration of negotiations or “for the duration of the Olympic Games.”

General segment

In addition, it must be said about what unites the “two Chechens”. This is a Chechen criminal community that has long been collecting tribute from the Russian economy. It seems that the time has come when it is necessary to destroy this community by any means and make Chechen criminal groups a part of history - from Kaliningrad to Nakhodka (and above all, in Moscow). And considering how high the Chechen crime bosses “stand,” this decision should be made at the political level, and not at the level of some police department or even the Main Internal Affairs Directorate (especially since, together with the Chechen organized crime groups, they must be cleaned out - or “covered up” , if they performed special tasks - those ranks in law enforcement agencies who are directly or indirectly connected with the Chechen criminal community).

Western recipe for the West

To create a “picture for export” of the situation in Chechnya, Western templates must be used . For example, Henry Kissinger in his “testament” to the current Republican administration - “Does America need a foreign policy?” (M., 2002) - conducts an interesting analysis of the situation in Colombia and, in particular, the guerrilla war that has been waged against the legitimate government by radical Marxist groups supported by drug cartels for several decades. Let me quote:

“The result is that Colombia is caught in the classic dilemma of a country engulfed in guerrilla warfare. There is no point in fighting for guerrillas unless they are confident that the force is on their side, especially when they have to operate outside their safe territory. And they have no reason to win battles; their goal is to inflict damage that ultimately weakens the government and shakes the basis of political agreements. Guerrillas usually win when they do not lose, and conversely, the government loses when it does not win, that is, does not destroy the partisans" ( pp. 86-87).

Mr. Kissinger’s conclusions are very revealing: “In historical retrospect, guerrilla wars <...> always ended either in the complete victory of one of the parties, or in the complete exhaustion of both. Negotiations between the warring parties almost never ended in compromise, although negotiations remain the favorite recipe of North American advisers insisting on a "political" solution to problems. They did not succeed in Colombia either" (p. 87).

From the above words it is clear that the famous diplomat is quite sane when it comes to issues of fighting partisans in the “world of democracies” in the Western Hemisphere. So why haven't Russian journalists done a big interview with him yet, in which Mr. Kissinger explained how Chechen militants differ from Colombian guerrillas? If a respected theorist proves that Chechens and Colombians are “two big differences,” then we will have an excellent opportunity to once again study the split consciousness of a Western politician, which occurs in him whenever it comes to Russia. Well, if Kissinger says that there is no difference between them, then this interview should be translated into major European languages ​​and paid for their publication in leading American and European newspapers.

Transnationalization

was the first to speak about this idea of ​​the Americans - as a possible one It seems that Alexey Pushkov . Washington, in his opinion, may try to turn the “Chechen conflict” into an object of international attention and is even ready to consider the possibility of its mediation between Moscow and Chechen militants. Since American mediation is obviously not needed even in the form of an intellectual game, let them confine themselves to their advisors in Georgia.

However, we can again use Henry Kissinger to cool the ardor of the “American crusaders,” who writes about the “fatal inertia” of the United States, which first led them to a stalemate and then to complete disappointment in Vietnam (ibid., p. 89). This inertia took America from the presence of military advisers and supplies of military equipment to becoming involved in hostilities and subsequent defeat. One reminder about Vietnam will be enough for Washington to forget about any mediation in the Chechen conflict, which, whatever one may say, is interference in the internal affairs of Russia.

So the only thing that Western partners in the counterterrorism coalition are hindering us and can hinder us in the future is their desire to sit us down at the negotiating table with representatives of the “other Chechnya,” which amounts to a second Khasavyurt and is completely unacceptable. Therefore, we must work to re-educate Western “public opinion”, including, perhaps, by introducing a “picture” in which the two Chechens are clearly separated .