Colin Powell. Evidence of guilt

Evidence of guilt
Text of the report at the open session of the UN Security Council on the situation in Iraq

Colin Powell

Publication date: February 6, 2003

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Secretary General, dear colleagues; I would like to begin my report by expressing gratitude for the special effort that each of you had to make to be in this room today. This is an important day for all of us in terms of the development of the situation in Iraq in connection with its disarmament obligations under UN Security Council Resolution #1441.

On November 8th last year, the Council voted unanimously to adopt Resolution 1441. The purpose of this resolution was to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction. Iraq has already been found guilty of violating its obligations by failing to implement sixteen previous resolutions over a twelve-year period.

Resolution 1441 did not apply to an innocent party, but to a regime that had been repeatedly condemned by the Council over the years. Resolution 1441 gave Iraq one last chance - a last chance to either comply or accept serious consequences. None of the Security Council members present at the vote were under any illusions about the content and intent of the Resolution, or about the consequences Iraq would face if it did not comply.

And so, to help Iraq disarm, we called on it to cooperate with returning inspectors from UNMOVIC and IAEA. We have made firm demands on how Iraq should receive the inspectors and ensure their work.

This Council placed the responsibility on Iraq to comply with the requirements of the resolution and disarm, and not on the inspectors to look for what Iraq has been hiding from them for so many years. Inspectors are just inspectors; they are not detectives.

I asked for today's session with two purposes in mind. First, to support the conclusions reached by Dr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei. As Dr. Blix reported to this Council on January 27th, "It appears that Iraq, up to this day, has not made the sincere decision to disarmament that has been demanded of it."

And as Dr. ElBaradei said, the Iraqi Declaration of December 7 "contained no new information relevant to the specific issues that have been raised since 1998."

The second purpose of my statement today is to provide you with additional information, to share with you what the United States knows about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, as well as Iraq's involvement in terrorism, which was discussed in both resolution 1441 and other adopted earlier resolutions.

I would like to add on this point that we provide all the relevant information we can to the inspection team so that they can do their job successfully.

The materials that I will now present to you are obtained from various sources. Some information was obtained by the United States, some by other countries. Some sources are technical in nature: interceptions of telephone conversations and photographs obtained from satellites. Other sources were people who risked their lives to make the world aware of Saddam Hussein's true intentions.

I can't tell you everything we know. But what I can share with you, coupled with what we have all learned over the years, is deeply troubling. You will be presented with the quintessence of facts and disturbing patterns of Iraqi behavior. The facts show this: Iraq's actions demonstrate that Saddam Hussein and his regime made not the slightest attempt - not the slightest! - disarm at the request of the world community. In fact, the facts and actions of Iraq show that Saddam Hussein and his regime are hiding their attempts to produce as many weapons of mass destruction as possible.

Let me start by listening to the tape. What you will hear is a conversation intercepted by my government. It took place on November 26 last year, the day before a team of UN inspectors resumed their work in Iraq. This is a conversation between two high-ranking officers, a colonel and a brigadier general from Iraq's elite military unit, the Republican Guard.

Let me pause the listening and draw your attention to the key elements of the conversation between these two officers that you just listened to. Firstly, they know that our colleague Mohamed ElBaradei is coming, and they know why he is coming, and they know that he is coming the next day. He comes to see things the production of which is prohibited. He expects these gentlemen to cooperate with him, not hide from him what he is looking for.

But they are worried. "We have it in a modified form. What will we say if they see it?" What was it that bothered them so much? They were concerned that they had something in their possession that they should not have, something that no one should see.

The general expresses doubt: “You didn’t receive a modified one. You don’t have one, do you?” - “I have one thing.” - “Which one, where from?” - "From the workshop." - "From Al Candy's company?" - “Yes, from Al Kendi’s company.” - “I’ll come to you tomorrow morning. I’m worried. You all have something left.” “We evacuated everything. We have nothing left.”

Notice that he says, "We evacuated everything." He doesn't say, "We destroyed everything." He does not say, “We have everything lined up for inspection,” or, “We have everything lined up to show the inspectors.” No, he says: “We evacuated everything so that when the inspectors showed up, they wouldn’t be able to find anything.” To this end, “I will come to you tomorrow morning.”

Now about the Al-Kendi company. This company is reliably known to have taken part in the production of prohibited weapons.

Let me play another tape for you to listen to. As you may recall, inspectors found 12 empty chemical warheads on January 16th. And on January 20, four days later, Iraq promised inspectors to help find the remaining warheads. You will now hear an officer from the Republican Guard headquarters giving orders to a field officer. This conversation happened last week.

Let me pause again and review some elements of this order. "They're inspecting the equipment you have, right?" - "So". - “Is there a possibility that they will find something forbidden?” - "They may find something by chance." - “But yesterday we sent you a written order to clean out the entire square. Every piece of the square, including the previously abandoned areas. Make sure that there is nothing there.”

Remember the first conversation about evacuation. All this is part of a system of hiding things, a system of taking things away from the path of inspectors so that they do not find anything.

If you follow the conversation further, you will hear specific instructions coming from headquarters: “When you have completed everything contained in the written order, destroy it, because I do not want anyone to see this order.” - "Good good".

Why is it necessary to destroy the order? Why? Because it would serve as evidence for the inspectors of distortion of the facts. They are supposedly helping to search for prohibited weapons, but they do not want the order to come to the attention of the inspectors, because they are trying to clear the inspected area of ​​all traces of weapons of mass destruction there. So that they could later claim that there was nothing there. Inspectors can inspect this area as much as they like: they still won’t find anything there.

This attempt to hide loose ends and hide what is being sought from inspectors is not one or two isolated cases; just the opposite. This is part and evidence of a policy of cover-up and lies that has been carried out for twelve years, a policy developed in the highest circles of the leadership of the Iraqi regime.

We know that Saddam Hussein established what is called a "high committee for monitoring the group of inspectors." Think about it. Iraq is creating a high-level committee to monitor the inspectors sent to monitor Iraqi disarmament. This committee is not created to cooperate with the inspectors, but to spy on them and prevent them from doing their work.

The committee reports directly to Saddam Hussein. It is headed by Iraqi Vice President Taha Yassin Ramadan. Its members include Saddam Hussein's son Qusay. This committee also includes Lieutenant General Amir Al-Saadi, Saddam's adviser. In case that name doesn't immediately come to mind, General Saadi was the Iraqi regime's chief point of contact for Dr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei. It was General Saadi who publicly stated last fall that Iraq was ready to unconditionally cooperate with the inspectors. But we are convinced that the opposite is the case: Saadi's job is not to cooperate, but to conceal; not to disarm, but to mislead the inspectors; not to help them, but to ensure that they do not find out about anything.

We have learned a lot about the work of this special committee. We learned that even before the inspectors returned to Iraq, last November, the regime decided to resume what we heard called "the old game of cat and mouse."

Let me focus, as an example, on the now famous declaration that Iraq presented to this Council on December 7th. It shows that Iraq never had the slightest intention of submitting to the mandate of this Council. Instead, Iraq planned to use the declaration to blindside us all and overwhelm inspectors with a mass of completely useless information about the presence of authorized weapons in Iraq - so that we would have no time to obtain information about prohibited weapons. Iraq's goal was to give us gathered in this room, we members of the Council, the false impression that the inspection process was going smoothly. You see the result. Dr. Blix said the 12,200-page declaration, while verbose, was information-poor and contained virtually no new information.

Can any member of the Council speak honestly in support of this declaration?

Everything we have seen and heard indicates that, rather than actively cooperating with the inspectors to ensure the success of their mission, Saddam Hussein and his regime are doing everything possible to ensure that the inspectors find absolutely nothing.

Colleagues, every statement I made today is based on sources, serious sources. These are not unfounded allegations. We give you facts and conclusions based on reliable intelligence. I will give examples of some information received from people, our informants.

Iraqi security services and Saddam Hussein's own office were ordered to hide all correspondence with the Organization for Military Industrialization. This is the organization that oversees Iraq's activities in the production and storage of weapons of mass destruction. Rest assured that we will not find any documents that would allow us to trace this organization.

We know that Saddam's son Qusay ordered the removal of all prohibited weapons from Saddam's many palace complexes. We know that Iraqi government officials, members of the ruling Baath Party and scholars have hidden prohibited items in their homes. Files with key information about military and scientific developments were placed on vehicles that move around the country at the direction of Iraqi intelligence services in order to avoid detection.

Thanks to intelligence received, inspectors recently discovered dramatic confirmation of this information. When they searched the home of an Iraqi nuclear energy scientist, they found approximately 2,000 pages of documents. You see them now in front of you: they were seized from a private home and handed over to the UN. Some of this material has been determined to be related to Iraq's nuclear weapons program.

Tell me, answer me, should inspectors search the homes of every Iraqi government official, every member of the Baath Party and every scientist in the country to find out the truth, to obtain the necessary information, to fulfill the demands of our Council?

Our sources indicate that in some cases computer hard drives containing information about Iraqi weapons were seized. Who took these hard drives? Where did they go? What was hidden? Why? There is only one answer to all these questions: to deceive the inspectors, to hide information from them.

Numerous informants tell us that the Iraqis are moving not only documents and hard drives, but also weapons of mass destruction to prevent them from being found by inspectors.

When we discussed Resolution #1441 in this room last fall, we knew from reliable sources that the missile brigade in the vicinity of Baghdad was dismantling and distributing missile launchers and warheads containing biological weapons reagents to various locations, mainly in Western Iraq. Most of the missile launchers and warheads were hidden in large palm groves, where they were constantly moved so that they were not stored in one place for more than 1-4 weeks, making them harder to find.

We also have satellite photographs showing that prohibited materials have recently been removed from the warehouses of a number of Iraqi facilities capable of producing weapons of mass destruction. Let me say a few words about satellite imagery before I show you some of these images. The photographs I am about to show you are sometimes difficult to interpret unless you are an expert; they are difficult for me too. These photographs are deciphered by meticulous specialists with extensive experience; this work requires a lot of time spent at tables with lighting equipment, and the exertion of all the forces of these specialists. In showing you these photographs, I will try to explain what they mean, using the work of our satellite photography experts.

Let's look at the first picture. Shown here is a military factory with weapons production facilities located in a place called Taji. It is one of about 65 such plants in Iraq. We know that this plant specializes in the production of shells for the delivery of chemical weapons. In fact, this is where the Iraqis produced four of these additional capsules.

Here you see fifteen bunkers with military ammunition, they are outlined in yellow and red lines. The four circled in red squares are the active chemical silos.

How do I know this? Why can I say this? Let me explain. Look at the image on the left. On the left is an enlarged fragment showing one of the four chemical bunkers. Two arrows indicate the presence of clear signs that chemical weapons are being stored in the bunkers. The arrow at the top points to the security checkpoint that is always placed in front of these types of bunkers. Inside the bunker there is special security and special equipment to monitor any leakage that may occur from the bunker.

The truck you see nearby is also a telltale sign. This is a decontamination vehicle in case of any malfunction.

These features are common to all four bunkers. Special safety equipment and a decontamination vehicle, which is not necessarily present near each bunker, but is always nearby in order to approach each of the bunkers if necessary, since people work in different bunkers.

Now look at the photo on the right. You can see two of these decontaminated bunkers. The vehicle left, the awnings were removed, and the facility was dismantled on December 22, before the arrival of a group of inspectors. And you see the inspectors’ cars arriving below, in the photo on the right.

The bunkers were clear by the time inspectors arrived. The inspectors found nothing.

This sequence of events raises troubling suspicions that Iraq was somehow notified of the inspectors' impending arrival in Taji. As the experience of the 1990s shows, Iraq continues to actively use its powerful intelligence resources to conceal its illegal activities.

Our sources know that the inspectors are under constant surveillance by an army of Iraqi intelligence operatives. Iraq tirelessly attempts to record all their correspondence and negotiations, both oral and electronic.

I would like to draw the attention of my colleagues to the exceptional importance of the document circulated yesterday by England; it describes in detail the means the Iraqis resort to to deceive.

Next example. You will see a pattern of cover-up actions by Iraq that were taken in response to the return of the inspectors. It must be said that in November 2002, when the inspectors were ready to return, this type of activity came to naught. I will give three examples.

At this site, equipped for the launch of a ballistic missile (this takes place on November 10), we see a truck preparing to take away the components of a ballistic missile. At this biological weapons plant (photo taken on November 25, just two days before the inspectors returned), this caravan of trucks appeared; We have never seen anything like this before at this enterprise, and we monitored it regularly and carefully.

But at this ballistic missile production facility - again two days before inspections resumed - five large trucks appeared, accompanied by a crane to move the missile launchers. We have seen this kind of “washing dirty linen in public” at about thirty sites.

A few days after the action was taken, the vehicles and equipment we had just seen disappeared without a trace, and these enterprises became examples of “clean”, normal production. We don't know exactly what was taken from these enterprises, but the inspectors knew about them in advance, so Iraq knew that they were coming there.

We must ask ourselves: Why did Iraq suddenly decide to move this kind of equipment just before the inspectors arrived, if it is so eager to demonstrate what it actually has and doesn't have?

Consider the first example, an audio recording of two Iraqi officers talking about the need to hide a modified weapon from inspectors. Where did Iraq get all this equipment? Why was it not presented to the inspectors?

Iraq also refused to allow familiarization flights of the U-2 aircraft, which could have given inspectors a better idea of ​​what was carried before, during and after inspections.

Refusal to allow flights intended to facilitate the work of inspectors is a direct violation of paragraph seven of our Resolution 1441.

Saddam Hussein and his regime are not only trying to hide weapons, they are also trying to hide people. You know the basic facts. Iraq is not complying with its obligations to allow immediate, unimpeded, unrestricted personal access to all officials and other persons, as required by Resolution 1441.

The regime only allows conversations with inspectors in the presence of Iraqi officials, the “supervisors.” The official Iraqi organization, called upon to provide all possible assistance to the inspectors, without a shadow of embarrassment announces publicly: “No one will leave Iraq to conduct a conversation with UN representatives.”

Iraqi Vice President Ramadan accused the inspectors of espionage; this is nothing more than an unambiguous threat: those Iraqis who dare to cooperate with UN inspectors will be charged with treason.

Iraq has not fulfilled its obligations under Resolution 1441 to provide a complete list of scientists working on projects to develop and produce weapons of mass destruction. The list provided by Iraq is outdated and contains only about 500 names, despite the fact that the United Nations Security Council Commission (UNSCOM) previously compiled a list containing about 3,500 names.

Let me tell you what we learned from the whistleblowers. Saddam Hussein was directly involved in efforts to prevent conversations with scientists. In early December, Saddam Hussein warned all Iraqi scientists of the serious consequences they and their families would face if they provided important information to inspectors. Scientists were forced to sign documents according to which being caught disclosing information would be tantamount to a death sentence.

Saddam Hussein also said that scientists should not agree to leave Iraq; anyone who agrees to talk outside Iraq will be considered a spy. This is a direct violation of Resolution 1441.

In mid-November, just before the inspectors returned, Iraqi experts were ordered to report to intelligence offices for emergency "counterintelligence" training. This training included techniques for withholding information, avoiding answering direct questions, defensive conversational techniques - in a word, things that make it possible to mislead inspectors.

Ladies and gentlemen, these are not unfounded allegations. These are facts obtained from many sources, including √ from the intelligence services of other countries.

For example, in mid-December, weapons experts at one plant were replaced by Iraqi intelligence officers whose goal was to mislead inspectors about what the plant was actually producing.

On Saddam Hussein's orders, Iraqi authorities imposed the unlawful death sentence on a scientist and put him behind bars.

In mid-January, experts at one of the Iraqi enterprises involved in the production of weapons of mass destruction were ordered to stay home and not go to work in order to avoid meeting with inspectors. Workers from other Iraqi military plants not directly associated with weapons programs were sent to the weapons plant to replace workers there who were ordered to stay home. More than ten experts were put under house arrest, and not in their homes - they were gathered together in one of Saddam Hussein's "guest houses". Similar cases can be listed for a very long time.

As the examples I have just cited, as well as other extensive information and intelligence, show, the Iraqi regime is making active and systematic efforts to hide key information and the people who carry it from inspectors; all of this is a direct violation of Resolution 1441. This is not a matter of reluctant cooperation or even non-cooperation. What we are seeing is a deliberate campaign to disrupt any meaningful work by the inspectorate.

Colleagues, paragraph four of UN Resolution #1441, which we worked on for so long last fall, clearly declares that the false statements and false data in the declaration, as well as Iraq's refusal at any time to comply with the requirements of the Resolution and to make every effort to fully implement this Resolution, will be considered - and the facts speak for themselves - will be considered a direct violation of Iraq's obligations.

We have worded this paragraph in such an unequivocal manner as to subject Iraq to a preliminary test - yes, to subject Iraq to a preliminary test. Will he provide a truthful declaration and thereby show good will to cooperate with the inspectors from the very beginning? This was a preliminary check.

They failed this test. According to the precise meaning of this paragraph, Iraq continues to this day to flagrantly violate its obligations. I believe that this conclusion is undeniable and irrefutable.

In doing so, Iraq exposes itself to the gravest consequences of its actions as contemplated by UN Resolution 1441. And the UN itself faces the risk of inadequacy if it allows Iraq to continue to challenge its will without effective and immediate resistance.

The challenge before us is not how long we are going to keep our inspectors in Iraq and let Saddam lead them by the nose. We must answer another question: How much longer are we willing to tolerate Iraq's refusal to comply with our demands? When, finally, we, the Security Council, we, the United Nations, say: "Enough! Enough!"

The gravity of this moment stems from the gravity of the threat that Iraq's weapons of mass destruction pose to the world. Let me now turn to these lethal weapons programs and explain why they pose a real and present danger to the region and to the world.

First of all, it should be said about biological weapons. We have spoken here many times about biological weapons. It seems to me that I should, by way of historical introduction, briefly address three points.

First, you will remember, of course, that it took the UN Security Council Commission four long and difficult years to wrest - literally wrest - from Iraq an admission that it had biological weapons.

Secondly, when Iraq finally admitted in 1995 that it had these weapons, the quantity was enormous. Meanwhile, half a teaspoon of anthrax, such a tiny amount, sent in an envelope (it was a tiny handful) was enough to disrupt the work of the United States Senate in the fall of 2001. This episode resulted in several hundred people being forced to undergo emergency treatment and caused the death of two postal workers - and we were dealing with a relatively insignificant amount of substance that fit in one thin envelope.

Meanwhile, Iraq, according to its own declaration, had 8,500 liters of anthrax, but the Commission estimates that Saddam Hussein may have produced 25,000 liters of the drug. If this amount of substance were converted into a dry powder state, it would be enough to fill a thousand teaspoons times ten, times ten, and times ten. At the same time, Saddam Hussein did not provide evidence of the destruction of even one teaspoon of this deadly substance.

From here it is natural to move on to the third point of my theses. And it is key in this context. Iraq has never accounted for all the biological weapons it has, by its own admission and by our absolute best knowledge. It never accounted for all the organic materials used in its production. And he did not account for the huge number of shells filled with these reagents, of which 400 bombs are known. This is irrefutable evidence, not speculation. This is true. It's well documented.

Dr. Blix reported to this Council that Iraq had provided inconclusive evidence of the number of anthrax agents produced and equally inconclusive evidence of their destruction. And in this light, it should not surprise us that since Saddam kicked out the last inspectors in 1998, we have collected a huge amount of intelligence indicating that Iraq continues to produce these weapons.

One of the most alarming facts emerging from the analysis of operational data on biological weapons that Iraq possesses is the presence of mobile mobile biological reagent production stations.

Let me take you through some intelligence and share with you what we've learned from eyewitness testimony. We have a first-hand account of biological weapons factories on wheels and on rails.

Light-moving trucks and railroad cars are designed to evade inspectors. In a matter of months, they are capable of producing a quantity of biological weapons equal to the entire quantity that Iraq admitted to having in the years leading up to the Gulf War.

Although Iraq's mobile station program began in the mid-1990s, UN inspectors had little understanding of such programs at the time. Confirmation was received much later, in 2000.

We have testimony from a source who was a direct witness - an Iraqi chemical engineer who oversaw one of these mobile stations. He was present during the very process of producing biological reagents. He was also on site when the leak occurred in 1998. As a result, twelve technicians died from infection with biological reagents.

He reported that when the Commission visited the country and carried out inspections, the production of biological reagents had already begun; it was carried out every Thursday evening because the Iraqis believed that inspectors would not carry out inspections during the Muslim holy time, on the night from Thursday to Friday. He added that this was important because the process could not be interrupted at any time, and by Friday evening it was completed - before inspectors could arrive.

Our informant is hiding in another country, knowing full well that Saddam Hussein will kill him if he finds him. His testimony about mobile stations was confirmed by other sources.

Another informant, an Iraqi civil engineer in a position that allowed him to know the program in detail, confirmed the existence of a system of mobile stations mounted on road trailers.

A third informant in a similar position reported that in the summer of 2002, Iraq produced a system of mobile stations mounted on both road trailers and railroad cars.

Finally, a fourth informant, an Iraqi major, confirmed that Iraq has mobile biological research laboratories, in addition to the mobile production facilities already mentioned.

We have a chart that visually summarizes the testimony of all the witnesses about these mobile stations. The description given by our informants gives us the technical characteristics of these objects, very detailed and carefully verified. As these diagrams show based on the above readings, we know what these fermentation tanks look like, we know what the tanks and pumps and all that stuff look like. We know how these installations work. And we know a lot about the platforms on which they are installed.

As this diagram shows, these production stations can easily be hidden, disguised as a regular truck or train car, and scattered throughout Iraq, hundreds of kilometers from main roads; they can be parked in regular garages or barns, or in Iraq's extensive system of underground tunnels and bunkers.

We know that Iraq has at least seven of these mobile biological reagent production stations. Truck-mounted stations consist of at least two or three trucks. This means that the production capacity of mobile stations is very small - there are maybe 18 such trucks, and we know about them. But just imagine having to find 18 trucks among the thousands and thousands of similar vehicles that ply the roads of Iraq every day.

It took inspectors four years to prove that Iraq was producing biological agents. How long do you think it will take inspectors to locate even one of these 18 trucks if Iraq itself, as it should have done, does not provide us with information about these mobile stations?

Ladies and gentlemen, this is complex equipment. For example, they can produce anthrax and botulism spores. In fact, they can produce enough dry matter in one month to kill many thousands of people. And this type of dry substance is the most deadly for people.

By 1998, UN experts concluded that the Iraqis had perfected drying technologies for their biological weapons program. Now Iraq is using this drying knowledge to create equipment for mobile production.

We know from past admissions by Iraqi leaders that Iraq has successfully developed weapons using anthrax spores, as well as other biological agents, including botulism spores, aflatoxin and ricin.

The exploration of Iraq did not end there. Saddam Hussein organized research into dozens of biological substances that cause diseases such as gas gangrene, plague, typhus, tetanus, cholera, smallpox and hemorrhagic fever. He also has the necessary means to produce a deadly strain of smallpox.

The Iraqi regime has developed methods for the widespread and targeted distribution of lethal biological agents in water supplies and in the air. Thus, Iraq carried out a program to modify air fuel tanks for Mirage-class fighters. This video of an Iraqi Air Force training flight obtained several years ago by the UN Special Commission shows an Iraqi Mirage F-1 jet. Notice that it sprays 2,000 liters of liquid that simulates anthrax spores.

In 1995, Iraqi officer Mujahid Sali Abdul Latif told inspectors that Iraq intended to install poison spray tanks on a MIG-21 aircraft, converting it into an unmanned aerial vehicle, or UAV. UAVs equipped with tanks for spraying poisons are an ideal means for a terrorist attack using biological weapons.

Iraq has admitted to producing four of these tanks. So far, no convincing evidence has been provided that they were destroyed, as demanded by the international community.

There is no doubt that Saddam Hussein has biological weapons and can quickly produce new ones on a larger scale. Moreover, Iraq is capable of spreading these deadly poisons and diseases in ways that can cause massive loss of life. If the thought of biological weapons is terrifying, then thinking about chemical weapons makes your blood run cold.

The UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission has already published most of this material; we can all read them in the 1999 UNSCOM Report on this topic.

Let me draw your attention to three key points that we all need to remember: First, Saddam Hussein has already tested this terrible weapon on another country and on his own people. In fact, in the history of chemical weapons, no country has had more combat experience with chemical weapons since World War I than Saddam Hussein's Iraq.

Second, as with biological weapons, Saddam Hussein never accounted for the enormous quantity of chemical munitions: 550 artillery shells filled with mustard gas; 30,000 empty warheads and enough capacity to increase stockpiles of toxic chemicals to 500 tons. If we take into account only one category of weapons - the 6,500 bombs left over from the Iran-Iraq War - then, according to UNMOVIC, they must contain at least 1,000 tons of chemicals. We have not received a report on the destruction of these chemical weapons.

Dr. Blix quipped, "Sulfur mustard is not something ephemeral. You have to know what you did with it."

We are confident that Saddam Hussein knows what he did to him and he has not told the whole truth to the international community. We have evidence that these weapons existed. But we have not received convincing evidence from Iraq that these weapons were destroyed. We don't know where it is. We are still waiting for recognition from Iraq.

Third, Iraq has repeatedly concealed the fact that it has chemical weapons. It took years to get Iraq to admit to producing four tons of the deadly VX nerve gas. One drop of this substance on the skin kills a person in a matter of minutes, and Iraq has four tons of it!

The confession came only after inspectors collected documentation, thanks to the defection of Saddam's late son-in-law Hussein Kamal. UNSCOM also obtained legal evidence that Iraq produced VX and filled warheads with the substance.

However, Iraq still denies having fielded the VX. On 27 January, UNMOVIC advised the Security Council that it had information that contradicted Iraq's description of its VX program.

We know that Iraq has introduced key elements of the infrastructure needed to produce illicit chemical weapons into legitimate civilian industry. Apparently, even to experts, this infrastructure appears to be ordinary civilian production. Legal and illegal production can operate simultaneously, or this dual-use infrastructure can quickly switch from clandestine to commercial production and vice versa.

This is a chemical weapon.

For example, Iraq rebuilt key elements of the Tariq government institution. The facility contains equipment specific to Iraq's chemical weapons program and employs key individuals involved in previous programs.

This is the production part of Saddam's chemical weapons program. What about delivery vehicles?

I want to show you just a small part of the chemical complex called al-Mussaid, a site that Iraq has used for at least three years to ship chemical munitions and transport them from production facilities to field installations.

In May 2002, our satellites photographed the unusual activity you see in this photo. Here we see a cargo transport that has once again arrived at this shipping terminal, and we see that the convoy is accompanied by a decontamination vehicle, which is used in biological or chemical weapons operations.

Just a few weeks ago, we intercepted a conversation between two commanders from the Second Corps of the Iraqi Republican Guard. One commander instructs another. You will clearly hear on the tape what he wants to say to his comrade. He wants him to hear and understand him well, so he repeats each phrase twice. This allowed his words to be recorded and fully understood. Listen.

Let's analyze some selected parts of this conversation. Two officers talk to each other over the radio and try to pronounce each phrase clearly and distinctly to avoid misunderstandings.

"Delete. Delete the phrase."

"The phrase, I understand."

"Nerve agents. Nerve agents. Whenever that phrase is used."

"It's clear".

"Wherever it is found."

"In instructions, instructions transmitted wirelessly."

"Wireless. I got it."

Why does he repeat everything twice? Why is he trying so hard to get his point across so that he is understood correctly? And why did he emphasize instructions transmitted wirelessly? Because the senior officer is worried that he might be overheard.

He really was being overheard.

"Nerve agents. Stop talking about it. We're being overheard. Don't give evidence that we have these scary substances."

But we know they have them. And this conversation once again confirms this. According to our conservative estimate, Iraq today has between 100 and 500 tons of chemical weapons. This is enough to fill 16,000 combat missiles.

Even with 100 tons of such substances, Saddam Hussein could destroy all life in an area of ​​more than 100 square miles, which is five times the size of Manhattan.

Let me remind you that the 122mm chemical warheads recently discovered by UN inspectors may be just the tip of the iceberg, as has already been noted. The question before us, dear friends, is: when will we see the rest of the iceberg hidden from our eyes?

Saddam Hussein has chemical weapons. Saddam Hussein used these weapons. And he, without the slightest remorse, will again use it against neighboring countries and his people.

Our sources informed us that he recently authorized his field commanders to use it. He would not have given such orders if he did not have these weapons or did not intend to use them.

The same source said that 1,600 prisoners sentenced to death were transferred in 1995 to a special unit designed for such experiments. An eyewitness saw prisoners being tied to their beds so that experiments could be carried out on them. There was blood coming from their mouths. Autopsies were then performed to confirm the prisoners' exposure to toxic substances. Saddam Hussein's inhumanity knows no bounds.

Let me now turn to nuclear weapons. We have no indication that Saddam Hussein has abandoned his nuclear program. On the contrary, we have had evidence for more than a decade that he remains determined to acquire nuclear weapons.

To fully appreciate the challenge facing us today, remember that in 1991, inspectors first examined primary nuclear weapons production facilities in Iraq and found no evidence that Iraq was pursuing a nuclear weapons program.

But with the help of information received from a deserter in May 1991, Saddam Hussein's lies were exposed. In reality, Saddam Hussein had a massive and highly classified nuclear weapons program that involved several different methods of uranium enrichment, including electromagnetic isotope separation, gas centrifuge, and gaseous diffusion. We estimate that this illegal program has cost Iraq several billion dollars.

However, Iraq has insisted to the IAEA that it does not have a nuclear weapons program. If Saddam had not been stopped then, Iraq could have produced an atomic bomb by 1993, many years earlier than the worst-case scenarios made before the war began.

In 1995, thanks to another defector, we learned that after the invasion of Kuwait, Saddam Hussein had begun an intensified program to build nuclear weapons using makeshift methods, in violation of his UN commitments.

Saddam Hussein already possesses two of the three key components needed to build an atomic bomb. He has competent nuclear scientists and plans to build a bomb.

Since 1998, his efforts to revive the nuclear program have focused on acquiring the third and final component: enough nuclear fuel to produce an atomic explosion. To make nuclear fuel, he needs to learn how to enrich uranium.

Saddam Hussein is determined to gain access to the atomic bomb. His intentions are so obvious that he has made repeated secret attempts to purchase high-strength aluminum pipes in 11 countries, even after inspections resumed.

These pipes are controlled by the Nuclear Suppliers Group precisely because they can be used as centrifuges for uranium enrichment. Nowadays, almost everyone has heard about these pipes and we all know that there are different opinions on this matter. There is controversy over what these pipes are intended for.

Most US experts believe that they were intended to be used as rotors in uranium enrichment centrifuges. Other experts and the Iraqis themselves argue that they are actually intended to produce missile casings for conventional weapons, particularly missile launchers.

Let me tell you something that no one doubts. First, all the experts who have studied the tubes at our disposal agree that they can be adapted for use in centrifuges. Secondly, Iraq has no right to buy them for any purpose. He is forbidden to do this.

I'm no expert on centrifuge tubes, but as an old warrior, I can tell you this: First, it seems very strange to me that these tubes are manufactured to a tolerance that significantly exceeds American requirements for comparable missiles. Perhaps the Iraqis are simply seeking to produce conventional weapons to a higher standard, but I don't think so.

Secondly, we examined pipes from several different batches. They were secretly intercepted before they were taken to Baghdad. What is noteworthy is that across these different batches there is a noticeable trend towards increased coating strength. In the latest batch of pipes, an anodized coating is applied to the extremely smooth internal and external surfaces. Why would they strive to improve the strength of the coating if these pipes are designed for conventional missiles, which one way or another explode and break into many fragments?

High tolerance aluminum pipes aren't everything. Intelligence from multiple sources indicates that Iraq is attempting to acquire magnets and high-speed balancing machines; both could be used in a gas centrifuge program to enrich uranium.

In 1999 and 2000 Iraqi officials were negotiating with firms from Romania, India, Russia and Slovenia to purchase a magnet production plant. Iraq sought to obtain a plant for the production of magnets weighing from 20 to 30 grams. Magnets of this exact weight were used in Iraq's gas centrifuge program before the Gulf War. The pipe incident is another sign that Iraq is trying to rebuild its nuclear weapons program.

Intercepted communications from mid-2000 to last summer indicate that advanced Iraqi companies were trying to purchase machines that could be used to balance gas centrifuge rotors. One of these companies also made a failed attempt in 2001 to smuggle aluminum pipes into Iraq.

This issue will continue to be debated, but I have no doubt that these attempts to illegally acquire strategic materials show that Saddam Hussein is working hard to add the missing element to the nuclear program - the ability to produce nuclear fuel. It is also committed to maintaining other key elements of its nuclear program, with particular concern for its staff of nuclear scientists.

It is noteworthy that over the past 18 months, Saddam Hussein has been personally paying increasing attention to Iraq's leading nuclear scientists, whom the government press openly calls his nuclear mujahideen. He regularly gives them instructions and praises them for their success. Success in achieving what goal?

The Security Council has long demanded that Iraq stop all nuclear development.

Now let me talk to you about the delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction being developed by Iraq, in particular about ballistic missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles, UAVs.

First about rockets. We all remember that before the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein's main goal was missiles capable of flying not just hundreds, but thousands of kilometers. He wanted to strike not only at his neighbors, but also at states far beyond his borders.

Although inspectors have eliminated most of the banned ballistic missiles, numerous intelligence reports over the past decade from sources inside Iraq indicate that Saddam Hussein retains a cloaked force of several dozen SCUD-type ballistic missiles. These missiles have a range of 650 to 900 kilometers.

We know from intelligence reports and Iraq's own admissions that the al-Samoud and al-Fatah ballistic missiles allegedly authorized by Iraq violate the 150-kilometer limit defined by the Security Council in Resolution 687. These are prohibited systems.

UNMOVIC also reported that Iraq is illegally retaining critical 380 SA-2 rocket engines. Most likely they are used for al-Thamud. Their importation was illegal in three respects. Resolution 687 prohibited any military supplies to Iraq. UNSCOM has banned the use of these particular engines in surface-to-surface missiles. And finally, as we just noted, they are designed for a system that exceeds the flight radius of 150 km.

What's worse is that some of these engines were purchased in December - after the Security Council adopted Resolution 1441.

I want you to know today that Iraq has programs to produce ballistic missiles that can fly 1000 km. One of the programs aims to create a liquid-fuel rocket that can fly over 1,200 kilometers. And on this map we can clearly see who these missiles will threaten.

Another small piece of evidence: As part of this program, Iraq built an engine test stand larger than anything it had previously had. Notice how much larger the new test bench is than the old test bench. The new one is on the right. Note the large exhaust valve. This is where the engine combustion products come out. The hood on the test bench on the right is five times longer than the hood on the left. The one on the left was used for short range missiles. The one on the right is quite obviously designed for long-range missiles that can fly 1,200 kilometers. This photo was taken in April 2002. The test facility has since been put under a roof, making it more difficult for satellites to see what's going on inside the test facility.

Saddam Hussein's intentions never changed. He is not developing missiles for self-defense. These are the missiles Iraq wants to have as a projection of force, to threaten neighboring countries and deliver chemical, biological and nuclear warheads if we let it.

Now about unmanned aerial vehicles, UAVs.

Iraq has been working on several types of UAVs for more than ten years. In this photo you can see what the UAV looks like. Among other things, attempts were made to modify the MIG-21 and turn it into a UAV. This was done with great success with the L-29 aircraft. However, Iraq's current focus is not on these aircraft, but on the development and testing of smaller UAVs such as this one. UAVs are well suited for spraying chemical and biological weapons.

There is strong evidence that Iraq is making great efforts to develop and test spray devices that can be adapted for UAVs. The meager information that Saddam Hussein provided about the UAVs he has does not give the true picture. His falsity was clearly and indisputably proven by the intelligence data we received on June 27 last year.

Iraq's declaration, filed on December 7, said its UAVs had a limited range of 80 km. But we discovered one of Iraq's newest UAVs during a test flight. He flew 500 km non-stop. on autopilot in a racetrack-type holding pattern shown in this photo.

This test not only goes well beyond the 150-kilometer radius permitted by the UN. Nothing was said about it in Iraq's Dec. 7 declaration. The UAV flew in circles for a long time. Therefore, the 80-kilometer limit in reality turned into 500 kilometers of non-stop flight on autopilot without refueling, which is a violation of all obligations under resolution 1441.

We are deeply alarmed by the possible links between Iraq's UAV program and biological and chemical warfare agents, which have become apparent more than once over the past 10 years. Iraq could use these small UAVs, which have a wingspan of only a few meters, to deliver biological agents to neighboring countries and, with adequate transportation facilities, to other countries, including the United States.

My friends, the information that I have presented to you about these terrible weapons and about Iraq's continued violation of its obligations under Security Council Resolution 1441 is related to the topic on which I now want to spend a little time. This has to do with terrorism.

We are concerned not just about these delivery vehicles, but also that these illegal weapons may be linked to terrorists and terrorist organizations who have no remorse in using such devices against innocent people around the world.

Iraq's history with terrorism goes back decades. Baghdad trains members of the Palestine Liberation Front in the use of small arms and explosives. Saddam uses the Arab Liberation Front to transfer money to the families of Palestinian suicide bombers to keep the Intifada going. And it is no secret that Saddam's own intelligence service was involved in dozens of such attacks or attempted assassinations in the 1990s.

But today I want to draw your attention to a more sinister connection between Iraq and the Al Qaeda terrorist network that could have far-reaching consequences. In this case, classic terrorist organizations are combined with modern methods of murder. Modern Iraq is home to the extremely dangerous terrorist network of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, an assistant and associate of Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda militants.

Zarqawi is a Palestinian born in Jordan. More than ten years ago he took part in the Afghan war. Returning to Afghanistan in 2000, he oversaw a terrorist training camp. This camp, in particular, specializes in the use of poisons. When our coalition drove out the Taliban, Zarqawi's network helped create another training center that teaches the use of poisons and explosives. And this camp is located in northeast Iraq.

Going back to the early to mid-nineties, when bin Laden was based in Sudan, an Al Qaeda source reports that Saddam and bin Laden reached an understanding that Al Qaeda would no longer support activities against Baghdad. From the outset, senior Iraqi intelligence officials maintained contacts and exchanged information with al-Qaeda.

We know that representatives of both organizations have met several times. Since the beginning of the nineties, we know of at least eight such meetings at the highest level. In 1996, foreign security officials told us that bin Laden had met with a senior Iraqi intelligence official in Khartoum and subsequently met with the director of the Iraqi intelligence agency.

Saddam began to take an increased interest in al-Qaeda after the organization carried out several horrific attacks. A detained Al Qaeda member told us that Saddam was more willing to help Al Qaeda after the bombing of our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. Saddam was also deeply impressed by the attacks on the American destroyer USS Cole in Yemen in October 2000.

Iraqis continued to visit bin Laden at his new compound in Afghanistan. A high-ranking former Iraqi intelligence agency Europe defector claims that Saddam sent agents to Afghanistan sometime in the mid-1990s to train al-Qaeda members in document forgery.

From the late nineties until 2001, the Iraqi Embassy in Pakistan served as liaison to the Al-Qaeda organization.

Some argue that these contacts will lead to nothing. They say the secular tyranny of Saddam Hussein can hardly be reconciled with the religious tyranny of Al Qaeda. This thought does not console me. Iraq has enough ambition and hatred to work closely with Al Qaeda. Enough of them to teach al-Qaeda how to make more sophisticated bombs and forge documents, enough for al-Qaeda to turn to Iraq for help in creating weapons of mass destruction.

Saddam Hussein's collaboration with other Islamist terrorist organizations is also beyond doubt. Thus, Hamas opened its representative office in Baghdad in 1999, and Iraq has repeatedly organized conferences on its territory, which were attended by representatives of Islamic Jihad from Palestine. These groups are the main sponsors of suicide bombers in Israel to kill civilians.

Al Qaeda remains extremely interested in acquiring weapons of mass destruction. As with Zarqawi and his network, I can analyze the account of a senior terrorist operative who described how Iraq trained Al Qaeda in the use of these weapons. I will now tell you about it in his words. This senior Al Qaeda terrorist ran one of the Al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan. The information is first-hand because this individual was personally involved in al-Qaeda activities at the highest level. He says bin Laden and his senior emissary in Afghanistan, the late al-Qaeda leader Muhammad Atif, did not believe al-Qaeda's Afghan laboratories were capable of producing these chemical or biological agents. They needed to find another place outside of Afghanistan where they could get the help they needed. Where did they direct their gaze? Who did they contact? They headed to Iraq.

Our informant also describes how two Al Qaeda operatives were trained to use chemical or biological weapons in Iraq in December 2000. He says the militant, known as Abu Abdul al-Iraqi, deployed to Iraq several times between 1997 and 2000. for the acquisition of poisons and toxic gases. Abdul al-Iraqi described the relationship with Iraqi officials as successful.

As I said at the very beginning, this should not surprise us. Saddam has resorted to terrorism for decades. He supported terrorism long before these terrorist networks became known. And he continues to support them. The connection between poisons and terror is something new, but the connection between Iraq and terror is as old as time. But this is a deadly combination.

In the presence of such irrefutable evidence, Iraq's denial of the facts of its support for terrorism, as well as its denial of the existence of a program to create weapons of mass destruction, is nothing more than one continuous web of lies.

When we deal with a regime that has plans to dominate the region, hides weapons of mass destruction, and provides shelter and support to terrorists, we are faced not with the past, but with the present. And if we don't take action, an even worse future awaits us.

My friends, I have presented you with the facts at length and in detail. And I thank you for your patience. But there is one more topic that I want to briefly touch on. This is Saddam Hussein's violation of human rights, which has always been a source of deep concern to the Security Council.

As I have already said, at the heart of all these facts and these stereotypes of behavior is Saddam Hussein's contempt for the will of this Council, his contempt for the truth and, most terrible of all, his complete contempt for human life. Saddam Hussein's use of mustard gas and nerve gas against the Kurds in 1988 was one of the worst atrocities of the 20th century; 5,000 men, women and children died then.

His campaign against the Kurds, carried out from 1987 to 1989, included mass executions, disappearances, arbitrary imprisonment, ethnic cleansing and the destruction of 2,000 settlements. He also carried out ethnic cleansing of Shia Iraqis and Arabs living in the March Lands, whose culture has flourished for more than a thousand years. Saddam Hussein's police state mercilessly deals with anyone who dares to disagree with his actions. Iraq has more cases of enforced disappearances than any other country. Over the past decade, tens of thousands of people have gone missing.

Nothing speaks more clearly to Saddam Hussein's dangerous intentions and the threat he poses to us all than his brutality against his own citizens and the citizens of neighboring countries. It is clear that Saddam Hussein and his regime will stop at nothing until something stops them.

For more than 20 years, in word and deed, Saddam Hussein pursued his vain ambitions to dominate Iraq and the wider Middle East through the only means he knew how: intimidation, coercion and the destruction of all who stood in his way. For Saddam, possession of the most lethal types of weapons is the main trump card with which he intends to carry out his intentions.

We know that Saddam Hussein is determined to keep his weapons of mass destruction and make new ones. Given Saddam Hussein's history of aggression, and what we know of his grand plans, his ties to terrorists, and his determination to take revenge on his opponents, should we take the risk of waiting for him to one day use it all? weapons at such a time, in such a place and in such a manner as he deems necessary? But he can do this at a time when our world will be weakened and will not be able to respond properly!

The United States is unable and unwilling to risk the lives of American citizens. After September 11, there is no question of allowing Saddam Hussein to have weapons of mass destruction at his disposal for a few more months or years.

My colleagues, about three months ago, our Council recognized that Iraq continues to pose a threat to international peace and security and that Iraq has violated and continues to violate its disarmament obligations. By not taking advantage of this last opportunity, Iraq has brought forward the day when it will be forced to face the gravest consequences of continued defiance of the will of the Security Council.

My colleagues, we have a commitment to our citizens, we have a commitment to our organization to ensure that all of our resolutions are implemented. We passed Resolution 1441 not to find a cause for war, but to preserve peace and give Iraq another chance. So far, Iraq has not taken advantage of this last chance.

We should not be afraid of what lies ahead. We must fulfill our duty to the citizens of those countries that are represented in this organization.

Thank you, Mr. President.