“Iran dossier” of Putin and Bush

Moscow has its own questions for Tehran

Yesterday, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov gave a rather sharp rebuke to Washington's attempts to accuse Moscow of facilitating Tehran's desire to obtain nuclear weapons. The confrontation around Iran “does not meet anyone’s interests, this will not happen, Russia opposes interference in the affairs of any state,” the minister said.

Mr. Ivanov’s last words were clearly spoken in polemical fervor, since the entire world agenda after the events of September 11, designated as the fight against international terrorism, is nothing more than this very “intervention.” In the “affairs” of precisely those countries from which the above-mentioned threat comes. Otherwise, for example, “interference in the internal affairs of Turkmenistan” can be called the recent statement by the Chairman of the State Duma Committee on International Affairs, Dmitry Rogozin, that he has evidence of support for the Taliban from Ashgabat on the eve of the anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan.

Another thing is that it is difficult to disagree with Mr. Ivanov when he is indignant at the “ultimatum form” in which the Americans make “unfounded accusations” against Iran and express “claims” against Russia. When White House press secretary Ari Fleischer says Iran "provides safe havens for al-Qaeda terrorists," he provides no concrete evidence. When the Americans suddenly announced the cessation of all private contacts with official Tehran, allegedly discovering that Iran was involved in the recent terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia, they also have not yet provided evidence of this. At least publicly.

As for the “nuclear” component of Washington’s “Iran dossier,” the documentary base here looks more solid. And in this case, Moscow is ready to take the Americans’ arguments more than seriously. The fact is that in February of this year, the head of the IAEA, Mohamed AlBaradei, and a group of experts inspected a number of nuclear facilities in Iran (a procedure mandatory for an IAEA member country). Among other things, Mr. AlBaradei was especially wary of a plant in the city of Natanz, equipped with modern centrifuges that can be used to obtain weapons-grade plutonium from enriched uranium.

Considering the already established fact that Iran purchased a batch of uranium hexofluoride (an intermediate product of uranium ore enrichment) from China in the mid-1990s, it cannot be ruled out that work was carried out in Natanz as part of a military nuclear program. On June 16, a report by experts will be presented at the IAEA Board of Governors, in which they should report whether signs of the presence of uranium were found in Iranian centrifuges. If the answer to this question turns out to be positive, then, as informed sources in the relevant Russian departments told the Vremya Novostey newspaper, Moscow may find itself in a delicate position. Then Russia will not be able to as confidently reject US suspicions that the cooperation between Moscow and Tehran in the development of the “peaceful atom” (the construction of a nuclear power plant in Bushehr) is not used by the Iranians for military purposes. Similar suspicions are raised by the heavy water production plant built by the Iranians in the city of Arak.

Iran, as a member of the IAEA, has the right to conduct scientific research in the nuclear field, but experts are wary that Tehran did not officially announce a uranium deal with China at one time, as is required in the case of acquiring nuclear materials from a country that is not a member of the IAEA (China joined the organization later).

Heeding the arguments of the United States, Russia not long ago warned Iran that it would refuse the supply of nuclear fuel planned for this year to launch the Bushehr nuclear power plant if Tehran does not sign an “additional protocol” with the IAEA. This protocol will provide IAEA inspectors with access to all nuclear facilities in the country, including those secret ones where true “nuclear power” can be concentrated. Iran is already concerned about Russia's delay in the Bushehr work schedule. Moscow responds to these reproaches by saying that Tehran must first guarantee the return of spent nuclear fuel to Russia. The Iranians object, saying that this is currently hampered by Russian legislation, which does not allow the import of such fuel into Russia.

But even if these problems are resolved, Tehran will have to answer other questions (posed recently at negotiations in Moscow by the leadership of the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy) to the Russians - regarding the goals of its nuclear program. According to the Vremya Novostey newspaper, the Chairman of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization, Mr. Agha-Zadeh, is expected in Moscow with answers at the end of June.

If we return to the American “passion for Iran,” they are most likely due to domestic political considerations: Washington is doing everything to ensure that George Bush approaches the upcoming presidential elections in fighting form, and anti-Iran rhetoric, designed for a long time, is well suited for this purpose . Moscow's support would also be useful for President Bush. In three days in St. Petersburg, Putin and Bush will find something to say to each other, including about the “Iranian dossier.”

Arkady DUBNOV