Sergey V. Biryukov. Chechnya before the elections: missed opportunities

The presidential elections in the Chechen Republic, scheduled for October 5 this year, complete the important period for the republic of the post-Maskhadov institutionalization of power, which began with the referendum on the constitution on March 21. The quintessence of a kind of “interim period” was the statement made on September 11 by the only State Duma deputy from Chechnya, Aslambek Aslakhanov, about his refusal to participate in the elections and his simultaneous appointment to the post of assistant to the President of Russia for Chechnya. This decision has ambiguous implications. On the one hand, it means the Kremlin’s virtual abandonment of the search for an alternative to Kadyrov (since this eliminates from the electoral process one of his most serious competitors, who has the lowest “negative rating” among all contenders) and the simultaneous collapse of the initiatives of the “united opposition” (Malik Saidullaev , Khusein Dzhabrailov, Aslakhanov and Beslan Gantamirov, who joined them), began with the dismissal of Gantamirov from the post of republican minister of press and the refusal of Dzhabrailov, whom he supported, to participate in the elections. On the other hand, this appointment symbolizes the Kremlin’s desire to work with the “non-Kadyrov” segment of the pro-Russian Chechen elite in the future. Finally, for Aslakhanov himself (who has neither a large-scale economic base nor controlled military force in the republic), this means retaining the opportunity to influence the situation in Chechnya and not be pushed to the margins of the political process in the republic. At the same time, if the gains of the Kremlin and Aslakhanov in this situation remain hypothetical, then Kadyrov’s dividends are more than real.

The latter, who began his career as an outcast from the entourage of ex-President of Ichkeria A. Maskhadov, now has at his disposal administrative resources (the loyalty of the Chechen government led by A. Popov plus heads of city and district administrations personally appointed by Kadyrov), his own military and police forces (the Chechen Ministry of Internal Affairs, practically not controlled by Moscow, has its own security, plus special forces created formally to fight militants under the command of his son Ramzan) and acts as an obvious favorite in the elections 1 .

In case of predicted success in the elections, Kadyrov will have the opportunity to bargain with Moscow from even more advantageous positions. The latter, obviously, did not find a better solution to the situation other than building an outwardly loyal center of power on a clan-teip basis, discarding both the “governor-general model” and the “checks and balances” model . Now, if he wins the elections, Kadyrov will actually close the main channels of power and influence on himself, turning not only the population of Chechnya and moderate groups of the “pro-Russian” elite, but also the federal Center itself into his “clients.” The prospects for the privatization of Grozneftegaz (a subsidiary of Rosneft) will allow it to build independent relations with Russian oligarchs. The ability to distribute financial flows ensures the loyalty of the immediate environment and all levels of management, and the presence of de facto own law enforcement agencies allows you to maintain yourself relatively independently in relation to federal law enforcement agencies. Such a political scheme, despite all its external strength and manageability, will entail a number of costs.

Ordinary Chechens, most of whom demonstrated their loyalty to Russia in the March referendum on the Constitution of the republic, will be practically excluded from the process of political regulation, left to one of the elite clans.

The power emerging in Chechnya will not be fully legitimate (since Kadyrov is perceived by many in Chechnya not as a national leader, but as the most successful “field commander” and head of his teip), nor effective (due to the structure of power on the principle of “all-encompassing clientele” ).

Due to the weakness and unpopularity of the authorities, many problems in the republic will not be properly resolved, which will preserve the ground for discontent, and most importantly, preserve a specific marginal-anomic environment that systematically reproduces “Chechen terrorism” (which has long acquired an international nature). Such a bleak prospect is already visible today: according to surveys conducted in Chechnya by the Public Opinion Foundation together with the sociological service Validata, 60% of respondents answered negatively to the question “Is the administration of the republic doing something to normalize the situation?”, and 76 % of respondents believe that the head of the republic is doing a poor job of fulfilling his responsibilities. And only 51% of Chechens believe in the prospect of normalization of the situation.

After the elections, Moscow will not have enough effective leverage to influence Kadyrov, who, citing “extraordinary working conditions” and the terrorist threat, will be able to defend the system of personal power he created. In addition, if necessary, the new president of the republic will have the opportunity to put propaganda pressure on Moscow using “human rights rhetoric” - that is, by criticizing the violation of the rights of peaceful Chechens by ordinary security forces.

Constructive and pro-Russian opposition to Kadyrov within the republic, without the opportunity to institutionalize, will be out of work - which could in the future alienate some loyal Chechens from Moscow.

As a consequence, Chechnya will remain a source of destabilization in the South of Russia (which is extremely undesirable given the general weakness of the Russian state), will divert colossal resources (thus complicating necessary socio-economic reforms) and keep the country in a “quasi-emergency state” regime (which is unfavorable for democracy). At the same time, the scenario of Kadyrov turning into the second “Imam Shamil” and launching an armed struggle against Russia in the medium term seems unlikely.

The “Chechnya factor” in the international arena will hinder the development of relations with both the EU and the Muslim world (which is vital for preserving Russia as a multinational and multi-religious state).

All of the above allows us to conclude that Russia once again failed to take advantage of the strategic opportunities that arose immediately before the second Chechen campaign.

Among the latter were:

1) A deep split in the Chechen elite (primarily between the irreconcilable field commanders who made up a special body - the Shura, many of whom were associated with Wahhabism, and part of the moderate supporters of Maskhadov, who were left out of work by such a development of events - among them the most influential were the then Mufti of Chechnya A. Kadyrov and the influential field commanders brothers Selim, Khalid and Dzhabrail Yamodayev who controlled the city of Gudermes), which ultimately led during the second military campaign to the refusal of a number of elite groups from the armed struggle and their transition to the Russian side.

2) Disappointment of many residents of Chechnya in the idea of ​​“Ichkerian independence”, fatigue from the situation of criminal and terrorist “lawlessness”.

3) The rejection by the majority of Chechens committed to adat to the export of “radical Arab Islam” and the ideology of Wahhabism - which again turned their attention to Russia, which, even during periods of military confrontation with the Caucasians, demonstrated relative religious tolerance. This factor, in particular, became decisive for representatives of traditional Sufi Islam led by Mufti A. Kadyrov, for whom there was no place within the framework of the Wahhabi system, which denies the very institutions of muftis and mullahs.

4) The inability of Chechnya in its current state to create not only full-fledged statehood, but also simply a normally functioning system of governance without the participation of Russia - which forced part of the Chechen elite, interested in the survival of the nation and its way out of the “deadlock of demodernization” (bright Representatives of Chechen intellectuals of this kind were the current presidential representative for human rights in Chechnya, Abdul-Khakim Sultygov, and the deceased spiritual leader Adam Deniev).

5) Disappointment in previous anti-Russian ideologies and stereotypes ("free Ichkeria", "Islamic brotherhood", etc.), the implementation of which led to a national catastrophe.

6) Marginalization and decomposition of the foundations of traditional culture, which led, along with a mass of negative social consequences, to the erosion of centuries-old anti-Russian stereotypes and to a noticeable weakening of the motivation for confrontation - which opened the opportunity for a critical rethinking of the Chechens' national history, for dialogue and reconciliation with Russia.

To achieve these goals, the Russian leadership had to solve a number of very difficult tasks:

1) Neutralization of the rebel movement and the gradual narrowing of its social base - in fact, failed, since the number of gangs invariably remained at 2-3 thousand people, the widely advertised amnesty did not give the expected results (according to official data, only 200 militants laid down their arms), and the hostility of the population supported by purges and the continuous disappearance of people in the republic.

Moreover, the real resistance base has not diminished, and the militants' infrastructure has been restored after the damage caused in 1999-2000. The structures waging a terrorist war against Russia have increased the effectiveness of their actions through the use of “Palestinian tactics” (as evidenced by the Nord-Ost tragedy, as well as the recent terrorist attacks in Tushino, Mozdok, Stavropol and Ingushetia).

2) Creation of a unified command (coordination center) of law enforcement agencies (FSB, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Armed Forces) fighting against gangs - today in the republic only FSB officers, Chechen riot police (consisting of blood relatives and staunch opponents of Maskhadov) remain truly reliable instruments of counter-terrorism activities and Basayev) and (with certain reservations) the special forces of the Yamodayev brothers, which cannot be fully said about the units of the Chechen Ministry of Internal Affairs and special forces under the command of the son of the head of the republic Ramzan Kadyrov, in which recently amnestied militants and even “brigadier generals” serve 2 . Confirmation of the general low effectiveness of counter-terrorism operations was the recent failure of the operation to capture the notorious Abu Al-Walid.

3) Consolidation of pro-Russian Chechens, with the involvement of the Chechen diaspora in Moscow in the process of settlement - despite individual steps in this direction, most of the recent events (the death of many supporters of Russia in Chechnya itself, the refusal of Kh. Dzhabrailov and A. Aslakhanov to participate in the elections , the marginal position of the last of the “Moscow” contenders M. Saidullaev) work rather in the opposite direction.

4) Building an effective system of power, loyal to the Kremlin, relatively free from “teip preferences” and enjoying significant support in the republic - in fact, a military-police control system (“governor general”) with elements of teip representation capable of stabilizing the republic was never created (an advisory body of representatives of teips), and the hastily formed local administration headed by A. Kadyrov does not have the necessary weight and authority - at the same time demonstrating increased ambitions and exaggerating its role in the process of “bargaining” with the federal Center.

5) Involving constructively minded political forces and segments of the population of Chechnya (teips, virds, clergy) in the process of peaceful settlement and creation of power structures - a full-fledged “intra-Chechen dialogue” will most likely not succeed due to monopolization by the “Kadyrov group” (instead of structures directly subordinate to Moscow ) the main “networks of influence” and power resources.

6) Achieving basic success in the peaceful settlement and implementing the tactics of “building up successes”, humanizing the situation and strengthening citizens’ trust in the authorities - in practice, measures taken to attract the civilian population to the Russian side (amnesty, ensuring security, taking measures to establish a peaceful life and restoration of the social sphere, involvement of elders and religious authorities in cooperation, etc.) are formal and ostentatious. As a result, in Chechnya, according to the Human Rights Commission under the President of Russia, the terror of militants and unidentifiable “paramilitary” formations, the disappearance of people continue, and the problems of adaptation of refugees and the return to normal life of the younger generation of Chechens remain on the periphery.

7) Creation of favorable public opinion abroad, including in the countries of the Muslim world and the EU. On the one hand, a number of Russia’s foreign policy steps (its position on the “Iraqi crisis,” its recently declared intention to join the organization of the “Islamic Conference” as an observer) contributed to the solution of this task, 3 but on the other hand, the absence of a general constructive solution to the “Chechen problem” and the aggravation humanitarian situation create an unfavorable foreign policy background, preventing the militants from being cut off from moral and material support from the outside (confirmation of this is the clearly protracted issue of extradition to Russia of Maskhadov’s emissary A. Zakayev, as well as the disseminated information about foreign tranches received by Abu Walid and Maskhadov). Thus, the “window of opportunity” that arose for Russia after September 11, 2001 and the subsequent series of terrorist attacks was never fully exploited.

8) The development of a comprehensive program for restoring the economy of Chechnya, providing employment (primarily for young people) and connecting the region to economic projects of a national and international scale (mainly in the field of oil refining) has actually been blocked due to the ongoing instability and corruption of the authorities, and a comprehensive approach to restoration and the development of the Chechen economy is replaced by lobbying the interests of individual business structures.

9) Implementation of a set of measures to suppress the activities of economic criminals of both “internal” and external origin, stopping the “business at war” of business structures and politicians. The first is obviously difficult due to the lack of a unified system for managing law enforcement agencies in the republic and problems in the work of the entire Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs. At the same time, the “oligarchized” nature of the Russian economy, the weakness of the state and the influence of oligarchs and other “interest groups” on government decisions do not allow us to fully solve the second problem.

However, the lack of a systematic approach to solving the “Chechen problem” is not surprising in light of the unresolved nature of many problems on an all-Russian scale. The basis of economic policy continues to be the doctrine of one-sided liberalism and financial stabilization, which does not consider among the government’s goals the equalization of imbalances in regional development and the strengthening of the all-Russian economic space. State building does not have a clear strategy and is experiencing a lot of problems due to the stalling of reforms of the state apparatus and local self-government. There is also no national policy and national idea capable of uniting a multinational and multi-religious country into a single whole, offering a modernization and geopolitical project that suits everyone.

It is obvious that it is impossible to resolve the “Chechen issue” without restoring the subjectivity of the Russian state, the formation of a fundamentally new type of state power (public and responsible instead of corporate-polyarchical) and economy (effective and socially oriented - instead of shadow and oligarchic).

Notes:

1 Migalin S. 2003. Kadyrov plays big. // September 5, S.2.

2 Riskin A. 2003. Information “purge” in Kadyrov’s style. // September 8, p.9.

3 Umnov A. 2003. Chechnya in the Palestinian mirror. // Nezavisimaya, August 28, p. 6.