Konstantin Krylov. Rus' and Non-Rus

1.

Everything is relative. History teaches nothing precisely because it does not have the subjunctive mood - and exactly to the extent that it does not have it. We know nothing about a fact unless we know (or at least assume) what would have happened if it had not happened or if something else had happened.

In most cases, such a comparison is prohibited even by the most lenient methodology, but the mind has the understanding to find loopholes and use them to fuse all sorts of “illegal methods of judgment.” A system of such loopholes, hidden in the soil of European culture like sewer pipes or underground passages, secretly gives (or prescribes, or even ascribes) meaning to history. For example, the concept of "artistic genius" is based on the assumption that "if this person did not exist, his masterpieces would never have seen the light of day." On the contrary, the concept of “objectivity of scientific knowledge” implies that “everything important” will be discovered by someone, and not too late and not at too great a cost 1 . Statistics (or rather, methods of reasoning that are imitated by it) divides facts into significant and insignificant, which, when removed from the historical continuum, “change nothing” (the early death of Napoleon changes the world, but the death of a Napoleonic soldier changes almost nothing)...

All these intellectual constructs somehow coexist (of course, in an unpresentable form, “half-bent”) with the official dogma about the uniqueness of a historical fact - and, accordingly, about the absolute unknowability of a world in which this fact is absent.

And rightly so: we cannot even imagine a world without some events, and therefore cannot know it.

However, thinking about historical a priori is sometimes still possible. How is it possible - let some Kant think about it, he has a head. It is important for us that this is an experimentally observable phenomenon. “There are such options” regarding which almost all people with any sane minds are in complete agreement - yes, if this happened, then it would be so and so and in no other way. Where does such confidence come from is an interesting question (and deserving special consideration in each specific case), but still a second one. First, we need to notice the very existence of these points of general agreement - “yes, everything would be exactly like that .” And only then, based on this agreement, think further.

As you know, the variants of the “events of 1993” (as well as 1991) are practically not calculated: here everyone makes up their own, and more often than not they don’t even try to make up their own. In fact, it is completely unclear (that is, “not visible”) what would have happened if Rutskoi and Khasbulatov had won, and what that victory would have led to. Moreover, they had plenty of options for defeat - starting with a quick surrender of positions in the style of the State Emergency Committee ("it's not possible to shed blood") and ending with something in the style of an assault on La Moneda. All this is unclear, which means that there seems to be nothing to talk about: “what happened happened,” we will live in the world that was created by this event.

However, let us first ask ourselves one hypothetical question. Suppose: everything that Yeltsin and his accomplices did in October 1993 would have been done, say, by the communists in ninety-one. Now the question is: how, in what form, and in what capacity would the “shooting of the White House” figure in the anti-communist myth - Russian, and (take it higher) world?

For some reason everyone answers this question the same way. "Oooh!"

If we go into more detail, then: the shooting of the White House, with the whistling of bullets, with the impacts of shells, with a conflagration, with brutal scum in uniform, slaughtering those running through the gateways 2 , would ideally look like the latest and most vile (even if not "the most terrible") crime of the damned communists. If you like, an exemplary crime of the “red-bellies”, worthy of crowning the anti-Soviet mythology

Oh, what would have happened! A multi-ton lump of Klaas's ashes would have fallen on the scales of history, forever lifting up the pathetic weight with the inscription "1/6-1945-Sputnik-Gagarin". All attempts to say at least something good about Soviet civilization would be crushed by the stone-inflexible: “in the end, the red bastard cowardly and basely shot the Russian Parliament and killed innocent people, killed cowardly, basely and cruelly.” The lips of Honest People would endlessly curl in a grimace of endless pain and endless contempt: “ they killed students, girls, old people who came to defend freedom... they shot the Truth with direct fire... they burned the White House, this symbol of Our Hope... “With the refrain - “the country where this happened has no right to historical existence.” “Tanks-are-walking-through-Prague” would organically stick together in the mind with the burning of the Reichstag 3 and the Winter Palace, the eternal hatred of the intellectual for “scum in uniform” would have found its complete expression (oh, I can hear it - “behind these gateways where the boys were killed... I won’t forget this, I won’t forgive, beat the cops, save Russia"), and the Black White House would forever become an incredibly clear symbol of desecrated democracy: The Black Book of Communism would be published with its image on the title. Etc.

And, of course, “after that you can’t talk to them about anything: only through a sight, only at direct fire, we won’t forgive, we won’t forget.”

Now let's get back to reality. In which the events around the White House became a real celebration of the “Russian educated class.”

Much has been said and written on this topic. And I will not bore the reader with a boring listing of what (and most importantly - how , in what tone and in what words) was said and written in those glorious times by all sorts of “decent people”. Much more important is that even now, after a decade, they have not changed their views at all. Those who demanded blood not only did not repent, but sincerely wished to continue the banquet. Of those who signed the famous “letter of the 42,” only one person, it seems, expressed some regret. The rest wanted and still want the same thing - and they mourn that “then it was not possible to crush all the bastard at once.” Valeria Novodvorskaya still remembers the song with nostalgic tenderness :

Oh, our tanks are on Polyanka, And the red toadstools are dying...

Or, as one sweet, intelligent woman recently put it in simplicity: “Ten years ago our tanks shot the rebel Bolshevik bastard . ”

Let us note that “our tanks” is a phrase that is almost unthinkable and oxymoronic for an intellectual. It seems that not a single event in Russian history in which tanks took part - including the Great Patriotic War, which has long been cursed and spat on by all decent people - has caused such delight among decent people , such a touching fusion with these terrible, rattling pieces of iron. “ Our tanks”, “ our riot police”, everything is ours, everything is suddenly loved. Only because they “shot the Bolshevik bastard”, “killed the red bastard”.

Looking ahead, I will say that the epithet “red” and adjectives equated to it play the role of a camouflage net here.

2.

The fact that the “communist theme” is attached to the apology for the shooting of the White House simply for lack of anything better is well known to both sides: those who are now drinking “on this occasion” champagne with pineapple (or whatever they drink in their night clubs), and those who drink bitter. It is clear that no “communist rebellion” in the classical sense of the word was lying around here. Or, in any case, the “reds” here need to be understood very broadly - as “poor”, “outsiders”, “not adapted”, and a bunch of “not resigned” to something very nasty that they did and are doing in Kremlin.

Communist slogans, banners and even words were heard, but this was precisely the case when the signs significantly changed their meanings: the red flag was, at best, a metaphor, a vague “symbol of protest” (which it was initially), and not a solid one. and a certain statement like “we want to go back to the 26th Congress, give us back Ilyich’s eyebrows.” What didn't happen didn't happen. They grabbed the red banners in exactly the same way as a defending person grabs a brick or a crowbar, not really thinking that they were created for completely different needs. Some suitable symbols were urgently needed, but there was no time to compose them “throughout the whole science.” They took what they had - and the fact that it turned out to be red means no more than the color of the brick that the beaten poor fellow grabbed.

Exactly the same “first thing that came across” were the notorious White House leaders, Rutskoi and Khazbulatov (not to mention the rest). I don’t seem to know a single person I know who would go to the White House to defend “Rutskoi’s rights to the presidential kingdom.” Some perceived him as a “symbol of resistance” and hoped that for some time he would at least cope with this - to be honest, not so difficult - “just be silent and puff out your cheeks” - role. They didn’t expect anything more from him: if he had any charisma (“pilot, Afghan”), it was minimal, at the bottom 4 .

As for the Chechen Khazbulatov, his popularity, so to speak, was of a very strange nature: on the one hand, he was known as an arrogant and stupid “national cadre” of the Soviet era, on the other hand, as a Chechen (and there was already fear of Chechens then almost universal 5 ). In the minds of supporters of the Supreme Council, these two minuses somehow added up to some kind of uncertain plus: “well, yes, he’s a fool, but he’s a Chechen, cool, you know what they are,” on the one hand, and “well, yes, he’s a Chechen, but “He’s not a bandit, he’s not a scumbag” - on the other. Plus, this one was barely holding on: Khas was very difficult to love, and no one was particularly diligent about it.

In principle, Rutskoi and Khas were and remained “bosses”, whom they followed only because they were (no, they seemed) somewhat less disgusting than the Kremlin bosses 6 . Most likely, they understood this - and in the event of a hypothetical “victory” (that is, Yeltsin’s removal), their paths would very quickly diverge from those people who were ready to fight for this victory. How it would all end - God knows. Most likely, nothing good would come of this. Many openly hoped that “ even these would be gotten rid of on the quiet.”

3.

Somewhat more valid is the view that the White House defenders were "fighting for the rule of law." The same Rutskoi was considered by many who came to the White House as a “legitimate President” - “according to the decisions of the 7th session of the Supreme Council of September 22, 1993.” This was important, much more important than Rutsky’s personality itself. In the same way, the title of Khasbulatov - Chairman of the Supreme Council - was much more significant and weighty than Khas as such. The legality of the power of the Supreme Council was not the main, but still a very significant topic - as well as the fact that Yeltsin was legally removed from power (by the decision of the Presidium of the Supreme Council on September 21). It’s not that people “came to defend the law” - of course not. But it was important for them that they were on the side of the Correct Law, that is, “something right and good.”

It is interesting that from a “strictly legal point of view” this is all true. It was precisely because of this circumstance, and not at all Yeltsin’s goodwill, that all the captured members of the Armed Forces had to be released. It was simply impossible to judge them according to the law - at least according to the laws that existed then. It was also impossible to kill them “like simple scum,” and everyone understood this. Firstly, death was exactly what Rutskoi lacked before he “became a noticeable figure”: the opposition would have had a “portrait on the banner,” which they were still afraid of back then 7 . Secondly, the murder of bosses of this level (and Rutskoy and Khaz still remained bosses “by caste”) could cause completely unpredictable consequences: it would mean breaking the unspoken consensus of the Russian elites, according to which there are a small number of the most important people in Russia, who can never be killed for anything 8 . Breaking this consensus could have unpredictable consequences. Therefore, I am sure that if Rutskoi and Khasbulatov actually died in the White House, their death would certainly be attributed to suicide or some kind of “shootout among their own.”

Of course, legal measures were taken in this regard “for the future.” Yeltsin's "constitution", the main trophy of the 1993 Victory, provides for "super-presidential power." That is, power limited only by the power (or powerlessness) of this power itself, “the power-as-much-I-can-eat.”

It is clear that the very idea of ​​“legality” has now been forever discredited - along with the idea of ​​a “legislative body”. It became clear to everyone once and for all that if parliament (any parliament sitting under these parliaments) happened to do anything that the executive power did not like, the executive power would shoot him. Or at least she can always do it. Everyone understands this - from the “gentlemen of deputies” to the last homeless person. They explained to everyone - once and for all - that there is only one power: the power of a rifle, a cannon, a tank and a grenade launcher - and there will be no other way.

Therefore, from now on there simply cannot be any laws that deserve even a modicum of respect in Russia. “The law of the Russian Federation,” as the people understand it, is always something unbearably disgusting, prostituted, some kind of bitch piece of paper written out by a thief for his thieves’ affairs, with damn milk and a beaver stream, waved after the fact through the back seat, “a damn letter” , and not a Law by which to live.

This, of course, does not negate the fact that in reality (since late Soviet times) more important and priority than any “law” are “by-laws” (“acts” - that is, some hasty and unscrupulous copulations under the protection of some dirty canvas). something like the “constitution”), more important than them are the “instructions” (written by the devil himself, no less), and above all of them is the mood of the law enforcement officer, that is, any cop, any official-robber, some “sanitary inspectorate” and “fire department” , any lazy woman “with the right to sign”, in general, any chmyr and gnebeshchuk who finds himself on the other side of the barricade counter separating the social winners and the social losers. But in Soviet times there was still hope for “legality,” at least as an idea, albeit somewhat spoiled by “law enforcement.” Now the very foundations of law stink of buckets.

Some see certain advantages in this state of affairs. In fact, the resulting system turned out to be stable and even allows for the implementation of “all sorts of different activities” - including useful ones. Putin’s power, in fact, is based on the idea of ​​“beneficial use” of Yeltsin’s mechanisms. Alas, this is precisely its original flaw: it cannot be “used usefully” even with the best intentions. Real, non-PR national success is based on the people's sense of involvement in the affairs taking place in the country. The people are now more than indifferent: they are disdainful . Power has found its last secret refuge in its own disgustingness. As Nabokov said about Gogol’s devil, “no force in the world will force him to be crushed with bare hands ” - but the hands of the people are bare.

4.

The lack of clear positive symbols (not to mention the “positive program”) was more than made up for by clearly expressed negativity. The people going to the White House went there with one intention - to overthrow Yeltsin’s power, to “drive away the devils ,” as the elderly man who was taking me to the White House put it.

“Yeltsin,” of course, meant not only the specific Boris Nikolayevich, but that’s all - that is, the regime that was established after 1991.

This did not mean at all that anyone liked Gorbachev or Brezhnev. It was just a matter of stopping It. No one really understood what “This” was, or rather, there were many different opinions on this matter, but everyone understood that “there is no time for theories here.” Theorists, however, were also there ┘

5.

The traditional mistake of traditional nationalism is that, while highlighting the nation as a subject of historical action, it does not see other subjects acting in the same arena. Hence the idea that a nation can only be opposed by another nation.

Such a theory describes well a certain part of historical facts, but still not all the facts. The gap is usually filled by introducing hidden entities, that is, conspiracy theories of various kinds. (For example, classical anti-Semitism, as well as anti-Masonry, understand “world Jewry/Freemasonry” in much the same way as modern physics understands the “hidden mass” of the Universe: something that eludes perception and yet is active 9. ) Those who go somewhat further go who postulates the existence of quasi-national entities: for example, Lev Gumilyov with his concept of “anti-system”.

However, the problem can be solved differently by assuming that a nation and its interests can be opposed by any community, organized on any principles and united only by a “negative interest” in relation to a given nation. This, by the way, paradoxically returns us to the foundations of nationalist discourse: the French “nation” as an organic whole against the “aristocrats” as a “class” 10 that has inappropriately separated itself from the national body and is parasitic on it 11 .

The specificity of Russian history is that over the past centuries, Russians as a nation have been confronted by a certain complex formation, which I propose to call “Non-Russia” 12 .

Non-Russia is a collection of peoples, classes, social groups, as well as professional, religious and other communities seeking to subjugate, suppress or even destroy Russians as a people and Russia as an independent state. The reasons for this desire are not so important and also vary greatly. In essence, they can be anything - starting from completely rational, economic considerations (for example, the desire to “rob”) and ending with irrational, absolutely causeless, “animal” hatred of everything Russian. It should be understood: when it comes to hatred, its object is always more important than its specific causes 13 .

There is no need to imagine this community as a “nation”, especially in its “biological”, “racist” understanding - if only because it also includes many ethnic Russians 14 . It also includes such exotic entities as, for example, the “ruling circles” (sometimes very narrow) of some states, the population of which has an indifferent or even positive attitude towards Russians . What is especially bad is that the so-called “ruling circles” of Russia itself quite often either themselves belonged to Non-Russia 16 , or, at a minimum, were obliged to take into account its interests.

It is important to understand that there is nothing original in the very fact of the existence of the “anti-Russian community”. Now, for example, there is (and is well known) an “anti-American community,” which includes a variety of forces, from individual nonconformist intellectuals to peoples and states that have made anti-Americanism part of their identity 17 . Nerus is unique in other ways: it is the oldest and strongest anti-national community of all existing today 18 . Several times Non-Russia seized (in one way or another) power in Russia, after which it began to subjugate, or destroy, or simply wipe out the Russians.

The last time this happened was in 1991, when the anti-Russian part of the population managed, hiding behind “anti-communist” and “anti-Soviet” slogans, to seize power in the country. It is no coincidence that from now on the only ideology absolutely prohibited in modern Russia is Russian nationalism - be it moderate, “extremist” or whatever.

In order to be convinced of this, it is enough to analyze the most popular slogans of the current regime. We leave this interesting task to our readers. However, let us give one - but typical - example. The seemingly innocent expression “multinational state” is used as an antonym to the slogan “Russia for Russians.” And in this sense, it is a euphemism marking modern “ Russia for general use . ”

6.

In this sense, the absence of a “positive program” of the 1993 uprising stated above is not a defect. In the current Russian situation, the very idea of ​​a "positive program" is false - and even ridiculous.

The point is not that we, Russians, need some kind of plan for “Russian national revival” or “national salvation”, which we - that’s bad luck! - we just can’t invent it. point The only is to “drive away the devils” - that is, to remove Non-Russia and its servants from power.

No “program for the revival of Russia” is needed . More precisely, no realistic program of “revival” is possible without victory over Nerussia - and in the event of victory, it will be unnecessary. The main thing is to return power over their country to the Russian people, give them property, allow them to live by their own mind and have national dignity.

They will do the rest themselves.

Notes:

1 In this regard, the cult of Einstein is suspicious, if only because it has all the signs of a “cult of genius,” as if STR and GR are not so much “objective knowledge” as artistic creations of a “brilliant brush” - which, willy-nilly, suggests the idea of the unscientific (or at least dubious scientific) nature of these intellectual constructs.

2 Try it, read it as a quote from a liberal newspaper - it’s true, it comes out naturally and smoothly, like a cake from a brownie, huh?

3 Which, according to many of my friends, was also arranged by the communists: “well, not themselves, they arranged it through Hitler, anyway, these scum are worse than Hitler, worse than everyone,” as one nice girl from the Russian State University once explained to me.

4 Although, when it was all over, I heard drunken conversations of those who were late (like me) for the distribution - about some cars filled with “Rutskoi’s colleagues” who, they say, were going to “rescue the commander.” Most likely, these were already consoling stories, talk in favor of the losers, “if only we could do it a little more.”

5 In general, animal fear of Caucasians and especially Chechens was and remains a system-forming factor for Russian society “after 1991.” By the way, one should not think that this fear has been overcome in any way. In any case, at the everyday level it has rather strengthened. In this sense, the current tendency to staff the internal troops of Russia (that is, the same “mentor”, which is increasingly acquiring the features of an occupation army) with Caucasians and especially Chechens is quite natural. I wonder if they will be allowed to carry checkers?

6 However, I do not rule out that the same Rutskoi - if luck had smiled on him - could not have become something more than the servile creature that we now have the displeasure of observing. The situation makes the person no less than the person makes the situation - this is especially true for “leaders”. After the seventeenth, Kerensky also looked rather pitiful, but if things had turned out a little differently, he would have remained under the sun of history “known for his inflexibility.”

7 On the contrary, the same Rokhlin was dangerous precisely as a “real person” who could do something only while he was alive.

8 It is interesting to note that this list is extremely small and very elitist. For example, deputies of the Russian parliament can be killed. This time I do not mean the White House events: we are talking about the State Duma. In the period from 1994 (Aizderdzis, a deputy of the State Duma of the Russian Federation of the first convocation, was killed in Khimki) and up to 2003 (the murder of Yushenkov), 13 people were shot - not many, but not few, “noticeably so - for those who understand.” Politicians at the regional level are shot periodically - including governors and persons equivalent to them. Of course, all these murders went unpunished. However, those who have at least been at the top of the power pyramid remain inviolable: it seems that potential murderers are well aware that “in certain cases” they will be found and judged informally, without lawyers.

9 It is interesting that such an understanding is almost identical to the no less traditional “discourse of Fate and Providence” - fundamentally imperceptible to the senses and (sensory) mind, but at the same time an entity operating in history, “walking along secret paths and moving by secret springs.”

10 In the Russian revolution, the situation turned out to be strictly the opposite: since the revolutionaries defined themselves as a “class” (of course, “oppressed”), their enemy turned out to be precisely the nation, in this case the Russian one. This is where the idea of ​​the strategic alliance of the “Russian oppressed class” with the “oppressed nations” comes from, which led to certain consequences.

11 However, the honor of discovering “anti-national communities” belongs to the Jewish tradition, according to which “anti-Semites” are a kind of “nation” opposed to the Jews. According to traditional Jewish views, all anti-Semites are descendants of one man, Amalek, king of the Amalekites, who was not killed in time during the Jewish conquest of Palestine.

12 “Non-Rus” (with emphasis on the first syllable) is a “folk” name for distinctly “anti-Russian” peoples and population groups, primarily, historically, the southern ones. I use this word as an ethnosociological concept, the definition of which I give below.

13 This is the psychology of accomplices or accomplices. Several villains who decide to rob or kill the same person may have very different reasons for this: one wants to take revenge, another wants to get rich, the third wants to experience a thrill. What unites them is not a goal, but a sacrifice.

14 Now, for example, the ranks of Non-Russia have been swelled by “ethnically Russian” organized crime.

15 For example, Americans, despite almost a century of Russophobic propaganda, treat Russians without much hatred (although without any sympathy). But at the same time, the American “expert community,” as well as the political establishment, are extremely anti-Russian (albeit for different reasons).

16 A classic example of “anti-Russian power” was, for example, the period of Peter the Great. Now it can already be considered proven that absolutely all of Peter’s “reforms” were meaningless or harmful both for the Russians as a nation and for Russia as a state. The victims suffered by Russia (including the mass extinction of Russian people) were monstrous. Peter I's Russophobia (reaching the point of pathology) is well known. Apparently, the “Old Believer” perception of Peter as the “Antichrist” and the “devil” was completely consistent with reality - if, of course, we consider the latter through the prism of Russian national interests.

17 America, having declared war on so-called “world terrorism,” actually meant and still means by the latter the anti-American community, and not “terrorists in general.” The United States is bombing centers of “world anti-Americanism.” In this sense, there is no difference between the destruction of Yugoslavia and the Afghan (or Iraqi) campaign - a successful name was simply found that quite clearly indicates “all enemies of America and everything American”, but does not name them directly.

18 Only “world anti-Semitism” has a more venerable history. But since now there is no longer anti-Semitism as an organized and any successful force, Non-Rus can lay claim to leadership.