Alexander Morozov. Orthodox Christians face a choice

Orthodox Christians face a choice
Publication date: November 18, 2003

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In general, the boring Duma elections of 2003 are extremely interesting from the point of view of the “Orthodox factor”. The novelty of the situation lies in the following. In the 90s, the Orthodox electorate was forced to be channeled along two false channels: either the party in power or the “national-patriotic opposition” led by the communists. Both were inherently an unnatural union. Tiny groups of Orthodox political activists in the 1990s. exhausted by a long history of misalliances. With a painful compromise, they applied themselves to the KRO, Rutskoi's "Power", the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, Govorukhin, Shumeiko, etc. Their childhood and adolescence passed, as it were, in suffocating stocks, and now, when the stocks have been split, we are faced with underage freaks. And now Putin’s policy and the redrawing of the political space opens the waters of big “systemic” politics to the Orthodox, a big maneuver, bold claims are possible.

Of course, by “bold claims” we do not mean the rotten ideological goods that have been lying around in patriotic warehouses since the 90s.

POPOV-KUIMOV. The party “For Holy Rus'” did not join V. Lebedev in the People’s Party, and later did not accept an alliance with Glazyev. This is a completely anecdotal phenomenon, designed to prove that the concept of “Holy Rus'” is of interest to 0.28% of voters. S. Popov, judging by his speeches in the so-called “television debates,” seems to have been zombified by someone in order to mechanically portray a “super-clerical” party. “For Holy Rus'” is a kind of parody of Sharia law. Popov, in his public speeches, strives to show that economic laws, law, civil life - all this is contained entirely and without any intermediary links in the Old and New Testaments. There is even an instruction manual written by him for candidates who are advised to simply repeat the Ten Commandments when answering all questions about economic policy. Popov himself followed this instruction when meeting with G. Yavlinsky on air on November 17.

The Popov-Kuimov experiment could probably channel the very edge of Orthodox political radicals. But, unfortunately, this will not happen, because groups related to the "Holy Russians" ("Orthodox Rus'" by K. Dushenov, "Russian Messenger" by A. Senin, "oprichnina brotherhoods" and others) did not side with Popov and did not form the "Black Hundred Front" ".

KRUTOV-LEONOV. Unlike the “priests” - crystal monarchists, anti-Semites and mystics - Krutov-Leonov is ideologically a completely different phenomenon. These are exponents of a rapidly becoming outdated, but very characteristic of the second half of the 90s. tendencies of supporters of “Soviet revanchism” who dream of replacing communism with Orthodoxy. Revanchist comments by General Leonov are the signature style of the “Russian House”. Despite almost ten years of efforts, not only Leonov, but also Krutov failed to take on the form of convincingly church people. But they undoubtedly managed to create a protest television program with high ratings and form their own audience. The purpose of their presence in the Rodina bloc is to become the rat-catchers under whose tune a part of the Orthodox Christians, who until now remained in its sphere of influence, will leave the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. For a long time, the existence of the “Russian House” was associated with the patronage of Archimandrite Tikhon (Shevkunov), and through him S. Pugachev. However, today, from the point of view of the political elite to which these leaders are tied, the ideology of the “Russian House” is already extremely archaic. After all, this part of the elite is rapidly turning from marginal to dominant, and Krutov-Leonov were unable to show the necessary ideological flexibility. Therefore, now - after long work for the so-called Orthodox security officers - they are not destined to reap the fruits. They did not have the strength to overcome the inertia of the opposition in the conditions of Putin’s rapidly changing political reality. And others reap these benefits.

DERZHAVIN-LEBEDEV. That's who reaps the benefits. Valentin Lebedev, chairman of the Union of Orthodox Citizens, having joined the People's Party, made, as it turned out, a more promising choice. On the basis of Raikova’s party, something like a conservative proto-party is emerging, so far, of course, with great reservations, in which the Orthodox look both “Orthodox” and “systemic.” The Galchenko-Derzhavin-Lebedev knot is the first in the history of modern Russian parliamentarism, an interesting application for the “Orthodox factor” in elections, which has a resource for development, for maneuver. This doesn't mean everything will happen. We are talking only about an application, but under extremely favorable conditions. Firstly, the “populists” are one of two Putin parties (together with S. Mironov’s Party of Life) that correctly voice the “new course” (well outlined in “RJ” by V. Golyshev). Secondly, they pocket the ball thrown to them by G. Pavlovsky - after all, they turned out to be the parliamentary head of the “St. Petersburg power group”. Thirdly, G. Raikov, regardless of passing the 5% barrier, will still form a faction in the State Duma of the 4th convocation.

Nikolai Derzhavin is the person who for the first time “legalizes” Orthodoxy as an element of public policy without marginalism and protest rhetoric. The main thing in his image is the intention to get rid of the “specificity” of Orthodoxy, and this is very significant, since in modern - and highly secular - Russia, the public revelation of Orthodoxy immediately gives specificity and gives rise to an alienating effect. In this sense, Derzhavin is an organic figure. He is not a neophyte, like Konstantin Kinchev or Alexander Krutov, but on the contrary, he is a biographically absolutely rooted in Orthodoxy, a person who at the same time has a certain gloss of secularism. In other words, he, on the one hand, is a completely decent citizen, and on the other hand, being the referent of the Patriarch, he is completely legitimate in his image as an Orthodox Christian. In his image, a form of coexistence of the religious and secular worlds is found. He is successfully complemented by Valentin Lebedev. Although he performs extremely poorly in television debates and at press conferences, something else is important. He sees the church in the space of civil society. He often repeats that he is a supporter of A. Kartashov’s teaching about the “molecular churching of society.” It is worth noting here that for people like Kuimov-Popov, the Russian church historian and politician of the 1917 era, Anton Kartashov, is simply a Freemason and a liberal. Lebedev, as is clear from his speeches, is inspired not by the pre-revolutionary experience of the Orthodox in politics, but by the post-war experience of the German CDU with all the civil institutions that accompany the activities of this conservative party.

In a word, the Galchenko-Derzhavin-Lebedev group is trying to show for the first time that Orthodoxy is not an “anti-modernization ideology.” And this is the significant novelty of the “Orthodox factor” in the 2003 elections.

Of course, the reality of public consciousness will remain the basic trend of a secular society: for those baptized in the Russian Orthodox Church, political choice is not determined by the experience of faith. The votes of “Orthodox voters” will be distributed across the entire spectrum. But in the virtual sphere of the power mythology that our political class lives by, a significant change can occur: Orthodoxy is increasingly turning from an ideology into a style. From anti-modernization ideology - to the style of the establishment, which will express itself not in slogans and discussions about “spiritual security”, but in an unemphasized image, often based on a gesture, on a biographical drawing, on an understanding of events adjusted for personal experience of faith.

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Previous articles of the discussion 'Ethnopolitical technologies' ( discussion archive ):
Alexander Morozov , Orthodox before a choice /11.18/
	The confessional factor in the 2003 election campaign . Tiny groups of Orthodox political activists in the 1990s. They are exhausted from a long history of misalliances and are trying to catch their game. But despite their efforts, Orthodoxy is turning from an anti-modernization ideology into the style of the establishment.
Andrey N. Okara , About the subethnic pride of the Great Russians /11/20/
	The subethnic diversity of modern Russia may become the basis for a new concept of “official nationality.”
Oleg Alekseev , "Political Orthodoxy" or Orthodox politics? /21.11/
	The “pre-election” attitude towards religion is very heterogeneous. Religion is used , practiced or tolerated . Those who “use”, of course, are the majority. They draw from Christianity arguments in favor of directly opposite doctrines: from the oligarchy of capital to the dictatorship of the proletariat.
Egor Gaidai , Russians! Where am I going?.. /24.11/
	"Russian question" in the 2003 election campaign . Today a different time is coming, when being Russian is not only possible, but also stylish. The epidemic affected generals, academicians, Orthodox bankers, as well as depoliticized taxi drivers listening to Troika radio. Today Russian nationalism must be respectable. Albeit with a good-natured face, but with the cold eyes of a winner.
Alexander Morozov , Six Islamic problems of Vladimir Putin /28.11/
	Muslims in the elections to the State Duma and in the presidential campaign . The request is obvious: it is necessary to crystallize the core of cultural, loyal, secularized Islam, which is systemically built into Putin’s state, suitable for presentation in the global Islamic context. But around this task there is a cloud of dust raised by who knows who and why.

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