Alexander Morozov. Six Islamic problems of Vladimir Putin

Six Islamic problems of Vladimir Putin
Muslims in the elections to the State Duma and in the presidential campaign

Alexander Morozov

Publication date: November 28, 2003

The significant difference between the current elections and the campaigns of 1995 and 1999, in relation to the Muslim topic, is obvious: in the past elections, the “party in power” dealt with a federal state, and therefore its rhetoric certainly included a “confessional” element in the form of statements of support.” traditional religions."

In 2003, the leaders of United Russia did not pay attention to either Orthodox or Russian Muslims. Confessional topics are essentially given over entirely to “small parties.” Namaz is present in the United Russia advertising video, but the viewer understands that this is a “Soviet namaz.” This is probably a consequence of the fact that United Russia proceeds from the concept of a unitary state. Real political topics related to Islam - such as the post-war development of Chechnya, extremism, the situation of certain large diasporas and communities, etc. - are taken outside the scope of the election debates.

There is very little demand for an Islamic party in the political market created by the Kremlin this year. In terms of grassroots initiatives, Muslim political activists' disillusionment with past efforts has had a strong influence. As among the “Orthodox patriots ,” Muslim leaders have accumulated too much of a burden of unsuccessful attempts at unification. is indicative An interview with Aslan Aslanbekov (November 25, 2003) : “We refused to go to the elections in 1999. I knew that we could not get five percent, and I did not want to join blocs with anyone. The Mejlis joined “Our House - Russia", "Refah" went with "Unity". Some ended up in the Duma. But what did the Muslims get from their stay there, excuse me, I have no idea. It is on their conscience, they ruined this matter. Now they are creating some kind of parties - Eurasian, True Patriots, etc., knowing in advance that they will not come close to the five percent mark. Due to the fault of those who were not thinking about unification, but about their own career, about being in this State Duma at any cost , it became impossible to unite the Muslims of the country" . This is the pessimistic conclusion of Aslanbekov, who has been attempting to create a Muslim political movement since 1991.

The electoral prospects of the Islamic party have already been exhaustively analyzed (see, for example, the article by A. Ignatenko , as well as the study on "islam.ru" ), and they are disappointing. One of the main factors, which A. Ignatenko rightly pointed out at the last elections, remains in force: in Muslim republics and regions of compact Muslim residence, the mobilization of the electorate occurs administratively.

Abdul-Vakhid Niyazov was buried in the Borodin block, Heydar Dzhemal disappeared somewhere on the periphery of Glazyev’s “Motherland”, Khachilayev is no longer alive. Ruslan Aushev - once a federal politician no less charismatic than Shoigu - is now lost in the party of Joseph Kobzon. Ramazan Abdulatipov is not participating. The so-called “Moscow Chechens” who participated in the presidential campaign in Chechnya did not go to the Duma elections.

This year, Radzhabov (“True Patriots of Russia”) was presented to television viewers. Radjabov is an Avar. The Avars, as shown by E. Kisriev's research, are the most devout people of Dagestan. Moreover, according to the study, the active Muslim core of the Avars does not exceed 76 thousand people. Radjabov's chances this year are probably worse than those of Nur in 1995, when the loyal Muslim association collected 0.57%.

Therefore, the question of the “Islamic factor” in the 2003 Duma elections - and essentially in the presidential campaign - is of interest on a completely different plane. There are six current problems of Muslim politics in Russia.

Washing out ethnic Muslims from the political elite, from the federal administrative elite. The social elevator, which lifted loyal and mature people from Tatarstan, Central Asia and the Caucasus to Moscow in Soviet times, is not working well. It is interesting that this topic was directly mentioned in Radjabov’s election video. Addressing Muslims, he asked: “Why vote for us? Why work for the party?” And he answered: “We will appoint those who prove themselves higher...” This passage can be looked at as a manifestation of eastern clientelism, or as a problem of the “social elevator.” There is no doubt that Russia in the “democratic period” was faced with the fact that the new mechanisms of public institutions began to raise not the highest quality national personnel to the top. There are fewer and fewer major ethnic Muslim figures in public policy at the federal level. Therefore, on the agenda is the question of how figures from Islamic regions will be recruited in V. Putin’s unitary state.

The second point is very close to the first. But he is not at all connected with public policy. It seems that the restoration of the corps of ethnic Muslim internationalists in security and law enforcement agencies is essential for Putin’s second term. A unitary state cannot be restored without capable personnel who ideologically share the idea of ​​a unitary state. With some degree of convention, this item on the agenda can be called the “Kadyrov factor.”

The third point will be called the “Aslanbekov factor”. Putin's policy of joining the OIC is an electrolysis placed in a solution of the old Islamic ideological wanderings in Russia. The request is obvious: it is necessary to crystallize the core of cultural, loyal, secularized Islam, which is systemically built into Putin’s state, suitable for presentation in the global Islamic context. If it is true that Aslanbekov has been appointed as Commissioner for Relations with the OIC, then the “growth point” of Islamic politics in Russia should be right here. The question is whether Aslanbekov will be able to create an intellectual headquarters.

The fourth problem node is connected with the Volga region, or more precisely, with the dismantling of the regimes of Shaimiev and Rakhimov. Everyone understands that this dismantling could have nationwide consequences. Or maybe not. The question is whether it will be possible to maintain for the population in Tatarstan and Bashkiria the scheme of interpretation of events: “Moscow’s against ours.” Or the situation will move to another and sadder level - interethnic. The events around Veremeenko, in my opinion, show that Rakhimov is observing the pact with Moscow. The propaganda line of Rakhimov’s supporters on regional TV is entirely focused on the fact that everything is fine in the republic and only some unnamed impostors from Moscow are muddying the waters. Around the “problem of dismantling” there is a cloud of dust raised by who knows who and why - the problem of the Kryashens, the “Russian Islam” project from the depths of the center of P. Shchedrovitsky, Veremeenko’s bid for the presidency, the “Kazan theme” in the rhetoric of the Union of Orthodox Citizens, an inspired discussion about the trend of supposedly massive transition of Russians to Islam, etc. All this, in my opinion, is unsystematic initiative of individual citizens, which can end very badly.

The fifth problem is designated by the term “religious extremism”. It is no secret that for a year now, from time to time, the expert community has been agitated by the message that the president is about to hold a meeting of the Security Council, State Council and heads of departments on the problem of religious extremism. And it is postponed every time. The novelty of the situation on the eve of the presidential elections lies in the fact that the issue of “religious extremism” will be removed from the agenda altogether. Propagandists will now shift all this “extremism” outside Russia. And the prospect of cooperation with the OIC requires closing this topic in its old form.

The sixth and essentially the most important issue on the agenda is largely in the hands of the spiritual leaders of Russian Islam. Both cooperation with the OIC, and the needs of the final dismantling of Yeltsinism, and the search for tools for the political integration of the Russian population raise the question of what the Islamic infrastructure should be like in Putin’s Russia. As follows from the controversy, the “Russian Islam” project, put forward by theorists from S. Kiriyenko’s circle , was precisely an attempt to show a strategy for creating such an infrastructure. That is, to answer the question: will we have Islamic universities, Islamic banks, what should the migration policy be, is there a prospect for the consolidation of the entire Russian ummah under the leadership of a loyal leader (or a council of leaders), etc. This project apparently had significant flaws and was met with harsh criticism. But the discussion itself about the functioning of Islamic infrastructure remains high on the agenda.

Returning to the beginning: all these real issues are not represented in the elections, since no attempt was made to unite Islamic political organizations into one bloc in these elections. When building blocs, a spark of ideological discussion and a dispute about strategies is inevitably struck. And Radjabov’s regional party does not need any ideology. The presidential campaign will be much more interesting in this regard.