Gleb Pavlovsky. Go and rule for a long time

Go and rule for a long time
Speech at the Open Forum club on February 3, 2004

Gleb Pavlovsky

Publication date: February 5, 2004

And so, we are given a standard - “standard unsolvable problems” ! Mikhail Delyagin began the discussion with this formula without encountering any objections. And it is true that our standard in politics is that not deciding does not prevent one from “taking a stand.” A position on what - unsolvable? This is also our political spectrum - a spectator spectrum that differs in the types of spectators - the stalls, the gallery, voyeurs peeping through a crack - instead of groups offering different classes of solutions. Isn’t this a gap in the most important thing - in the ability of the political class to be ruling, that is, to decide something? The ruling class will not allow itself the “standard” of indecisiveness; this threatens the long-term foundations of its rule.

Now, after the Duma elections, which, together with the presidential elections, abolished the place of the voyeuristic standard, freeing it up for forces intending to decide and act, a competition for the role of the ruling class of Russia is opening. The new majority after the December 2003-March 2004 votes may be second only to the great democratic majority of 1989-91 - just as certain . The first was deceived by its political class. This parallel also reminds us of our risks. After all, the second great majority may also get lost, losing its stakes in power, just as the first one lost them. And by 1995 it became clear that those who voted were not satisfied with the state based on their own votes. The state potential of the first majority was stolen through the fault of the then political elite, hence the question: will the current, weaker and less cultural, but more sophisticated political class cope with the task of building a national ruling class? Maybe today we should not panic, not rush around in horror shouting “what else will this terrible Putin do to us!”, but concentrate on organizing the victorious majority into a state for a long time, far beyond the notorious 2008?

The politicians and experts gathered here have the role of developing the necessary solutions. In my opinion, there are three main tasks around which the spectrum of the new board will be formed.

1. How to make Putin’s victory on March 14 a full-fledged, binding, spectrum-forming choice given the reluctance of the political class, opposition and bureaucracy to take the elections seriously?
2. How to further organize the governance of the country in conditions when the authority and capacity of the previous political infrastructure - parties, etc. - have abolished themselves?
3. How to prevent the emergence of an externally controlled political sector and politicians within the country?

Let's go through each of these tasks, where, in fact, a certain range of positions will arise, already real. It will be included in the new standard. All attempts to position themselves within the old “spectator standard”, left or right, are pointless.

The first task is how to leave within the constitutional framework the voting process, which has the character of a vote of confidence in Putin? That is, how does the majority that presents itself to the nation by voting for Putin organize itself into a majority that trusts the entire system of constitutional institutions? If he is not helped to identify his intentions and goals, the victory will be seized by irresponsible political or bureaucratic forces. There is by no means a spectrum of rulers yet, but the composition of the irresponsible is visible. Those who are interested in elections only from the point of view of the “percent”. In this sense, I don’t see any difference between “Club 2008” and, say, the club of Mr. Pugachev’s friends. For such people, elections are like a lotto, where when the desired number comes up, you are given carte blanche for whatever you want. Hence the recent attempt to apply the “Georgian scenario” in the elections in Bashkiria. Hence the impossibility of understanding who is compromising the constitutional context of the elections with such things as the explosion of a firecracker at Tregubova’s door. Who knows if this crossbow was carried out by some fool from London or a fool from Lubyanka? Moreover, they could well have invented this at the same time, both of them, since for them the constitutional super-task of elections - as the creation of a government - is not important. Today, part of the old liberal class has united with the reactionary part of the bureaucracy to nullify the long-term meaning of elections under the ridiculous pretext that one of the candidates actually has an advantage in the eyes of voters.

The second task is the task of formalizing the organization of the ruling class in the state. Here again, a wide range of options is assumed. The most dangerous scenario is when there is a leader, but the ruling majority does not offer him and the nation the foundations of a viable system of governing the country. This is a direct and obvious threat to leadership. Putin cannot replace the system of government with himself. And “managed democracy” will be of little function in this role - after all, it relied on a bygone standard, on Yeltsin’s infrastructure, and was part of it, an upgrade. How can the winner now manage the country and victory? Here a paradoxical analogy arises with the early Stalin and the political class of that time. That is, Putin will run into the problem on which Stalin’s centrism, which was very successful until the end of the 20s, was distorted and broken. Without presenting the country with a system of regular government, without coping with the paradoxes of rapid growth, the elite did not join the ruling class, and a managerial failure ensued, ending in the degeneration of the leader and the chopping off of heads in the ruling class. Crossbow of the elites - this threat still exists, but it has, of course, more than just Stalin’s solution.

( Mark Urnov: Gleb, for the first time I understood the tragedy of Stalin.

Gleb Pavlovsky: This is the real drama of a politician who failed to properly manage his victory. Typically Russian drama is unprepared for long-term normalization. This risk has arisen many times in Russia and will continue to arise. Anyone who does not see its political meaning is simply a happy idiot.)

And the third task is how to prevent the formation of an “externally controlled political sector” in the country - in the presence of hedonistic elites and a giant neighbor behaving both rationally and insanely? I mean the USA. Today, the task of any Russian leader is to be friends with the United States, while simultaneously limiting American improvisations to the boundaries of the interests of his society and state. This is a difficult task, and Putin, I would say, has so far tackled it surprisingly liberally. While maintaining friendship with America, he does not allow Americans to undergo vivisections in our political process a la Georgia, Iraq or Ukraine. But the threat will grow; America is not emerging from the revolutionary rage. And again, there should be a range of interaction options, besides the favorite one for the old elites - get out of the car, lie on the ground, hands behind your back! This is not the path to a long-term alliance with America.

Here are three problems that the ruling team will work on for a long time, before and after 2008. Thanks to Putin, the ruling class for the first time relies on the trust of the middle class in the state and can become a national ruling class (I mean the nation of all of Russia). That is, elites in the precise sense of the word. Then he will be ready to solve problems that were called “modernization” here. He is obliged to offer his own version of modernity, since for Russia, modernization based on other people’s mythologized ideas about “modernity” is acultural and useless. It will again end in disaster, and we will then dissolve the state twice in one century. In my opinion, the resource of spectator politics has been chosen here.

Among the three tasks there is no “issue about Putin”, since he has solved his personal leadership task - but only the leadership task! Undoubtedly, Putin will be the leader. But who will be the actual ruling class and what exactly will they do? This is a matter of political development that is time to begin. Putin's actions do not compensate for the incapacity of those in power. And the national majority, which will count itself out in the March 2004 vote, will then immediately demand government. The class that this government will formalize will become the irreducible ruling class.

It's time to tell ourselves, the politicians and experts present here: gentlemen, stop clapping and whining, go rule!

( Mark Urnov: Okay. Please note: the first task is to prevent the formation of a soft totalitarian regime. The second task, according to Gleb, is to prevent the formation of a totalitarian-repressive regime. So I understand? There can be two opinions on each of the options.

Gleb Pavlovsky: For every real task in the country there are and will be more than two positions. Let's not pretend that we know everything in advance without discussing and working on it. I assure you, our history is such that in the event of a failure, an evil worse than the old one can always arise, even such as “totalitarianism.” Where there is civilization, there is the risk of its catastrophe and limitless violence due to the fault of a class that has failed to cope with the normal task of ruling. This threatens Putin as much as everyone present here. We can become the ruling class for a long time or enter the class of the doomed.)