Alexander Myachin. Supervise and punish

Supervise and punish
Alexander Myachin

Publication date: February 24, 2004

On February 23 , representatives of Sergei Glazyev’s election headquarters announced the possibility of his refusal to further participate in the presidential election campaign. The reason for the refusal was stated to be dishonest campaign methods and “dirty” technologies widely used against the candidate.

It is noteworthy that these statements were made against the backdrop of the publication by a number of leading sociological services of new data that recorded a drop in Glazyev’s rating.

There is no smoke without fire; the survey data appears to have some validity. However, in any case, this is only part of the truth. Another part of it is that the possible drop in Glazyev’s rating was a direct consequence of the operation carried out on a special scale to neutralize the contender.

The silencing of Glazyev in the Sunday final programs of state television channels (against the backdrop of at least occasional mentions of other candidates) was the final touch that completed the week-long picture of war declared by the Kremlin against the undesirable candidate. On the other hand, the well-known “Moment of Truth” from the Duma elections, using a well-developed technology, has been carefully “pasting” Glazyev into the context of Berezovsky’s “anti-Putin conspiracy” for the second week.

The main blow of the rapidly gaining momentum of the anti-Glazyev campaign fell on the Glazyev-Rodina team. At first, Glazyev was expelled from the Party of Russian Regions with a scandal through the hands of Rogozin and Skokov, and the PRR was renamed “Motherland”. The Kremlin's two-step move was completed by the hasty registration of the newborn "Motherland" by the Ministry of Justice.

The decision of the Ministry of Justice, legitimizing the “coup” in the bloc, clearly showed who is now the boss in Rodina. “No contradictions to the current legislation have been found,” the ministry emphasized, as if warning against possible attempts by Glazyevites to challenge Rogozin’s actions. Glazyev had no choice but to express “regret” about what happened. The first round was won by the Kremlin. Faced with a choice: to engage in a long, tedious and, by and large, futile litigation for the brand, or to abandon an already fairly tarnished and discredited name, Glazyev, apparently, will have to come to terms with the second option.

Only a not very favorable balance of power did not allow Rogozin to carry out a coup in the Duma faction on the crest of success. The first attempt was unsuccessful. But we can confidently believe that she is clearly not the last.

Large attacks alternate with small bites. These include the decision of the Central Election Commission to place in election information posters about the candidates a message about the unreliability of the data provided by Glazyev about his income . The violation cost 47 thousand rubles, which, as it turned out, came from fees that the candidate did not receive for giving lectures at universities. Glazyev, by the way, turned out to be the only violator of the “strict” and “equal to everyone” moral standards of Veshnyakov’s department.

Such more than serious attention to Glazyev’s person can hardly be explained only by the tasks of the current moment, dictated by the rapidly approaching date of March 14.

But something else is obvious: of the rated politicians available today, it is Glazyev who causes the greatest fear among representatives of the “old order”. These forces were forced to make certain concessions in accordance with the spirit of the times and “adapt” to Putin in the hope of reaching an agreement with the new regime and its mutation. They would like to limit the New Deal to changing signs without changing the essence of the oligarchic model of peripheral capitalism created in the country in the early 90s.

In the current situation, the fears of these forces coincide with the interests of the Kremlin administration, which has placed its bets on a landslide victory for the current president. They would like to exclude even the hypothetical threat of a second round, which, in their opinion, Glazyev’s participation in the elections creates. The triumph of March 14 could in this case be considered as the final chord in the process of completing the concentration of power resources, which, among other things, would allow the Kremlin to solve the 2008 problem purely privately, slowly selecting and sifting through different options and combinations.

The development of the situation showed that Glazyev confused the cards for those Kremlin directors who only expected to use him in their game, but underestimated his independence and ambition as a politician claiming to be the leader of nonconformists. The only option left for them was to remove Glazyev from the election campaign. And apparently, the Kremlin was close to accepting exactly this point of view. And a serious campaign to discredit the former leader of Rodina should have prepared public opinion for such a step.

However, other arguments prevailed. After all, Glazyev’s removal could have worsened the situation for Putin himself. The elections, already profaned, would finally be labeled as “no alternative”, which would create a real threat of their failure due to the absence of voters .

Forced to allow Glazyev to participate in the elections, the Kremlin administration must now urgently solve the problem of neutralizing the Glazyev factor - not only in the short term (in view of the threat to Putin’s triumph planned for March 14), but also in the long term (in view of Glazyev’s possible interference in the issue of Putin’s successor, especially relevant in connection with the corresponding recent statement by the President at a meeting with his proxies).

The harsh truth is that after March 14, Putin (while maintaining the current rules of the game) automatically turns into a “lame duck” - and this becomes an additional factor of contradictions in the heterogeneous and fragmented circle around Putin, divided into numerous clans and interest groups. And the unstable balance between them may give Glazyev a chance to become in demand in a situation of acute shortage of promoted candidates for the role of heir.

The question of Glazyev’s participation in the elections thereby turns into a question of viewing a potential change in the current leadership of the country. The criterion for the validity of Glazyev's claims could be a bar of 10% of votes - a result not lower than the percentage of votes cast for Rodina. At the same time, the elections would answer the question: to which of the two leaders of the bloc - Glazyev or Rogozin - does Rodina owe its victory.

Thus, the main task of the anti-Glazyev game (and elections in general) can be considered to prevent Glazyev from going beyond the five percent line, which would mean a more than serious blow to his political ambitions. The split in Rodina turned out to be a very convenient tool for solving this problem. Cutting off Glazyev from the promoted brand , depriving him of the support of the bloc, can thoroughly demoralize the Rodina voter.

And in order for Glazyev’s defeat to become as sensitive as possible and for a long time to discourage him from trying to get ready for the presidential chair, the candidate needs to be knocked down from the second place to which he had set his sights. The “latest” data on candidate ratings, actively promoted by central television channels, should convince the last doubters that Glazyev’s star, having barely risen, has already set.

A notable phenomenon of the week was Nikolai Kharitonov's rise to second place in surveys of leading sociological centers - well, who now dares to reproach Zyuganov for cowardice and short-sightedness? Under no circumstances can the Kremlin afford to give the Zyuganovites new reasons to doubt the advisability of their participation in the elections. After all, all that clearing that Kharitonov is now sprucing up will certainly go to Glazyev in such a situation. Both ORT and RTR now have to show increased sensitivity and attention towards the “main red agrarian” and the faithful admirer of “Iron Felix” .

It seems that that part of Putin’s circle, for which Glazyev is unacceptable under any circumstances, is determined to finally and irrevocably resolve the issue of Glazyev in these elections and remove the problem, which otherwise threatens to turn into a serious headache for the Kremlin for the entire new Putin four-year period and scatter the Kremlin alignment for 2008, which does not allow for any chance or spontaneity.