Alexander Myachin. Don't get excited

Don't get excited
Alexander Myachin

Publication date: February 25, 2004

The majority of domestic political scientists , not to mention the media, spoke favorably of the “tightening of the screws” in relations with Minsk. Indeed, in recent years the Belarusian “father” has managed to turn a significant part of the Russian establishment against himself. Frank demagoguery and reasoning have alienated many from Lukashenko, even among his supporters in Russia. Under the murmur of endless talk about love for Russia and the inevitable union, Lukashenko, all these years, has actually been busy talking about integration processes, in no hurry to part with sole power in the republic.

Therefore, the latest escalation of the gas conflict, which turned out to be the most serious in all the years of integration “pushing” and was accompanied by a complete cessation of gas supplies to the territory of Belarus, caused almost rejoicing in the widest circles of the liberal-patriotic public. The hearts of many of its representatives were filled with genuine joy: finally, the Kremlin showed “Kuzka’s mother” to the Minsk dictator, and moved from exhortations to whipping. The media were filled with expectations of an imminent miracle: now the unyielding “father” will capitulate - a little more, and Minsk will give Moscow the pipe and its most lucrative enterprises, sign an agreement on a single currency and much more...

However, if we leave aside the first vivid power-patriotic emotions and stand on the basis of real politics (with the interests of the players, internal political alignments and geopolitical constants of the process), then the picture will begin to emerge somewhat different.

Real politics has little in common with the moralizing approach that prevailed in assessments of the gas conflict in newspapers and on television. From that position, everything is clear a priori. Who is guilty? - naturally, Lukashenko. So what to do? - of course, force Lukashenko to capitulate at any cost, and even better - remove the Belarusian president, so unloved by Moscow.

Real politics involves operating with categories of political analysis, the quintessence of which is expressed by the question: who benefits from this?

And the answer to this question no longer sounds so optimistic. In the current geopolitical situation, the deterioration of Russian-Belarusian relations is beneficial primarily to anti-Russian circles in the United States and Europe, who are not interested in any significant strengthening of Russian geopolitical positions in the post-Soviet space.

In the current Belarusian internal political realities, the removal of Lukashenko will inevitably mean the coming to power in Minsk of a pro-Western radical nationalist opposition - the Belarusian analogue of the “National Movement” in Georgia or “Our Ukraine”.

The Belarusian reality is that there are no more or less rated pro-Russian politicians in the republic. All these years, Lukashenko has been diligently trampling the clearing around himself, securing for himself a monopoly on the brand of the exponent of the idea of ​​Belarusian-Russian integration. His departure will lead to the virtual destruction of the pro-Russian site. is ready for real participation in the struggle for power in the country Only the irreconcilable anti-Russian opposition .

The gas conflict with Lukashenko occurs against the backdrop of interesting trends in the internal political life of Belarus. For the first time, American emissaries managed to more or less unite the motley crew, mired in squabbles and endless clarifications of “who is more important?” opposition camp.

Shortly before the “gas blackouts,” a symptomatic event occurred in Belarus - the “People’s Coalition “5+” was created . Its stated goal is victory in the upcoming parliamentary elections. But, obviously, the instigators of the association consider it as the vanguard of the future “velvet revolution” in Minsk. The coalition included the United Civil Party, the Belarusian Popular Front, the Party of Communists of Belarus, the Belarusian Social Democratic Hramada and the Belarusian Labor Party, plus numerous non-governmental organizations.

The gas blockade of Belarus caused genuine delight among the leaders of the nationalist opposition, who did not hesitate to burst into angry philippics against Moscow. They sent strict demands to Lukashenko to sever allied relations with Moscow.

The first point of these demands is the withdrawal of Russian military bases from the territory of Belarus - a slogan well known from the events of the recent “velvet revolution” in Georgia. Both there and here (as in Ukraine), the irreconcilable opposition sees one of its main goals as a more definite orientation of its countries towards Euro-Atlantic structures and a reduction in Russian influence in all forms. said “hot on the heels” of the gas conflict As Deputy Chairman of the Belarusian Popular Front (BPF) Yuri Khodyko : “Russia is a foreign country for us. It has been waging a war against Belarus for a long time, and the gas conflict is just one single episode.”

The observed processes in the near abroad increasingly suggest the implementation of a strategy of encircling Russia with a new cordon of unfriendly regimes along the western and southwestern perimeter of the Russian borders. Georgia, it seems, was just the beginning. Next in line are Kyiv and Minsk. Belarus in this strategy looks like an important link, designed to close the emerging insulating semi-ring. In this light, Moscow's actions take on a very ambiguous character.

It is unlikely that Moscow decided to launch a gas attack without probing the position of its Western partners. But, remarkably, their reaction was far from unambiguous. Brussels, for example, did not fail to question the reliability of Moscow as a counterparty. The reaction of Warsaw was even more angry, as it immediately began negotiations with Oslo regarding the possible replacement of Russia by Norway as the main supplier of gas to the Polish market.

If Moscow received sincere applause anywhere, it was primarily in Washington, which has long been preoccupied with the problem of replacing Lukashenko with its protégé. At a recent conference in Riga dedicated to the fate of democracy in the post-Soviet space, the curator of the anti-Lukashenko opposition, Senator John McCain, clearly hinted to Lukashenko about the fate of Saddam Hussein, outlining a mechanism for solving the “Lukashenko problem” - according to the Georgian model, “through free and fair elections.”

Today's gas conflict with Minsk (like the previous "velvet coup" in Tbilisi) again raises a number of questions:

1) Is Moscow really ready to assist Washington in establishing a new order in the post-Soviet space? If this is so, then what are the costs and conditions for Moscow's participation in ensuring new stability?

2) Is Moscow ready to cede Belarus to the United States, which sees Minsk in the future as one of the pillars of Pax America in the CIS?

The situation with Belarus is radically different from the situation with Georgia or Ukraine. Georgia and Ukraine are already part of the US zone of influence, and at best there can only be talk there of jointly ensuring order on the terms of a junior partner, which implies a certain bargaining over the definition and delimitation of areas of responsibility. Belarus today is the only country in the near abroad that is completely included in Russia’s zone of influence and whose foreign policy orbit is firmly tied to the Russian coordinate system.

What is the price set by the Kremlin for Lukashenko’s departure, which will almost certainly mean a pro-Western opposition coming to power in Belarus? $50 per thousand cubic meters of Russian gas supplied to the new democratic Minsk, or somewhat more expensive? And what are the economic and geopolitical benefits or costs of the gas operation? In this case, is Moscow ready to curtail its military presence in Belarus, as it will inevitably have to do in Georgia (even with all the compliance on this issue that Saakashvili is now showing in the hope of quickly gaining Abkhazia)?

3) If this is a model of “liberal (read: oligarchic) ​​imperialism” in action, then to what extent does this model meet Russian national-state interests?

It is obvious that the problem of Lukashenko, who has turned into a brake on full-fledged Russian-Belarusian integration, must be solved. But it is also obvious that Moscow has done little to ensure a painless resolution in Russian interests. The time for a possible favorable decision has been lost - and this, apparently, was the period of 2002 - early 2003, when the United States was seriously occupied with Afghanistan and Iraq.

But most importantly, in the example of Belarus, a long-standing disease of Russian foreign policy has made itself fully felt - the problem of training and educating pro-Russian political actors in neighboring countries. Until this problem receives an adequate solution, any economic mechanisms will inevitably stall and integration initiatives will fade.

As for the immediate results of the gas conflict with Minsk, we have:

- The idea of ​​a union with Belarus has been seriously discredited.

- The whole cart of gas and other “economic” problems in relations with Lukashenko remains in place.

- The trust of European consumers in Moscow has been undermined.

- American plans regarding Belarus have become closer to implementation.

I would not like that after some time the famous phrase, expressing the cruel absurdity of Russian politics, would become applicable to the Belarusian situation: “they wanted the best, but it turned out...”