Egor Kholmogorov. Go reign

Go reign
Egor Kholmogorov

Publication date: February 25, 2004

The resignation of Mikhail Kasyanov's cabinet has been expected almost since its formation. The first rumors that Kasyanov would be removed appeared almost before he was appointed. And as a result, either because it is boring to wait for the inevitable to never happen, or because the resignation of the cabinet did not fit into the usual logic of electoral and political two-steps, everyone was very surprised.

However, what was even more surprising was not Kasyanov’s resignation, but the fact that Putin decided to resign. Although it seems like who else should decide? Nevertheless, it was assumed that the departure of the cabinet would happen “somehow,” by itself. The first reaction of the political community to the president’s decision looks something like this: “Wow, he also knows how to remove prime ministers...” - and this is after four years of ratingocracy, without five minutes of a “cult of personality” and Putin’s seemingly more than once demonstrated ability to decide .

This amazement and even resentment of the “political party” that the president apparently does not know “how such things are usually done” is very indicative. We poorly understand and feel the evolution of the political regime, using cloth journalistic (not even political science) clichés. And, not understanding the nature of political power - neither in general, nor here and now - we find ourselves unable, let alone predict, or even adequately respond to any significant events in the history of this power. The current style of political science analysis is characterized by attention only to bureaucratic practice and apparatus intrigue , and if we take into account that one cannot live without the other, then Russian politics is reduced in this analysis to apparatus politics. There is, of course, also so-called “public politics” - all kinds of elections. The cutting of budgets, the struggle of some similar programs - but all this passes more likely into the section of television criticism - in the same category as "Hunger", "Windows" and "People's Artist". Current political analysis does not see political power in its totality and specific manifestations.

Meanwhile, on February 24, 2004, Russia switched to a political regime of personal power . Everything was ready for this coming of the new order, the soil was plowed, fertilized, seeds were sown, canals were laid, even weeds were weeded out here and there. And yet it came as a surprise, although such a surprise in which it was absolutely clear what to do and how to behave. The reaction of the ministers, who greeted their resignation with unanimous, warm public approval, showed “what a millennium we have in our yard, dear ones.” Obviously - the third. The term “regime of personal power,” which originally denoted the system of De Gaulle’s Fifth Republic during the reign of the general himself, was used in our country before to denote the Yeltsin regime. The 1993 Constitution itself, in terms of the rights and powers of the president, was translated from French. However, everyone understood that the Yeltsin regime was a regime of personal anarchy , that is, a situation where immense powers of power are concentrated in the hands of one person, but this person uses them disorderly, unsystematically and under the influence of random influences. The constitutional power of the president was reliably limited by his personal weakness and the mutual influence of competing political factions.

Putin's "first term" regime was a strict antithesis to Yeltsin's. It was a regime of impersonal power . Authority, prestige, even popular adoration, but not the actual use of power, were concentrated on the first person of the state. Power as such was reliably fragmented and divided between several structures, and for most of Putin’s presidential term he had real co-rulers - the head of the administration and the head of the government, and competing centers of power were created within the administration and government themselves. Unlike the Yeltsin system, this system ultimately exercised power - quite systematically and more or less effectively. However, this power could hardly be called presidential. Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin and the President of the Russian Federation existed as if separately, and often Putin did not agree with the president on everything, sometimes he could influence him only by the force of his personal opinion, sometimes he was forced to intrigue - as one of the officials of his own administration. And, really, if Putin did not have his own apparatus experience, his role in this system would be much more modest than it actually is.

The situation was in many ways reminiscent of the one in which royal power found itself in France in the first half of the 17th century - ministers strengthened royal power, but not the power of the king. The Voloshin administration (and here we must give Alexander Stalyevich his due) strengthened the presidential power vertical as best it could, but not the presidential power vertical. Personally, Putin, as the bearer of power, could rely in this apparatus environment only on a certain number of personal friends and associates. And then each of their strengthening was perceived by the system quite painfully and forced it to become angry - even to the point of public attacks in the appropriately oriented press...

Let’s not guess what political processes led to the situation changing. The corresponding process took place in 2003 before our eyes, but no one really understood anything about it. Either Putin’s KGB friends won some important victory in the administrative apparatus struggle and managed to put real unlimited constitutional power at the feet of their overlord. Either the system, faced with too serious a challenge from the “oligarchic conspiracy” (if there really was one), was forced to turn to that source of power that is higher than hardware coordination. Or what else happened... One way or another, the Khodorkovsky case catalyzed the complete transfer of power into the hands of Putin in approximately the same way as (if we continue our slightly superficial and not very binding analogy with France in the 17th century) the arrest and imprisonment of Fouquet completed the formalization of the regime of personal the power of Louis XIV.

Within a few months, after slight pushes from the outside, the regime of impersonal power liquidated itself - first, “First Minister” Alexander Voloshin left the stage, replaced by a personal friend. Voloshin's removal was the first signal that from now on Putin would rule himself. Then, prepared by the previous administration and brought to mind by Putin, an “electoral revolution” took place, giving Putin an absolute majority in the State Duma . With several tough and outspoken gestures, “public policy” was abolished, and the presidential elections were turned into an outright farce that was not very interesting to Putin himself. And finally, the last, final stage: the actual abolition of the only constitutionally alternative center of power to the president - the government and the prime minister. At this point, the power revolution can be considered complete, the regime of personal power can be considered fully formed, and the upcoming presidential elections will be a referendum on confidence in the new regime. Now it finally becomes clear why Putin sought with such frankness to clear the “electoral field” of any unnecessary and inconvenient rivals. When the presidential elections are being transformed into a referendum on a new policy, any extraneous, purely ideological differences that force one to vote not for or against Putin, but for one of his competitors, seem to him absolutely inappropriate. The nation will be asked one question - whether it accepts Putin-2, and not questions about whether it likes the programs of Glazyev, Khakamada or Kharitonov more.

The fate of the new government is not so important now. It is obvious that the new prime minister, in any case, will not be Chernomyrdin, nor Primakov, nor Kasyanov. They will try to completely take away from the government its status as an alternative source of power, the center of the “bureaucratic opposition” to the supreme power represented by the president. And this is quite natural - the “Government of the Russian Federation” performed by Mikhail Kasyanov was the executive body of the “President of the Russian Federation” under the leadership of Alexander Voloshin; and the point here is not in the “family” nature of these political characters, but in the political culture they represent. After the “President of the Russian Federation” completely merged with Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, there could no longer be any “Government of the Russian Federation,” especially under the control of Mikhail Mikhailovich Kasyanov. Without changing the Constitution, it would be impossible to abolish the cabinet. Therefore, the most likely options for his transformation are the following: either the post of head of government will turn into the post of vice president (which it is according to the Constitution), and a “successor” will be appointed to this post, or Putin will look for his “Colbert” - a brilliant a technocrat who will be able to fulfill the task assigned to him of doubling GDP, as well as any other tasks of the same plan.

The fact that Putin considered it necessary to carry out his “constitutional coup” before the elections, and even to tell voters that they have the opportunity to approve his future course together with the president, suggests that the second option is more likely. Either the prime minister or key cabinet figures after such a promise will have to symbolize a certain socio-economic policy. Otherwise, a natural question will arise: “Why at all?”

This policy can be of only two kinds - either it will be a policy of “continuation of reforms,” that is, a liberal-monetarist course with the same emphasis on the manipulation of financial instruments and the destruction of everything that does not seem “economically efficient.” That is, in essence, this will be the office of “Gaidar #2”, but without the destructive pathos of the latter.

Either the country will be offered technocratic innovation, an emphasis on industrial development, on new technologies, and in the social sphere - careful, not landslide reforms. Which of these possibilities Putin will choose and which specific figure it will be represented by is premature to guess; Having set out to surprise, Putin, I believe, will continue surprises. But in any case, the new government will not resemble, either structurally or functionally, the previous cabinet. From now on, it will be Putin’s office and no one else. And the phrase “ look here and listen to what I say ” will never be repeated at meetings again, for lack of a reason.

The path that the country will take under the leadership of personal power is good or bad, or more precisely, in what proportions good and bad will be mixed, we do not know. But from now on, responsibility will rest with only one person. A man who has been the nation's favorite political enigma for too long and has spent too much time in the position of "promising man." Today the country, and Putin himself - can rightfully quote the words of Count Bennigsen, spoken to Alexander I on the night of the assassination of Emperor Pavel Petrovich:

- Stop being childish. Go reign.