Sergey Romashko. Here a quiet angel flew by

Here a quiet angel flew by
On the fifth anniversary of the Kosovo operation

Sergey Romashko

Publication date: February 26, 2004

During war events, they were archived and if they surface in the information flow, it is only in the form of curiosities. Thus, recently in German publications notes were published that a certain French transport company, together with its Romanian “daughter,” filed a lawsuit against Germany and other countries participating in the Kosovo operation for a total amount of about 10 million euros due to the fact that the collapsed During the bombing, bridges over the Danube caused serious damage to river navigation. Businessmen are unlikely to receive compensation, just as the Serbian victims of the bombings who presented their claims to Germany last year did not receive it: the court explained to them that individuals do not have the right to compensation from the state and that such issues are resolved at the interstate level. Formally, everything is correct, but I would just like to imagine how this bombed-out state makes claims to those who destroyed it. Of course, you can present it, but that’s not why so much money was spent on military operations.

However, all this, using the language of official military representatives, were “side effects” of the military operation that ended with the occupation of the autonomous region. What is the main result? Perhaps, before our eyes, a model of a new Balkan democratic society with a modern dynamic economy is emerging? There are dynamics, however, but of a different kind.

Neither before the start of the operation, nor after its completion, no one seriously thought about how to transform the already problematic Albanian paramilitary society of the Kosovo region into a more or less normal social structure. The farce of dressing up UCHK fighters as local law enforcement officers could not give anything other than what it gave: criminalized armed structures, including those involved in the persecution of the non-Albanian population (Serbs, Gypsies, Jews). Part of the UCHK directly became organized crime without any formal cover. The international forces located in Kosovo under the UN flag (18 thousand military and 4 thousand police) are able to maintain only the appearance of some order, while in fact ensuring their own security and the security of the UN mission. It seems without much success, because the territory of the international administration in the region increasingly resembles a fortified area rather than the headquarters of democracy.

In the time since the military operation, the Serbian population of the Kosovo region has halved, from 10 to 5 percent. According to the Hague Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, in the region in 2003 alone, 1,192 Serbs were killed, 1,305 were wounded, and 1,303 were kidnapped. Data for other years are no better. Monuments of Serbian culture are constantly being destroyed.

The amazing fusion of political, ethnic and religious extremism and criminal structures that has emerged in Kosovo is turning the region into yet another “special region.” This “base” connects the West and the East not at all in a poetic sense. First of all, Kosovo has become the most important source of drug smuggling into Europe. About 80 percent of the heroin entering Europe comes from Kosovo, and this is not just transit: powerful laboratories for its production have already been established here. In addition, the region's criminal structures are involved in smuggling cigarettes and weapons, and trafficking in women. Besides this, so to speak, economic component of Kosovo's contribution to globalization, there is also a more subtle, “spiritual” component: the growing influence of religious extremism . It is no coincidence that the actions of paramilitary groups in Kosovo gave rise to talk about the “Balkan Taliban.”

The worst part is that no one has any clear ideas about what to do next. The problem itself will not resolve; there is no hope for it. The Serbs consider Kosovo theirs, and the Albanians too. There is no way out of this situation. Negotiations between Serbs and Albanians that began at the end of last year in Vienna were only about the return of Serbian refugees to the region. Behind the Albanians' demand for independence looms the specter of Greater Albania, and no one knows whether international organizations have the means to deal with this specter. Otherwise, Europeans will have to answer an unpleasant question: what is better for them - Greater Serbia or Greater Albania? The choice is sad.

Even in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the initial situation was somewhat “better” (if that word is appropriate here), the open conflict suppressed by force and after a longer period did not lead to any positive results. It is impossible to talk about Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state (and even more so as a society): these are just three ethnic zones, each of which exists on its own and continues to cherish the local ideology of national enmity. The fact that they no longer shoot in Bosnia can be considered a definite achievement, but they didn’t shoot under Tito either. The fundamental problem with Balkan peacekeeping operations is that intervention in the conflict was in support of one of the warring parties , after which it is extremely difficult - even with the best will in the world - to move on to actually resolving the conflict rather than suppressing it.

"Undefeated" Kosovo remains a powerful destabilizing factor in the Balkans. Macedonia , already experiencing many difficulties , found itself under constant pressure. As for Serbia... If we leave aside the attempts of Albanian extremists to transfer the “Kosovo model” to southern Serbia with Albanian settlements, then the result here is not the best. The attack on Kosovo itself was aimed - in a more general perspective - at eliminating Yugoslavia as an independent force in south-eastern Europe. Eliminated. Over the past years, the process of “democratization” has not brought any positive results: a “crooked” and powerless economy without any prospects for recovery, the criminalization of society, a rickety political system that fully reflects the pathology of Serbian history in the twentieth century. True, Serbia, it seems, may finally have a government, which Vojislav Kostunica has undertaken to form. But this will be a minority government, which is therefore unlikely to be able to seriously change the current situation for the better. The Serbs, judging by the results of the parliamentary elections, in which pro-Western politicians failed miserably, will remember the “brotherly hand of the West” for a long time.