Translated material
[Radio Liberty: Programs: Economics]
New defaults in Russia? ..
How are new defaults likely in Russia? It turns out that it is quite likely, although - and not in the coming months. The assumption that the closest audit of the Russian economy for sustainability will be the fall of world oil prices was already common.
"The default would be useful to Russia, we even wait for it to check the new mechanisms for regulating the financial market ...". Approximately such a statement - we give it in the opposite, apparently, translation from English - sounded just a week ago. In London, at an investment conference in Russia. The most intriguing moment is that these words said - in an interview with the British newspaper Financial Times - not anyone, but the chairman of the Russian Federal Commission for Securities!
But - let's explain right away. Unlike the situation in August 1998, when the default for its obligations expressed in bonds was announced by the Russian state, this time we are talking about the market of so -called corporate bonds. That is, debt obligations of individual Russian companies or enterprises. Some of them, especially large ones, place their bonds abroad. But today we will say only the domestic market of such bonds nominated in rubles. The topic opens - from Moscow - analyst of the international rating agency Standard & Poor's Elena Anankina:
Elena Anankina: Ruble bond market began after the 1998 crisis and it began with “blue chips”. That is, from the well -known enterprises of the fuel and energy complex and metallurgy, which conducted the "intelligence of the battle" - before the production of Eurobonds. Since then, the composition of the market participants has become much more diverse. Now in Russia is one of the largest domestic bond markets in Eastern Europe - more than $ 5 billion.
Sergey Seninsky: Russian companies of which sectors and from which regions do they primarily turn to the Russian market for debt obligations today in order to take money for their own development on it?
Elena Anankina: Now there are several large borrowers in the ruble bond market. In addition to well -known companies - “blue chips” - Gazprom, Magnitogorsk Metallurgical Plant, TNC, Alrosa ... For them, this is simply an addition to international borrowings, which allows you to slightly reduce currency risks ... In addition to these companies, medium -sized enterprises have entered the market of ruble bonds, not only Moscow but also regional, as well as banks.
The industry structure of these borrowers is much wider. There are chemical enterprises, and the food industry and transporters .... Examples can serve as Nizhnekamskneftekhim, East-Line-Domodedovo, Ural Cosmetic Concern Kalina, Severstal-Auto and others ...
Sergey Seninsky: Our second interlocutor in Moscow is an analyst at Troika -Dialog investment company Alexander Kudrin:
Alexander Kudrin: If you look at the industry structure of borrowers in the Ruble corporate bond market, then the leading positions are occupied by oil and gas sectors, which account for about 16% of the market. It is also worth mentioning that companies of various sizes are represented in the bond market: from giants such as Gazprom and RAO UES of Russia, to companies whose volume of annual sales does not exceed $ 100 million. Therefore, we can say that this market, at least at this stage, is open to many companies, and many companies are now using this opportunity to occupy money in the open market ...
Sergey Seninsky: We talked about corporate bond issuers, that is, their sellers. And now - about the most typical buyers of such bonds?
Alexander Kudrin: More than 50% of the corporate ruble bond market is controlled by Russian commercial banks. The share of institutional investors - investment funds, insurance funds, pension funds - due to their underdevelopment - is very small.
As for foreign investors, the current legislation, namely, the “N” type account, through which investments are made in corporate bonds, creates noticeable obstacles to foreign capital to this market. Perhaps the situation for foreign investors in this market will change this year, when a new law on foreign exchange regulation enters into force. But for now, talk about it prematurely ...
Elena Anankina: As I understand it, Russian investors now prevail among buyers of ruble bonds. These are banks, investment companies, and so on. Many foreign portfolio investors are also interested in ruble bonds, but so far they mainly prefer the papers of large and well -known companies, since the risks of investing in Russia remain high. When a pension reform will go in Russia, Russian pension funds should be the largest investors ...
Sergey Seninsky: Companies strive to take money in the debt market - is it only because it is cheaper today than taking a bank loan, or are there any other reasons?
Elena Anankina: The release of bonds allows you to expand the base of investors and create a public credit history. It is unlikely that bonds - in the long run - can be much cheaper than loans, since their nature is the same: these are debt obligations. Although interest rates on the market of ruble bonds and Russian bank loans are now really low. For example, borrowers such as Gazprom can be “placed” at interest, which are lower than inflation.
Bonds and bank loans are now available! .. Since high oil prices provide an influx of money to Russia. But this phenomenon is largely temporary, since with a significant drop in oil prices, it may stop ...
Alexander Kudrin: There are several reasons why companies seek to enter the bond market. Firstly, this, of course, is the creation of a public credit history, which will subsequently allow them to easily refinance their current debts. Secondly, this is the possibility of attracting cheaper monetary resources. And finally, the issue of bonds does not require the formation of a pledge, which is often a prerequisite for obtaining a bank loan.
Sergey Seninsky: The pledge is for obtaining a loan ... Do you mean Russian practice?
Alexander Kudrin: Yes, this, first of all, applies to Russian commercial banks. But I must say that the market for ruble corporate bonds now for the most part is used by those issuers who are not able to enter the Western market.
Elena Anankina: If we talk about entering the ruble bond market, as a way to attract large amounts of borrowing, then this is not the case yet. The ruble bond market is about 5% of the total amount of loans issued by Russian banks. This market is small, but it grows very quickly!
Sergei Seninsky: If we generally compare the current holders of Russian corporate ruble bonds with those who "stumbled upon" in the August default in 1998, albeit in another category of bonds - state. How different, in your opinion, are these categories of investors?
Elena Anankina: Many investors are the same, but over the past time and domestic investors, the past and domestic investors have learned a lot. And they began to seriously relate to credit risks of Russian borrowers.
In general, corporate defaults in the market is an inevitable thing! In order to cope with this risk, investors simply collect papers of different borrowers in their portfolio, calculate the risks of all borrowers and demand from each borrower such profitability that would compensate for the risk of corporate default.
Defolt on state bonds is much more serious than the default on the papers of a separate company. Since state default is a crisis of the country's financial system ...
Alexander Kudrin: Yes, of course, the categories of investors differ significantly. In 1998, approximately 30% of the market accounted for foreign investors, while now there are practically no ruble corporate bonds on the market of ruble corporate bonds.
If you look at the structure of Russian investors, then Sberbank played a significant role in the public bond market in 1998, the share of which in the current Ruble corporate bond market is extremely small.
In addition, if you look at the pre -crisis situation, then the widest circle of Russian economic agents was involved in the market of ruble government bonds, which, after default, seemed to have forever lost interest in financial markets.
Sergey Seninsky: What in 1998 followed in Russia after the default declared by the state, I think many still remember well. But if - suddenly - in the foreseeable future, mass defaults in the corporate bonds of Russian companies ... in your opinion, the consequences will differ - not so much for the investors themselves, but as a whole for the country?
Alexander Kudrin: I immediately want to stipulate that mass defaults in the corporate bond market are currently unlikely to be possible! The fact is that interest rates in the domestic Russian market are very low, which allows many companies to easily refinance their debt. If you still assume that a series of defaults will occur in the ruble corporate bonds, then the consequences of these events for the economy will be very significant.
The fact is that many companies will lose the opportunity to borrow money in the open market, that is, to attract investments that can affect the pace of economic growth ...
Elena Anankina: Although since 1998 there have been no defaults in the ruble bonds of the default bonds, but the defaults of individual unreliable borrowers are an inevitable phenomenon in this market.
So that the first defaults that appear in this market do not lead to a panic, a culture of credit risk management is needed. By the way, credit ratings that Standard & Poor's make are needed to predict the credit state of a borrower. There are many years of statistical observations that show the probability of default for each specific borrower having one or another rating.
Mass corporate defaults in Russia now, when the economy on the rise, in my opinion, is unlikely. Yes, since the Russian economy is concentrated in the oil and gas sector, some borrowers may experience difficulties when falling oil prices. At the same time, the flow of money for the financial markets of Russia will decrease. But this is already a “stress” scenario for the country, and not the question of the default of each particular borrower ...
Alexander Kudrin: By and large, it is impossible to compare the consequences of possible defaults in the corporate bond market with what happened in 1998. Here we are talking about possible defaults on private debts, while in 1998 there was a default on state debts. That is, for those tools that are designed to be landmarks for the establishment of interest rates, and are the basis for the entire financial system of the country.
Nevertheless, I would like to say that investors should not forget the consequences of 1998. Nevertheless, this is a great, albeit negative, experience that can be useful in the current conditions in the corporate bond market ...
Sergey Seninsky: Thanks to our interlocutors in Moscow. Let me remind you that the programs of the program were answered by the analyst of the international rating agency Standard & Poor's Elena Anankina and the analyst of the Troika -Dialog investment company Alexander Kudrin. "The first of the Russian power plants found a foreign manager" ... The first case in Russia when the local power station is transferred to the management of a large foreign energy company - albeit with a Russian partner. Last week, the winner of the special competition, which was organized by the RAO UES of Russia, for the right to manage for 3 years of the North-Western TPP, which was organized near St. Petersburg, was known. This is the joint venture of the Italian company ENEL, the second energy company of Europe, by 60% of the Italian government, and the Russian company ECH. Our interlocutor is an analyst in the electric power industry of the financial corporation Nikoil Matvey Tayz. What is the share of the North-Western TPP in the total volume of electricity production in the north-west of Russia. And why was this station chosen for the competition? Matvey Thaz: The share of the North-Western CHP in the production of power plants in the North-Western region is 7%, but this is without the accounting of nuclear power plants. Why was this station chosen? - It's hard to say. One can only assume ... After all, the North -Western CHP is one of the latest energy objects. And the further development of this project is associated with the involvement of private investments. I think this is one of the most important reasons. Sergey Seninsky: Under the terms of the competition, the winner is prohibited from alienation of any assets of the station, you can only manage it for three years. Why did such a ban arise? Matvey Thaz: The management company acts, in fact, the role of the sole executive body, and, accordingly, the competence of this body includes alienation of assets, including. It can be assumed that in this way the organizers of the competition were safe from possible sales of assets. Although the issue of selling assets should be resolved by the board of directors, which represents the interests of shareholders. But I think this is not the most important restriction in this competition. Sergey Seninsky: Which restriction is more significant? Matvey Taiz: I think more importantly, the winner of the competition will not be able to buy this station within five years after the management agreement is signed. This restriction is due to the fact that the management company can - potentially - to influence the cost of this station, and thus create more favorable conditions for its further purchase. The terms of the competition were stipulated that within five years from the date of signing the contract, the management company will not be able to buy this station - in case of a possible sale of a package of shares. Thus, the organizers of the competition insured against the possibility of absorption of this station on an uncompetitive basis ... Sergey Seninsky: That is, the station management agreement is signed for 3 years, and you can’t buy a station for 5 years? Matvey Thaz: Yes, the management contract is signed for three years, then it can be extended for another year. But, nevertheless, from the end of the already extended contract until the purchase of the company should pass, at least a year ... Sergey Seninsky: But what is the purely commercial interest of the winner of the competition? Matvey Thaz: During the tender, applicants for the management of thermal power plants in their applications also indicated the amount of remuneration, as well as, probably, compensation for management costs. That is, the management company will receive some reward for managing these assets ... Sergey Seninsky: Electricity, which the North -Western CHP will generate "under the control of" a Russian -Italian company, is intended only for the domestic market, or it - theoretically - can it be supplied, say, to neighboring Finland? Matvey Thaz: In fact, electricity generated by the North-Western TPP enters the regulated segment of the Russian electricity market. And the export of electricity is controlled by RAO "UES of Russia". And a direct export contract is most likely an exception to the rules. As far as I know, there is currently one such "direct" contract - "Lenenergo" with the Finnish company Fortum ... Sergey Seninsky: Thank you, I recall that an analyst at the program of the financial corporation Nikoil Matvey Tyz answered questions in Moscow. The Economist A review of some publications of the next issue of the British weekly "Economist". He went out on Friday, February 27. Maria Klein will introduce you to the review: Maria Klein: Almost all of the ten European countries, which from May 1, 2004 will join the European Union, were discouraged by the plans of Western European countries either to limit the possibilities of free employment for their citizens, or, as the UK proposed, reduce social insurance for them. But Malta kept some suspicious silence. And - no wonder, writes "Economist". For the Maltese citizens, if they want to work in Western Europe, there will be no restrictions. At the same time, Malta itself retains the right to limit labor migration from other countries of the European Union, if it considers it necessary. These norms are only part of more than 70 exceptions that Malta was able to achieve in negotiations on joining the EU. The second of the most successful negotiators was Poland - 43 exceptions for her of general rules. The third was Latvia - 32 exceptions. Such "transitional norms" give extra time to the new EU participants - to introduce the norms of the European Union that are most difficult to fulfill them overnight. For example, to increase to the European level taxes on cigarettes, stop large -scale subsidies or introduce new standards in animal husbandry. Some of the measures of the "transition period" were imposed by the European Union himself, fearing sudden competition. The restriction of free employment in the West is one of them. Another example: farmers of the countries of Central Europe will receive smaller subsidies from a pan -European treasury in the first years than their Western colleagues. But, nevertheless, the majority of "transitional measures" are, in fact, individual privileges of countries that again recover in the EU. And the question arises: why did Malta received more than these privileges - one of the most prosperous among all the candidate countries, not burdened with either the communist past or internal social problems? One of the reasons, according to the professor of the University of Maltese, is that Malt was able to use the factor of tiny size of the country in the EU negotiating in the EU. Действительно, глядя из Брюсселя, совсем по-разному воспринимаются исключения для страны с населением в 400 тысяч человек и, скажем, Польши, где живут 40 миллионов. Кроме того, Мальта сумела убедить Евросоюз в том, что, по некоторым меркам, она - самая населенная страна в мире. Во многом именно этим объясняется одни из наиболее значимых её привилегий в ЕС: во-первых, право ограничивать в течение 7-ми лет приток рабочих из-за рубежа, а во-вторых, сохранить на неопределенный срок запрет на покупку недвижимости иностранцами, заключает "Экономист". В мае 1993 года Бернд Пишетсридер возглавил компанию BMW. Компания была на подъеме и все успешнее конкурировала с Mercedes-Benz. В январе следующего года Пишетсридер решил купить британскую компанию Rover. Однако BMW оказалась не в состоянии по-настоящему возродить её, убытки баварской компании исчислялись миллиардами, и разгневанный совет директоров расстался с г-ном Пишетсридером, пишет "Экономист". В мае 2003 года Бернд Пишетсридер возглавил компанию Volkswagen. Спустя год она оказалась в самом худшем положении за последнее десятилетие. Последние данные демонстрируют падение прибылей компании почти вдвое. Следует признать, правда, что, хотя проблемы Volkswagen и проявились при нынешнем её руководителе, возникли они еще до его прихода. Спад прибыли был во многом обусловлен крупными тратами компании в Бразилии. Как и большинство других автомобильных корпораций, Volkswagen провел здесь солидную реструктуризацию своих заводов как раз во время кризиса 1999 года. Однако надежды на возрождение местного автомобильного рынка - после кризиса - увы, не оправдались. Не вдохновили покупателей и последние разработки компании. Их готовило еще прежнее руководство Volkswagen. Речь - не только о лимузине Phaeton за 90 тысяч долларов, но и о последней модели Golf, одном из главных источников прибыли компании. Да, он нашпигован техническими новинками, но выглядит при этом скучно, а стоит - явно дороже, чем готовы за него платить те покупатели, на которых рассчитан этот автомобиль. Все прошлые годы Volkswagen, на зависть конкурентам, мог продавать свои модели дороже, чем они. Теперь же компания вынуждена впервые предлагать скидки на Golf - главный свой продукт. Проявились и другие проблемы. Скажем, на американском рынке дела у Volkswagen шли неплохо, но подкосил их дешевый доллар. Или - в Китае, где еще недавно компания занимала почти половину рынка. Сегодня в эту страну устремились все. Как 10 лет назад - в Бразилию. Ценовая конкуренция резко возросла, и доля Volkswagen на китайском рынке сократилась уже до одной трети. Наконец, "домашняя" проблема. Главный акционер Volkswagen - региональное правительство, федеральной земли Нижняя Саксония. А потому компания не в силах сократить ни численность работников, ни объемы выпуска - даже если дела пойдут плохо. И чтобы местные заводы компании оставались прибыльными, нужно продавать очень много автомобилей. Специальный местный закон не позволяет любому другому инвестору иметь больше голосов в компании Volkswagen, чем у правительства Нижней Саксонии. Однако Европейская комиссия все настойчивее добивается отмены этого закона, как противоречащего европейскому корпоративному законодательству. В этом случае Volkswagen, если собственные дела не улучшатся, явно становится объектом поглощения. Что же касается нынешнего руководства, то проблема Бернда Пишетсридера в том, что он возглавил весьма успешную компанию ровно в тот момент, когда её будущий спад только зарождался. Теперь ему необходимо повернуть тенденцию вспять, причем - быстро, заключает "Экономист".