Alexander Khramchikhin. Victory is just around the corner

Victory is just around the corner
Alexander Khramchikhin

Publication date: March 3, 2004

Today , Chechnya can perhaps be considered Putin’s only real, and not “PR” success. That is, this is the only serious problem facing the country, in the solution of which over the past four years there has been no rollback or, at best, marking time, but difficult and painful, but still progress.

Russia could have won the first Chechen war. Despite the catastrophic start to that campaign for the federal forces, by mid-1995 the enemy was practically defeated. Basayev's raid on Budennovsk (like the seizure of Nord-Ost seven years later) is a typical gesture of despair. But since all the Russian media at that moment worked for the separatists, this event was interpreted in exactly the opposite way - as an indicator of the omnipotence of the bandits. Subsequently, the first war was simply a game of giveaway on our part, so it could not help but be lost. Like the Americans in Vietnam, we lost to our own people, not to the enemy. The “voluntary” defeat demoralized both the army and the population, which allowed the separatists to build a gangster nest in “Ichkeria.” Their further expansion in the Caucasus was clearly predetermined at the moment of signing the Khasavyurt Agreements .

The only reason for the failure of the Chechen attack on Dagestan was the harsh resistance from the local population. This was an unpleasant shock to the separatist leaders, but they were still confident that they could defend their territory, since large losses would again lead the Russians into a state of panic. In this sense, the bombings of houses in Russian cities were a very strong and correct move. In reality, they caused the opposite effect, but the separatists did not realize this. In addition, they quite reasonably hoped for help from the West. At the beginning of the second campaign, the militants fought as a regular army, trying to hold territory and populated areas. This was a grave mistake, since the federal forces had an overwhelming advantage in firepower and complete air superiority. In addition, no matter what inhuman conditions the Russian soldier’s own superiors put him in, he still fights well, this is how it happened historically.

As a result, by March 2000, the entire territory of Chechnya was occupied by federal troops, while the separatists suffered huge losses, which significantly undermined their ability to further resist. The guerrilla war with attacks by relatively large gangs on convoys and targets of federal forces lasted only a few months, until the fall of 2000. After this, the enemy dried up. This is confirmed by the figures of our losses: in the first year of the war, more military personnel died than in the next 3.5 years.

Since then, the separatists have been waging a war of sabotage and terrorism , for which the number of personnel plays practically no role, and they are not fighting against the army (they have no strength for that), but almost exclusively against their own people, i.e. Chechens helping the legitimate government, and now also against the civilian population of the rest of Russia, primarily in the regions of the North Caucasus adjacent to Chechnya and in Moscow. At the same time, kamikaze tactics are increasingly being used. It should be noted that both killing one’s own and killing oneself is completely uncharacteristic for Chechnya. Adat (custom) here has always been stronger than Sharia (Islamic law), and part of adat is blood feud and the ability to kill the enemy while remaining alive. Thus, either the republican government formed by Moscow poses a real threat to the separatists, or there are fewer and fewer Chechens in the ranks of the gangs. Apparently, we can talk about the presence of both factors.

For all the uniqueness of Akhmad Kadyrov and his closest associates, they represent a real force, and the situation has developed in such a way that they will have to go with Moscow to the end. At the same time, the gangs, as already mentioned, suffered very serious losses at the initial stage of the war (and during the 1994-1996 campaign, their losses were very noticeable), and mostly ethnic Chechens died. A considerable part of the Chechens laid down their arms, either simply tired of fighting, or by agreement with Kadyrov. As a result, the proportion of non-Chechens in the bandit groups has sharply increased. These are, firstly, Muslims from all over the world, fighting for an idea (although they do not refuse money), and secondly, ordinary mercenaries, including Slavs. It was foreign Muslims who introduced kamikaze tactics into the actions of gangs.

Thus, the first Chechen war and the beginning of the second were for Russia the suppression of an armed rebellion with the aim of separating part of the territory from the country. Now the conflict is, on the one hand, a civil war in Chechnya itself, and on the other, a reflection of external aggression on the part of forces that are commonly referred to as “international terrorism.” This, by the way, makes any negotiations with the formal leaders of the separatists useless. They no longer belong to themselves, so they cannot make any peace, even if they want to.

Having already lost both the classical war and the guerrilla war, the enemy can now wage a terrorist and information war indefinitely. The human and financial resources for this are essentially inexhaustible, since they are located outside the borders of Russia. It is impossible to inflict any military defeat in this way, even on a country less powerful than ours, but this infinity itself has a detrimental effect on the state of public opinion. The losses of federal forces in Chechnya are less than the losses of our army outside its borders from hazing, accidents and disasters, careless handling of weapons, etc. (and in Chechnya itself, not all of our losses are combat), and the losses of the civilian population from terrorist attacks are several orders of magnitude less than from road accidents, man-made and natural disasters, murders, etc., but the psychological effect is completely different. Moreover, the media, although they do not wage such a frenzied fight against their own people as during the first war, do not provide much support either. So it all comes down to psychology.

Until recently, in our country, and almost throughout the world, there was a strong belief that the United States was terrified of any losses in the war, since they were poorly perceived by society. Therefore, the Americans can only crush the enemy from the air, but are not capable of conducting contact battles. The war in Iraq demonstrated that this is not the case. If the public believes that the war is just, it is willing to accept losses. Of course, she will not accept senseless losses, but she will accept inevitable losses. In this case, the army fights using all methods, including contact. The paradox is that for us the war in Chechnya is more just than for the Americans the war in Iraq. Nevertheless, our media, even having stopped romanticizing bandits, strenuously explain to military personnel that they are fighting for unjust goals, for “someone else’s money.” This demoralizes the army and only leads to increased losses. The goals are quite righteous, the country is interested in victory, especially since the Dudayev-Maskhadov regime has no right to exist from any point of view.

On the other hand, appealing to the consciousness and patriotism of our journalists is, perhaps, useless, and if the authorities take on the task of bringing everyone to a common opinion, then it will inevitably turn out “as always,” which is what we see every day on state television channels. Even in America today there are certain concerns about the fate of democracy, and here, with our traditions...

Therefore, we must continue to put pressure on the enemy by force of arms in Chechnya itself, and in addition, try to transfer the war to its territory .

We know very well where the leaders of “independent Ichkeria” live, where ideological and financial centers and mercenary recruitment points are located (this, by the way, is not only the Near and Middle East, but also the CIS and Europe). It is necessary to create a situation where everything connected with the “struggle for the freedom of Chechnya” can bring death anywhere and at any time. The situation for the enemy must be unbearable both in Chechnya and beyond its borders, then he will be broken psychologically, and his defeat will only be a matter of time. In this sense, the death of Yandarbiev in Qatar is more important than the death of Gelayev in Dagestan. From a moral point of view, both are good, but it is one thing to die in battle directly on a theater of operations, and another to die in a quiet country a thousand kilometers from Chechnya. Only acts of retaliation abroad should not be accompanied by failures , otherwise it is better not to carry them out at all.