| Ossetia, which is so often spoken of as Russia’s main outpost in the Caucasus, has now become similar to Bosnia. In the north, after the seizure of the school in Beslan, the conflict between Ossetian Christians and Ingush Muslims is again smoldering, and in the south, although there is no religious strife, a thunderstorm could break out at any moment. The villages of South Ossetia, separated by peacekeeping checkpoints, froze in anxious anticipation.
Ossetia is divided into North and South by the Greater Caucasus Range and the Russian-Georgian border, which, however, the South Ossetians do not recognize. There are only about 80,000 South Ossetians, and the vast majority of them have Russian passports. This is truly one people, so what is happening on one side of the mountains cannot leave those who live on the other indifferent. South Ossetian President Eduard Kokoity arrived in Beslan almost earlier than his North Ossetian counterpart Alexander Dzasokhov. His appearance, by the way, worried many - the fact is that in the fall of 1992, during the conflict in the Prigorodny region, South Ossetian volunteers, who had experience of war with the Georgians, became almost the main striking force of the Ossetian militia. Now militias from Tskhinvali are not expected in North Ossetia - especially since they have enough worries at home. It is possible, of course, that the head of the unrecognized republic hurried to the building of the school captured by the enemies, thinking about his image and political rating - only the image and rating hardly bothered those wounded whom his guards, under his personal leadership, were taking out from under fire. The North Ossetian president is not so mobile: when Tskhinvali came under a series of artillery attacks in mid-August, Mr. Dzasokhov remained in Vladikavkaz. But the speaker of the “northerners” parliament, Taimuraz Mamsurov, went to the shelled South Ossetian capital. Alexander Dzasokhov himself was also in the conflict zone last summer - although his visit was almost closed from the public.
But the visits of politicians are not as important as the mood of the people. A 30-year-old employee of Dzasokhov’s administration, he was a young man of military age when the war was going on in South Ossetia. “My friends and I got ready within a few hours and took a bus to the Roki tunnel. Many walked,” he says. - Yes, now it looks more like the South Ossetian conflict is being supported and provoked artificially. Yes, the Kudars (the local name for South Ossetians - Ed.) are not very liked in our north; they are considered rude simpletons. But if something serious happens there, everyone will go help again. But what can we talk about if every second person here has relatives beyond the ridge?”
The 4-kilometer Roki tunnel is the main Ossetian road through the Greater Caucasus. The “Transcam” - the Trans-Caucasian Railway - rises to it from the plain. It passes through the Zaksky gorge to Roka, and then descends to Tskhinvali along the Big Liakhva gorge. The echo of conflict is immediately heard here. Russian cellular communications disappear long before the border, almost as soon as the car enters the Zak Gorge. But Georgian cellular companies have already managed to install their stations high in the mountains, and immediately after the post of the South Ossetian border guards guarding unrecognized sovereignty, the greeting of as many as two cellular operators lights up on the screens of mobile phones: “Welcome to Georgia.” The Russian Megafon begins to work only in Tskhinvali itself. But transport communications, unlike cellular communications, are entirely connected to Russia. Over the summer, the Transcam was repaired on both sides of the pass, and if back in June the highway looked depressingly broken, now it is simply pleasant to drive along it. The political road markings are very clear: the main road from Tskhinvali is not to the south, to Gori and Tbilisi, but to the north, to Vladikavkaz.
Tskhinvali itself is located on the border of South Ossetia with the rest of Georgia proper. The outskirts of the city are pitted with trenches, and through field binoculars from observation posts installed on the roofs of long-abandoned factory workshops, the positions of the Georgians are visible. Officially, only the Georgian peacekeeping battalion can be in the conflict zone, but the fighters sitting in the trenches bear little resemblance to peacekeepers. The Ossetian trenches opposite them are empty - the militias formally complied with the decision of the authorities in the conflict zone to withdraw surplus troops. But militias and policemen are constantly nearby. They try not to lose their vigilance 200 meters from an armed enemy and cannot understand only one thing: why Russian peacekeepers do not react to his presence. “We are citizens of Russia,” says former South Ossetian parliament member Georgy Cheldiev, now a militia member. - We understand that only Russia can solve our issue, and it protects us, but we are a little dissatisfied that it protects us poorly. The militias have machine guns, which were distributed to them by our Ministry of Defense, many have weapons in their houses - the laws of South Ossetia allow this. But the Georgians will not come here, they will continue to fire at the city from afar. And in Gori, 15 km from here, they have tanks. Of course, we rely on ourselves. But only Russia can cope with such forces as theirs.”
Read a detailed report from South Ossetia in one of the upcoming issues of Vremya Novostei Ivan SUKHOV, Tskhinvali - Moscow
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