| Alu Alkhanov takes office as President of Chechnya Exactly a year after the election of its first post-war president, Chechnya is preparing for the inauguration of its second: tomorrow in Grozny, Alu Alkhanov, elected on August 29, will be inaugurated. It was promised not to hold a particularly loud celebration - this is somehow inappropriate against the backdrop of the ongoing forty-day mourning for the victims of Beslan in North Ossetia. The very repetition of Chechen inaugurations casts doubt on the applicability of the definition of “post-war” to the leaders of Russia’s most troubled region. At the same time, tomorrow’s inauguration will be quite different in meaning from the previous one.
When Akhmat Kadyrov took office, there was simply a kind of ritual consolidation of the already existing situation: by the time of the elections, Kadyrov had de facto headed the republic for more than three years. During this time, with the support of the Russian President, he managed to take away the lion's share of power from the military, rebuild the civil administration and provide it with its own security apparatus in the form of local police and the presidential security service. This system, however, was closed to Kadyrov himself. Even in the mechanism of relations between Chechnya and the federal center, the main transmission belt was the personal trusting relationship between him and Vladimir Putin. And when Kadyrov died, this system immediately lost its clear outlines.
The legacy of the deceased leader was his team, which some experts prefer to call a clan. “This is a powerful clan, formed not on the basis of a teip, but due to common economic, political and some other interests,” says Alexey Malashenko, deputy chairman of the scientific council of the Carnegie Moscow Center. Kadyrov’s supporters are grouped around Ramzan, the son of the deceased president, Deputy Prime Minister of Chechnya “for security issues.” Mr. Malashenko believes that Ramzan Kadyrov can be considered “today’s Dudayev.” Its military and economic resources are quite powerful - this, according to the most conservative estimate, is about 3 thousand fighters and about 30 gas stations. “He is extremely ambitious, he brings terror to the lowland part of Chechnya, he is strong, cruel and, apparently, a smart guy,” says Mr. Malashenko.
In his opinion, the goal of the Kadyrovites is to achieve maximum economic independence for Chechnya - they are persistently seeking an offshore zone regime and the right to dispose of all the oil produced in the republic. “About 2 million tons are legally mined,” says Alexey Malashenko. -- Another 800 thousand tons are mined illegally. Apparently, of the legally mined, approximately 400 thousand tons go to the “left” factories through “tappings” into the pipe.”
The expert draws attention to the fact that in the illegal part of the Chechen oil sector there is complete consent of all parties involved - be it Kadyrov’s men, militants or federals: from time to time demonstrative destruction of “samovars” is carried out, but it is well known that during all the years of the war there was no Not a single oil tanker was blown up. “It turns out that half of the oil production is already controlled by the Chechens and they would like to take the other half,” Mr. Malashenko believes.
Thus, Ramzan Kadyrov feels himself to be the real master of the situation in today’s Chechnya rather than the newly elected president. Ramzan was unable to directly inherit his father’s chair because he had not reached the age required by the Chechen constitution. But the whole of Chechnya is full of rumors that the new president, a few weeks before the elections, swore on the Koran to transfer power to the “heir” as soon as he turns 30 years old - this will happen, by the way, a year before the expiration of Mr. Alkhanov’s constitutional powers. Mr. Alkhanov himself publicly confirmed his “interim” status several times. This, by the way, causes discontent among the quite loyal Chechen intelligentsia. “Such a transfer of power is unacceptable,” one of the authoritative representatives of the Chechen diaspora in Moscow told Vremya Novostei. “As soon as we recognize the results of the elections on August 29, Alu Alakhnov is the elected president and must understand the significance of the power with which he is vested as a result of the expression of the people’s will.”
The current situation in Chechnya paradoxically resembles Maskhadov’s: the elected president is openly weak and surrounded by a mass of field commanders of various calibers, some of whom declared loyalty to the federals from the very beginning of the second war, while the other part came down from the mountains under the elder Kadyrov, impressed by the rapid growth of his authority. This entire company habitually lives by dividing federal appropriations and oil trade. Only then Maskhadov’s elections were recognized by almost all of Chechnya. And Maskhadov, at least at first, did not have “forest brothers” who continue to fight with might and main against the regime. If the federal center wants to avoid the development of this analogy and restore controllability in Chechnya, the situation will have to change in the very near future.
“Putin is unlikely to completely control Ramzan Kadyrov,” says Alexey Malashenko. - And the growth of the latter’s influence will be accompanied by growing contradictions (not everyone in Chechnya is happy with him) and general instability. The federal leadership has two ways out of this situation: either “educate” Ramzan, or oust him.” The expert believes that the Kremlin has several more years to do this - apparently, those same three years before Ramzan’s political coming of age. In fact, the time limit is more limited given the dynamic changes inherent in a conflict zone. On the other hand, the Kremlin cannot make a demonstrative decision right now, since this could further shake up the situation.
In Mr. Malashenko's opinion, we should begin to “resolve” the current situation with parliamentary elections - they should be held in Chechnya next year. The expert believes that parliamentary elections could turn into a large-scale conciliation procedure, especially if representatives from all parts of the political spectrum are allowed to participate in them. “If former brigadier general Ruslan Yamadayev sits in the State Duma of Russia, then why don’t some commanders of lower rank sit in the republican parliament? - asks Alexey Malashenko. — Talking about how wild Chechen society is is akin to talking about polar bears on the streets of Moscow. Chechens have a very Europeanized intellect. By holding normal parliamentary elections, it would be possible to see who they really trust, and, based on this, build all future policies.”
As a possible long-term scenario, Mr. Malashenko is inclined to consider the introduction of the post of governor-general in Chechnya: according to his data, more than half of the republic’s population approves of this option, and Vladimir Putin’s political initiative regarding the appointment of regional leaders makes it quite possible from the point of view law. It is unlikely that the military will be against it either, for whom there will be enough work in Chechnya for a long time and who, according to the expert, are “tired of discussing with Kadyrov’s men”: “If there is a Russian general and a Chechen government, it will be easier to negotiate.”
But for now, the General Government remains only a project, and Chechnya receives a new president - Alu Alkhanov. It looks like Moscow is going to support him within the existing system. According to Vremya Novostey, a change of prime minister may occur in Chechnya in the near future. The last “castling” of this kind was carried out in March of this year by Akhmat Kadyrov: the Chechen government was headed by his protégé Sergei Abramov. Before him, the government was headed by officials who were imposed on Kadyrov from Moscow and who, not without reason, were considered the “sovereign eye” in the Grozny administration. After the death of Akhmat Kadyrov, Mr. Abramov unexpectedly found himself acting as president of Chechnya, and from the end of August he returned to the prime minister’s chair, maintaining full loyalty to “Kadyrov’s team.” Oleg Zhitkov, the former mayor of Grozny and a career FSB officer, is said to be Mr. Abramov's likely successor. Such a replacement would seem quite justified in terms of strengthening the vertical of power: if any Russian territory needs this strengthening more than others, it is Chechnya. Ivan SUKHOV |
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