“She drowned” ... The truth about Kursk, which was hidden by the Prosecutor General Ustinov. ” 2005 material

This is the name of the book of lawyer Kuznetsov (M.: De-Fact, 2005. 219 c.), Going on sale at the end of this week. The book of lawyer Kuznetsov was supposed to be published last year. But, despite the agreement with the publishing house, Boris Kuznetsov decided to process the book in connection with the appearance of Pravda about Kursk from the Prosecutor General Ustinov.

The book was based on the materials of the criminal case of the death of the atomic underwater cruiser, the lawyer’s own investigation, independent expert conclusions and media materials about corruption in the navy, confirmed by the documents.

Despite the fact that many books were written among the authors-Igor Spassky (director of the Central Design Bureau Rubin, who designed Kursk) and the Prosecutor General Ustinov, the book of lawyer Kuznetsov first gives exhaustive information about the tragedy of August 2000 and the direct guilty of the death of the boat. Kuznetsov revealed the mechanism for falsification of the materials of the criminal case, named the surname and position of “falsifiers” and, in fact, made the final diagnosis of the judicial system of the Russian Federation.

Elena Milashina

“Even in the summer of 2002, when lawyer Dmitry Gavrilin and my assistant Dmitry Raev took up some materials from the criminal case on the fact of the death of Kursk and their primary understanding was underway, one of the guys told me that another copy of the criminal case was photocopy. At the traditional meeting in the office of the chief military prosecutor Alexander Nikolayevich Savenkov, I asked:

- Why another photocopy of the case?

“The chef is going to write a book,” answered Savenkov.

- Himself, or what?

“Himself,” answered Alexander Nikolaevich, “he always writes himself.”

... Vladimir Ustinov repeated in his book the main deception of this matter-about eight hours of life of sailors in the 9th compartment, repeated this in the book five times. From the number of repetitions of untruth, the truth will not come close by an inch. The truth is that the submariners were desperately knocking with a sledgehammer or some other metal object for more than two days-from 2 a.m. on August 13 to the evening of August 14-with a request for help. Their SOS signals are recorded, recorded on the magnetic tape by the hydroacoustic service of the flagship of the SF "Peter the Great". On magnetic records, an examination was carried out, which claims that the recorded knocks were made by a person along the intersectoral bulkhead of the submarine. ”

Vyacheslav Popov and explosions on Kursk

“... On August 3, 2000, during the exercises in the Barents Sea, the commander of the hydroacoustic group of the heavy atomic missile cruiser“ Peter the Great ”Senior Lieutenant Andrei Lavrinyuk, peering into the locator’s screen, discovered ... a large light stain, and after a moment, cotton rang out in the speakers. This outbreak and cotton differed from the explosions of regular ammunition, which are used on the navy. Flash bearing - 96 degrees.

... A few months later, the Lavrinyuk hydroacoustics will recall these events in the main military prosecutor's office: “... I reported this to the combat information center, on the chassis and to the central command post. Immediately, at the time of flash and cotton from the speaker, I felt that a hydrodynamic blow was passed on the ship, which was expressed in the trembling of the “Peter Great” body. In my opinion, this effect in the form of trembling of the case from the inclusion of any equipment on the "Peter the Great" could not occur. It was an external dynamic blow ... Then they did not pay attention to my report. However, I think that the qualified commander of the hydroacoustic group with extensive experience can classify this noise signal as an explosion ... ”

... Ironically, at the time of the explosion on Kursk, the head of the exercises, commander of the Northern Fleet Vyacheslav Popov, stood on the chassis of Peter the Great. The unexpected vibration of a heavy cruiser could not but surprise the admiral.

- What is it shaking here? -He asked the chief of staff of the Rear Admiral’s operational squadron Vladimir Rogatin.

“They turned on the antenna of the radar station,” he blurted out on the move.

And all those present on the bridge, without doubting a yota, believed the Rear Admiral.

... In his testimony, Vyacheslav Popov denies that he knew about the report of the hydroacoustics ...

... The fact that Vyacheslav Popov left the flagship, not receiving the report of the commander of Kursk, Gennady Lyachin, as I think, speaks not only about professional qualities, but also about human ones.

... On August 16, 2000, in Sochi, Russian President Vladimir Putin states that the operation to save the crew of the Kursk submarine began immediately after the accident. He emphasized that no one was waiting for a single minute, there was no delay. Rescue work from the very beginning was carried out in full. The president was simply misled. It is enough to recall the delay with the announcement of the emergency submarine. For reference, I will inform: the commander of the SF Vyacheslav Popov arrived in the search area and led the forces of salvation after 27 hours 15 minutes (according to the shift magazine of the TARKR "Peter the Great", the K-27 helicopter sat on the deck at 14.45 08/13/2000) after the death of the ship. The Commander -in -Chief of the Navy Vladimir Kuroyedov flew to the fleet five days later!

... from the decision on the termination of the criminal case: “As a result of ignorance by Admiral Popov V.A. and subordinate to him by officials of a particular situation ... and non-fulfillment of the requirements of the leading documents of the Navy, as well as due to the adoption of erroneous decisions in the process of waiting for the surfacing of the underwater cruiser, he was announced by emergency with a delay for 9 hours ”(a decision on the termination of a criminal case of 07.22.2002, sheet 23.).

I believe that they were not for nine, but for eleven and a half hours. Experienced leaders of the exercises need several minutes to adequately assess the situation and declare an emergency submarine.

Expert Kolkutin against 23 submariners of the 9th compartment

Was the part of the Kursk crew at that time, which managed to move after the explosion in the ninth compartment?

Prosecutor General Vladimir Ustinov publicly said that no. 23 sailors allegedly lived no more than eight hours.

He made the first such statement on the RTR a year and three months after the tragedy, on October 27, 2001, when the submarine was raised from the bottom of the Barents Sea.

... And on July 27, 2002, on the eve of the Navy Day, Russian Prosecutor General Vladimir Ustinov at a press conference that began with a minute of silence in memory of the 118 dead submariners, said: “I have just been with a more than 100-page report by the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin. He told him in detail about the progress of the investigation and the causes of the death of the nuclear cap. He studied everything carefully. Now I’m meeting with you ... According to the conclusions of experts, all 23 people were killed in the ninth compartment no later than eight hours after the explosions. By the time of the discovery of the sunken cruiser, it was no longer possible to save any of them. ”

... By the way, I have no complaints about 198 examinations, which Ustinov mentions, but at 8 hours of the life of sailors in the 9th compartment there is only one examination that was conducted with the participation and under the leadership of the chief forensic expert of the Ministry of Defense of Colonel Viktor Kolkutin.

Approx. Ed.: In the criminal case of Kursk, in fact, two packages of forensic medical examinations. The first package included the examinations of bodies of 12 submariners raised from the 9th compartment in October 2000.

The experts led by Kolkutin had the task: to determine the time of death of submariners. And the experts answered quite definitely. We quote: “to answer the question of the prescription (specific date and time) of the onset of death ... it is not possible, since the solution of this issue ... goes beyond the competence of forensic experts.” All experts signed under this, including Kolkutin. This is very important! Judicial doctors clearly said that they could not - science cannot! -Determine how much time people lived in the 9th compartment. Therefore, it was possible to determine this on the basis of other examinations, for example, by the time of filling out the boat compartments with water, the time of fire in the 9th compartment, identifying the knocks of SOS and the time when they were recorded.

But it was not possible to find out the time of filling out the compartments, nor when the fire began in the 9th compartment. But the experts of the acoustic and phonographic examination found that SOS signals were recorded until the evening of August 14. The revealed facts led to a direct accusion of the fleet officials, who led the exercises and the search and rescue operation.

Therefore, there was a need for examinations that would give a different interpretation of the facts about the life expectancy of people in the 9th compartment.

Therefore, a commission examination appeared 77/02, which was also headed by Kolkutin. Its content, however, amounted to 12 previously conducted examinations. In all these examinations, the same formulation takes place: “... it is impossible to accurately establish the time of death regarding the moment of the accident of the submarine ...” and “... death occurred within a few hours from the moment the fire occurred in the boat compartment ...”.

However, on the last page there are unreleased conclusions: “Members of the crew of the Kursk APRK, located in the 9th compartment after the second seismic event (11 hours 30 minutes on August 12, 2000), remained alive for 4.5-8 hours ...”.

Thus, it turns out that Kolkutin in one case is signed under the fact that the exact time of the death of submarines cannot be determined, and in the second case, ignoring their own (!) The arguments, under which he signed earlier, claims that death occurred no later than 4.5–8 hours. In one case, Kolkutin claims that the death of the submariners occurred a few hours after the fire, and in the second examination of Kolkutin, submariners die after the second explosion.

It was this conclusion that independent experts questioned, to whom the lawyer Kuznetsov addressed.

“... I can’t choose another word, such an examination,” writes Boris Kuznetsov in the book, “a sophisticated mind, a special psychology of a professional falsifier are needed. The expert opinion dated June 17, 2002, a month and five days before the termination of the criminal case, was just by the way.

... I decided to consult with the largest domestic and foreign specialists. Through our diplomats, I met Jovan Rajs, professor of forensic medicine in the Royal Institute in Stockholm. He read the conclusions of Viktor Kolkutin, sat in thought for a long time, and then said two words: “It's Criminal” ( this is a crime . - B.K. ).

Expert Kozlov and knocks SOS

“Here are the evidence of ordinary sailors who served on“ Peter the Great ”and participated in the search for“ Kursk ”. The midshipman from Peter the Great says Fedor N.: “... to the place of the tragedy, after we announced the search for the submarine, we reached four hours ( this happened at 3 a.m. on August 13. - B.K. ). Kursk discovered Peter the Great. I know this for sure. At first, hydroacousticity heard extraneous sounds in the sea. Informed the command. After that, the order was received by the entire ordinary composition to go to the deck in the patrol. Dali binoculars. They looked out for the buoys. The whole square passed, where the submarine could be, but the buoys were not found. Then the command decided to transmit the sounds that were made by hydroacoustics, according to the ship broadcast, so that everyone on the ship was heard. This was done so that the guys concentrate and react to the patrol more seriously. Of course, we were not told that there was an explosion on Kursk. It was simply reported that the submarine did not get in touch on time and we are looking for it. At some point, the sound of knocking began to subside. Then “Peter the Great” turned and lay down on the reverse course. The knocks became heard again. Hydroacoustics determined where the signals come from. As for the nature of the sounds, they were very deaf, I even had doubts that they were knocking on the gland. And they look like an alarm. I counted them. Each time from the bottom came nine strokes with constant intervals ... ".

Years after an unsuccessful rescue operation, prosecutors and the military prove to all the people that there were no knocks from the bottom at all. But after all, according to the ship broadcast, the entire crew of the huge cruiser Peter the Great, and these are six hundred witnesses!

... But in the decision on the termination of the criminal case, representatives of the GVP argue that "many times mentioned in the testimony in the case of noise and knocks previously classified by experts as distress signals were not published from the Kursk April, but from the underwater ship, which was outside the death of an underwater cruiser."

The version of the knocks “from the underwater part of the surface ships” was also born in the summer of 2002 before the termination of the criminal case. It is based on an acoustic-phonographic examination, conducted in June 2002, almost two years after the disaster.

At the disposal of experts, 14 audio cassettes were provided. Of these, 8 are recorded on the personal tape recorder of the acoustics of “Peter the Great” Lavrinyuk and 6 - with records made on the Mikhail Rudnitsky rescue vessel.

It is reliably known that not all cassettes gave experts. According to the documents available at my disposal, on September 6, 2000, 8 audio cassettes were transferred to the prosecutor's office from the hydroacoustic station of the Mikhail Rudnitsky vessel with copies of the notes of stouts. It was also reported (I quote literally): “On May 18, 2002, 11 audio cassettes with the notes of knocks made on the TARKR“ Peter the Great ”were received from the Central Design Bureau of MT“ Rubin ”to the main military prosecutor's office in the Kursk April region.

Three audio cassettes from Peter the Great and two with Mikhail Rudnitsky are not enough. I can only assume that they recorded knocks made after dinner on August 14. Since this does not fit into the official version that the sailors lived no more than 8 hours, five cassettes decided not to transfer to experts, but this is only my assumption.

... In an acoustic-phonographic examination, the investigator raises two groups of questions: the first provides for the study of cassettes with the notes of the knocks themselves and the background on which they were imposed, and the second concerns the establishment of the location of the sound source.

Part of the examination by nature of the knocks does not cause any complaints or complaints. In this part, the examination was carried out in full accordance with the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation and the legislation, which regulates the production of forensic examinations. One of the questions posed to the experts was leading: “Could these signals come from the underwater part of the surface ship?” Thus, the investigator in the question itself prompted the “correct” answer. Once again I will pay tribute to the experts. They did not deal with falsification.

... I give the conclusions of an acoustic-phonographic examination word word:

“In the originals and copies of the records on the audio cassettes presented by the Central Design Bureau of the MT“ Rubin ”, military unit 69267 (records are made on the TARKR“ Peter the Great ”and on the SS“ M. Rudnitsky ”), contains signals (knocks) of an emergency nature by a person by a metal object (most likely, an emergency hammer in an emergency hammer Intersective bulkhead of the Premier League). Knocks are recorded on audio cassettes in the period from 22.25 13.08. 2000 according to 00.10 08/14/2000 ”(unfortunately, the“ Peter the Great ”was a faulty device with the help of which the discovered knocks were recorded, the record was carried out on a household tape recorder.). And now the answer of the expert, the deputy chief navigator of the Navy, Sergei Kozlov: “To determine the geographical coordinates of the source of hydroacoustic signals accepted by the GAK of the Tarkr“ Peter the Great ”, it was not possible due to a significant scatter of the draws ...”

... Therefore, Kozlov draws a simple conclusion: knocking, but not from Kursk. Alas! It is impossible to establish and, most importantly, to check the conclusions of Sergei Kozlov for the same reason - there is no research part in the conclusion of the examination.

... Why did the smart and professional investigator Arthur Egiev not demanded by experts and the same goat examination in accordance with the law? I think that the last stage of the investigation and the political decision to “save the admirals” were a burden to him. He “waved his hand” for this examination.

Igor Spassky and the emergency hatch of the 9th compartment

Igor Spassky, General Designer of Rubin, the enterprise at which the 949A project was developed, in 2003 published the book “Kursk” ... after August 12, 2000 ”(Spassky I.“ Kursk ”... After August 12, 2000.“ Rus ”, M., 2003, p. 286.). In general, the publication is dedicated to the operation to raise the submarine from the bottom of the Barents Sea. But one of the chapters called “some thoughts aloud” caused me, softly, ambiguous feelings. In it, the “outstanding scientist and talented organizer” ( as it is written about the author of the publisher. - B.K. ) tried to analyze the mistakes that led to the death of Kursk.

However, criticism was more like a fatherly moralizing. ... But Spassky suddenly, for no reason, questioned the timeliness of the posthumous award of the Kursk crew: “I will frankly say: this efficiency ( this means that the sailors were awarded with government orders and medals almost immediately after death. - B.K. ) very strongly connected the hands of the causes of disaster and actions of personnel ...”.

The subsequent arguments of Igor Spassky that “it is impossible to reduce the great grief of people ...” is strongly given to cynicism.

... However, nothing is said in the book of Spassky about the numerous constructive errors of the project 949a.

... the main one: the commercial frequency was made with significant shortcomings. The rubber seal of the upper lid of the hatch is structurally designed for the maximum permissible pressure from the shaft (a chamber connecting the upper and lower hatch entering the compartment) no more than 6 atmospheres. The rubber seal of the lower cover is two atmospheres. If the pressure is larger there, then it is impossible to pump water from the suction chamber. Water flows into the camera.

This design makes it almost impossible to save submariners. “Kursk” lay at a depth of a hundred meters for a long time, and the pressure there constantly increased. Therefore, if the rescue apparatus sat on the boat not 16, but on August 13 or 14, when, obviously for me, the sailors were still alive, the AS-34 team could stick and open the hatch. Two days after the disaster, the pressure in the compartment could have more than two atmospheres.

Another reason that made the suction was virtually impossible was that the Comings Card of the 9th compartment did not toward the deck by 5-10 mm, but, on the contrary, was deepened to a depth of 7 mm. The fact is that the docking is provided by the cuff of the sealing unit, which, together with the supporting ring of the saving apparatus suction chamber, should “sit” tightly on the commercial-site. But the cuff of the apparatus to the supporting ring framing the rescue hatch of the submarine did not reach, as a result of which water entered the camera through the formed gaps. Why the commercial frequency on the submarine was deepened, no one could answer during the investigation.

Prosecutors and the Kursk case

I repeatedly emphasized a good level of investigation. At the same time, I had in mind not only a high professional level of investigation, but also the excellent ability to manipulate facts, keep silent about what does not fit into the “general line”, and focus on those points that fit into it.

... There are stubborn conversations (believe me, this is more than rumors) that the Prosecutor General Vladimir Ustinov issued an order for internal use, which obliges all state prosecutors acting in the courts, if they believe that the defendant must be justified or less a primeary article of the Criminal Code, to coordinate their position with higher prosecutors.

Some talk about this directly, others abruptly switch to you, puff out their cheeks and pursue their lips, although the day earlier on the sidelines of the vessels they eagerly chatted with lawyers ...

Relations with the investigator of the Prosecutor General Arthur Egiev, who conducted the case of the death of Kursk, I had emphasized respectful.

…Хотя Артур Левонович ни разу не согласился с моими доводами, но в отличие от других «твердолобых» прокуроров пытался найти объяснение той или иной нестыковке, проявляя при этом недюжинную изобретательность.

Например, на мое замечание, что следствие не установило неизвестного матроса, который якобы подавал сигналы SOS из подводной части надводного корабля, в то время как на «Курске» гибли люди, он заметил, что это выходит за рамки расследования, в связи с чем это обстоятельство его не интересует. Важно, заметил следователь, что стучали не с «Курска».

…Следователь никогда не заявлял, что он — лишь исполнитель, получивший приказ «сверху», но почти всегда, оказываясь в затруднительном положении, разводил руками, давая понять, что он к тому или иному решению имеет косвенное отношение.

…Мне жалко, что в целом порядочный и профессиональный следователь вынужден делать то, за что ему самому неудобно. Обидно, что система Генеральной прокуратуры России исключает самостоятельность и независимость следователя.

…Высокий, несколько полноватый генерал-лейтенант Савенков рассыпался комплиментами, предложил регулярно встречаться и обсуждать все проблемы, касающиеся дела «Курска», напрямую с ним, минуя следователя и надзирающих прокуроров. Для меня такое предложение заместителя генерального прокурора было в значительной мере неожиданным. Поначалу все шло лучше некуда. Родственников признали потерпевшими, они получили право знакомиться с материалами уголовного дела.

…С той поры наши встречи стали регулярными. Я не мог не воспользоваться знакомством, чтобы не попытаться разрешить некоторые из моих дел прошлых лет. Примерно в октябре 2002 года я передал Савенкову две жалобы.

…Вскоре Александр Савенков дал понять, что судьба моих «прошений» зависит от того, будет ли подана жалоба по делу «Курска». У прокуратуры был для ответа месяц, но я не получил ответов на жалобы ни в ноябре, ни в течение декабря. Как только я передал Савенкову 30 декабря 2002 года жалобу по делу «Курска», от подачи которой он меня отговаривал на каждой встрече, не в лобовую, конечно, отказы на мои жалобы «посыпались» незамедлительно….

…Встречи с Савенковым продолжались с завидной регулярностью, общение стало полуофициальным, и из его кабинета они стали перекочевывать в другие места. Дважды компанию нам составлял главком ВМФ Куроедов. Общение главкома и главного военного прокурора привело меня к окончательному выводу, что их дружба достаточно прочна. Как-то в очередной раз пытаясь «продавить» Савенкова, я ляпнул: «Александр Николаевич, ведь вы же знаете, что я прав, почему бы вам прямо не занять мою позицию по «Курску»?». Савенков ответил в духе следователя Егиева: развел руками, пожал плечами и выразительно посмотрел вверх. Смысл, как я понял, сводился к тому, что судьбу дела решили без его участия где-то наверху. Хотя Савенков оказался в кресле главного военного прокурора к моменту, когда по делу «Курска» наступил этап «раздачи наград», расследование, по сути, завершалось, именно с его приходом повторно «возник» Колкутин, и дело стало принимать другой оборот.

…Думаю, что окончательное решение не привлекать к уголовной ответственности командиров Северного флота принимали Устинов, Савенков и Куроедов».