Translated material
Stop! Who's coming?
The West is infiltrating Russian nuclear facilities
The topic of the safety of nuclear facilities - both military and civilian - has, unfortunately, become relevant recently. Mainly due to the increasing frequency of man-made disasters and the likelihood of nuclear materials and weapons falling into the hands of terrorists. In general, the vast nuclear or radiation hazardous component of Russia requires constant attention. These are 213 nuclear installations, 454 storage points for nuclear materials and high-level radioactive waste, 1,508 storage points for radioactive substances and low-level waste, about 16.5 thousand radiation sources.The quality of operation of nuclear facilities cannot be called ideal. According to the head of the Federal Atomic Supervision Service, Andrei Malyshev, the number of violations at nuclear power plants in 2004 decreased from 51 to 46, but during the operation of research nuclear installations, on the contrary, it increased from 26 to 31, nuclear power plants of ships - from 21 to 22, at nuclear fuel cycle enterprises - from 24 to 29, in the sphere of handling radioactive sources and radioactive waste - from 30 to 39. And although all these are technological level violations that did not lead to any consequences, the situation is not conducive to peace.
In addition, Rosatom is currently implementing a large-scale program for long-term storage of spent nuclear fuel (SNF). However, not today, tomorrow, the storage facilities will be filled to the design limit. And the import of foreign spent nuclear fuel is still coming. For this purpose, so far there is only a regulatory framework - in 2000, laws were adopted allowing Russia to import spent nuclear fuel for long-term storage and subsequent reprocessing. The technology is there; all that remains is to build the appropriate storage facilities and production facilities. But Rosatom has not yet even determined the location of their construction. Most likely, new facilities will be built next to existing plants. There was a project for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel on Novaya Zemlya, but it was not even considered “at the top”, since the military expressed strong protest. The imported spent fuel is partially reprocessed at the Mayak production association.
Is the game worth the candle? Apparently yes. Just storing 1 kg of spent fuel gives a thousand dollars. Recycling is probably much more. Increasingly entering the international nuclear market, Russia this year ratified the international Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage; the government submitted to the Duma a bill on ratification of the joint convention on the safe management of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste. An IAEA conference will be held in Moscow in March 2006. The idyllic nuclear picture was spoiled by only one fact: disputes over the Russian-American program for processing plutonium into mox fuel, which was frozen two years ago, have not disappeared. The stumbling block was very significant disagreements regarding the shared financing of the program. And although negotiations are ongoing, there is little hope for improvement.
The safety of nuclear facilities was tested during the accident in the RAO UES system in May of this year. As Andrey Malyshev reported, 360 nuclear facilities were switched off, of which 32 were the most dangerous. No violations of technological regimes were recorded. At research reactors in Obninsk and Moscow, the protection worked and they were cooled down. There was also no environmental impact. An established autonomous power supply helped to avoid the consequences. For some installations, this was not required - when the voltage failed, they simply went into the so-called parking mode. For the military, power backup is even more reliable. Their facilities in the Far East, where problems with energy supply are frequent, sometimes operate for two or three days in emergency mode.
The head of the 12th Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defense (GUMO), Colonel General Igor Valynkin, appeals to history: over the 55 years of operation of nuclear weapons in Russia, there were no losses, no accidents at facilities, or even prerequisites for this. It is impossible to hide an incident with nuclear weapons, Mr. Valynkin believes: even after a year, the information will still come to light. And today the level of security at the facilities of the 12th GUMO is high, but the general did not dare to guarantee their 100% security. The most dangerous, according to the general, are the Chechen gangs. True, there were no terrorist attacks on military nuclear facilities, but there were attempts to infiltrate civilians twice - in 2002 and 2003. The attempts were stopped by mobile security units. The violators were immediately taken away by FSB representatives, and the general does not know about their further fate.
So far, only foreign finance has penetrated Russian nuclear military facilities. Technical security equipment is being installed there with American and German money, in addition to our defense order. So the time is not far when sentries from nuclear facilities will be removed altogether. At these facilities, the Americans have the right to control only the work of companies that install technical security equipment; they are allowed access only to the perimeter. And by the way, the Ministry of Defense does not receive this money; it goes directly to the companies performing the work.
No one has the right to take control of Russian military nuclear facilities, even in the event of an emergency or military instability around a nuclear facility. There are no UN divisions, much less NATO - there are no international agreements in this case. But this does not interfere with Russia’s interaction with the West in the fight against terrorism - primarily in eliminating possible accidents. An initiative by Russia, the United States and the IAEA to reduce the radiological threat is being implemented, which provides for the removal from third world countries of nuclear materials previously imported by Russia and the United States. Today, for example, the issue of exporting highly enriched fuel from Uzbekistan is being resolved; before this, materials were exported from Yugoslavia and Afghanistan. For each such case, a separate agreement is concluded. And today there are mutual inspections of nuclear facilities with the United States - in accordance with the START Treaty.
However, there is an exception - the objects directly of the 12th State Medical Directorate are not included in the contracts and are not subject to inspection. According to General Valynkin, such a procedure is not expected in the near future.