There are six days left before the early presidential elections in Kyrgyzstan, and few doubt that the current acting head of state will be elected as the new head of state in the first round on July 10. President, Prime Minister Kurmanbek Bakiyev. Confidence in the outcome of the elections arose after the conclusion of an agreement in May between Bakiyev and the second main contender for the presidency, Felix Kulov. The latter refused to participate in the elections in exchange for the post of prime minister, which he should receive if Bakiyev wins.
The Bakiev-Kulov tandem intends to win in the first round, gaining at least 60%. For elections to be recognized as valid, at least 50% of voters must take part in them. But since the result is almost a foregone conclusion, people may simply not come to the polling stations. And July is a bad time for elections, the holiday season... The question of turnout now is the main headache.
Bakiev and Kulov themselves are trying to dispel doubts about the sustainability of their alliance after the elections. Bakiyev's supporters fear that Kulov, having received the right to form a government, will leave them behind. And he will try to shift the center of executive power from presidential structures towards the government.
And among Kul’s supporters, suspicions are brewing that after July 10, their patron will be subjected to a massive campaign, the purpose of which will be to discredit him and prevent him from taking the prime minister’s post. However, there is nothing indicating a possible breakdown of the Kyrgyz “water truce.” Both leaders demonstrate rare unity, making campaign trips together, publicly declaring their mutual trust.
But all these factors are important primarily for the internal situation in the country. For the external image of Kyrgyzstan, it is more important to rebuff attempts to present the events of March 24, which led to the escape of ex-President Askar Akayev, as destructive. The President of Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov, was the most successful in this, especially after the Andijan events. During a recent visit to Moscow, he spoke of a desire to spread the Kyrgyz hit-and-run, which began in Bishkek, throughout the region.
From this point of view, the results of the work of the commission headed by the Secretary of the Security Council of the Republic Miroslav Niyazov seem interesting. The commission was created in Kyrgyzstan to “study the causes and circumstances of the people’s revolution that occurred on March 24.” This 11-page document, which has not yet received wide publicity, is at the disposal of Vremya Novostei. Here are quotes from there.
“The people’s revolution completed the logic of the collapse of the “most liberal regime” in Central Asia, which Kyrgyzstan and the world community had long been proud of...” “Stagnation, deformation, and also the substitution of democratic values occurred. The personal qualities of the head of state, the lack of public administration skills in his life experience... led to the choice by the leader of the state of a course towards usurpation of power... the government, the executive branch of government, and then the judicial branch became “pocket”.” “The true goal of the authorities’ active intervention in the election process was the formation of a controlled majority in parliament and, ultimately, the extension of the powers of President A. Akaev for another term.” Let us note that the parliament formed in this way this spring continues to function, which allows observers to draw a conclusion about Akaev’s continued influence on the situation in the country.
The State Commission states that “the authorities’ disregard for the legal right to elect and be elected not by order from above, but by their own choice prompted the citizens of Kyrgyzstan to open and direct dialogue with the regime.” And Akaev’s “categorical refusal” of “this simple and basic way of reaching agreement” led “to a decisive and inevitable reaction of the people... the shameful and hasty flight of the ex-president from the country, which became evidence of the complete collapse of his “virtual regime.” Akaev “did not want and was unable to really assess the scale and causes of discontent,” “he began to voice the idea of destructive international influence, due to which some non-governmental organizations were perceived as conductors of foreign ideology.”
The report also talks about Akayev’s personnel policy, “built on the principles of personal loyalty and kinship,” about “the corruption of the Akayev family,” and about “mostly stolen loans received from outside in the amount of about $2 billion.”
Mr. Akaev himself does not want to consider himself an ex-president and calls himself nothing less than “the first president of Kyrgyzstan, who has faithfully and devotedly served his Fatherland all these years.” On July 1, he stated that his “conscience before the country is clear” and his “knowledge and experience will be in demand in the future.” Mr. Akaev calls for “giving up pseudo-revolutionary rhetoric” and “sees the Bakiev-Kulov tandem as the most promising.”
But the most curious thing is that on the same day, July 1, speaking at a closed conference in Volynsky near Moscow, held under the patronage of the Kremlin administration, Mr. Akaev predicted the defeat of the current Kyrgyz government in the next electoral cycle. This, apparently, means that Mr. Akaev remains “an optimist by nature,” as he said in his address to his compatriots on the eve of the elections.