Lessons from Nalchik

The militants changed their attack tactics

The security agencies have not yet fully summed up the results of the operation in Kabardino-Balkaria; so far only general assessments of the tragedy have been given. However, it can already be observed that the general characteristics of the events of October 13-14 in Nalchik on the part of most government agencies coincide: the special services and law enforcement agencies generally managed to thwart the militants’ plans.

In Nalchik, the special services have already worked proactively and taken proactive measures. On the eve of the militants' performance, several large storage facilities with explosives and ammunition - hexogen, nitrate, ammonia powder - were discovered. It was possible to avoid colossal casualties, despite the fact that the terrorist attack began at 9 am - the most inconvenient time of day, when people were going to work and children were at school. The militants were unable to capture the airport, although such an attempt was made. They experienced a shortage of weapons. Thanks to the coordinated actions of law enforcement officers, they did not capture a single large facility in Nalchik.

The undoubted positive result of the operation was also the destruction and detention of a large number of militants. As Shamil Basayev points out in a speech on one of the separatist websites, the raid on Nalchik failed and was accompanied by heavy losses (he admitted the loss of 41 terrorists, in fact there were more than 90) because the enemy turned out to be more prepared than expected.

The effectiveness of the actions of law enforcement agencies in Nalchik, in my opinion, was determined by several factors . In particular, it is worth emphasizing the positive results of the work of the regional operational control group (GROU), which began work in Nalchik a day before the militants attacked the buildings of law enforcement agencies. Let me remind you that operational control groups, to which units of the Ministry of Defense, FSB, Ministry of Emergency Situations and special forces of the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs are subordinate, were formed in August 2004 in all subjects of the Southern Federal District. The October events in Nalchik fully confirmed the correctness of the decision to create the GROU in order to strengthen the fight against the terrorist threat.

It is important to note that the militants in Nalchik did not have a surprise attack, as was the case in Nazran and Beslan. This was largely prevented by the timely receipt of operational information about the impending raid, even if not complete, which made it possible to strengthen the security of a number of objects (including the airport) in advance, discover caches of ammunition, and also partially reveal the chain of future participants in the action, many of whom were detained. As a result, the plans of the organizers of the attack on Nalchik were disrupted, which did not allow them to carry out larger-scale actions and forced the militants to move ahead of schedule. Moreover, in Nalchik the militants failed to establish control over the roads, as they did in Nazran.

And yet, despite the significant successes of the security forces in Nalchik, many factors and circumstances associated with the operation continue to cause concern. What new experience did we gain in Nalchik, what new challenges did we face? In answering this question, you must first of all have a very good idea of ​​what distinguished the recent militant attack on Nalchik from other similar actions.

The first thing I would like to mention is that no one attacked the capital of Kabardino-Balkaria from outside, it was not an attack armed groups from neighboring regions or Chechnya.

Despite the fact that among the killed and detained militants there were natives from other regions of the Caucasus, most of the participants in the attack were representatives of local Wahhabi “jamaats” - people from the Zolsky, Chegemsky, Baksansky districts of the Kabardino-Balkarian Republic, as well as from the city of Nalchik. This is a very alarming trend, indicating the widespread spread of the ideas of Wahhabism and terror among young people in the North Caucasus, as well as the existence in this region of organized militant groups whose actions are coordinated by extremist leaders.

But there is another important aspect of this problem: perhaps precisely because the emphasis was placed on the local population, the law enforcement agencies, in turn, were able to learn so much about the impending action . Now there is a lot of talk about the closure of mosques in Kabardino-Balkaria and other preventive actions of local authorities that are allegedly harmful to traditional Islam. But it must be taken into account that if not for such measures, many members of radical Islamic organizations planning to participate in the Nalchik events would not have been neutralized in advance.

The second distinctive feature of the events in Nalchik was the careful preparation of the militants for the attack and the relatively large number of extremists participating in it .

According to various estimates, between 150 and 200 terrorists took part in the attack. Let me remind you that Basayev said through the militants’ website that 217 people took part in the attack on Nalchik. It has been mentioned more than once that the bandits were promised a thousand dollars for participating in the operation, and these data are confirmed: those who attacked the FSB building in Nalchik had their pockets literally stuffed with money. The militants had yellow and orange armbands on their hands, by which they could distinguish their own; in addition, it was planned to form cover groups (in particular, in the Chegem region), which were supposed to ensure the withdrawal of large detachments of militants. Well-prepared people began the assault on more than a dozen objects in Nalchik. The group of militants that attacked, for example, the 2nd Department of Internal Affairs and the anti-terrorism center (“Center T”) was armed with machine guns, machine guns and grenade launchers.

The organizers of the action in Nalchik set very clear goals for the members of the gangs: the targets of the attack were only the buildings of regional security forces, military personnel and law enforcement officers. Better coordination of the militants' actions was greatly facilitated by advance reconnaissance of the alleged attack sites - one of the detained local residents, under the guise of a journalist, filmed the objects on a video camera. This allowed the attackers to clarify the location of all law enforcement facilities in the city, down to the location of rooms in departments and information about main and emergency exits, as well as obtain data on radio frequencies used by law enforcement agencies. Thanks to the receipt of relevant operational information, employees of the Organized Crime Control Department and the FSB, literally on the eve of the attack on Nalchik, managed to detain one of the airport employees, who handed over to the militants a diagram of the facility’s security system and its plan. This once again confirms that the scenario with the hijacking of several planes could well become a reality.

The terrorists’ plans have long included the option of seizing an airport in one of the North Caucasus republics; information in this regard has been received repeatedly. Now the media often say and write that supposedly no one attacked the airport in Nalchik. In fact, when officers from the operational headquarters of the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs arrived at the site on the afternoon of October 13, shooting was still going on there. It continued almost until the evening.

Finally, I would like to highlight one more significant feature of the events in Nalchik. The militants have clearly changed their tactics here. According to many eyewitnesses, the bandits in camouflage uniforms were emphatically loyal to the civilian population . The situation clearly contrasted with the Beslan events of last year - in Beslan the militants lost greatly because children died.

I am sure that the change in the militants’ tactics is a conscious step. So they want to ensure, if not support, then at least non-resistance to the actions of extremists on the part of the local population. And this, in turn, should create a favorable environment for the spread of extremist ideas and the expansion of the activities of Wahhabi “jamaats” in the republic.

I think federal structures need to seriously think about what we can oppose to this approach. The situation is very alarming: the number of attacks on law enforcement officials is growing exponentially in all North Caucasian regions - Dagestan, Ingushetia, now in Kabardino-Balkaria, not to mention Chechnya. The fact that militants are increasingly choosing to attack law enforcement officers is not surprising in itself. But lately this has been done so demonstratively, as if the bandits want to say: “We are not terrorists who fight with children. We are regular rebel forces." So far, fortunately, their calls have found little response.

Many people are now increasingly asking the question: how should society and government react in response to the events in Nalchik, what steps should they take? The solution to many problems, of course, lies in the socio-economic plane. In the same Kabardino-Balkaria, according to unofficial data, more than 70 thousand able-bodied citizens, mostly young people, are unemployed. It is this category that becomes a favorable environment for ideologists of national and religious extremism. It is also necessary to legislatively build a clear system of measures to combat terrorism.

I recently attended an expert meeting dedicated to discussing the bill “On Countering Terrorism,” which was held by the international public organization “Federation of Peace and Harmony.” I was amazed that among most experts the wording of the bill, which is now being prepared by the State Duma for the second reading, aroused such widespread criticism. For example, it was pointed out that the Ministry of Finance and other relevant ministries are not assigned the functions of financing counter-terrorism measures, that the law does not in any way regulate the issues of information coverage of counter-terrorism operations, etc.

The last point, in my opinion, is very important, primarily from the point of view of the attitude of society and the media to the activities of law enforcement agencies. For example, in Nalchik: despite the fact that experts assessed the results of the operation positively, we were again faced with a situation where the media, as a rule, were distrustful of the statements of the heads of law enforcement agencies regarding the number of deaths, the results of the operation, etc. The statements of militants, including Basayev, disseminated through extremist websites were immediately taken on faith. State policy in the field of media and counter-terrorism should, in my opinion, help ensure that any terrorist actions are covered more objectively and that the position of security forces is presented more clearly.

Anatoly ARTYUSHKIN, Deputy Head of the Department of the Main Command of Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia