The International Tribunal in The Hague turned the Nuremberg precedent into a historical trial

TOPIC OF THE DAY TRIBUNAL

Deputies of the Russian Duma believe that the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia “failed to realize the idea of its creation” and its work should be stopped. A document unanimously adopted by deputies yesterday, accusing the tribunal of double standards, bias and politicization, was sent to the judges themselves in The Hague, to the parliaments of NATO countries and to the UN Secretary General. The appeal of the Russian parliament is unlikely to lead to the closure of the tribunal, created in pursuance of UN Security Council resolution 827 of May 25, 1993. However, pessimistic reviews are also heard from those who were quite satisfied with the work of the tribunal. There is an increasingly widespread view that, having failed to convict Milosevic, the tribunal was unable to fulfill its historical function of enshrining in international law a certain assessment of the Yugoslav events. But it is not so.

The model for the Hague Tribunal was, of course, the Nuremberg Tribunal, which convicted 19 Nazi leaders in 1945-1946, and the lesser known Tokyo trials, which convicted 25 leaders of the Japanese military and government in 1946-1948. The historical uniqueness of these tribunals was that they managed to achieve unconditional condemnation of two regimes and the legitimacy of this condemnation was not disputed in the defeated countries themselves.

From this point of view, the Hague Tribunal certainly did not achieve what it wanted, and not at all in connection with the death of Slobodan Milosevic. Regardless of the course and outcome of the process, the population of Serbia (and other republics of the former Yugoslavia) was not ready to accept the conclusions of the judges and their view of the history of the Balkan conflict. In fact, the tribunal has long lost its legitimacy in Moscow. Milosevic's death turned out to be just a spectacular excuse for announcing this.

The secret of the success of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals was that their activities were based on the consensus of the leading world powers. With the beginning of the Cold War, such a consensus was impossible - already the second wave of the Nuremberg trials took place mainly under the auspices of the Americans. Thanks to the differences between the superpowers, each of which supported “their sons of bitches,” for almost half a century, war criminals and organizers of mass murders around the world did not have to fear international justice.

The possibility of bringing the organizers of massacres under the guise of national sovereignty to international court only reappeared with the end of the Cold War. Thanks to the briefly emerging “democratic consensus” between world powers. Following the Hague Tribunal, the UN Security Council created the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in 1994, and the Special Investigation Unit for East Timor in 2002.

In general, the development of international justice in cases of war crimes and crimes against humanity is now proceeding in two directions. On the one hand, there is a tendency to involve the countries affected by these crimes (after regime change has occurred) in such cases. Thus, the Special Tribunal for Sierra Leone, which indicted the former ruler of Liberia, Charles Taylor, was created by the UN jointly with the government of Sierra Leone. The crimes of the Khmer Rouge regime should be considered by a tribunal created by the UN jointly with the Cambodian government. An Iraqi tribunal was created to try Saddam Hussein, essentially acting on behalf of the international community.

On the other hand, a permanent supreme judicial body of the world community has been created - the International Criminal Court. If previous tribunals were authorized to consider only crimes committed in a specific region during a specific period, then this court can accept any cases, like any other judicial body.

Of course, the international justice system is very weak both politically and even legally. Increasing disagreements between the world's leading countries are undermining its legitimacy. Tribunals created by the UN jointly with national governments are often not very effective - for example, the Indonesian Special Tribunal for Human Rights Violations in East Timor convicted only one defendant. The effectiveness of the International Criminal Court is undermined by the refusal of the United States and China to recognize its authority: both countries view it as a threat to their sovereignty. Nevertheless, more than fifty Rwandan ministers and generals have already been convicted or are awaiting trial. The former president of Liberia is hiding in Nigeria, but will most likely be extradited by her. Several dozen Serbian, Croatian and Bosnian ministers and generals are now wanted, convicted or on trial.

During the Cold War, the prospect of being brought before an international court for dictators and war criminals was zero; today, ending their careers is becoming one of the very real options for them. The Nuremberg Tribunal was an exception, brought to life by the exceptionality of the crimes of Nazism; The Hague Tribunal began the process of making international justice the norm.

Stand up, the process is underway