Maternal and political capital

President Putin in his message proposed a way to solve the demographic crisis in the country. The method is expensive and generous: one and a half thousand rubles a month for the first child, and for the second - three thousand a month plus 250 thousand rubles. "maternity capital". Amounts that, of course, will not allow you to pamper a child, but are a serious help, especially in a provincial city.

The demographic catastrophe in Russia is its main problem. This is a problem before which any Yukos, any Caucasus, any hazing pales. Question: what do these considerable sums really represent - a way to solve demographic problems or a way to solve political problems?

The population of Russia is declining annually by 700 thousand people. The figure is known. However, it is less known that the main contribution to the “Russian cross” (that is, the diagram in which the birth rate line crossed the death line in 1993) comes not so much from low birth rates, the same as in Western countries, but from fantastically high mortality rates. Similar mortality rates outside of Russia are observed only in the HIV-infected poorest countries of Africa. That is, the catastrophe does not happen because women don’t give birth enough. And on the quality of life of those who were born.

Roughly speaking, we reproduce like Europeans and die like African natives.

I am not going to argue here that mortality cannot be reduced without raising the standard of living and introducing the ideals of goodness, light and democracy into society. For one simple reason - we are not dying from a lack of democracy. The vast majority of experts (see, for example, a review of hypotheses in the monograph by Daria Khalturina and Andrei Korotaev “Russian Cross: Factors, Mechanisms and Ways to Overcome the Demographic Crisis in Russia”) agree on one thing. The main reason for high mortality is not economics, medicine or authoritarianism. The main reason is trivial - drunkenness. When Gorbachev's anti-alcohol campaign led to a 27% reduction in alcohol consumption, male mortality fell by 12%. One of the leading Russian demographers A.V. Nemtsov estimates the number of lives saved by this campaign at 1 million 220 thousand people (from 1986 to 1991).

The two poorest regions of the country are Dagestan and Ingushetia. Both of these regions (despite the quasi-war) are regions with the highest life expectancy in Russia. The reason is trivial: they don’t drink like that there.

In other words, the first, most obvious way for experts to combat the demographic crisis is not to increase the birth rate, but to combat drunkenness.

But, as Gorbachev’s experience shows, the fight against drunkenness is an unpopular measure. Firstly, it will take votes away from Putin. Secondly, it will deal a serious blow to the class of lumpen bureaucracy on which he relies. After all, any dirty business in the country (including vodka) is protected by shoulder straps.

In other words, if instead of fighting the main cause of death, which can damage the popularity of the president, we see the distribution of money to voters, we have the right to conclude that the main thing in this case is not increasing the birth rate. And the rating increase.

But there is a second consequence of the president’s decision, much more serious than simple populism.

I once talked to a Chechen woman whose husband fought both the first and second wars, and whose son fought only the second. When the second Chechen war began, my son was sixteen. He just got married. At fifteen years old. “Why did he get married?” - I was amazed. They explained to me: “Well, of course. It was clear that there would be war. If they kill their son, at least there will be children left after him.”

No no. I am not at all saying that the Russians should follow the example of the Chechens. Such behavior may evoke deep respect, but in modern Russia it is no longer possible.

I'm talking about something else.

One of the most terrible problems in Russia is the death of traditional clan, family and community ties. In the USSR they were destroyed quite deliberately, and have now disappeared irrevocably. It would be ridiculous to appeal to the traditions of the Russian rural community when trying to resolve a demographic or any other crisis. It no longer exists, just as there are no Roman legions or Greek city-states.

People were consistently told: you now have a state instead of a family. It’s not the son’s job to support his mother—the mother will support the state. It’s not a mother’s job to raise a son; a pioneer will raise a son.

One of the few areas where the state did not play the role of a benefactor was the birth of children. The mother was the working unit of society, her work was too valuable a contribution to the socialist treasury, and the entire system of Soviet benefits - maternity leave, child care leave - was built on letting a woman give birth, but immediately dragging her back to work.

So: President Putin’s initiative does not encourage women to work. Statistically, it is capable of creating a whole class of mothers who, at best, do not strive for a career, but live on a small salary plus benefits, and at worst, give birth to children in order to receive three thousand rubles and drink on them without waking up.

This is the classic way of creating a lumpen voter dependent on power. French socialists once took this path, on the one hand, giving citizenship and benefits to Arabs who moved to France, and on the other, cutting them off from a career and integration into society. Under good slogans, they created a voter who would vote for freebies - and profited from this in the Parisian riots.

There is a category of mothers who give birth according to the “Chechen” model. She gives birth without looking back, driven by the instinct to preserve the race, which is much more fundamental than the “basic instinct” from the film of the same name. Such a family often has no money, but for the child it is like an unbreakable wall. Such a mother will not be able to send her child to Oxford, but she will throw herself in front of bullets for him.

There is a category of mothers who give birth according to the “Western” model. Having acquired an apartment, a car, a job (marriage is not necessary). Three thousand rubles is not a factor for such a woman; she will not give birth until she buys a house on Rublyovka. Such a mother will not throw herself in front of bullets for her child, but she will pay for his Oxford.

No matter how different individual cases may be, statistically Putin's program gives rise to a third category of mothers. A category for which three thousand rubles a month and living space that can be bought for 10 thousand dollars will become a factor determining motherhood. This category is essentially the equivalent of the Arab neighborhoods in the suburbs of Paris. I don’t know what kind of mothers they will be, but they will be good voters for Putin.

But the population of Russia is decreasing by 700 thousand people per year.

Demography is too serious a thing to be used as a tool for electoral games.

Photo by Andrey Kobylko