Tymoshenko plus Poroshenko

In Ukraine, the “orange” parties after long approvals have nevertheless agreed on the creation of a government coalition. At a new level, the confrontation between Tymoshenko and Poroshenko is restored. Only if earlier secretion in the National Security and Defense Council looked for Poroshenko something like a comforting prize for a defeat in the struggle for premiere (real hardware weight of this structure is low), now he becomes the chairman of the parliament. And, therefore, in this capacity, it can interact with the ruling coalition and with the opposition, promoting some bills and putting it in a long box, or even torpedoing others, including the trained Tymoshenko. It is clear that in these cases the speaker will focus on the opinion of the president (to which he belongs to the party), and not on the point of view of his sworn opponent.

The Orange Lady itself receives premiership a second time, but in a different situation. At the beginning of last year, she came to the government without a team (her eternal associate Turchinov could not be considered such) and in the shadow of Yushchenko, a loan of trust in which was extremely high. Yes, and the position of prime minister then resembled the Russian - a manager, depending on the president. Now, political reform has sharply increased the significance of the premier chair, the results of the parliamentary elections are clearly in favor of Tymoshenko, and a number of supporters will include the government. Thus, the hardware and political capabilities of the future prime minister are increasing sharply.

In general, we can say that Tymoshenko won, but Yushchenko did not lose. He achieved the preservation of the right to appoint power ministers and received his “his” speaker, who will now swear with Tymoshenko (and the president at the same time, play the image of a strict, but fair arbitrator). It was simply impossible not to let Tymoshenko (with all the antipathy to her from the president) as the prime minister as part of the “orange” coalition - it would slam the door, and ruins remained from the coalition. The extreme partners-socialists who wanted to get the post of speaker for their leader Alexander Moroz, are extremely in this game, but were forced to retreat, agreeing to several ministerial portfolios and the position of first deputy prime minister.

Of course, the socialists could be offended and go to Viktor Yanukovych, compiling a coalition with him and the Communists. This option is arithmetic - the dream of an anti -revolutionary -minded Russian proceeding establishment - was quite possible, but from the point of view of real policy it is extremely vulnerable. The point is not only that the frost is the traditional critic of Yanukovych - in the end, the relationship between them is no more conflict than between Tymoshenko and Poroshenko. However, the main Ukrainian parties are not only political forces, but also communities of lobbyists. The “regionals” represent the interests of the oligarchy of the southeast of the country, the socialists are close in spirit to Russian farmers of the early period of their history-when they still belonged to the left opposition, but did not forget about the needs of their corporation. And for lobbyists, the most unpleasant thing is the system conflict between the president and the government (in general, and not only with the prime minister), which paralyzes any effective activity of the authorities, including the satisfaction of the appetites of the main groups of influence. And if so, then the coalition without “our Ukraine” looked too risky and instrumentally unsuitable.

But what about the scenario in which the Party of Regions joined the “wide coalition” with “our Ukraine”? What was it, bluff or such an option was considered seriously? It seems that the answer to this question cannot be unambiguous. On the one hand, part of the Yushchenkovsky environment, not tolerating Tymoshenko, was ready to agree with Yanukovych, who was ready to abandon the premiere for the post of speaker of the parliament and control over the TEC in the government. This option was especially arranged by Ekhanurov (under him he remained the prime minister) and Poroshenko. On the other hand, Yushchenko is too experienced a politician who subtly feels the mood of his voters and activists, and they are obvious - the “orange coalition”, and nothing else. Otherwise, almost nothing would have left of the electorate of “our Ukraine” (already delayed the formation of the coalition led to the decline in the popularity of the right), and many president’s associates would accuse him of betraying revolutionary ideals. It’s not for that that Yushchenko’s supporters drowned the “Professor” (so!) Yanukovych during the year before last by the election campaign in order to now recognize him as a coalition partner. At one time, in Bulgaria, a compromise with post-communists was popular with the first democratic president of the country with Zhelev, from which those who had applauded a well-known dissident scientist turned away shortly before. Therefore, while Yanurov seriously agreed with Yanukovych, Yushchenko used these negotiations for pressure on the allies for the “Orange Coalition” that had not developed in any way.

As for the prospects of the coalition, they depend on how much Tymoshenko and Poroshenko - two main characters - will be able to compromise both political and economic. If they are capable of, then the coalition has a future - after all, a government team in Bulgaria is held, where socialists get along with supporters of the former king Simeon. But this is necessary for all participants in the coalition of the fact that Ukraine may lose an already non -obvious European perspective with an unstable government and constantly gnawing leaders. If they turn out to be incapable of, it is possible that in the medium-term perspective the option of the coalition Yanukovych-Yushchenko can become a reality-despite all the image and political costs for the Ukrainian president of such a development of events.