Translated material
Hazing
Russia recognized Uzbekistan as a member of the CSTO
This happened as if by chance, in the course of work, and therefore did not look like a sensation. Opening an extended meeting of the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) summit in Minsk on Friday, Vladimir Putin said: “Uzbek colleagues are lifting the moratorium on active participation in our organization.” “We will assume,” Putin added, “that from now on Uzbekistan is an active member of our organization.”At this time, the camera lens zoomed in on the Uzbek president - the press was not allowed into the meeting room and was content with the television broadcast. Islam Karimov, without raising his face, frowns and concentrates on something in his hands. It seems that the words of the Russian president have nothing to do with him.
About twenty minutes later, having received the floor, Karimov warns: “I did not specifically prepare for this speech and I will only say three things.” He recalls that the Collective Security Treaty was signed on May 15, 1992 in Tashkent. Karimov did not go into details. But it was he who then persuaded the first President of Russia, Boris Yeltsin, to conclude this agreement, fearing the chaos of the civil war that was then beginning in Tajikistan would spread to his country. Karimov then recalls that Uzbekistan “suspended its membership in the organization in 1998 for well-known reasons, but did not denounce the treaty.”
The president was mistaken with the date - it happened a year later, when Tashkent, like Baku and Tbilisi, refused to sign the protocol on extending the agreement for the next five years. Tashkent refused to extend the agreement in April 1999. At that time, Uzbekistan sharply opposed Moscow’s actions in the post-Soviet space, plans to create a Russian military base in Tajikistan, as well as the supply of Russian S-300 anti-aircraft missile systems to Armenia, joining Baku on this issue. At that time, Karimov was not satisfied with Moscow’s attempt to “unite everyone on one platform”, to drive everyone into one stall, “developing a unified position of the CIS in relation to NATO, on striking Iraq, on the situation in Kosovo.”
Seven years later, a completely different Karimov spoke in the Belarusian capital, whose romance with NATO and the West in general had long since ended. At the Minsk summit, Islam Karimov explained that Uzbekistan’s participation in GUAM was “not only suspended, but then denounced.” And in the “organization” - the CSTO abbreviation was prudently not pronounced - “we just suspended our activities, that’s the difference...”. Most likely, both Putin and Karimov preferred to use the word “organization” because Uzbekistan cannot legally be considered a member of the CSTO - this organization was formally created only on September 18, 2003, after the entry into force of the charter and agreement on the legal status of the CSTO, ratified by all participating states. If Tashkent “restored” its membership in Minsk, it was only in the organization of the 1999 model, which is now non-existent. No one spoke out loud about this legal nonsense at the Minsk summit. Otherwise, it would be necessary to announce that in the near future Tashkent will sign the statutory documents of the CSTO, but Uzbekistan has not yet made such promises.
On this occasion, a Vremya Novostei correspondent addressed high-ranking members of the two delegations participating in the summit. Both of our interlocutors only shrugged their shoulders vaguely, although they admitted that there was a problem. However, one of them cited as an example another legal inconsistency that took place in the history of the CIS. In January 2003, the then President of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma was elected Chairman of the Council of Heads of State of the CIS. Despite the fact that Kyiv, which never signed the CIS charter, was never a full member of the Commonwealth. Kuchma's election was politically motivated - presidential elections were being prepared in Ukraine, and it was necessary to give extra points to Kuchma's successor.
The current “Uzbek case” is obviously also explained by political expediency. It is no coincidence that Karimov noted that “this worries those who are located far beyond this territory...”. The words are clearly addressed to Tashkent's former Western allies - they say, know that Moscow is now behind me. It is curious that the press service of the Uzbek president, commenting on the events in Minsk, focuses on the existing “mechanism” in the CSTO for providing military assistance to its members if they are subject to an external attack. And he refers to the CSTO charter and agreement of 2003, which was not signed by Uzbekistan.
Armenian President Robert Kocharyan, speaking in Minsk, expressed bewilderment that Art. 4 of the CSTO charter makes reference to a “mechanism” for providing military assistance in the event of external aggression, however, “the regulatory framework for this mechanism has not yet been formed,” although Yerevan has repeatedly pointed this out. “I hope there are no particular disagreements on this issue, and such a base will soon be created,” the Armenian president noted, not very confidently. Yerevan's concern is understandable. Armenia is the only CSTO member that is de facto at war with a “third” country, Azerbaijan. And from time to time, signals are heard from Baku about the possibility of a forceful solution to the conflict if diplomatic methods do not help.
But if even a full member of the CSTO, Armenia does not see guarantees of military protection from its allies, then what can Uzbekistan count on in a force majeure situation, being a virtual member of the “organization”? Obviously, only to the aid of Russia, with which he signed an agreement on allied relations. But this has nothing to do with the CSTO. Therefore, the “Uzbek decisions” of the Minsk summit so far have only a symbolic meaning and are rather “educational” in nature.
The President of Uzbekistan himself said this best at the final press conference. Sharing his impressions of participating in two summits, EurAsEC and CSTO, held in Minsk, Islam Karimov noted: “Such frank, impartial exchanges of views have never happened before, they are useful for reassessing our actions, and I must draw appropriate conclusions in the interests of the common cause.” . As Vremya Novostei learned from informed sources, during the communication between the heads of state in a narrow circle, Karimov had to hear many critical statements addressed to him from the presidents of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Claims against Tashkent were made in a public speech by Tajik President Emomali Rakhmonov at an extended meeting of the EurAsEC summit. The point was that the conclusion of agreements on the creation of the Customs Union, promised by Tashkent at the beginning of this year, was being slowed down, including on the free movement of citizens, which infringes on the rights of residents of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.
According to the interlocutors of the Vremya Novostey correspondent, Karimov endured the attacks of his colleagues “unexpectedly calmly, if not courageously.” And he even noted that “it was useful to know what others think of you.” According to the same sources, a certain “constructivism” was introduced into the heated discussion between the presidents by the host of the meeting, Alexander Lukashenko. Noting that it was difficult for him to understand the intricacies of relations between his Central Asian colleagues, Lukashenko cited the example of relations between the countries of the European Union. There, according to him, no one persuades anyone to sign documents, they put them on the table and say: “If you sign, you are with us, if not, then no.”
For Lukashenko himself, the Minsk summits can hardly be considered successful. The Belarusian leader will head the CSTO for a year, but the draft Concept of International Activities of the EurAsEC prepared by Minsk, which, in particular, states that “agreed conditions for accession to the WTO are a determining factor for the further successful development of the EurAsEC,” has been sent for revision. Thus, Lukashenko’s idea of creating first a Customs Union within the framework of the EurAsEC, and then, on its basis, the accession of all its members to the WTO, did not go through. The final decisions of the EurAsEC summit welcome the soon-expected accession to the WTO by Russia and Kazakhstan.
Perhaps most of all, Alexander Lukashenko is disappointed that he was unable to force a discussion on Russian gas supplies onto Vladimir Putin. It seems that the scenario for gas negotiations remains written in Russian terms - they should not have anything to do with politics, since they are exclusively commercial in nature. For this purpose there are prime ministers or heads of economic entities - Gazprom and its Belarusian partners.