| Establishing a peaceful life in the Caucasus is no easier than ending the war Both unofficial possible successors to Vladimir Putin have made their mark in the North Caucasus. About two weeks ago, Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov flew to Chechnya, promising to speed up funding for the reconstruction of Grozny, destroyed by the war. And yesterday, the president instructed First Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev to “summarize and report” the results of a visiting meeting of the government commission on restoring the economy and social sphere of Chechnya, which took place in Grozny.
The visit of two high-calibre federal politicians should indicate that Chechnya is still in the center of attention of the country's leadership, as it was seven years ago, when the promise of a settlement to the Chechen problem became one of the key moments in Vladimir Putin's rapid political rise. But the situation in the republic, as elsewhere in the North Caucasus, still remains very controversial, and the vertical of power, which has been discussed so much in recent years, can be maintained mainly through the visits of high-ranking guests.
Military successes in the Caucasus are obvious: the big war in Chechnya came to an end already in 2001-2002, the main leaders of the separatist formations were killed, captured or “went over to the side of the people.” Individual acts of sabotage and clashes between militants and security forces continue constantly and almost everywhere, although major attacks such as the raid on Ingushetia in June 2004 or the attack on Nalchik in October 2005 have not occurred for more than six months. But over time, it became clear that no less complex and important problem than the armed extremist underground is the completely legal system of power in the republics.
In this regard, Chechnya is somewhat different from its neighbors in the Caucasus: its ruling elite was formed not in the last 15-20 years, but after the end of the second military campaign. In 2002-2003, it seemed that it was in the destroyed and frightened Chechnya that the federal center received carte blanche to create a reliable, effective system of government that fully complies with the law. However, Moscow actually left this to its chosen protege - the former mufti of Ichkeria Akhmat Kadyrov. He created a cabinet of ministers in which the main principle of personnel selection was not so much competence as personal loyalty.
Immediately after Kadyrov himself became the elected president of Chechnya, the political tradition was destroyed, according to which the prime minister of Chechnya remained an ethnic Russian, less connected with the local system of complex kinship and corruption relations and thus remaining a kind of “sovereign eye” in Grozny. Akhmat Kadyrov achieved the appointment of a “technical” Prime Minister Sergei Abramov, who was as convenient as possible for the new Chechen elite. After the death of Kadyrov Sr. as a result of the terrorist attack on May 9, 2004, Mr. Abramov, by force of circumstances, found himself acting president, and Akhmat Kadyrov’s son, Ramzan, was appointed first deputy prime minister to support the young politician. Even then it became obvious that restoring full control over the Chechen government would be problematic. Akhmat Kadyrov's associates ensured the nomination of Alu Alkhanov, the ex-Minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Chechnya, absolutely loyal to the Kadyrov family. The Kremlin chose to support Mr. Alkhanov's candidacy, and after the resignation of Sergei Abramov from the Chechen government, it received a “technical” president under the all-powerful Prime Minister Ramzan Kadyrov.
The majority of former members of illegal armed groups consolidated around Kadyrov Jr., realizing that life under the new pro-Russian regime could be no worse than under the old separatist one. Despite his young age, Ramzan Kadyrov has serious political ambitions and the undoubted charisma of a field commander. Apparently, it helps him ensure the relatively effective work of local officials - at least it is obvious that during Kadyrov's premiership the situation with the restoration of Grozny has improved significantly. In addition to Ramzan Kadyrov, there are several other authoritative commanders in the republic who act on the side of Russia, but it is obvious that it is the prime minister who increasingly feels like the master of the situation and even the national leader of his people. The population of Chechnya fluctuates between fear and even hatred towards the new Kadyrov, which became an inevitable consequence of the methods of work of the “republican security forces” created by him, and clearly growing respect for him.
Kadyrov himself publicly emphasizes his complete and unconditional devotion to the cause of the territorial integrity of Russia and is even going to give a lecture about this to the “Nashi” youth movement the day after tomorrow. But in Chechnya itself, belonging to Russia comes down mainly to a carefully learned refrain about the subject of the federation. President Alu Alkhanov, who was partly seen in Moscow during the elections as a politician capable of balancing Kadyrov's political ambitions and ensuring compliance with the letter and spirit of federal law, performs mainly representative functions. In October, when Ramzan Kadyrov turns 30 and can become the constitutional president of Chechnya, the Kremlin will again have to make a difficult choice between the “correct”, well-governed, but unpopular and frankly weak current head of the republic and the bright, ambitious, very ambiguous, but effective in war and peace prime minister. In public, the top officials of Chechnya still demonstrate mutual affection, but joint appearances are becoming less and less, and signs of confrontation are becoming more and more.
Meanwhile, Chechnya is far from the only Caucasian republic that has problems with the organization of power. There are quite serious problems in Adygea, where the resignation of President Khazret Sovmen was expected this spring. Critics of the president in the republic itself and in the Southern Federal District believe that Mr. Sovmen himself shows little interest in governing the region and spends most of his time outside its borders, while the real management is carried out by the head of the presidential administration, Talii Beretar. Adygea is falling further and further behind in economic and social indicators, and the corruption of regional authorities is legendary. The possible resignation of Mr. Sovmen coincided with the intensification of the project for the unification of Adygea and the Krasnodar Territory. As a result, the republican authorities mobilized the ethnic organizations of the Circassians, who constitute a minority in the republic, and, in fact, created the appearance of a threat of aggravation of the interethnic conflict - in the event that the resignation takes place and the course towards unification continues. To the surprise of local oppositionists, the Kremlin demonstrated exceptional compliance: Sovmen remained president, and Adygea remained a republic. Nevertheless, the problem will have to be resolved in January 2007, when Sovmen's powers expire.
In at least two years we will have to return to the Karachay-Cherkess problem. The Karachay President of the Karachay Republic, Mustafa Batdyev, took his seat after the victory over Vladimir Semenov, won with the support of the federal center and the Circassian community led by the famous politician and businessman Stanislav Derev. Mr. Derev died a few days ago, but Mr. Batdyev lost the support of the Circassians long before that. And the conflict that arose in connection with the murder of several Karachais, in which the presidential family was involved, resulted in mass unrest in the fall of 2004, which almost cost Mr. Batdyev his position. Having retained power, he was never able to regain his full influence: the opposition controls the capital's mayor's office and the Republican Supreme Court, which is still hearing a murder case involving the president's son-in-law.
Serious problems also exist where leaders have already been changed. For example, in North Ossetia, which is considered a stronghold of stability in the North Caucasus. The prosecutor's audit, which began last winter, revealed serious financial irregularities and led to the actual removal of Finance Minister Konstantin Urtaev and head of the presidential administration Sergei Takayev from their posts. While republican experts argue whether the audit began at the behest of the head of the republic, Taimuraz Mamsurov, appointed in 2005, who wanted to get rid of the legacy of the “old team,” or against his wishes, the shadow of resignation hangs over the current Prime Minister Alexander Merkulov.
The new president of Dagestan, Mukhu Aliyev, who was appointed this year, has not yet proven himself in any way in his new position, except for the desire to preserve the management system created under his mentor and predecessor Magomedali Magomedov. Dagestan, the most complex and mature political entity in the North Caucasus, which is also subject to constant terrorist attacks not only because of its proximity to Chechnya, but also because of its own terrorist underground, has in recent years attracted the closest attention of the plenipotentiary mission of the President of the Russian Federation in the Southern Federal District. However, given the current state of affairs, one can hardly count on a solution to the problems of corruption and clannishness repeatedly raised by Dmitry Kozak. Ivan SUKHOV |
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