PUNITIVE CONSPIRACY

CAUCASUS KNOT

Recently, a conference was held in Stockholm, dedicated, among other things, to the problems of the North Caucasus. Political scientists, journalists, human rights activists were invited. At this meeting, a report was read out, fragments of which we are publishing today. Waha...

Recently, a conference was held in Stockholm, dedicated, among other things, to the problems of the North Caucasus. Political scientists, journalists, human rights activists were invited. At this meeting, a report was read out, fragments of which we are publishing today.

Vakha IBRAGIMOV, researcher, Chechnya:

- A significant number of local residents perceive the "activities" of the detachments formed from Chechens as much worse than what the so-called federals did before them. “Those are Russians, but these are their own, how can they treat us like that?” - such a half-question-half-statement has been heard more than once from the lips of people. And yet, people who are critical of the Kadyrovites and who hate them would not want a return to 3-4 years ago, when the republic was completely and solely ruled by the Russian military and special services.

Why? For one simple reason: members of the pro-Moscow detachments, being Chechens themselves, do not act in relation to the rest of the inhabitants of the republic based on the ethnic principle. Their enemies are not ethnic Chechens or even real separatists, but specific families and people with whom they have personal scores. Therefore, it can be argued that participation in the war on the side of the federal forces is not a politically motivated decision for the majority of Kadyrov’s, Yamadayev’s, Kakiev’s and others. This is a convenient way to solve your own problems with the help of the state, which ensures their safety and removes material issues for a while.

The members of these detachments are involved in the same captures of people, commit murders and torture, and in terms of cruelty have long been equal to the "death squadrons" consisting of regular officers of the Russian special services, but their actions are still selective. Residents who do not oppose themselves and the federal government (and the federal government only in the second place), they usually do not touch.

What are these units, who do they consist of? The media, at the suggestion of the authorities, are positioning their members as former militants who, “realizing the futility of continuing resistance,” went over to the Russian side. This statement is far from the truth.

One of the main components of Russian policy in the region is blood feud. This custom has not become obsolete in Chechen society and has played a stabilizing role until recently. To kill a person is not a decision for every criminal. People who once committed such a crime and did not achieve forgiveness are doomed. The only way out for them is to go somewhere. During periods of weakening of the state, they often united in armed groups and, from a position of strength, put pressure on their persecutors. Some of the armed groups that existed during the years of Maskhadov's rule and caused him a lot of trouble also consisted of bloodlines.

It was the Russian leadership that considered it possible to stake on them in its policy. A significant number of the current so-called power structures of Chechnya were created with the participation and under the direct supervision of people who committed premeditated murders and abductions. Immediately after the seizure of the territory of the republic, for example, the group of Movladi Baysarov passed into the service of the Russian military. Its leader was a member of the gang of recidivist criminal Ruslan Labazanov, which was defeated by Chechen law enforcement agencies in the summer of 1994. Between the two wars, together with his henchmen, he was noted for capturing people for ransom.

One of the first to take the side of the federal government was Sulim Yamadayev. According to the prosecutor's office, his group was also involved in kidnappings. Later, it was legalized as a special company under the military commandant of the Gudermes region. Now, on its basis, the Vostok battalion has been created as part of the 42nd motorized rifle division of the Russian Defense Ministry.

Said-Magomed Kakiev's detachment was also included in the same division as the "West" battalion. This man was also a member of Ruslan Labazanov's gang and was accused of committing a number of criminal offenses and terrorist acts.

The most serious complaints from the civilian population are caused by the activities of the so-called Kadyrovites. The detachments, which are conditionally withdrawn under this name, grew out of the security service of Akhmat Kadyrov and are still led by his former bodyguards. These same bodyguards now occupy all key positions in Chechnya. Ruslan Alkhanov, for example, is the minister of internal affairs, and Adam Demilkhanov is the government's deputy prime minister for law enforcement agencies.

Initially, this structure included several dozen people. Mostly from among the closest relatives and fellow villagers of the former mufti of the republic (Kadyrov Sr. - Ed.). As they grew larger, they began to include members of criminal gangs who had come out of the underground. And then, and now the backbone of Kadyrov's formations, first in the form of "anti-terrorist centers", and now as the "South", "North" battalions, the 2nd regiment of the police patrol service, etc., co-opted into the power structures of the Russian Federation, were people who committed murders and kidnappings. Of these, commanders were appointed, they were also entrusted with the recruitment of recruits.

The story of Lema Salmanov, a native of the village of Mairtup, is indicative. In November 2002, in his yard, he shot dead two fellow villagers who, by agreement, came to collect money for a truck they had previously bought from them. Relatives of those killed declared a blood feud to Lema. But the authorities stood up for the criminal: he was appointed commander of a detachment of Kadyrovites in the village, and then the commander of the emerging anti-terrorist center of the Kurchaloy district. Having received practically unlimited opportunities, he began to pursue his bloodlines and their closest relatives, all those who, even hypothetically, could ever take revenge on him. Some of them went to the militants, others began to hide with friends. These very acquaintances were also subjected to repressions for providing asylum: they were beaten, tortured, and killed. Several families were involved in the conflict. Its individual episodes were presented in the media as a fight against "terrorists". On Russian Police Day in 2005, Lema Salmanov, who six months earlier had even shot his elderly cousin who was trying to reason with Lema, was awarded a government medal.

This man is still one of the influential commanders in Kadyrov's formations. Although, it would seem, why does the Russian government need it? After all, the result of his activities is not only the corpses of personal, not the state, enemies, but dozens of people who went to the mountains, to the militants ...

It seems that this is precisely the essence of Chechenization, originally conceived in order to push the Chechens together, not to let the conflict die out, transferring it to the plane of civil war. It is clear that when promoting such a policy, it is best to rely on those who, having transgressed once, will commit the same more than once. No one is going to cancel the blood feud in Chechnya, prosecution for crimes is possible even after many years, which connects such people with the Russian government much stronger than ideological views.

This policy simultaneously solves purely propaganda tasks. For example, the participation of local residents on the side of the federals in the war gives grounds to declare the conflict as not having separatist roots.

There have always been people in the Chechen environment who position themselves as supporters of the republic being part of Russia. They had organized movements and armed detachments. Under the command of Bislan Gantamirov, for example, there were hundreds of people who had been opposing the separatists since the early 1990s. At the beginning of the second Chechen war, even before Akhmat Kadyrov's security service was created, militia detachments arose in some areas, thanks to which Russian troops captured the mountainous part of the republic without great losses.

However, the members of these detachments and their commanders refused to participate in the cleansing, captures and executions of people. Emphasizing loyalty to the Russian government, the militias nevertheless demonstrated their intention to protect the population, including from the military.

Beginning in the summer of 2000, they began to get rid of "unreliable" allies. The militia of the Vedeno district, for example, was first disbanded, and then most of those who participated in it were either kidnapped or killed. The rifle company under the Shatoi district commandant's office was destroyed, the basis of which were people who, for ideological reasons, stood under the Russian banner. The reason is the refusal to join the “West” battalion, which was formed largely from criminal elements.

In other words, Chechenization is not just a transfer of powers to structures consisting of local residents, but the elevation, legitimization of those who were ready to participate in punitive operations against their own population. Thus, Chechenization is a course towards expanding the war. The result of the implementation of such a policy was the replacement of the genocide of the population, carried out by the Russian structures themselves in the initial stage of the conflict, with today's terror of criminal and semi-criminal gangs supported and directed by Moscow.