| Pressure on Pyongyang only deepens the crisis
After the DPRK conducted nuclear tests on October 9, and the UN Security Council adopted a tough resolution condemning this step, the question arises - what will happen next.
One option for the development of events is a continuation of the current path of confrontation and a further escalation of tension up to a military conflict. The policy of increasing pressure on North Korea contributes to the formation of a vicious circle. Sanctions are pushing the DPRK to respond harshly in accordance with the principle “we will respond to dialogue with dialogue, and to harshness with super-rigidity,” which Pyongyang adheres to. At the same time, the response itself becomes a source of new, even tougher sanctions.
The logic of escalating sanctions will sooner or later allow the United States to put on the agenda the issue of “collective” use of military force against North Korea. The alternative to this bleak scenario is meaningful negotiations with North Korea within the framework of the six-party process or other formats.
The origins of the crisis lie in the area of unsettled bilateral relations between Washington and Pyongyang. Despite the importance of the role of mediators and the international community, even in the person of the UN, there are issues that no one except these two players can resolve. The problem is rooted in the inconsistency between the basic tasks of the two countries. North Korea is fighting for its survival and self-preservation. From the very beginning, the current owners of the White House did not hide the fact that they set a course for regime change in Pyongyang, that is, for the elimination not of the DPRK’s nuclear program, but of the republic itself.
Until recently, Washington assured that the proliferation of nuclear weapons among unstable non-nuclear states was the greatest and absolutely intolerable threat to the United States and the world community. But in the last year or two the emphasis has shifted. The most terrible danger now seems to be not the presence of an atomic bomb in state regimes, but the leakage of such weapons, along with nuclear materials and technologies, into the hands of non-state players (terrorists, fundamentalists, etc.), against which the United States and other powers have no effective protection. Such intentions are often speculatively attributed to Pyongyang.
Let us note that there is a state in the world that actually, and not at a hypothetical level, committed this “most terrible sin” and illegally carried out the organized transfer of nuclear materials and technologies to Islamic regimes unfriendly to America. But this country turned out to be Washington's friend and ally - Pakistan. Islamabad was forgiven and kept on the list of "good guys".
In the case of the DPRK, a paradoxical situation is observed. The US Republican administration with its own hands is pushing North Korea to take those actions that Americans fear most and which the North Koreans themselves would prefer not to take. The threat of regime change apparently became the main reason for the emergence of nuclear weapons in Pyongyang, although the DPRK authorities have repeatedly offered to exchange their nuclear program for American security guarantees. The development of the existing model of communication between the United States and the DPRK may lead to a violent outcome of events.
In a statement from the DPRK Foreign Ministry on October 3, it was said that Pyongyang intends to “prevent the proliferation” of nuclear weapons. There is reason to believe that these words correspond to North Korea's actual intentions. But if the trends of unilateral pressure on North Korea and tightening sanctions prevail, Pyongyang will not humbly wait until the sanctions regime completely destroys the country’s economic and defense potential. There is numerous verbal and practical confirmation of this from the DPRK. Driven into a corner and on the brink of an abyss, Pyongyang may take dangerous steps that are not currently in its plans. The scenario of an unexpected collapse of the central government in the DPRK with nuclear weapons falling into the hands of provincial generals opens up no less gloomy prospects.
Is it worth continuing on the current path? Does it correspond to the interests of the United States itself? Such questions are now being asked loudly by many senior leaders of previous administrations, from former President Jimmy Carter to former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to the author of the 1994 US-North Korea Framework Agreement, Robert Gallucci. Calling on the White House to take a more adequate approach to its responsibility to ensure the security of its country, they insist that the only way out of the crisis is a return to “real” negotiations with the DPRK with recognition of its legitimate interests. US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice heard similar assessments and proposals the other day in Seoul, Beijing and Moscow. This is the second possible way of developing the situation, leading to a constructive way out of the vicious circle. Alexander VORONTSOV, Head of the Department of Korea and Mongolia, Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences
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