Chance for North Korea

Russia's role is invisible, but there are results

Yesterday it became known about the possibility of resuming, after a year-long break, six-party negotiations on the Korean nuclear issue with the participation of the two Koreas, China, Russia, the United States and Japan. They may resume in Beijing before the end of the year. The timing is now being discussed by diplomats gathered in the Vietnamese capital Hanoi ahead of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit. At the end of the week, Russian President Vladimir Putin will also travel to Hanoi.

Negotiations are a chance for supporters of a non-violent solution to the problem. The formula for a possible settlement is clear. Pyongyang is ready to abandon its nuclear programs in exchange for guarantees of security and non-interference in internal affairs and assistance in socio-economic development. This was unambiguously stated in the Joint Statement adopted following the results of the next round of the Six-Party Group on September 19, 2005.

However, then, almost on the same day, the United States announced that it would consider the issue of building a nuclear power plant (and this was one of the fundamental conditions of the North Koreans) only after Pyongyang fulfilled its part of the deal. American financial sanctions against North Korea soon followed. The escalation of tension did not cause surprise - serious experts do not dispute the thesis that the United States is not satisfied with nuclear weapons in the DPRK, but with the regime itself. Pyongyang's reaction was predictable. North Korea has launched a demonstrative build-up of “deterrence forces.” Milestones along this path were this year's missile launches in July and nuclear tests in October. And this is not the limit.

Pyongyang's decision to return to negotiations is by no means its “defeat” as a result of its “principled line” on pressure and sanctions, as the American officialdom is trying to present. On the contrary, now the North Koreans have a stronger position, which is why they “condescended” to the requests of the other participants to return to the negotiating table. It was the United States that was forced to make a concession and agree to discuss the issue of financial sanctions against Pyongyang, which it had previously refused. If Washington tries to maneuver on this issue, the negotiations will break down again. Meanwhile, the North Korean bomb will catch up...

The stakes are rising. In 2002, North Korea would only have to shut down its suspected uranium program and begin dismantling its previously frozen plutonium program. Now the price of North Korean concessions will be immeasurably higher, because Pyongyang will have to give up its self-proclaimed nuclear status. It would be good if this time Pyongyang’s opponents approached the matter pragmatically and began to discuss the terms of a compromise, which involves taking into account the interests of their partner. But if negotiations are perceived only as a means to form an anti-Pyongyang front, as a diplomatic cover for putting pressure on the DPRK and its isolation, then everyone will lose. After all, the likelihood of a military conflict will increase.

In search of a compromise, Russia acts as a “moderator” (responsible for compliance with established rules or norms of behavior. - Ed. ) - neutral relative to other participants, but offering solutions. This role is not very noticeable, and in the West, which is trying to win China over to its side, it is usually hushed up. No one seemed to notice that the first representative of the “six” to visit Kim Jong Il after the nuclear explosion was Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Alekseev. Did Russian arguments really play a lesser role in the DPRK returning to negotiations than Western pressure and Chinese entreaties?

The six-party negotiations are important for Russia from the point of view of national interests in preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ensuring the peaceful, stable development of the border region. You cannot miss such an important chance, no matter how small it may be.

Georgy BULYCHEV, Director of the Center for the Study of Modern Korea at IMEMO RAS