Translated material
The law within the law
The Minister of Health and Social Development Mikhail Zurabov was arrested on suspicion of bribery and misuse of funds by the leadership of the Federal Compulsory Health Insurance Fund (FFOMS). Fund, the work of which the above-mentioned minister is involved in ex officio. The head of the secretariat of the republican commission for the payment of compensation, Sultan Isakov, was arrested on suspicion of extortion from Prime Minister of Chechnya Ramzan Kadyrov. Mr. Kadyrov is the head of this commission - so there is no question of involvement here. The figures against whom these coincidental arrests were directly or indirectly directed reacted to what happened in a diametrically opposite way. Mikhail Zurabov said that suspicions of dishonesty in the management of the fund arose a long time ago, that they decided to fire the detained head of this organization, Andrei Taranov, a week ago, but they just didn’t have time to announce the decision. And the simple-minded Ramzan Kadyrov directly called the detention of a subordinate “a political action that undermines the authority of the republican authorities.”
But, despite such different reactions (despite the fact that the actions of law enforcement officers in both cases may be completely justified by law), the very style of current Russian politics is such that, in principle, the motive of following the law is excluded as the main one in the majority of such arrests.
It is quite obvious that Mikhail Zurabov, and even more so Ramzan Kadyrov, has influential opponents among those who really govern the country and the opposing pro-government groups. Moreover, for example, Ramzan Kadyrov's opponents - the Kremlin's power group - clearly defend not so much political as economic interests. After all, they control the Chechen oil complex, which Kadyrov Jr., who is rapidly gaining popularity in Chechnya and has a confidential personal relationship with the Russian President, is trying to close to himself.
Therefore, when Anna Politkovskaya or a public political opponent of Ramzan Kadyrov, the former head of the FSB special detachment “Highlander” Movladi Baysarov is killed in Moscow, or when the head of the secretariat of the republican compensation commission is arrested, these actions are automatically, regardless of who is doing it and why, aimed at discrediting Kadyrov as the main contender for the post of President of Chechnya and the real owner of the republic. When arrests occur in the FFOMS, regardless of whether there were bribes there or not, this case is directed against a fairly influential minister. Moreover - and perhaps more importantly - against First Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, who oversees national projects (including health care), as one of the most likely successors to the president. Moreover, the imprisonment of the leadership of the FFOMS happened exactly when VTsIOM published data according to which Dmitry Medvedev for the first time quite significantly broke away from another candidate for successor.
This is the system of coordinates in today's Russia in which power exists. The coordinates in which she placed herself, removing society from participation in governing the country and monitoring government officials.
All of the above does not mean that the state should not fight violations of the law by state representatives. It should and must. The simple fact that in Russia, for the same thing, some people receive sentences in maximum security colonies, while others receive personal control over ever new business assets and additional political privileges, automatically devalues such efforts of law enforcement officers.
In any crime it is customary to look for a motive. In Russia, alas, the motive is often more important to look for in punishment. And too often this motive in high-profile cases turns out to be connected with the interests of representatives of the authorities themselves, through law enforcement agencies trivially settling scores (and scores) with each other.